The Effects of the Use of a Hybrid Approach to Competition Law in the Regulation of Market Power: the Case of Brazil by Da Correggio Luciano, Laíse
The Effects of the Use of a Hybrid Approach to Competition Law in the
Regulation of Market Power: the Case of Brazil
Da Correggio Luciano, Laíse
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information
derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/jspui/handle/123456789/1880
 
 
 
Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally
make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For
more information contact scholarlycommunications@qmul.ac.uk
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Effects of the Use of a Hybrid Approach to Competition Law in the Regulation of 
Market Power: the Case of Brazil 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Laíse Da Correggio Luciano 
Queen Mary, University of London 
Thesis submitted for the PhD degree
  
Declaration 
 
The work presented in this thesis is my own. 
 
 
............................................................................ 
Laíse Da Correggio Luciano 
I 
 
Abstract 
 
The Effects of the Use of a Hybrid Approach to Competition Law in the Regulation of 
Market Power Control: the Case of Brazil 
 
The Brazilian competition law and policy are inspired by the EU and US competition law 
models and incorporate different aspects of these systems, such as the rule of reason and the 
concept of abuse of dominance. Based on the analysis of competition cases and in-depth 
interviews with members of the Brazilian competition authority, the research examines how the 
authority has dealt with the differences between the EU and the US models when applying its 
competition law. It identifies the ways in which the authority seeks to adjust its competition 
system to the particularities of a large developing country, in terms of legislation, economy, 
culture and institutional framework. The research also analyses the way in which the current 
competition legislation was intended to give flexibility to the competition authority but at the 
same time has produced the potential for inconsistencies in its enforcement.  
 
The study reveals differences between the formal provisions of the competition law and the 
manner in which it is applied. In addition, the research argues that the application of diverging 
concepts drawn from the EU and US models have resulted at times in incoherence in relation to 
issues such as the definition of the relevant market, the concepts of dominance and abuse, as 
well as the dissimilar treatment of specific offences. With regards to the latter, the findings 
suggest that there is a need to address institutional problems, such as the shortage of 
administrative personnel, political interference, inadequate training and a lack of an 
‘institutional memory’. Possible solutions discussed include the publication of guidelines and 
II 
 
authoritative decisions to restate the law, improvements in training and funding, as well as 
proposals for administrative and legal reform. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Many jurisdictions have developed models of competition law over the past decades. 
Developing countries have mainly enacted competition laws that draw on the experience of 
the most successful competition law models, notably the US and the EU. Brazil is an example 
of this global trend,1 as it has developed a hybrid system of competition law which is largely 
inspired by the experience of the EU and the US. The Brazilian competition law establishes a 
system of regulation that combines an administrative and judicial enforcement system since 
1942 which was inspired by the US.2 Moreover, it prescribes criminal and administrative 
sanctions for cartel prohibitions, being inspired by the US legislation as well. However, it has 
elements that could be said to be inspired by the EU, such as the prohibition of abuse of 
dominance and the concern with market entry and harm to competitors. The interpretation of 
the law has also been inspired by the US and the EU as the Brazilian competition authority 
looks at how certain concepts, e.g. the definition of the relevant market, are dealt with by the 
competition authorities and courts in both sides of the Atlantic. In terms of application of the 
law, the hybrid system is also evident as the Brazilian competition authority usually looks at 
how cases are decided in the US and the EU, adopts the rule of reason, whilst at the same 
time imposes special responsibilities over dominant firms. Nonetheless, the Brazilian 
competition law system also has its own peculiarities; for instance, it prohibits all kinds of 
anti-competitive acts or conduct under only one article, namely article 20 of Law 8,884/94, 
and it adopts a higher market share than the US and the EU when applying the SSNIP3 test.4  
                                                 
1
 For instance, the People’s Republic of China has sought inspiration from EU competition law as well as 
American antitrust expertise when drafting the 2007 Anti-monopoly Law. 
2
 See Shieber, Abusos Do Poder Economico; Direito e Experiencia Antitruste No Brasil e Nos E. U. A, 17. 
3
 Small but Significant and Non Transitory Increase in Prices. On the SSNIP test see p. 123. 
4
 See p. 126. 
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In contrast with other BRIC5 countries, Brazil has had a comprehensive competition law in 
place for over 16 years,6 as well as a specialised competition authority,7 which has resulted in 
a more consistent and mature system of competition law and policy at legal, institutional and 
political levels.  
 
In common with other BRIC countries, Brazil is earning a reputation as one of the emerging 
economic powers of the 21st century. A number of factors are responsible for this 
development, including the strategic economic policies and market reforms undertaken over 
the past two decades, President Lula’s international popularity and the ability of the Brazilian 
economy to avoid the meltdown of the recent global economic crisis. The future hosting of 
major international events such as the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Rio Olympics exemplify 
Brazil’s increasing international influence. 
 
However, there are still many challenges that Brazil will face over the coming decades in 
order to become a successful world economic power, especially in regards to the social well-
being of its population. Although Brazil is a functioning western democracy governed by the 
rule of law, a vast divide between the rich and poor remains. This is the case in terms of 
education, income and social opportunities. This vast discrepancy has resulted in the 
emergence of parallel societies. For instance, first-time visitors to a metropolis such as São 
Paulo or Rio de Janeiro are often surprised to find Brazilians living in luxury apartments or 
villas enjoying a higher standard of living than most Americans and Europeans. In addition, 
                                                 
5
 BRIC is an acronym created by John O’Neill from Goldman Sachs in 2001 to refer to the emerging economies 
of Brazil, Russia, India and China. Since 2009 the BRIC countries have yearly summits. See Houlton, “First 
BRIC summit concludes.” See also Reuters, “Communique from BRIC summit in Brasilia.” 
6
 Brazil, Law n. 8,884 of 11 June of 1994. 
7
 Composed of the Secretariat for Economic Monitoring (SEAE), the Secretariat of Economic Law (SDE) and 
the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE). See section 2.4. 
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there is an emerging middle class that is seeking to achieve the Brazilian version of the 
American dream, whilst less fortunate Brazilians live in a state of socioeconomic segregation 
in favelas, or shantytowns, where living conditions are comparable to the poorest countries of 
the developing world. While such a vast social inequality is undesirable per se, it also results 
in other socioeconomic problems that affect the Brazilian population as a whole, such as high 
levels of violence, organised crime, drug trafficking and political corruption. 
 
On the one hand, direct government intervention through taxation and the provision of public 
services is a key factor in reducing gross income inequalities and resultant socioeconomic 
problems. On the other hand, competition law and policy has a potentially useful role in 
helping to address some of these concerns by enhancing competitiveness and efficiencies in 
the market. A market economy accompanied with effective competition allows economic 
development and social well-being. Although competition law is not a ‘magic bullet’ that 
would solve all of Brazil’s social problems, it can contribute to raise standards of living by 
increasing efficiencies and allowing access to better and cheaper products and services. 
 
In recent times, most notably under the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil has 
been under the international spotlight as the ‘up-and-coming’ economic power of the 21st 
century. The Brazilian market is also becoming more attractive for multinationals due to 
Brazil’s economic growth, large population,8 emerging middle class and current ranking as 
the seventh largest economy in terms of GDP.9 Brazilian competition law has a global 
relevance. In fact, many decisions of the Administrative Council for Economic Defence 
                                                 
8
 Estimated to be circa 200 million as of 2010, which ranks Brazil fifth in terms of population after the People’s 
Republic of China, India, USA and Indonesia. See Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão, “IBGE: 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística.” 
9
 As of 2010, Brazil is ranked 7th in terms of GDP after the US, Japan, the People’s Republic of China, 
Germany, France, the UK and Italy. See Ibid. 
4 
 
(CADE)10 discussed in this research concern multinationals or Brazilian companies with 
considerable commercial interest overseas. This fact underpins the significance of the current 
reform of Brazilian competition law,11 the need to promote legal certainty and foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and the central theme of this research; namely the hybrid nature of the 
Brazilian system of competition law and the direction where its policy is heading towards.  
 
It could be argued that one of the most important points of divergence between the US and 
EU models of competition law concerns their approach to market power;12 that is, the 
offences of monopolisation or attempt to monopolise pursuant to Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act and abuse of dominance under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). Much research has been undertaken in respect of the similarities 
and differences in the approach of the competition authorities in the US and the EU.13 Many 
authors have compared the two systems when examining specific types of conduct14 and 
others have dedicated books on the antitrust regulation in both sides of the Atlantic.15 Some 
studies have also examined the use of the rule of reason and per se rule in the EU and the US, 
                                                 
10
 CADE is the body of the competition authority responsible for deciding competition law matters. See section 
2.4.3. 
11
 A Competition bill is currently in the National Congress. When enacted, it will replace Law 8,884/94. See 
section 2.3.4. 
12
 See e.g. Fox, “The Market Power Element of Abuse of Dominance-Parallels and Differences in Attitudes-US 
and EU.” 
13
 See e.g. Kovacic, “Competition Policy in the European Union and the United States: Convergence or 
Divergence?.” Varney, “Striving for the Optimal Balance in Antitrust Enforcement: Single-Firm Conduct, 
Antitrust Remedies, and Procedural Fairness.” De Smet, “The Diametrically Opposed Principles of US and EU 
Antitrust Policy.” 
14
 See e.g. Areeda and Hovenkamp, Antitrust law an analysis of antitrust principles and their application. Fox, 
Sullivan, and Peritz, Cases and materials on U.S. antitrust in global context. Jones and Sufrin, EC Competition 
Law. Whish, Competition law. 
15
 See e.g. Léveque and Shelanski, Antitrust and regulation in the EU and US legal and economic perspectives. 
Elhauge and Geradin, Global competition law and economics. Marsden, Handbook of research in trans-Atlantic 
antitrust. Slot and McDonnell, Procedure and enforcement in E.C. and U.S. competition law proceedings of the 
Leiden Europa Instituut seminar on user-friendly competition law. Colino, Vertical agreements and competition 
law a comparative study of the EU and US regimes. 
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the proof of effects, as well as the role of efficiency defences and objective justifications.16 
The changes in the interpretation of competition rules in the EU and the US have also been 
subject of study, especially by economic schools of thought.17 This thesis identifies some of 
the elements that are relevant for understanding the main differences and similarities between 
these competition law models and proposes a structure for the study of these elements. 
 
Such structure is used in this research to examine the Brazilian competition law and policy. 
With regards to the study of Brazilian competition law and policy, most of the academic 
research to date concerns mergers18 and cartels.19 Moreover, there have not been many 
studies on the role of consumers in competition law,20 on the social function of property and 
the abuse of economic power21 and on institutional issues concerning the Brazilian 
competition authority.22 
 
                                                 
16
 See e.g. Posner, “The rule of reason and the economic approach: reflections on the Sylvania decision.” 
Carrier, “The rule of reason: an empirical update for the 21st century.” Piraino, “Reconciling the Per Se and 
Rule of Reason Approaches to Antitrust Analysis.” Roeller, “The year 2005 at DG competition: The trend 
towards a more effects-based approach.” Petit, “From Formalism to Effects? The Commission's Communication 
on Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC.” Albors-Llorens, “The role of objective justification and 
efficiencies in the application of Article 82 EC.” Balto, “Proof of competitive effects in monopolization cases: a 
response to Professor Muris.” 
17
 See e.g. Crane, “Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago.” Connor, “Did the competitive regime switch in 
the 1980s?.” Brodley, “Post-Chicago Economics and Workable Legal Policy.” Sullivan, “Post-Chicago 
Economics: Economists, Lawyers, Judges, and Enforcement Officials in a Less Determinate Theoretical 
World.” Piraino, “Reconciling the Harvard and Chicago schools: A new antitrust approach for the 21st century.” 
Easterbrook, “The Chicago School and Exclusionary Conduct.” Fox, “The Efficiency Paradox.” Fox, “We 
Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors.” 
18
 See e.g. Mattos, A Revolução Antitruste no Brasil: a teoria econômica aplicada a casos concretos, pt. I. 
Oliveira and Rodas, Direito e Economia da Concorrência, chap. V. Forgioni, Os Fundamentos do Antitruste. 
Botta, “Fostering Competition Culture in the Emerging Economies: The Brazilian Experience.” 
19
 See e.g. Mattos, A Revolução Antitruste no Brasil: a teoria econômica aplicada a casos concretos, pt. III. 
Oliveira and Rodas, Direito e Economia da Concorrência, chap. II. De Araujo, Pugliese, and Castillo, 
“European Union and Brazil: Leniency in Cartel Cases - Achievements and Shortcomings.” Forgioni, Os 
Fundamentos do Antitruste, chap. VII. 
20
 See e.g. Carpena, O Consumidor no Direito da Concorrência. Goldberg, Poder de Compra e Política 
Antitruste. 
21
 See e.g. Lopes, Empresa e Propriedade: função social e abuso de poder econômico. 
22
 See e.g. Ramin, As Instituições Brasileiras de Defesa da Concorrência. Bello, Autonomia Frustrada: o Cade 
e o poder econômico. 
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In relation to abuse of dominance in Brazil, very little has been researched to date. Oliveira 
and Fujiwara23 provide an overview of competition policy in Brazil, but no assessment of 
abuse of dominance was undertaken. Moreover, Oliveira and Rodas24 only deal with some 
aspects of vertical restraints and predatory pricing and to date there has not been a thorough 
analysis of the body of the case-law. These authors only deal with the case-law in an 
appendix where a small number of case extracts are transcribed, unfortunately without an in-
depth analysis. One of the very few authors who have undertaken a broad study of 
competition law in Brazil is Forgioni,25 who summarised the US, EU and Brazilian 
competition laws and explained the historic development of competition law in these 
jurisdictions. However, her work follows a deductive approach and there is no in-depth 
examination of the Brazilian case-law. Forgioni also used the same approach in a book 
dedicated to vertical restraints in the US, EU and Brazil,26 which deals with abuse of 
dominance and cartels. Other authors have also dealt with aspects of abuse of dominance, but 
none have pursued their studies on the elements of abuse.27 Franceschini is the only author 
who has published case-law books on competition law in Brazil.28 However, his books do not 
deal with some of the decisions that were considered by the interviewees as leading cases, nor 
contain cases decided after 2003. Moreover, differently from what one would expect, the 
works of Franceschini do not contain an analysis of the cases. Finally, Philip Marsden29 has 
                                                 
23
 See Oliveira and Fujiwara, “Competition Policy in Developing Economies: The Case of Brazil.” 
24
 See Oliveira and Rodas, Direito e Economia da Concorrência, chap. III, IV. 
25
 See Forgioni, Os Fundamentos do Antitruste. 
26
 See Forgioni, Direito Concorrencial e Restrições Verticais. 
27
 See e.g. Mattos, A Revolução Antitruste no Brasil: a teoria econômica aplicada a casos concretos, pt. II. 
Rocha et al., A Lei Antitruste - 10 anos de combate ao abuso de poder. 
28
 See Franceschini, Direito da concorrência: case law. Franceschini, Jurisprudência do CADE de 1962 a 2003. 
Franceschini, Lei da concorrência conforme interpretada pelo CADE. 
29
 See Marsden, Handbook of research in trans-Atlantic antitrust. 
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discussed some aspects of abuse of dominance in Brazil, including some cases on abuse, such 
as MATEC.30 
 
Given the relatively limited nature of the research to date which analyses the development of 
Brazilian competition law, this work seeks to provide an original contribution to this 
emerging field as the first study which combines the use of in-depth interviews, case-law 
analysis and a literature review to examine the effects of the hybrid approach to competition 
law and policy in Brazil with respect to abuse of dominance. 
 
The provisions of the Brazilian competition law create relatively extensive and broad legal 
norms and allow considerable interpretative discretion to the competition authority. In 
addition, the hybrid nature of Brazilian competition law and policy results in an application 
of the law that rests between the poles of the EU and US models. On the one hand, this can be 
justified on the grounds that Law 8,884/94 was enacted during a period of considerable 
socioeconomic change. On the other hand, this phenomenon results in potential 
inconsistencies in the way that competition law is interpreted and applied.   
 
The aim of this research is to examine how a hybrid approach to competition law and policy 
in Brazil affects the doctrine on abuse of dominance with respect to: (i) the legal text; (ii) its 
interpretation; (iii) its application by the competition authority.  
 
A wide scope of legal, economic, social and political issues could be studied when analysing 
the Brazilian hybrid model of competition law. However, the central focus of this research is 
                                                 
30
 Power-Tech Teleinformática Ltda v Matel Tecnologia de Informática SA - MATEC - 08012.000172/1998-42. 
See section 5.2. 
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limited to the regulation of market power, i.e. abuse of dominance and monopolisation from a 
legal perspective. Moreover, although the abuse of dominance practised by state-owned 
enterprises is a very interesting subject of study, especially considering the fact that Brazil 
has gone through a strong period of privatisation in the past two decades, due to word 
limitations this thesis will not deal with this matter.   
 
The research follows an inductive methodology. The theoretical framework for the work has 
been accumulated from information gathered from academic literature, case analysis and 
twenty in-depth interviews. The research analysed the most significant cases involving abuse 
of dominance. It is important to note that Brazil does not have a system of case-law reporting 
as in England and Wales. Brazilian decisions can be found on-line in CADE’s database, but it 
does not contain a complete body of case-law. In order to ensure a good sample of abuse of 
dominance cases, in addition to keyword searches, the following search criteria was used: 
minutes of judgments, cases contained in Brazilian competition law publications and cases 
which, in the opinion of Councillors and other members of the Brazilian Competition Policy 
System (BCPS),31 were the most relevant. More information on the case analysis conducted 
in this research can be found in the appendix. 
 
The interviews included former and current Councillors and assistants of Councillors of the 
CADE, the General Advocate and three Advocates of the CADE, members of the SDE and 
the SEAE, as well as Brazilian and UK lawyers. This triangulated methodology used a 
qualitative analysis which offered the best opportunity to understand the underlying 
competition policy in the analysis of abuse of dominance in Brazil. The views of those 
                                                 
31
 The BCPS is composed of the CADE, the SDE and the SEAE. See p. 51. 
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directly involved in the investigations and decisions were fundamental to fully understand the 
decisions examined. In order to maintain the anonymity of the interviewees, it was not 
possible to state whether the interviewee was a current or former member of the competition 
authority. The use of interviews also minimised the risk of imposing the researcher’s own 
assumptions or expectations when analysing the case-law or when constructing explanations 
for the reasons behind certain decisions or actions. More detailed information on the 
methodology can be found in the appendix. 
 
The first chapter of the research provides a historical, legal and institutional framework of 
Brazilian competition law and policy. The development of competition law and policy in 
Brazil is placed within a historical context to better understand how the current competition 
system has come into being. The current structure of Brazilian competition law and the role 
of the competition authority are explained whilst highlighting proposed reforms, such as the 
competition bill that is expected to be enacted in the near future. 
 
Chapter two explores some of the key aspects of convergence and divergence between the US 
and the EU in respect of the regulation of market power. It is not intended to provide a 
summary of the regulations and policies in these respective jurisdictions; rather, it provides a 
framework to assist the comparative analysis of this research. Therefore, it highlights 
similarities and differences between the US and the EU in respect to the use of the rule of 
reason, the per se approach and the role of efficiencies as defences or objective justifications.  
 
Chapter three examines the elements of abuse of dominance in Brazil. The goals of Brazilian 
competition policy are analysed in the light of the legislative purpose of Law 8,884/94 and 
the views of interviewees. The definition of the relevant market is explained by identifying 
10 
 
the elements taken into consideration by the legal reasoning of the competition authority. 
Further issues are also discussed, such as the legal threshold for presuming dominance, as 
well as barriers to entry and collective dominance. The final part of chapter three analyses the 
elements for configuring an abuse of dominance in Brazil, including the adoption of the rule 
of reason and the special responsibilities doctrine. 
 
Chapter four analyses the approach of the competition authority in respect of some non-
pricing conduct, namely exclusive dealing, tying arrangements and refusing to deal. Various 
leading decisions of the CADE are analysed to demonstrate the influence of the US and the 
EU models. The underlying theme of chapter four is based on the premise that the 
development of a predictable, coherent and relatively uniform interpretation of competition 
law is essential for ensuring the emergence of an efficient and effective system of 
competition law in Brazil. 
 
The final chapter explores how pricing conduct is examined and adjudicated by the Brazilian 
competition authority. The offences of predatory pricing and price discrimination are studied 
in greater detail. Although chapter five focuses on exclusionary offences, for completeness, 
excessive pricing, which can be exclusionary but is mainly exploitative, is also discussed. 
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2. Chapter One - The Historical, Legal and Institutional Framework of Competition 
Law and Policy in Brazil 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter offers a historical, legal and institutional framework of competition law and 
policy in Brazil. It is not intended to explore these elements in detail; rather, it seeks to 
provide the foundation for a better understanding of the current system of competition law 
and policy in Brazil.  
 
The historical section explains how the economy of Brazil has been characterised by 
governmental protectionism and market concentration since the colonial era and how the 
market structure is changing since the privatisations and the opening up of the economy to 
international trade in the 1990s, after two decades of dictatorship and economic instability. 
This historical aspect underpins the concerns of policy-makers when the current competition 
law 8,884 was enacted in 1994 and the reasons why many Brazilian markets are still 
characterised by monopolies and oligopolies. 
 
This historical background also helps to explain the importance of the constitutional 
principles contained in Law 8,884/94 and why the Consumer Code of 1990 already contained 
provisions against abusive conduct. The Consumer Code will be studied only in relation to 
these provisions, as the consumer protection authority can find some forms infringements that 
correspond to abuse of dominance based on the consumer code. Further, the most relevant 
Articles of competition law for the purpose of this research are analysed in order to give the 
necessary background information for comparisons with the US and EU models and to better 
comprehend the development of the Brazilian case-law. Such analysis will include the study 
12 
 
of the relevant changes in the control of abuse of dominance by the competition bill, given 
that it contains examples of how the hybrid approach is developing in Brazil. For instance, at 
the same time that it reaffirms the prohibition of abuses by dominant firms, it formally adopts 
the use of the rule of reason in the analysis of competition law cases. Moreover, it removes 
abusive prices from the non-exhaustive list of prohibitions confirming what, as will be seen 
in this research, is already the understanding of members of the competition authority in 
Brazil. 
 
Finally, the structure of the BCPS will be studied. Achievements of the Brazilian competition 
authority are highlighted, as well as areas for improvement. More specifically, the final part 
of this chapter explores issues such as the chronic shortage and high turnover of staff, the 
short term of office of Councillors, the inadequate training of Specialists in Public Policy and 
Management (Specialists), and the problems relating to the effectiveness of the competition 
authority’s decisions under the current system of judicial review. The analysis of the issues 
related to the institutional framework of the competition authority is fundamental given that 
many of its shortcomings are factors that at times lead to inconsistent decisions or the 
incorrect use of foreign concepts.  
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2.2 The Historical Development of Competition Law in Brazil 
2.2.1 The Colonial Era of Competition Law in Brazil 
 
During the colonial period, which was from 150032 to 1822,33 the issue of free competition 
was insignificant in Brazil. The Brazilian economy reflected the workings of Portuguese 
colonial rule, which put in place what became known as ‘bilateral monopoly’. This consisted 
of a double monopoly possessed by Portugal, as it was the sole and direct importer, as well as 
the sole owner of Brazil’s precious export industry. Nevertheless, in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, it became possible to observe the emergence of public concern with 
what would be considered nowadays as matters relating to competition law.34 For instance, 
the exclusive privileges granted by the Portuguese Crown to chartered companies began to be 
seen as harmful to freedom of trade and economic development. As a result, sectors of the 
population rebelled against these privileges. The main concerns were the imposition of 
excessive monopolistic prices of products for domestic consumption, as well as the artificial 
depreciation of Brazilian exports.  
 
In 1808 the Portuguese Royal Family sought refuge in Brazil when Napoleon’s army 
occupied Portugal. This signalled a change to the prior colonial policy towards Brazil. As a 
result of political necessity, the colonial ports became accessible to allied powers, among 
them, Great Britain. Moreover, there were domestic reforms to support the Portuguese 
Crown; the Brazilian Bank was founded and concessions gave greater freedom to the 
manufacturing sector. However, these reforms did not amount to a substantial emergence of 
                                                 
32
 The year representing the discovery of Brazil by Pedro Álvares Cabral. 
33
 This is the year of the independence of Brazil from Portugal. 
34
 See Forgioni, Os Fundamentos do Antitruste, 08. 
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competitive industries, given that the domestic economy was still at an early stage of 
development and local industries could not cope with foreign competition from industrial 
countries.35 Most manufactured products were imported and the authorities lacked a policy to 
develop national industries in the private and public sectors.  
 
Napoleon’s defeat marked the end of exile of the Portuguese Crown, which attempted in the 
1820s to re-establish the previous bilateral monopoly over the Brazilian economy and 
international trade, as well as greater Portuguese control over the colony. This fuelled 
political movements in favour of greater economic and political autonomy, which culminated 
in the independence of Brazil in 1822.  
  
                                                 
35
 Ibid., 103. 
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2.2.2 Competition after the independence of Brazil in 1822 
 
Following the proclamation of independence in 1822, Brazil’s first constitution was drafted 
in a political environment characterised by the conflict between radical and conservative 
groups. In order to safeguard his position, Brazil’s first post-colonial leader, Emperor Pedro I, 
appointed supporters of his position and political views to the constitutional assembly. This 
resulted in the conservative character of the Constitution of 1824, which formally enshrined 
the powers of the Emperor. Nonetheless, there were areas of compromise, given that 
economic provisions of the constitution were inspired by the laissez-faire principles of 19th 
century economic liberalism, as the constitution protected citizens’ private property and 
economic freedom.36 
 
The Empire of Brazil came to an end in 1889 by way of a coup d’état, resulting in the birth of 
the Old Republic, i.e. the United States of Brazil, with the enactment of the Constitution of 
1891. This new constitutional era adopted a republican form of government inspired by the 
Unites States of America. The previous liberal provisions of the Constitution of 1824 were 
strengthened by limiting State intervention in the private sector and prohibiting limitations to 
private property.37 
 
Both constitutions of 1824 and 1891 limited the intervention of the State in the private sector. 
Indeed, irrespective of substantial changes to the Brazilian State, i.e. from an Empire to a 
Republic, from an economic and ideological perspective the Brazilian constitutions were 
                                                 
36
 See Brazil, Politic Constitution of the Empire of Brazil, Article 179. 
37
 See Brazil, Constitution of the United States of Brazil 1937, Article 72. 
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inspired by liberal economic principles which enshrined the protection of private property 
and freedom of enterprise.  
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2.2.3 The increase of State Interventionism 
 
The Old Republic came to an end as a result of a military coup in 1930, followed by a brief 
interim democratic government under the leadership of President Getúlio Vargas, who sought 
to implement interventionist policies following the great depression. In 1934, a new 
constitution was enacted which protected economic freedoms. However, their protection was 
conditioned by the principles of justice and the national interest.38 During this period, the 
previous liberal regime was put into question and governmental intervention in the economy 
was legitimised.39 Indeed, during the great depression of the 1930s, the intervention of the 
Brazilian government in the economy was not solely limited to correcting market 
imperfections; instead, the government went one step further by directly managing strategic 
sectors in the economy.  
 
Steven Topik explains that Brazil had always had an interventionist State, even if previous 
constitutions were inspired by the liberal tradition. Indeed, Brazil’s interventionist character 
can be evidenced even before the great depression. In his words: 
 
...well before the disruption of the export economy in 1929, the Brazilian State was 
one of the most interventionists in Latin America. It owned two-thirds of the country’s 
railways, its largest shipping line, major ports, its largest commercial bank, savings 
bank, and three of its wealthiest mortgage banks. (...) [T]he State acted relatively 
independently from the forces of civil society...40 
                                                 
38
 Brazil, Constitution of the United States of Brazil 1934, Article 115. 
39
 Ibid., Article 116.  
40
 Topik, The Political Economy of the Brazilian State, 1889-1930, 01. 
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In 1937, a new constitution which departed from the previous liberal model was enacted. It 
ensured that public intervention could take place under certain conditions, whilst providing 
wide governmental discretionary powers. Public intervention was legitimised not solely to 
correct market imperfections but also to protect and promote the national interest.41 
 
The Constitution of 1937 prescribed the enactment of subordinate laws to punish crimes 
against the popular economy. Consequently, Decree 869/38 was enacted in the following 
year,42 being the precursor of Law 8,884/94 and the first law relating to competition in Brazil 
as it regulated conduct, such as agreements to arbitrarily increase profits and attempts to 
dominate the market. Decree 869/38 was also enacted with the aim of countering the abuse of 
economic power of foreign enterprises in order to protect consumers and to allow the 
emergence of national industries.43 Thus, the historic emergence of competition law in Brazil 
was not ideologically linked to economic liberalism as in the US, because it did not have the 
overriding aim of protecting free enterprise and the freedom to compete. However, according 
to the Consultants of the Federal Republic at the time, the Sherman and Clayton Acts did 
serve of inspiration for the actual draft of Decree 869/38.44      
 
Decree 869/38 was followed by the enactment of Decree 7,666/45 during a period when 
nationalism was strong as a result of the populist policies of President Getúlio Vargas. The 
latter decree was instrumental for protecting the national economy, as well as consumers, 
                                                 
41
 Brazil, Constitution of the United States of Brazil 1937, Article 135. 
42
 Brazil, Law Decree n. 869/38. 
43
 See Forgioni, Os Fundamentos do Antitruste, 114. 
44
 Shieber, Abusos Do Poder Economico; Direito e Experiencia Antitruste No Brasil e Nos E. U. A, 17-18. 
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against the abuse of foreign economic power. However, it was in force only for three months, 
as President Getúlio Vargas was ousted from office by a military coup in 1945.  
 
The change of government in 1945 also resulted in the enactment of the Constitution of 1946, 
which provided, for the first time, a general provision regarding the abuse of economic 
power: ‘The law will repress any form of abuse of economic power, inclusive the unions or 
groups of individual or social enterprises, no matter their nature, which intend to dominate 
the national markets, eliminate competition and increase their profits arbitrarily’.45 
Notwithstanding such constitutional provision, it was not until 1962, with Law 4,137, that a 
competition law was enacted. Nevertheless, this law failed to modernise Brazilian 
competition law, as it was still conceived as a means to pursue protectionist policies.  
 
Interventionism intensified during the period of military rule which lasted until 1985 and 
competition law continued to be conceived as an instrument to protect the interests of the 
State and the political status quo.46 During this period, other constitutional texts were 
enacted, namely the Constitutions of 1967 and 1969. Their provisions in relation to the 
economy were very similar to those of the Constitution of 1946, as the subjugation of the 
economic power was considered a constitutional matter.47 
 
From an economic perspective, during the early 1970s Brazil was one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world. However, its growth resulted largely from uncompetitive companies 
that were heavily subsidised by the federal government. Following the oil crisis of 1973, 
                                                 
45
 Brazil, Constitution of the United States of Brazil 1946, Article 148. 
46
 Ramin, As Instituições Brasileiras de Defesa da Concorrência, 26. 
47
 The provisions related to the repression of economic power can be found in articles 157 and 160 of the 
Federal Constitutions of 1967 and 1969, respectively. 
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economic growth declined and interventionism came to be regarded as a means to improve 
socioeconomic welfare. As a result, monopolies were tolerated to the point that at the end of 
the military dictatorship in 1985, Brazil had many monopolised markets and its economy was 
suffering as a result of high levels of inflation.   
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2.2.4 The Transitional Period of Competition Law in Brazil 
 
After decades of military rule, in 1985 Brazil implemented a gradual shift to democracy 
under the tutelage of the military leaders.48 This process culminated in the enactment of the 
Federal Constitution of 1988, which remains in force and signalled a departure from the 
previous regime. It expressly enunciates freedom of enterprise as a principle of the economic 
order, whilst subordinating it to the achievement of social justice and a dignified life to the 
population.49 
 
Article 173, paragraph 4 of the Constitution states that ‘...the law will repress the abuse of 
economic power which has the object of controlling the markets, eliminating competition and 
increasing profits arbitrarily’.50 These provisions demonstrate a special concern with arbitrary 
increase of profits and consumer protection, as there were high levels of inflation at the time 
in which the Federal Constitution was enacted. Moreover, given that Brazil had experienced 
two decades of military dictatorship and large industries played a part in supporting the 
military, the Constitution was intended to protect society from abuses from the private as well 
as public sector.  
 
Political reforms were matched with policies that promoted economic liberalisation during 
the 1980s and 1990s. The first democratically elected President following military rule, 
Fernando Collor de Mello,51 sought to open up the market to foreign companies whilst 
privatising state-owned enterprises. The previous import substitution policy was banished and 
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 See Political Transition and Democratic Consolidation, 11. 
49
 Brazil, Federal Constitution of 1988, Article 170. 
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 Ibid. Article 173, para. 4. 
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 Fernando Collor de Mello was elected in 1989. 
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import tariffs were reduced. Moreover, prices were no longer set by the government. 
Therefore, national companies became exposed to international competition, particularly 
from multinationals.  
 
To facilitate the aforementioned economic and political transition, Law 8,158 was enacted in 
1991 with the intent to allow the government to intervene preventively in relation to 
economic conduct that could harm the economic order.52 However, even after the enactment 
of Law 8,884/94 the CADE did not play a relevant role in the maintenance and enhancement 
of competition in the market.  
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 Forgioni, Os Fundamentos do Antitruste, 29. 
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2.2.5 Modern Socioeconomic and Political Changes in Brazil and Competition Law 
 
In 1990, President Collor announced measures to liberalise the economy further and reduce 
inflation, as well as increasing imports, investment and competitiveness. The ‘Collor Plans’, 
whose primary objectives were to open up the country to imports and privatise many state-
owned enterprises, were implemented. However, the application of these economic plans was 
not successful as they caused disruption in production, distribution and sales, whilst the drop 
in inflation rates was merely a temporary one. Moreover, in 1992 Fernando Collor de Mello 
was impeached following serious accusations of corruption.  
 
The presidency of Brazil after the impeachment of Collor de Mello went to the then vice-
president Itamar Franco. He was in favour of liberal reforms to modernise the economy; 
however, he was also a strong critic of privatising state-owned enterprises. Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, who later became President, was the Minister of Finance during Itamar 
Franco’s presidency. In 1994, Fernando Henrique Cardoso introduced the Real Plan which 
ended hyperinflation in Brazil and has laid the foundation for Brazil’s current economic 
success. As a result, Fernando Henrique Cardoso was elected President of Brazil for two 
consecutive terms between January 1995 and January 2003. 
 
In 1994, when the current competition law was enacted, Fernando Henrique Cardoso was 
implementing a policy of privatisation to achieve economic stability and prosperity.53 The 
wealth and stability generated by the Real Plan was much welcomed. However, it was 
accompanied by many social concerns that persist to this day, such as the growing gap 
                                                 
53
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between the rich and poor, criminality, as well as the worsening of basic public services and 
education. As a result of this discontent, in the elections of 2003, a left-wing politician was 
elected for the first time in Brazil’s modern history. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, commonly 
known as Lula, had campaigned strongly on a platform of social change. President Lula was 
re-elected in 2006, extending his term until January 2011. It is generally accepted that the 
main reason for Lula’s rise to power when he was first elected was the existence of a general 
desire among Brazilians for social change, especially in relation to the growing gap between 
the rich and poor.  
 
Prior to his presidency, Lula headed the Steel Workers’ Union and was a co-founder of the 
Worker’s Central Union (CUT),54 a trade association representing various workers’ unions. 
The CUT is widely considered to be the main supporter and political arm of Lula’s political 
party, namely the Workers Party (PT).55 Even though the latter is a left-wing socialist party, 
prior to the 2003 election it remodelled itself as a non-revolutionary, moderate political 
movement in order to gain wider public appeal. Therefore, commentators have stated that in 
effect, Lula’s policies represent a continuation of the economic reforms formulated in 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s government, which are predominantly liberal in nature.56 
 
Foreign policy has experienced a greater change than economic policy. In addition to forging 
greater economic links with controversial left-leaning Latin American countries, such as 
Bolivia, Venezuela and Cuba, Brazil has acted more defensively in trade negotiations 
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involving the United States.57 Lula has also sought to strengthen commercial links with the 
European Union and developing countries, including various Portuguese-speaking countries 
in Africa58 and other BRIC countries.59 The consequence of this shift in foreign policy is that 
Brazil is asserting its international presence, reducing its historical dependence on the United 
States and becoming more integrated into the global economy.  
 
At a regional level, Lula’s policies reflect an effort to promote Brazil’s regional leadership, as 
well as the economic integration and cooperation of Latin American states by promoting 
regional causes, including the Mercosur agreement,60 a regional economic block founded in 
1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, which has been modelled on the European 
Community and currently consists of most Latin American countries as associated members 
or observers. Lula’s policy of fostering closer relations within Latin America resulted in an 
increase of more than 100% of Brazilian exports to other South American partners.61 
 
Nevertheless, although Brazil has strengthened its links with the EU and other developing 
countries whilst reducing its previous dependency on the United States, the latter still 
represents its biggest trade partner.62 Therefore, it ought to be acknowledged that while 
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Lula’s presidency does represent a shift from its predecessor,63 in substantial terms there has 
not been a dramatic rupture given that Brazil, being a large western democracy, shares many 
common interests with the US.   
 
The aforementioned changes in Brazilian foreign and economic policies can be felt in the 
current developments of Brazilian competition law and policy. As will be discussed further in 
this work, the US model continues to be the most influential. However, in recent years there 
has been a shift in favour of the EU model, as well as a desire by Brazilian policy-makers to 
develop a model which is particularly suited to the specific demands of Brazil.  
                                                 
63
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2.3 The Brazilian Competition Law Framework 
 
The competition law framework in Brazil could be understood as: (1) the relevant 
constitutional provisions which protect competition and legitimate governmental intervention 
and regulation; (2) fifteen competition related laws,64 the most relevant being Law 8,884/94; 
(3) three decrees;65 (4) twenty-nine directives;66 (5) seventeen resolutions;67 (6) one 
normative instruction,68 and (7) the body of Brazilian case-law and administrative decisions, 
which are merely persuasive given that Brazil is a civil law jurisdiction which lacks the 
common law doctrine of stare decisis. 
 
Of the above, the most relevant and authoritative legal documents for the purpose of this 
research are the Federal Constitution of 1988 and Law 8,884/94. The former enunciates the 
guiding principles for legitimising and interpreting competition law, whilst the latter 
represents Brazil’s comprehensive competition law which, although has elements of the US 
and EU competition legislation, such as the existence of criminal sanctions for cartels and the 
prohibition of abuse of dominance, was not intentionally designed to be a hybrid law or to be 
used in a hybrid system69 of competition law. The following sections will focus in particular 
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on both of these legislative texts, as well as the Brazilian Consumer Code70 in order to 
understand the nexus between competition and consumer policies in Brazil.  
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 Brazil, Law n. 8,078 of 11 September 1990. 
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2.3.1 The Federal Constitution of 1988 
 
Title VII of the Federal Constitution deals with the economic order. Its most significant 
chapters for the purpose of this research are: Chapter I on the principles of the economic 
activity; Chapter II on urban policy; Chapter III on agricultural and agrarian reform policy 
and Chapter IV on the financial and economic order.71 The most relevant provisions for this 
research are Articles 170 and 173. According to the latter the law ‘...shall repress the abuse of 
economic power with the aim to dominate markets, to eliminate competition, and to arbitrary 
increase profits’.72 This provision legitimises the government’s power to regulate the process 
of competition.   
 
The wording of Article 170(IV) makes competition a constitutionally protected interest as it 
prescribes the protection of the economic order. It reads as follows: 
 
The economic order, founded on the valorisation of human labour and on free 
enterprise, has the goal of ensuring a dignified life, in accordance with the rule of 
social justice, observed the following principles: I – national sovereignty; II – private 
property; III – social function of property; IV – free competition; V – protection of 
consumers; VI – protection of the environment, including the use of differential 
treatment in accordance with the impact caused by the products and services and the 
processes used in its production and performance; VII – reduction of social and 
regional inequality; VIII – search for full employment; IX – Favourable treatment to 
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small companies constituted under Brazilian laws and which have their headquarters 
and administration in the country.73 
 
According to the competition authority in Poliolefinas,74 the free market economy was 
chosen as the most suitable system for the national economy under the Federal Constitution 
of 1988, given that it establishes the freedom of enterprise as its underlying principle. 
However, economic freedom is not absolute as it is conditioned on the need to protect free 
competition pursuant to Article 170(IV).75 Moreover, given that the freedom of enterprise 
protects private economic interests and limits the role of the State, the direct or indirect 
intervention of the latter in the economy is not absolute. Only where the private sector is 
unable to provide a public service or to correct market failures will direct State intervention 
be legitimate.76 Indirect intervention via regulation or competition law enforcement would be 
legitimate only when freedom of enterprise or free competition are harmed or threatened.  
 
The principle of national sovereignty is the first element of the economic order under Article 
170(I). This provision legitimises the State’s authority to intervene in the market under 
specific circumstances. However, such powers are not unlimited as they are subject to the 
protection of free competition and private property pursuant to Article 170(II) and (IV).  
 
Article 170(III) protects the social function of property. The theory of the social function of 
propriety, which has also influenced many European constitutional texts, was originally 
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formulated by Auguste Comte in Système de politique positive.77 Auguste Comte’s thoughts 
have been very influential,78 particularly in Brazil; even the motto Ordem e Progresso79  in 
the national flag was inspired by his statement ‘L'amour pour principe et l'ordre pour base; 
le progrès pour but’.80 The social function of property plays an important constitutional role 
as it is not only protected under Article 170(III), but also under Article 5(XXIII).81 
Nevertheless, when applying Brazilian competition law, the social function of property needs 
to be balanced with other constitutional principles, such as private property and freedom of 
enterprise.82 In the analysis of abuse of dominance cases, the concept of social function of 
property is usually linked to the concept of special responsibilities of dominant firms, i.e. 
those firms who are dominant should act not only in their self interest but in the interest of 
society as a whole.83   
 
The last relevant constitutionally protected interest is the protection of consumers pursuant to 
Article 170(V). This is particularly important due to the fact that Brazil is a developing 
country with a considerable number of uninformed and vulnerable consumers. Further, 
markets tend to be concentrated, so the socioeconomic conditions tend to facilitate abuse by 
large firms. Moreover, competition law offences in a developing country that lacks an 
                                                 
77
 See Comte, Système de politique positive ou, Traité de sociologie d'Auguste Comte. However, Pierre Marie 
Nicolas Léon Duguit, a leading French scholar of administrative law, developed and perfected the theory. See 
e.g. Duguit, Le droit social, le droit individuel et la transformation de l'état conférences faites à l'École des 
hautes études sociales. 
78
 See Lopes, Empresa e Propriedade: função social e abuso de poder econômico. 
79
 Order and Progress. 
80
 Love as a principle and order as the basis; progress as the goal. 
81
 ‘Everybody is equal before the law, without distinction of any nature, ensuring Brazilians and foreigners 
residing in this country the inviolability of the right to life, freedom, equality, safety and property, in the 
following terms: (...) the property will achieve its social function. Brazil, Federal Constitution of 1988, Article 
5(XXIII). 
82
 See p. 35. 
83
 See p. 165. 
32 
 
effective welfare reditribution system may cause an increase in prices resulting in poorer 
members of society being unable to afford basic provisions.  
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2.3.2 Law 8,078/90: the Brazilian Consumer Code 
 
Law 8,078/90,84 known as the Consumer Code, is a comprehensive legislation that deals with 
consumer protection. The Consumer Code’s first provision declares that its overriding 
purpose is the protection of public order and social interest, pursuant to the Constitutional 
principles of consumer protection under Article 5(XXXII) and Article 170(V) of the Federal 
Constitution of 1988. 
 
Article 4 of the Consumer Code stresses the need to achieve a reduction or suppression of all 
abuses in the consumer market, including those resulting from unfair competition. Article 39 
of the Consumer Code contains a non-exhaustive though extensive list of abusive conduct, 
including competition law related offences, such as tie-in sales and refusal to supply.85 These 
specific offences are also prohibited under Law 8,884/94.  
 
In regards to overlapping prohibitions between the Consumer Code and Law 8,884/94, 
although they offer a double level of protection against abusive conduct, this results at times 
in conflicts and confusion in respect to which institution should enforce them and how. This 
lack of clarity was alluded by a member of the competition authority: 
 
I remember that there was a case which went to the court of appeal about the 
possibility of PROCON [a consumer protection agency] to apply fines based on Law 
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8,884/94 and the court stated that PROCON could apply the fine. (...) I believe that 
there should be more coordination among the different bodies to avoid two 
organisations fining companies for the same behaviour.  
 
Indeed, it was stated by one member of the CADE that ‘...when there is dominance, the 
matter should be taken care of by the competition authority because it has an impact on 
competition, but where there is no dominance, consumer protection organisations should deal 
with it’. This solution applies to abuse of dominance offences; it represents a practical 
compromise as the competition authority could refer cases to consumer protection agencies 
when it determines that the undertaking lacks dominance but there may be nonetheless harm 
to consumers. In fact, in cases where consumers are harmed, but competition is not, the 
CADE does not apply Law 8,884/94. However, consumer protection agencies do not refrain 
from acting when there is harm for both consumers and competition. The criteria of the 
existence of dominance could assist in drawing the line between the agencies and avoid 
overlapping decisions or an incorrect application of competition law.  
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2.3.3 Law 8,884/94: Brazil’s Competition Law 
 
Law 8,884/94 represents Brazil’s first comprehensive competition law. It contains a general 
section that works as a guide to its interpretation together with provisions to regulate specific 
conduct. Article 1 of Law 8,884/94 establishes as its general purpose: 
 
 [T]he prevention and repression of infringements to the economic order, being guided 
by the constitutional principles of freedom of enterprise, open competition, social 
function of property, protection of consumers and the repression to the abuse of the 
economic power.86 
 
Law 8,884/94 seeks to implement many of the key constitutional principles in accordance 
with Article 173, paragraph 4 of the Constitution of 1988, which states that ‘...the law will 
repress the abuse of economic power which has the object of controlling markets, eliminating 
competition and increasing profits arbitrarily’.87 Article 173, paragraph 4 legitimises the 
power of the government to regulate competition via the enactment and enforcement of 
competition legislation. 
 
Articles 20 and 21 represent the most important provisions of Law 8,884/94. On the one 
hand, the drafting of these provisions demonstrate that Law 8,884/94 has a hybrid regulatory 
structure, being influenced by both EU and US models of competition law. On the other 
hand, they also demonstrate characteristics that are unique to the Brazilian system.  
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The following sections will examine Articles 20 and 21, as well as Articles 54 and 58 of Law 
8,884/94 in order to ascertain the admissible justifications to a conduct. This will be followed 
by observations of the regulatory approach in relation to abuse of dominance adopted in the 
competition bill, which is currently in the process of deliberation in the Brazilian Congress 
and is expected to replace Law 8,884/94. 
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2.3.3.1 Article 20 of Law 8,884/94 
 
In contrast with the EU and the US competition legislation, Law 8,884/94 contemplates 
horizontal, vertical, unilateral and joint practices all under a single provision, namely Article 
20. Indeed, any act or conduct, irrespective of being unilateral or multilateral, which has as its 
object or is capable of restraining competition, is considered an offence.88 
 
One difference between the US and Brazilian competition laws regards the fact that whilst 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act refers to the prohibition to monopolise, Article 20(IV) of Law 
8,884/94 prohibits the abuse of market control, which is similar to the prohibition of an abuse 
of dominance pursuant to Article 102 TFEU. Moreover, paragraph 2 of Article 20 prohibits 
abuses by a company or a group of companies; this is similar to Article 102 TFEU which 
states that an abuse of a dominant position could be carried out by one or more undertakings. 
Therefore, in both jurisdictions, the concept of collective dominance is expressly 
contemplated in the legislation. Conversely in the US, although collective dominance is 
recognised, it not expressed in the Sherman Act in the same way as in the EU and Brazil.89 
 
The prohibition to ‘limit, restrain or in any way injure open competition or free enterprise’ 
under Article 20(I), highlights a special concern held by Brazilian legislators with regards to 
market entry. On the one hand, the inclusion of this provision is likely to result from the need 
to protect the principle of ‘free competition’ pursuant to Article 170(IV) of the Federal 
Constitution of 1988.90 On the other hand, the particular concern given to market entry is best 
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understood when looking at the historical events during the course of the drafting and 
enactment of Law 8,884/94. Between the late 1980s and early 1990s Brazil was in a state of 
social and economic transition. Many public industries were privatised with the aim of 
promoting enterprise and revitalising the economy after decades of economic stagnation.  
 
The proviso in Article 20 ‘Notwithstanding malicious intent’ means that the undertaking’s 
intention is immaterial. Therefore, from a formal analysis of Brazilian competition law, the 
potential effects of the conduct play a central role. This is different to the US, where only the 
wilful acquisition of a monopoly through unfair means is prohibited.91 
 
Article 20(II) contains a general prohibition concerning ‘...the control of a relevant market of 
a certain product or service’. At the same time, Article 20(IV) prohibits the abuse of market 
control as well, so it would appear as though the latter prohibition is redundant, given that the 
mere control of the market would already be forbidden under Article 20(II). However, 
paragraph 1 of Article 20 states that ‘...the achievement of market control as a result of 
competitive efficiency does not entail an occurrence of the offence provided for in item II...’ 
Therefore, Article 20(II) does not contain an absolute prohibition of market control, but 
rather a prohibition conditional on justifications pursuant to Paragraph 1 of Article 20. When 
both of these provisions are analysed in unison, it appears to reveal a particular concern in 
terms of the concentration of market power which does not result in efficiencies. This 
specific concern regarding the inefficient concentration of market power could be explained 
by the fact that Brazil has had concentrated markets throughout its history. 
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2.3.3.2 Article 21 of Law 8,884/94 
 
Article 21 of Law 8,884/94 contains a long but non-exhaustive list of practices that are 
deemed to constitute violations of the economic order to the extent that they result or may 
result in an offence under Article 20.92 
 
The reason for adopting a non-exhaustive list could be that, during the drafting of the law, 
Brazil was undergoing a process of economic transition. Markets were opened up to 
international trade; there was a monetary stabilisation plan, and many state-owned enterprises 
were privatised.93 Therefore, the legislator appears to have intended to allow a level of 
flexibility in the drafting of Article 21, given that at the time it would have been difficult to 
anticipate the full effects of economic reforms and the development of competition law in 
Brazil. The legislative style adopted in respect of Article 21 appears to have given flexibility 
to the enforcement of Article 20, allowing the competition authority a wide level of discretion 
to develop competition law and policy in a fast changing and dynamic environment, whilst 
the listing of 24 different offences offered guidance to judges, practitioners and firms on what 
would be likely to be deemed a violation of the economic order. 
 
Article 21(VII) prohibits dominant firms ‘...to require or grant exclusivity in mass media 
advertisements’. Initially, it might be difficult to understand why such a specific prohibition 
was drafted in relation to the mass media sector. However, the reason for this might be that 
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there was only one major aerial TV broadcaster in Brazil, namely TV Globo,94 which unlike 
major broadcasters in Europe, such as the BBC in the UK or RAI in Italy, is not a public 
entity. Article 21(VII) applies to situations where a broadcaster enters into exclusivity 
agreements in respect of advertisements, which may potentially breach the provisions of 
Article 20. This would be the case if they resulted in the creation of artificial barriers to entry 
in the market for competitors which are not party to the exclusivity agreements. The special 
concern with market access may be justified by the concentrated structure of the mass media 
sector in Brazil.  
 
The fact that Article 21 contains a long list of acts which could constitute a violation to the 
economic order results in the inclusion of behaviour which does not fit within the traditional 
scope of competition law. Article 21(XV) and (XVII) of the Brazilian competition law 
demonstrate this by providing acts which could be deemed to fall within the scope of unfair 
competition, rather than competition law.95 Article 21(XV) forbids undertakings ‘...to 
destroy, render unfit for use or take possession of raw materials, intermediary or finished 
products, as well as destroy, render unfit for use or constrain the operation of any equipment 
intended to manufacture, distribute or transport them’, whilst Article 21(XVII) contains a 
similar prohibition in relation to the agricultural sector as it forbids the ‘... abandonment or 
destruction of crops or harvests, without proven good cause’. These two provisions regulate 
unfair practices which are deemed relevant under Law 8,884/94 as they have the potential of 
harming competitors and consumers, given that prices would increase due to a reduction in 
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supply. The particular attention given to the harm of agricultural production in Article 
21(XVII) appears justified in a country such as Brazil, where the agricultural sector has 
significant economic importance and a shortage of agricultural commodities would result in 
disproportionate harm to disadvantaged sections of the population. However, it could be 
argued that these provisions would sit better within an unfair competition law. Unfortunately, 
Brazil does not have a comprehensive unfair competition law. Moreover, only some aspects 
of unfair competition are present under chapter six of the Industrial Property Law 9,279 
which was enacted two years after Law 8,884/94.   
 
In addition to the aforementioned socioeconomic reasons that explain the inclusion of Article 
21(XV) and (XVII) in Law 8,884/94, these prohibitions might have been included due to the 
political priority of reducing the rising level of inflation of industrial and agricultural 
commodities during the drafting of Law 8,884/94.96 
 
In fact, Article 21(XXIV) prohibits charging excessive prices and seems to reflect the 
concern of Brazilian legislators with protecting consumers and controlling the rate of 
inflation. Indeed, the period between the mid 1980s and early 1990s witnessed soaring levels 
of inflation. The denomination of the Brazilian currency changed many times as a result of 
uncontrollable levels of devaluation. In accordance with the Brazilian Institute for Geography 
and Statistics (IBGE),97 Brazil had an average annual inflation rate of 330% in the 1980s 
which increased to 764% between 1990 and 1994.  
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During the 1990s, Brazil implemented the Real Plan under the economic leadership of 
President Cardoso.98 Under this package of legal and economic reforms, there was a final 
change in currency denomination when the current Brazilian Real (R$) was adopted in 1994. 
This was accompanied by economic measures to control the rate of inflation. The Real Plan 
has proven to be effective at fighting inflation and achieving greater stability: between 1995 
and 2000 the average annual rate of inflation was 8.6%; this figure decreased gradually to 
7.2% between 2001 and 2007, and more recently to 5.9% and 4.31% in 2008 and 2009 
respectively.  
 
The above data and the magnitude of the Real Plan demonstrate how the control of inflation 
was at the top of the political agenda when Law 8,884/94 was enacted in 1994. Therefore, 
this could have had an influence over the legislators when drafting Law 8,884/94 and adding 
to it Article 21(XXIV), which prohibits deliberately increasing prices. The successful 
reduction of inflation by other governmental policies may also be a reason for the 
competition authority to have avoided, since its enactment, the enforcement of Article 
21(XXIV), which is not be present in the competition bill which is set to replace Law 
8,884/94.    
 
Article 21(XIX) contains another provision that does not fall within the typical scope of 
competition law. It forbids ‘...to import any assets below cost from an exporting country other 
than those signatories of the GATT Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Codes’. The inclusion of 
anti-dumping provisions in Law 8,884/94 has been criticised in Brazil, as competition law 
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and anti-dumping law serve different purposes.99 The inclusion of this prohibition could be 
explained by the fact that Brazil enacted anti-dumping legislation one year after the 
enactment of Law 8,884/94.100 Therefore, the Brazilian legislator sought to eliminate a lacuna 
by widening the scope of competition law; the political justification for this could be that 
imports increased considerably in Brazil during the 1990s and the anti-dumping law serves 
the primary purpose of protecting local companies against below cost imports.  
 
The amalgamation of anti-dumping and competition law provisions under the current 
regulatory framework has resulted in counterproductive consequences at an institutional 
level. Anti-dumping cases where the country of origin is not a member of the WTO are still 
dealt with by the competition authority. Conversely, cases where the country of origin is a 
WTO member fall within the administrative competence of the Ministry of Industry, 
Commerce and Tourism. The existence of this division of competence at an institutional level 
remains difficult to justify and it will be subject to reform by the competition bill.101 
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2.3.4 The competition bill 3,937/04 
 
Bill 3,937/04, hereinafter the competition bill, was initially proposed in 2004 and its current 
draft results from its merger with another bill proposed by the government in 2005.102 The 
competition bill is currently in the final phase of debate in the Brazilian Congress and is 
expected to be promulgated into law sometime between 2010 and 2011; therefore it ought to 
be noted that further alterations or proposals could be made. This section discusses some 
changes to the current provisions on abuse of dominance under Law 8,884/94 as of 
September 2010. 
 
Article 1 of the competition bill establishes that the goal of competition law is the prevention 
and repression of infringements to the economic order. It is guided by the constitutional 
principles of freedom of enterprise, open competition, social function of property, protection 
of consumers and repression of abuse of economic power. Therefore, its drafting mirrors 
Article 1 of Law 8,884/94.103 
 
In regards to the rule of reason,104 the competition bill states, in its preamble, as follows: 
 
...the rule of reason will be used in the analysis of potentially anti-competitive conduct 
and these will not be prohibited if they promote economic efficiency and consumer 
welfare which cannot be achieved using less restrictive or harmful means to 
competition, compensating the restrictions caused to competition and producing 
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benefits that are divided among the participants in the conduct, as well as 
consumers.105 
 
This is the first time that the use of the rule of reason becomes part of the competition 
legislation in Brazil. It seems to reflect what the interviewees revealed as being already the 
understanding among members of the competition authority i.e. that the analysis of conduct 
in Brazil must follow the rule of reason, even if this concept is interpreted in a quite different 
way when compared to the US rule of reason.106 
 
Although the competition bill refers to anti-competitive conduct, in reality this provision has 
to be understood together with Article 88 of the competition bill for the approval of mergers 
which also guides the analysis of abuse of dominance. The equivalent of Article 88 of the 
competition bill is Article 54 of Law 8,884/94. Both of these provisions refer to the 
conditions necessary for approving mergers. However, these criteria seem to be followed in 
the analysis of conduct as well. In fact, the analysis of the potential effects on competition, 
considering the elements above, constitutes the Brazilian rule of reason. In interviews, a 
member of the competition authority stated: ‘We look at Article 54 when analysing a 
conduct; we have to respect it’. This view was shared by other members of the competition 
authority. However, there is no obligation imposed by the law on the competition authority to 
use the efficiencies analysis of mergers to abuse of dominance. In fact, Article 54 regards acts 
that may restrict competition and therefore must be notified to CADE for authorisation. This 
would not include abuse of dominance cases. Nevertheless, the lack of guidelines on the 
enforcement of abuse of dominance may have resulted in members of the competition 
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authority seeking guidance from other sections of the law, including Article 54, which was 
tailored for merger control. Such analysis, in the view of many interviewees, means that the 
rule of reason is respected. Therefore, the use of the rule of reason in Brazil would be referred 
to as the analysis of the conduct which takes into account its possible effects whilst 
respecting the conditions of Article 54 of Law 8,884/94, or Article 88 of the competition bill, 
i.e. an analysis which seeks to ensure that: (1) the conduct will result in efficiencies that will 
benefit participating undertakings and consumers alike; (2) that efficiencies cannot be 
achieved by less anti-competitive means, and (3) competition is not eliminated in the relevant 
market. 
 
Articles 20 and 21 of Law 8,884/94 have been merged into a single provision of the 
competition bill, namely Article 36. The reason for this change to the regulatory structure is 
that Article 20 represented a general provision regulating cartels, mergers and abuse of 
dominance whereas Article 21 contained only examples of prohibitions.107 From a 
substantive point-of-view, this does not represent a significant change, given that the content 
of Article 36 resembles the terms of Articles 20 and 21. 
 
The provisions of Article 20 of Law 8,884/94108 remain largely unaltered in the current draft 
of Article 36 of the competition bill, except for the definition of dominance. Article 20 
contains a rebuttable presumption of dominance for firms with a market share greater than 
20%. The current draft of the competition bill recognises that such market share threshold is 
not sufficient in itself to give rise to a presumption of dominance. According to the bill, 
dominance is presupposed when a firm or group of firms is capable of changing market 
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conditions unilaterally or coordinately or when a firm controls 20% or more of the relevant 
market, although the competition law and the bill state that this market share threshold can be 
changed by the CADE to specific sectors of the economy.109 
 
In practice, the interpretation of many members of the competition authority has departed 
from the formal understanding of the rebuttable presumption under Article 20 of Law 
8,884/94, as many regard the 20% market share threshold as more of a safe harbour rather 
than a presumption of dominance.110 The competition bill does not go as far as expressly 
creating a safe harbour and the presumption of dominance based upon a 20% market share 
threshold remains. Therefore, it could be argued that the Brazilian legislator lost an 
opportunity to express in the law the existence of a safe harbour that already exists in 
practice. 
 
 The competition bill also proposes changes to the list of examples of offences of Article 21 
of Law 8,884/94. Paragraph 3 of Article 36 of the competition bill contains 20 prohibitions 
which replace the previous 24 offences under Article 21. The list of prohibitions remains 
non-exhaustive and their applicability would be conditional to the extent that they are capable 
of harming competition in accordance with the main section of Article 36; this is similar to 
the current interaction between Articles 20 and 21 of Law 8,884/94.  
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Article 36(3)(I) of the competition bill has merged Clauses (I),111 (III),112 (VIII)113 and 
(XX)114 of Article 21 of Law 8,884/94. This improves the drafting structure of the cartel 
prohibition by making it clearer. It now would prohibit the following: 
 
...to agree, collude, manipulate or set with a competitor, in any form:  
a) prices of goods or services offered individually;  
b) the production or sales of a limited quantity of goods or a limited volume or 
frequency of services;  
c) the apportion of parts or segments of an actual or potential market of goods or 
services via, among other things, the distribution of clients, suppliers, regions or 
periods; and 
d) prices, conditions, advantages or abstentions in public procurements. 
 
Some of the prohibitions under Article 21 have been abandoned under the current draft of 
Article 36 of the competition bill. For instance, Article 21(XVII) which prohibits ‘...to 
abandon or cause abandonment or destruction of crops or harvests, without a proven good 
cause’115 has been removed because it was too specific and did not have a clear link with the 
protection of competition. As stated above, the inclusion of Article 21(XVII) in Law 8,884/94 
probably resulted from a considerable political concern with countering inflation.116 
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Therefore, the abandonment of this prohibition appears appropriate as the Brazilian economy 
has become more stable and the levels of inflation have decreased over the past decade.117 
 
Article 21(XXIV),118 which prohibits excessive prices or unjustified increase in prices, is 
another prohibition of Article 21 that is not present in Article 36(3) of the competition bill. 
However, this prohibition has not been wholly abandoned as the list of prohibited offences 
under Article 36 of the competition bill is non-exhaustive. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the 
competition authority will find an undertaking in breach of competition law for setting 
abusive prices, as it has never, to date, found a firm liable for abusive pricing and most 
Councillors believe that it is not an offence, but a symptom of market dysfunctions. Such 
view conforms to the US understanding of abusive pricing.119 
 
Article 21(XIX),120 which incorporated aspects of anti-dumping law into the Brazilian 
competition law, has also been abandoned under the current draft of the competition bill. This 
proposed reform is welcomed in the light of the issues discussed above.121 The anti-dumping 
law is utilised for defending local companies against imported products sold cheaper than in 
the country of origin. Thus, it serves a different purpose from competition law, whose 
primary aim is to protect the process of competition. Therefore, CADE’s competence in 
respect to anti-dumping will cease and the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism 
should become the sole competent institution. 
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Some of the provisions of Article 36 of the competition bill represent a novelty in relation to 
Article 21 of Law 8,884/94. Article 36(3)(XIX) prohibits ‘...to demand or concede 
exclusivity, including territorial exclusivity, of the distribution of goods or services’.122 This 
prohibition is likely to result from the development of CADE’s body of authority in relation 
to exclusivity arrangements, particularly in respect to abuse of dominance cases.123 In 
addition, this provision also prohibits ‘...to exercise or explore abusively industrial, 
intellectual technological or brand rights’. The latter prohibition demonstrates an 
understanding by Brazilian policy-makers of the anti-competitive effects that can result from 
the abuse of intellectual property rights.124 Owners of intellectual property rights, such as 
copyrights or patents, are allowed to preclude their use or enjoyment by competitors; 
however, this right may be abused in a manner that harms competition. For instance, this 
would be the case if IP rights are refused as part of a strategy to exclude competitors rather 
than compete on the merits.   
 
At an institutional level, the competition bill also contains many proposals to reform the 
plurality of institutions forming the BCPS. These are examined in further detail below and 
demonstrate the importance of issues discussed herein, such as the training of the new 
personnel and the future direction of Brazilian competition law and policy.125 
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2.4 Institutions 
 
At an institutional level, the BCPS is composed of three bodies: (1) the Secretariat of 
Economic Law (SDE), which is responsible for investigations, preparing the initial 
procedural documentation and statements of cases for the prosecution. Its opinions are non-
binding and it is also responsible for competition advocacy;126 (2) the Secretariat for 
Economic Monitoring (SEAE) is responsible for investigations, mainly in concentration 
cases, preparing the initial procedural documentation and statements of cases for the 
prosecution. Its opinions are also non-binding and it is also responsible for competition 
advocacy;127 and (3) the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE), which is a 
federal independent agency, competent to judge, as the last administrative instance, 
competition law administrative cases.128 
 
The Brazilian Competition Policy System (BCPS) has been a denomination widely adopted 
when referring to the plurality of Brazilian regulators. However, according to Oliveira and 
Rodas, ‘system’ is not the most suitable term for qualifying the current institutional 
arrangement, given that it would presuppose a certain logic or order, which is not compatible 
with the approach adopted by the government in the creation of a plurality of competition 
authorities over the past decades.129 The term ‘system’ would imply that the three 
aforementioned institutions form an integrated functioning whole, which is not always the 
case in practice. Indeed, the term BCPS is often mockingly referred to by Brazilian 
practitioners as ‘the three competition counters’. 
                                                 
126
 SDE is the acronym for Secretaria de Direito Econômico. See section 2.4.1. 
127
 SEAE is the acronym for Secretaria de Acompanhamento Econômico. See section 2.4.2. 
128
 CADE is the acronym for Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica. See section 2.4.3. 
129
 See Oliveira and Rodas, Direito e Economia da Concorrência, 23. 
52 
 
The plurality of the separate institutions that form the BCPS has been regarded in the 
interviews as a problem in need of reform by many Councillors of the CADE, not only 
because it is alleged to be in a state of disorganisation at the operational level when 
conducting investigations or proceedings, but also in respect of competition advocacy. For 
instance, according to one Councillor: ‘If we want to create conferences, etc., we need people 
from the three organisations and this is much more difficult than if there was only one’.  
 
Under the current draft of the competition bill,130 it is expected that the BCPS will be 
composed of two institutions: (1) SEAE, and (2) CADE, as the role of the SDE will become 
incorporated into the CADE. Nevertheless, the institutional reforms proposed do not go as far 
as creating a sole competition law regulator.  
 
The current draft of the competition bill will also result in many administrative and 
procedural reforms which are needed to improve the operational effectiveness of the 
BCPS.131 Of these, one of the most significant will be the increase in the number of qualified 
personnel in the competition authority, which will amount to two hundred professionals. This 
number is currently less than one hundred, a figure that has been criticised for being too 
low.132 
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2.4.1 The Secretariat of Economic Law - SDE 
 
The SDE is part of the Ministry of Justice, which is part of the Executive power. It is headed 
by a Secretary who is appointed by the Ministry of Justice and composed of two 
administrative bodies: (1) the Department of Economic Protection and Defence (DPDE),133 
which has the role of conducting investigations, preparing the initial procedural 
documentation and statements of case for prosecution, supplying non-binding opinions, as 
well as being responsible for competition advocacy; (2) the Department of Consumer 
Protection and Defence (DPDC),134 which has the role of coordinating consumer protection 
policy at national level. 
 
Of the administrative bodies of the SDE, the DPDE is the most relevant in relation to 
competition law as it is responsible for investigating competition law offences. All formal 
complaints, referrals and representations are made to the SDE and even those made through 
the website of the SEAE are forwarded to the SDE. 
 
The DPDE is divided into administrative bodies, known as Coordinations, in accordance with 
the scope of their work, namely: the Coordination for Legal Matters;135 the Coordination for 
the Analysis of Offences in the Agricultural and Industrial Sectors;136 the Coordination for 
the Analysis of Offences in the Service and Infrastructure Sectors;137 the Coordination for the 
Analysis in the Public Procurement Sector;138 and the Coordination for Market Control.139 
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As of October 2009, the DPDE was composed of 32 qualified professionals and 27 
administrative personnel.140 Most have passed open competitions, albeit some were appointed 
by the Ministry of Justice. The number of professionals working at the SDE was considered 
insufficient by the 2010 OECD Peer Review141 and there is a reform proposal to increase the 
number of ‘Gestores’, i.e. Specialists in Public Policy and Management (Specialists), not only 
at the SDE, but also in the other bodies of the competition authority.  
 
According to one member of the competition authority, the Secretary of the SDE has the final 
decision as to whether or not a conduct is investigated. Although the Secretary of the SDE is 
appointed by the Ministry of Justice, one interviewee stated that ‘...interference from the 
Ministry of Justice is unlikely to happen in practice. Competition issues are of low priority 
for the Minister, given that he has more important and urgent matters to deal with, such as 
human rights issues’. Therefore, there is no apparent concern with the political intervention 
of the Ministry of Justice on competition policy. Nevertheless, it was pointed-out that ‘…the 
system places power in the hands of only a few persons in the SDE, so you begin to depend 
on the personal will of these persons’. 
 
The latter criticism concerned the fact that currently the CADE is reliant on the SDE as the 
former adjudicates decisions whilst the SDE is responsible for the investigatory and 
preliminary phases. When enacted, the competition bill will reform the institutional structure 
of the BCPS and will incorporate the SDE into the CADE’s structure. Nevertheless, it was 
argued by one member of the competition authority that: 
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The new law will not help it at all: it concentrates the decision power in the hands of 
the General Superintendent of the CADE, who is the Secretary of the SDE today. This 
person will not be subordinated directly to the Ministry of Justice, because it will have 
a mandate, but this will not reduce the issue of the concentration of the decision to 
investigate or not in the hands of one person. For instance, if they appoint a 
superintendent that believes that the priority is to fight predatory pricing of medicines, 
then that is what will be done, even if CADE believes that this is not an issue for 
competition at all. 
 
Many interviewees stated that the separation of the SDE from the CADE is positive for the 
due process of competition law, because it ensures an independent investigation and impartial 
decisions. However, others declared that such a division poses a disadvantage: ‘...it leaves in 
the hands of the SDE, who does not judge, the choice of priorities. The CADE has no power 
to impose priorities to the SDE, so the latter establishes an agenda that the CADE has to 
follow. This results in great difficulties to create a consistent policy’.  
 
Many interviewees confirmed that the SDE had improved over the past years. However, there 
was much criticism in respect of the amount of time that investigations take. In the words of 
one member of the competition authority: ‘...the investigation sometimes takes too long in the 
SDE so it becomes difficult to analyse the conduct since it happened a long time ago and the 
market conditions have changed considerably’. 
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This issue is related to the lack of sufficient personnel and has impacted on the development 
of competition law.142 For instance, in 2008 the CADE heard Celular CTR,143 which dealt 
with exclusive agreements in the mobile phone sector. The claimant company, Telet SA, is a 
mobile phone operator that brought a complaint to the BCPS in respect of the exclusivity 
agreements between the defendant company, Celular CRT SA (CRT), and distributors 
situated in the State of Rio Grande do Sul. It was alleged that the exclusivity agreements were 
implemented by CRT to create unjustified difficulties for its competitors, as well as to raise 
barriers to entry in respect of distribution channels in the mobile phone sector. The defendant 
company submitted a successful defence, stating that there were other distribution channels 
available for competitors. The presiding Councillor, Luis Fernando Rigato Vasconcellos, 
declared that the exclusivity agreements resulted in indirect negative effects on consumers 
and direct negative effects on retailers. However, the delay in the investigations resulted in an 
awkward situation, as the findings revealed that the harm to competition did not materialise. 
Councillors were faced with the decision of whether to find liable a firm whose past conduct 
had the potential to harm competition, although it did not actually occur.144 The conduct was 
found to be legitimate because other companies managed to emerge in the market by finding 
alternative distribution channels. However it is questionable whether the outcome would have 
been the same if the decision had not been delivered seven years after the complaint. The 
CADE had the advantage of hindsight when finding that other distribution channels were 
available and there was no potential harm to competition, notwithstanding the fact that the 
use of alternative channels by CRT’s competitors may not have been foreseeable when the 
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exclusivity agreements were put into place. A paradox perhaps emerges from Celular CRT, 
i.e. the delay in the investigations may have resulted in the right decision being achieved. 
 
In addition to circumstances similar to the one described above that occurred due to delays in 
the SDE’s investigations, according to one member of the competition authority, ‘...there are 
and there were many cases prescribed because the SDE does not do anything about it’, i.e. 
procedures are barred due to the expiration of the statutory limitation periods.   
 
Another general criticism of the SDE that came to light during the interviews is that 
‘...sometimes the SDE makes procedural mistakes resulting in the impossibility of finding the 
undertaking liable’. The judgments of the CADE can be appealed to the courts. Appellants 
generally base their applications on procedural or substantive grounds. However, the courts 
are unlikely to challenge the latter as the CADE has greater competence and knowledge of 
competition law, so the procedural issues are more likely to give rise to a reversal of a 
decision of the CADE, even if the breaches of procedure were committed by the SDE during 
initial investigations. 
 
A specific criticism of the SDE concerns its treatment of cartel complaints and investigations. 
Members of the BCPS as well as Brazilian legal professionals acknowledged that 
enforcement against cartels was effective. However, the vast majority had reservations 
concerning the effectiveness of the SDE in regards to abuse of dominance, due to the limited 
human resources available to undertake more complex investigations. This factor is supported 
by statements of interviewees at the competition authority; for instance, it was mentioned that 
‘...the SDE focuses on cartels because, since they are almost a per se conduct, they are easier 
to prove than unilateral conduct, which requires a refined analysis’.  
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Therefore, the SDE has been criticised for giving priority to cartel investigations. In the 
words of one member of the competition authority: ‘This prioritisation became so important 
that it resulted in all the rest being neglected’ and ‘We know that there are far too many 
abuses taking place in the market that we do not catch’. Another member went as far as to 
state the following: 
 
Now we have a policy that is concerned with cartels. In my view it focuses on it too 
much. In a country like Brazil, you have markets that are extremely concentrated - and 
this is historic: in Brazil there was first the monopoly, and then the creation of the 
State - cartels may not be the most harmful conduct. In markets where there are 
companies with a market share greater than 50%, there is no tendency of cartelisation, 
because dominant companies do not need to create cartels to achieve their goals. Why 
would AmBev, which has a 70% market share, engage in a cartel? It does not need to 
do so. 
 
In the view of one Councillor of the CADE, part of the problem could be alleviated by the 
creation of regional offices of the BCPS which could take care of the simpler competition law 
issues, such as small-scale cartels and allow more significant cases to be dealt by the CADE, 
such as abuse of dominance or large-scale cartels. ‘The small cartels are harmful and have to 
be caught, but having such a small structure as the one we have today, it is better to catch the 
steel cartel or the petrochemical cartel, or the industrial gases cartel, not the small ones’. The 
issue therefore is that, as explained previously,145 for historical reasons Brazil has many 
concentrated markets and the competition authority should arguably concentrate its resources 
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on abuse of dominance and large-scale cartels, leaving to smaller, regional offices, cases 
involving practices that have a much more limited effect in economic as well as geographic 
terms.     
 
The SDE’s neglect of abuse of dominance cases in favour of combating cartels was a major 
issue of concern for most interviewees. In the view of one member of the competition 
authority, ‘To me there is only one explanation for the SDE’s behaviour: fighting cartels is 
something that is faster and is more immediate. If someone opens a fridge they believe that 
the light is a spot light and start immediately giving interviews’.  
 
It could be argued that the SDE gives priority to combating cartels due to the media attention 
that cartel cases generate as the public opinion is against collusion. However, this could also 
be positive, as the exposure in the mass media of the enforcement of competition law plays 
an important role in competition law advocacy, which is crucial in a developing country such 
as Brazil, given that although the general population appreciate economic freedom, most are 
ignorant of the role of competition law in society. However, media attention may not be the 
sole reason for the neglect of abuse of dominance by the SDE. 
 
It is expected that the enactment of the competition bill will allow the SDE to devote greater 
attention to abuse of dominance complaints. A member of the competition authority stated 
that ‘...when the competition bill is approved, the SDE [which will be incorporated into the 
CADE] will have more professional staff and hopefully they will use some of them to create 
specialised departments to monitor the markets’. In the view of another member of the 
competition authority: ‘...markets are not monitored in Brazil, so to catch an abuse it has to be 
either really obvious or there has to be a complaint’. Indeed, the lack of technical expertise 
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and professional administrative staff to allow the SDE to monitor the market effectively was 
one of the main reasons given for the neglect of abuse of dominance in Brazil. Therefore, the 
new competition law may result in an increase of competition law enforcement against 
unilateral conduct after the institutional reforms are implemented.      
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2.4.2 The Secretariat for Economic Monitoring - SEAE 
 
The Secretariat for Economic Monitoring is an institution which forms part of the Ministry of 
Finance. Its role in competition law enforcement includes the investigation of merger cases 
and the supply of non-binding opinions. It also has an important role in promoting 
competition policy in other governmental organisations, especially in relation to regulated 
sectors.146 
 
The institutional mandate of the SEAE results in a competence overlap between the SEAE 
and the SDE. The existence of two distinct institutions with investigatory powers was 
justified during the interviews by members of the BCPS on the grounds that the SEAE’s 
sphere of expertise is more centred on economics, whilst that of the SDE is more legalistic. 
 
Directive n. 33147 was enacted by the SEAE and the SDE to reduce the overlap between these 
two institutions. As a result, the SEAE currently focuses on mergers and acquisitions and the 
SDE on conduct cases. Under the current regime, the SDE notifies the SEAE when it initiates 
an administrative case, as the SEAE can provide an opinion on its merits.148 
 
The institutional mandate of the SEAE is wider than competition law and policy as it is 
involved in the regulation of other sectors, such as games and prizes, energy, transport, 
media, and health. Its role in the BCPS is limited to two specific areas, namely conduct and 
mergers. In terms of human resources, the SEAE is composed of a total of around 22 
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professional and administrative staff;149 half are appointed and the remainder are employed 
via open competition.150 
 
One issue that assumes particular importance to the approach undertaken in the analysis of 
competition law cases is the training of members of the competition authority. It was stated 
by one member of the competition authority that in the SEAE and the SDE ‘...the staff has a 
strong American influence because many members have had links with the US through their 
education. We all know the US and EU theories, but there is a tendency to look at the US 
because of specialisation courses that have been undertaken’. This issue assumes even greater 
relevance when considering that the number of personnel staff in the BCPS will be increased 
to 200 professionals. Therefore, the future approach of the competition authority to abuse of 
dominance will depend in great part on how and where members of the staff will be trained.  
 
Although to a much lesser extent than the SDE, the SEAE was also criticised by interviewees 
for not being proactive in the enforcement of competition law, as well as for undertaking poor 
and slow investigations at times. With the enactment of the competition bill, the SEAE will 
be responsible for competition advocacy.151 Nevertheless, it will still hold investigative 
powers. It is hoped, by some interviewees, that the SEAE will become more proactive given 
that under the current draft of the competition bill, its personnel will be increased as well. 
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2.4.3 The Administrative Council for Economic Defence – CADE 
 
The Administrative Council for Economic Defence was created by Law 8,884/94 as an 
independent federal agency with competence to judge, as the last administrative instance, 
cases investigated by the SDE or the SEAE which have originated from complaints or from 
their own initiative.152 The CADE also has a role in competition advocacy, pursuant to 
Article 7(XVIII) of Law 8,884/94, which states that the CADE must educate the population 
in respect of the forms of offences to competition law. 
 
The Judging Council is composed of seven Councillors, one of whom is the President of the 
CADE. The decisions are always taken in a plenary session, i.e., every Councillor has a vote. 
The decisions are made by absolute majority, with the presence of at least five Councillors 
and the President has a casting vote.153 Dissenting votes are allowed and published. 
 
CADE was considered by most of the interviewees, including legal practitioners in the 
private sector, as a model for other administrative organisations. Many interviewees 
highlighted that it is transparent, in contrast with most other institutions in Brazil. In the 
words of one competition lawyer: 
 
The CADE is one of the most transparent public organisations that we have in Brazil. 
It is an organisation that tries to do things technically right. I see the CADE in a 
positive light, especially when compared with other regulatory agencies. For instance, 
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the ANATEL [the National Regulatory Agency for Telecommunications] is a disaster 
in the sense that you cannot even have access to your own case. I can see a growing 
respect in society for the CADE. It was not like this before; the CADE has improved. I 
think that the CADE is in the right track and I believe that [other] lawyers share my 
views. 
 
The aforementioned comments on CADE’s transparency and technical ability were 
mentioned by other interviewees. For instance, another Brazilian lawyer stated that the 
CADE was one of the few administrative bodies in Brazil that could be considered 
technically competent: ‘...whether you agree with the terms of the decisions or not is another 
matter; but one cannot neglect that it is a technical decision based on technical know-how’. 
 
Although the CADE represents a model for other Brazilian institutions, as well as to other 
competition authorities in developing countries, there are many aspects that are in need of 
reform to improve its effectiveness. This is particularly the case in relation to its shortage of 
staff and administrative resources. Indeed, a member of the BCPS declared that ‘the CADE’s 
infrastructure is very small, so it does not have enough personnel to develop strategies’. Some 
of the deficiencies of the competition authority that are particularly relevant for the CADE 
will be discussed below. 
  
65 
 
2.4.3.1 Shortage of administrative staff 
 
There are around 34 professional employees in the CADE:154 24 Specialists in Public Policy 
and Management and several DAS,155 which are fiduciary administrative appointees with the 
role of assisting the seven Councillors. 
 
According to one member of the competition authority, ‘[i]f you add all the professional staff 
of the CADE, the SDE and the SEAE, you will have circa 100-110 professionals. This figure 
is too little and creates administrative difficulties’. Given that there are no regional offices of 
the CADE to deal with cases of a regional magnitude, together with the fact that the CADE is 
an understaffed institution, it could be reasonably argued that it has managed to make the 
most of its limited resources.156 
 
Many members of the CADE are aware of the need to follow the developments in the 
markets and to become more proactive. However, the small number of personnel makes it 
difficult to enforce competition law effectively. As stated by one Councillor:  
 
The CADE has recently created some sector-specific groups of personnel responsible 
for regulation, economics and so on. However, the groups are formed by people that 
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 As stated by members of the CADE in August 2009. However, the OECD’s Peer review states that there is a 
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work in the chambers; therefore, they lack the time to participate in the groups 
effectively. There should be groups to follow at least the main ten sectors of the 
economy in order to follow the history of the sectors and to know recent 
developments. This would be better than just getting an economic model and applying 
it to a case without being fully familiar with the specific sector. With the competition 
bill, if it is enacted, there will be 200 professionals in the competition authority, so this 
may become possible.  
 
The current draft of the competition bill seeks to remedy this shortcoming by providing an 
increase of professional administrative staff at the BCPS to a total of 200.157 The increase of 
professional staff, coupled with adequate training, is likely to result in a more proactive 
competition authority and in better quality of investigations and decisions. Another 
problematic aspect that may be improved by an increase in personnel regards the ex-post 
facto analysis of competition law of cases involving complaints for potential harm.158 In 
addition, it will allow the BCPS to dedicate part of its staff to carry out studies and gain 
greater knowledge of the impact of its decisions, allowing them to learn from the past and to 
formulate a coherent competition policy. As affirmed by one Councillor:  
 
Currently there is no serious study on the effectiveness of the CADE’s decisions. 
There is no study, for instance, on the consequences of the merger of AmBev which 
was approved a decade ago,159 even though AmBev has been the object of many 
complaints of abuse of dominance over the past years.  
                                                 
157
 See Cadoca, Competition Bill n. 3,937/04, 50. 
158
 See Telet SA v Celular CRT SA - 53500.000502/2001. 
159
 See Silva, Companhia Antarctica Paulista/Companhia Cervejaria Brahma - 08012.005846/99-12. 
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2.4.3.2 High turnover of personnel 
 
Problems resulting from the shortage of administrative personnel are aggravated by the high 
rotation of the existing staff. This results in a lack of an ‘institutional memory’, which is 
faced by all institutions that form the BCPS; however, it may have a more harmful effect on 
the CADE, where the rotation of personnel appears to be extremely detrimental.160 
 
Previously, most of the professional staff would change at the end of a Councillors term of 
office. This issue was addressed in 2006 when the CADE created 27 permanent professional 
positions, although only 25 of them have been filled as of late 2009.161 Therefore, the positive 
effects of having professional administrative staff on a more permanent basis have not yet 
fully materialised. However, in the view of many members of the BCPS, this has resulted in a 
greater institutional memory, although, as stated by one member of the competition authority: 
‘...there are still too many DAS staff.162 This is not good for the development of a coherent 
policy. It becomes difficult to trace back the history of what has been done previously’. The 
particular concern in respect of the high numbers of DAS results from the fact that they are 
fiduciary administrative appointees which can be changed at any time. Given that many assist 
Councillors, it is common, for instance, for the DAS to change when a Councillor’s term of 
office comes to an end. 
 
When asked about CADE’s case-law during the interviews, many members of the BCPS, 
including Councillors, stated that they could only talk about the cases which occurred during 
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their term of office because, although they knew the views of previous Councillors, they had 
little knowledge about previous cases. It could be argued that this is irrelevant as Brazil is a 
civil law jurisdiction where the common law doctrine of binding precedent does not apply. 
However, the above finding raises concerns given that the lack of knowledge of previous 
decisions does not help the creation of a coherent body of case-law, which although not 
binding, is highly persuasive. Moreover, EU law in general is not subject to the doctrine of 
stare decisis; nonetheless EU institutions have sought to learn from the past in order to 
gradually develop a coherent competition policy.   
 
Problems arising from the high rotation of personnel and the lack of institutional memory are 
worsened by the fact that there is no specific administrative career tailored to the BCPS. 
Permanent positions are usually awarded to Specialists who have passed an open 
competition. After succeeding in this, Specialists can move within various governmental 
institutions after two years of becoming members of an institution. Moreover, as revealed by 
some interviewees, the two year limit before transferring to another institution might not 
apply if the transfer concerns institutions within the same Ministry.  
 
Although some Councillors confirmed that their assistants had some knowledge of 
competition policy developments before their terms started, a few interviewees suggested that 
even if permanent Specialists offer some institutional stability, they were not in themselves 
able to give a collective memory to the institution. This suggests that offering permanent 
positions is a positive step, but it is not a ‘magic bullet’ as it has to be accompanied with truly 
permanent positions to reduce the rotation of Specialists, as well as better record keeping, 
training and specialised public competitions.  
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2.4.3.3 Training 
 
The professional training and development of the BCPS’s administrative staff appears to be 
an issue of concern, as revealed during the interviews. These concerns were highlighted by a 
Councillor who stated that: 
 
The training is ‘on the job’. We do have training programmes, such as the FGV163 
specialisation programme, but sometimes individuals have already been working for a 
year or more before starting the course. The Specialists have received some general 
training during their preparation course for the national general competition, but 
specific training in relation to the competition authority is only one point in the whole 
syllabus. Also, the DAS do not receive any kind of prior training. 
 
In addition, there are members of the administrative support staff that do not need to pass any 
selection process. The CADE contracts a third company to provide support staff, whose basic 
requirement is for applicants to have acquired secondary education. This issue was raised by 
an interviewee who stated that, although for certain types of support services there is no need 
for applicants to have a higher education, for certain positions a degree in Law or Economics 
would be beneficial. 
 
Moreover, the fact that Specialists start working without any specific training is certainly a 
reason for concern. Practical experience is fundamental to fully understand the intricacies of 
the job; however, specialised in-house training on competition law and policy is essential to 
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master the fundamental issues and eliminate areas of practice where there is a shortage of 
skills.  
 
There are specialised courses provided by FGV which are offered to members of CADE, 
SDE and SEAE. This ensures a similar and consistent knowledge among junior members of 
the institutions that form the BCPS. The cost of the course is fully covered by the government 
and it deals with competition law, economics of competition, econometrics and regulated 
markets. The existence of specialised training is encouraging. However, there are aspects of 
the courses which could be improved upon. According to some members of the competition 
authority, the courses consist of various seminars, i.e., speakers from various specialisations 
come to talk about specific issues. While these speakers offer a variety of perspectives that 
could prove beneficial in raising awareness of wider issues, a more uniform, didactic 
treatment of specific competition law issues, focused on aspects such as the development of 
Brazilian case-law, interpretative approaches and the regulatory framework could prove to be 
more useful, especially for junior staff.164 
 
In addition to the aforementioned specialisation courses, the Specialists also enjoy the 
opportunity of undertaking academic or professional courses in foreign jurisdictions. This 
may influence the competition policy outlook of Specialists. In fact, members of the BCPS 
stated that some professionals were more inclined towards one of the major models of 
competition law, namely the US or the EU, as a result of courses attended in these 
jurisdictions. The views of the professionals that deal with the day-to-day job are also 
important when taking into consideration that interviewees stated that some Councillors had a 
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reputation for being more pro-US whilst others were more pro-EU. Given that the personnel 
and resources for training will be increased considerably with the enactment of the 
competition bill, the issue of international training should not be underestimated, as it has the 
potential to shape the future development of Brazilian competition policy. 
 
In addition to learning about the US and EU models of competition law, a training focused on 
the practical application of competition law by the CADE could foster the emergence of a 
more coherent and consistent Brazilian competition policy. This could serve as a point of 
reference for other developing countries. In fact, Brazil is not solely a receiver of technical 
assistance; it is becoming a provider as well.165 It has shared its experience with other Latin 
American countries such as Argentina, Chile, El Salvador and Paraguay.166 In addition, it is 
exporting its experience to countries outside Latin America. For instance, the Brazilian 
competition authority is working on an informal basis with the government of Angola to 
assist with the drafting of its competition law and with capacity building.167 Therefore, the 
approach of the competition authority, which mixes concepts from the US and the EU, as 
well as considering Brazil’s own peculiarities, may have an influence over the approach to 
competition law in other jurisdictions as well. This, in conjunction with the growing 
economic and political influence of Brazil in the global economy, highlights the importance 
of ensuring a coherent approach to competition law in Brazil.  
 
Improvements in training could result in a clearer policy, especially in regards to abuse of 
dominance, which is an area where there is still lack of guidance on the enforcement of 
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competition law. It emerged from interviews that the BCPS has made many efforts to clarify 
the application of competition law in relation to mergers and cartels through, for instance, the 
issuance of guidelines, studies and policy reports. However, effort needs to be made to clarify 
how unilateral conduct ought to be regulated. According to the view of one lawyer: 
 
I do not believe that what could be deemed to constitute an abuse of economic power 
is clear. There are two red herrings that come to the mind of a Brazilian CEO when 
you mention the CADE or competition law: mergers and cartels. Abuse of dominance 
does not come into their minds at all.  
 
It has also been affirmed by another competition lawyer that: ‘...there is a lack of knowledge 
in clients of what could be considered an abuse of dominance. (...) The term abuse of 
dominant position is not even in the mind of company officers of dominant undertakings’. 
Further improvements to the training of Specialists, combined with competition law advocacy 
and the drafting of guidelines on abuse of dominance could result in a greater understanding 
of abuse of dominance offences, as well as a clearer policy in this respect. In addition, an 
increased number of high-profile abuse of dominance decisions could serve an educational 
purpose. In the words of one lawyer: ‘Only solid decisions would make company directors 
think about abuse of dominance’. An example of the importance of solid decisions is the 
recent AmBev168 judgment, which received considerable attention within the media and got 
practitioners, CEOs and society in general talking about abuse of dominance.  
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2.4.3.4 Short terms of office of Councillors and the influence of the Executive 
 
The short terms of office of Councillors contribute for the lack of ‘institutional memory’ 
mentioned above.169 There are seven Councillors, one of them being the President of the 
Council. They exercise administrative adjudicative roles as quasi-judges and their decisions 
can be appealed to the courts. 
 
Currently, Councillors are appointed by the President of the Republic and approved by the 
Senate; their term of office lasts for two years and can be extended for another two. This 
short term of office also applies to the Advocate General who is appointed by the President of 
the Republic under the nomination of the Ministry of Justice and is approved by the Senate. 
There is one Advocate General, who is assisted by three non appointed Advocates and do not 
have a determined term of office. In a similar vein to the Specialists, Advocates need to 
progress a national open competition and later opt to join the competition authority. 
 
The Advocates have two roles. The first one is ex ante, guiding Councillors on legal aspects 
of the decisions, making sure that they respect legal principles, as well as informing the 
Councillors of what is likely to be accepted by the courts. For instance, if there is a similar 
decision that was rejected by the courts, the Advocate General will instruct Councillors to 
modify their decision to reduce the possibility of rejection by the courts. The Advocate 
General also holds informal meetings with Councillors to offer guidance in respect of how to 
best apply and interpret, especially when they are faced with a complex case. 
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The second role is ex post, which regards the judicial defence of the decision. The Advocates 
anticipate the matters that will be brought before the courts and prepare the defence, 
sometimes even before the companies ask for a judicial review of the decision in order to 
speed up the process. 
 
The current draft of the competition bill addresses the issue of short terms of office, as 
Councillors and the Advocate General will have a four-year term without the possibility of 
having a second term. This will be an attempt to improve the ‘indirect’ interference that the 
Executive and the Legislative can have over Councillors in their first term of office. 
 
In fact, the short duration of the term of office of Councillors and the Advocate General 
currently allows the Executive and the Legislative to exercise considerable influence over the 
BCPS. One Councillor stated the following:  
 
The re-conduction for a second term is not linked to the fact that you had a good first 
term or not; it depends on political will. When the government clarifies its position on 
a certain case, this generates pressure on members of the CADE. There was one 
Councillor that stood by his decision in the polemic merger between Nestlé and 
Garoto just before the confirmation of his second term of office was due. His decision 
created much political pressure and it became clear that his term would not be 
extended.  
 
Many members of the competition authority reiterated this incident during the interviews. 
According to another Councillor, the extension of the term of office of this Councillor was 
about to be confirmed by the Senate: 
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...but the politicians did not allow his name to go to the plenary session because he 
was one of the biggest supporters of the Nestlé-Garoto decision and politicians from 
the Federal State of Espírito Santo created many problems; this Councillor waited for 
four months for his term of office to be extended; as it did not happen, he decided to 
quit. 
 
This does not seem to have been an isolated case, as another Councillor affirmed that: 
 
When the merger of AmBev170 was approved, the term of office of four Councillors 
was not confirmed. It was a very controversial period because there were complaints 
of corruption and articles on this issue appeared in major magazines.171 At the end, the 
Minister of Justice did not investigate any accusations but decided not to confirm the 
second term of office of anyone. 
 
In fact, when the controversial merger between Brahma and Antartica (which created 
AmBev) was approved, it was said that the President of the CADE, Gesner Oliveira, had 
made an agreement with the Executive. He was said to have acted as the ‘right hand man’ of 
the Executive in the decision and that the CADE would benefit from supporting the 
Executive’s will by having its budget increased.172 Another Councillor stated that ‘[i]f the 
ruling party changes, it may well be that the President decides to change all the proposed 
nominees which are awaiting approval by the Senate, and so the Councillors may change’. 
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According to one Councillor, the pressure exercised by the Executive over the BCPS is 
indirect: 
 
I have never received a call from anyone asking me to vote in a particular manner. 
What does happen is someone calling you asking for information, but this is fair 
enough, since we are a public administrative body. We have not been directly elected. 
We have been appointed by the President, so he has the right to know why we decided 
in a certain way. 
 
The fact that Brazil is a democratic State means that the political pressure is not as ‘direct’ as 
it may be in other BRIC countries, such as in China. However, the existence of an ‘indirect’ 
pressure could result in the danger of competition law becoming politicised, rather than being 
applied objectively; this certainly takes away part of the independence of some members of 
the CADE. The fact that a Councillor has been appointed by the President does not give the 
latter the right to supervise the BCPS by asking why a Councillor voted in a particular way.  
 
Under Law 8,884/94, the CADE is instituted as an independent federal agency. Therefore, it 
could be rightfully argued that the President is subject to the law and should not interfere in 
any way. Although Councillors do not form part of the Judiciary, their independence is 
guaranteed by law. Their fixed terms of office, together with the political scrutiny that 
candidates receive before their appointments are approved, should invalidate the 
aforementioned statement that equates the President to a ‘rightful supervisor’ of Councillors.   
 
The ‘indirect’ interference of the Executive over the BCPS runs contrary to constitutional 
principles of fair governance and the rule of law; this is particularly disturbing given that 
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Brazil is a western democratic State. The relevance of the existence of ‘indirect’ interference 
of the Executive over the BCPS may result in an approach that is not always based on legal 
certainty and may cause incoherent case analysis. The in-depth analysis of the effects on the 
policy of the BCPS due to the interference of the Executive is out of the scope of this thesis, 
but is an issue revealed by the interviews conducted in this research which deserves further 
studies. In any case, this matter is likely to be addressed with the enactment of the 
competition bill, which seeks to increase the independence of Councillors, as it provides 
longer terms of office without the possibility of re-appointments.  
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2.4.3.5 Judicial Review 
 
Although the CADE is an administrative body, its Councillors enjoy a quasi-judicial role. 
This is because the Brazilian legal and administrative systems have been largely inspired by 
models from Continental Europe. The quasi-judicial role of Councillors is akin to that of 
Conseillers of the Conseil d'État in France.173  
 
According to the Federal Constitution of 1988, the law cannot prohibit judicial review.174 
Therefore, CADE’s decisions are subject to judicial review. The Judiciary in Brazil is divided 
into Federal Justice and State Justice. The first is responsible for judging any cases where the 
Federal Union, its independent agencies, foundations and public companies are complainants 
or defendants, whereas the latter has a residual competence.175 Both Federal and State Justice 
have first and second instances. For constitutional matters, appeals can be made to the 
Supreme Federal Court. 
 
Article 64 of Law 8,884/94 states that the review of competition law decisions should be 
made at the first instance of the federal courts of the federal district of Brasilia or at the 
judicial district where the defendant is domiciled, at the discretion of the CADE.176 The 
courts can review CADE’s decision on procedural and substantive grounds. Therefore, the 
merits of the administrative decision are not out of bounds. In practice, a judge can overturn a 
decision of the CADE. 
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The process of judicial review was considered to be far from perfect by most interviewees. 
The main concern appears to be the procedural delays involved. According to an Advocate, 
appeals to the courts occur in circa 85% of the cases where liability is held. When decisions 
are reviewed by the courts, they are sent to the first instance which allows for the possibility 
of having a subsequent appeal to the second instance, and in some cases it may even be 
possible to appeal to the third instance, i.e. to the Supreme Federal Court for constitutional 
matters. The administration of justice in general in Brazil is not very efficient and since 
appeals are allowed to the first instance courts, competition law cases follow the same slow 
procedures as cases presented for the first time to the courts. Moreover, parties have many 
procedural rights which are often abused and used as delaying tactics. Therefore, cases 
usually take many years to be decided by the courts.  
 
As a result of these delays, Advocates in charge of defending CADE’s decisions make a point 
of endeavouring to respond to judicial demands promptly. In the words of an Advocate: ‘...if 
a case takes two years to be judged instead of ten, we consider this a great achievement’. 
According to another Advocate: 
 
Although the period to present the defence in a case is usually 60 days, the Advocates 
usually present it in three days or in one week in an attempt to guarantee celerity and 
ensure the credibility of the CADE before the courts. This is very important as the role 
of the Advocates is to be seen by the courts in a positive light. 
 
According to the interviewees, the courts have the right to re-examine decisions. However, 
due to the complexities of the competition law, the scope of the review is generally limited. 
For instance, it is more likely for the courts to re-examine how certain terms were interpreted, 
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or if the procedure was in accordance with the law, rather than re-examining how the 
economic analysis was undertaken. Therefore, the courts tend to confirm the decisions of the 
CADE. In this sense, the main concern is not whether the courts reverse a decision; rather, it 
is whether long procedural delays result in the ineffectiveness of decisions. As confirmed by 
an Advocate: ‘...there is a temporal ineffectiveness, i.e., the courts may confirm CADE’s 
decision, but only after too many years’. 
 
Another concern raised by members of the BCPS is that the courts grant too frequently 
interim relief which suspends the effectiveness of the decisions of the CADE by preserving 
the status quo pending trial. This concern is based on the premise that the courts often fail to 
take into consideration the wider interests at stake when reviewing competition law decisions. 
They prefer to maintain the status quo by restricting the scope of sanctions imposed by the 
CADE. In the view of one member of the competition authority: ‘[t]he courts usually 
maintain the status quo. This is dangerous because of the tendency of looking at the harm 
caused to the undertaking in question and neglecting the harm caused to consumers’. For 
instance, the CADE decided the AmBev177 case in July 2009,178 applying the highest fine for 
an abuse of dominance case in its history.179 However, the effectiveness of the decision is 
likely to be felt only in a few years, given that the courts have granted interim relief, allowing 
AmBev not to pay the fine imposed by the CADE until the decision becomes res judicata. 
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When questioned on the aforementioned concerns, although Lawyers tended to defend the 
right of judicial review, they also recognised that the administration of justice should be 
improved to limit the scope of reviews. In the words of one Lawyer: 
 
Judges should not be able to put themselves in the place of seven Councillors and 
review the whole decision. However, I do not think that the judge should decide only 
on abstract legal matters either. He or she should be able to decide on the merits, but 
subject to restrictions.  
 
Moreover, when CADE’s decisions are reviewed, applicants can submit challenges based on 
facts as well as on points of law. For instance, applicants can contest proofs or statements of 
case, or simply submit a total denial of CADE’s claims. In the words of an Advocate: 
‘Lawyers can contest the merit as well as the facts, but usually they challenge the admission 
of proofs. Lawyers many times lie and state that something did not happen, although they 
know that it did happen’. The latter statement could appear surprising to observers from a 
common law tradition. For example, Barristers or Solicitors in England & Wales are treated 
as officers of the court who cannot act dishonestly by deceiving the court.180 In Brazil, 
professional conduct rules are different, as Lawyers are under the overriding obligation to act 
on the best interest of their clients, even if it results in deceiving the court.    
 
A lack of competition law knowledge among members of the courts was also deemed to be a 
problem by interviewees. Most universities do not currently offer specific courses on 
competition law. Therefore, it is an area of law which is alien to most judges, some of whom 
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may consider the very existence of competition law provisions as unnecessary. This issue 
could be addressed by the creation of a specialised court within the Judiciary to review 
CADE’s decisions. In the view of one Councillor: 
 
...the Judiciary’s structure is very slow and unworkable; because of this, today it is 
almost impossible to have a decent enforcement of CADE’s decisions. A specialised 
court could be created, with the possibility of appealing to the second instance and the 
Supreme Court for violation of the law or constitution, similarly to what currently 
happens with the Labour Justice or the Military Justice.  
 
The above reform proposal appears to be reasonable, given that specialised courts within the 
Judiciary would ensure the correct application of competition law and raise its standing or 
profile within the Brazilian legal system. However, it would involve high costs and many of 
the interviewees stated that it would be virtually impossible to convince the government to 
make such an investment. 
 
The fact that CADE’s decisions are reviewed by first instance judges, rather than by judges 
from within the higher hierarchy of the Judiciary was regarded by many interviewees to 
constitute a major problem and an obstacle to the effectiveness of the decisions. However, in 
order to be able to implement this suggested reform by providing the right to ask for a review 
of CADE’s decisions to a second instance of the Judiciary,181 amendments to the Constitution 
would be needed. Moreover, this reform proposal raises wider political institutional issues. In 
the words of one Councillor: ‘...if the CADE asks for this [reform], then other national 
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agencies would ask for it as well and the reform would become politically impossible’. 
Another Councillor stated that ‘...we would like the decisions to be faster. Theoretically 
speaking, it may be a good idea, but it is not possible to implement such thing’. 
 
One possible alternative would be to change the drafting of Article 97 of the competition bill, 
as it currently reflects the provisions of Article 64 of Law 8,884/94. The possibility of 
appealing to the court of the district where the defendant is domiciled should be removed. 
Thence, all the appeals would be made exclusively to the federal courts of the federal district 
of Brasilia. This would result in improvements in procedural terms, since there would be 
fewer delays in the federal courts. The quality of the decisions would be improved as well, 
given that the number of judges dealing with competition law would be limited and their 
knowledge of the matter would increase over time. One criticism that this solution might 
receive is that it would not be fair on defendants. However, this criticism appears to be 
unsubstantiated as the original the decision was held by the competition authority, which is 
also located in Brasilia. 
 
The issues raised in this section are crucial for the effectiveness of CADE’s decisions. 
Unfortunately, the competition bill does not address this matter and it appears that no law will 
do so in the near future. Advocates try their best to speed up the cases in court, but this is 
clearly not enough and requires reform. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
Brazil has had an economy defined by governmental intervention, monopolies and highly 
concentrated markets since its colonial times. Following two decades of autocratic military 
dictatorships, a return to democratic rule occurred in 1985. Although this political transition 
was beneficial, the economic transition from a highly regulated market to a more liberal 
environment resulted in poor economic performance and high inflation rates. 
 
From the early 1990s, the market underwent a series of reforms consisting of the privatisation 
of state-owned enterprises and the abandonment of many protectionist policies. To ensure 
greater economic stability and growth, the 1994 monetary stabilisation plan, commonly 
known as the Real Plan, introduced the current currency and successfully reduced the rate of 
inflation. In the same year, Law 8,884/94 was enacted and this constitutes the current 
competition law until the enactment of the competition bill in the near future.  
 
Law 8,884/94 and the competition bill seek to reinforce the protection of constitutional 
principles, such as free enterprise, open competition, the social role of property and consumer 
welfare, as well as the restraint of abuses of economic power that result in harm to the 
economic order.   
 
Given the special concern with economic stability and inflation, Law 8,884/94 reiterates 
many provisions that were already present in the Consumer Code of 1990, such as the 
prohibition of charging excessive prices. Although the CADE has distanced its approach 
from a literal interpretation of the law and Brazil no longer suffers from high levels of 
inflation, this has resulted in a style of competition law which is consumer oriented.  
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The most important provisions of Law 8,884/94 are Articles 20 and 21. These provisions are 
interconnected as the latter contains a non-exhaustive list of typified anti-competitive 
practices that are prohibited if they are capable of breaching Article 20.  
 
The competition bill introduces some structural changes to the current regulatory system, 
such as the amalgamation of Articles 20 and 21 into a single provision. However, in terms of 
abuse of dominance, there will be no major regulatory reforms. 
 
An analysis of the various institutions that constitute the BCPS indicated that, although many 
improvements have taken place and the competition authority has managed to make the most 
out of limited resources to develop the Brazilian competition law regime, there is still room 
for improvement, which explains the current deliberation of the competition bill. The 
institutions that form the BCPS suffer from a chronic shortage of staff which, in conjunction 
with the high rotation of personnel, harms the emergence of an ‘institutional memory’ and 
consequently, the creation of a consistent competition policy and coherent body of case-law. 
The competition bill aims to resolve this issue by increasing considerably the number of 
permanent administrative staff at the BCPS.  
 
Another issue that the competition bill seeks to address is the erosion of the competition 
authority’s independence from the Executive and Legislative by replacing the short 
renewable terms of office of Councillors with longer fixed terms of four years; thereby 
reducing the ‘indirect’ influence of the government on decisions. This object of reform is 
welcomed, given that Brazil is a democratic state with constitutional principles such as the 
separation of powers, good governance and the rule of law, so such interferences should not 
take place.   
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Interviews with members of the BCPS revealed that the training received by administrative 
staff, particularly by Specialists, is in need of reform. Training of a practical and theoretical 
nature should be offered to all members, particularly to those at a junior level. Moreover, 
training courses should give particular consideration to economic sectors, whilst offering an 
awareness of the main models of competition law, namely the US and the EU, without losing 
sight of the Brazilian system. This is of particular relevance to how the Brazilian competition 
law will be interpreted and applied in the future, since it was found that the training received 
does have and influence in how members of the staff perceive competition rules and with the 
enactment of the competition bill there will be many new professionals joining the 
competition authority.    
 
Finally, many issues were revealed in respect to how judicial review is conducted, namely the 
ineffectiveness of CADE’s decisions, the inexperience of the courts with competition law, as 
well as long procedural delays. There are many proposed reforms to resolve these issues, 
such as allowing appeals from the CADE directly to the second instance of the Judiciary, 
shortening procedures. However, this does not appear to be a viable solution at either a 
practical or theoretical level, as it would require an amendment of the Constitution and it does 
not solve the problem of the current lack of familiarity of competition law by the courts. 
Another proposed reform would be to create a specialised court or section to hear appeals 
from the BCPS. However, this would involve high costs and many of the interviewees stated 
that it would be virtually impossible to convince the government to make such investment. 
The issues concerning the current judicial review of CADE’s decisions is not addressed by 
the competition bill, but it is of crucial importance for the effectiveness of the decisions.  
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A proposed reform concerns the removal of the possibility of appeal to the judicial district 
where the defendant is domiciled, thereby resulting in a single court to hear all appeals from 
the CADE, i.e. the federal courts of Brasilia. The advantages of such reform are twofold: 
firstly, proceedings would be conducted in a prompt and efficient manner; secondly, it would 
allow the courts to gain greater expertise in competition law. This proposal could be subject 
of criticism as it removes the general principle that the forum ought to be where the defendant 
is domiciled. However, it must be borne in mind that the original decision was held by the 
competition authority, which is also located in Brasilia, so this should not constitute a further 
burden on the defendant. In any case, in-depth research should be undertaken to find the best 
solution at an institutional, legal and political level. 
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3. Chapter Two - Monopoly Power Control in the EU and the US: Convergence and 
Divergence 
 
This chapter discusses the approach of the US and the EU to monopoly power control. It is 
not intended to summarise all the regulations and policies in these jurisdictions; rather, it will 
offer a framework to assist a comparative analysis in the following chapters which discuss 
how monopoly power control is developing in Brazil. Accordingly, this chapter highlights the 
key aspects of monopoly power control in the US and the EU, as the comparative analysis of 
this research requires that the main differences and similarities between these jurisdictions are 
made clear. 
 
It could be argued that the EU and the US pursue the same goal, i.e. the maintenance of 
competition for the benefit of consumers and society. The central focus of competition 
authorities and courts in these jurisdictions is not primarily aimed at protecting competitors; 
rather, the protection of the process of competition is the generally accepted aim of 
competition law. Therefore, it would be fair to expect a similar approach to abuse of 
dominance on both sides of the Atlantic. However, the EU and the US competition policies 
have developed differently.182 The American approach is generally less regulatory and takes a 
more laissez-faire stance in comparison to the EU. In fact, some important cases, such as 
British Airways183 and Microsoft,184 which involved the same parties and circumstances, have 
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resulted in different outcomes, summarised by the clearance in the US and prohibition in the 
EU. 
 
The divergent approaches of US and EU competition policies pose some questions, such as 
how different is the regulation of economic power in the US and the EU and how do these 
differences manifest in the antitrust analysis with respect to monopolisation and abuse of 
dominance offences in these jurisdictions.   
 
Providing a definitive and comprehensive answer to the above questions is challenging, as 
there are many diverging opinions,185 and would be beyond the scope of this research. This 
section on divergence and convergence is useful to better understand the development and 
direction of Brazilian competition law. Therefore, the following paragraphs will endeavour to 
shed some light in respect to the following central diverging elements between the US and 
EU models: (1) the per se rule and the rule of reason; (2) the requirement of proof of effects; 
(3) the roles of efficiency defences and objective justifications. 
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3.1  Per se rule and the rule of reason 
 
As revealed by the interviews, several members of the Brazilian competition authority were 
not certain about the meaning and differences between the per se rule and the rule of reason. 
Many believed that the per se rule was only used in the EU, while the rule of reason was only 
used in the US. As will be discussed below, there appears to be some misconception of these 
concepts in Brazil.   
 
The US Supreme Court has stated that the rule of reason is the prevailing standard in antitrust 
analysis.186 The fact that it is ‘prevailing’ implies that it is not the only standard used. Indeed, 
the per se rule is still present, although with a reduced scope. One of the justifications for the 
per se rule is that, with the development of the case-law, the competition authorities and 
courts can develop clear rules to enhance deterrence avoiding a rule of reason analysis which 
will result at times in mistakes due to the high costs that it involves.187 The EU model adopts 
a forms-based, or quasi per se approach with respect to abuse of dominance. However, it has 
been suggested that the EU analysis is moving from a formalistic towards an effects-based 
approach,188 i.e. closer to the rule of reason.  
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3.1.1 Per se rule 
 
The use of the per se rule in antitrust law originated in the United States. In 1958 the US 
Supreme Court stated in Northern Pacific Railway the concept and purpose of the per se rule: 
 
There are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on 
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be 
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm 
they have caused or the business excuse for their use.189 
 
Per se prohibitions result from the policy making of antitrust courts and agencies.190 Conduct 
prohibited per se is that one which would be very likely to be prohibited when applying the 
rule of reason. Pragmatically, once identified, these types of conduct would be prohibited 
without the need to undertake an in-depth analysis under the rule of reason. In essence, the 
rule of reason is generally considered the opposite of the per se approach.191 When applying 
the rule of reason, the pro and anti competitive effects and efficiencies generated by the 
conduct are balanced. 
 
The per se rule is similar in the US and the EU. In the latter, the European Commission, after 
examining the conduct’s features, rather than its economic impact, determines if the dominant 
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undertaking’s conduct is capable, by its own nature, of causing anti-competitive effects on 
the market and falling foul of competition law.192 
 
Adopting the per se approach offers many advantages, such as greater legal certainty, 
benefiting regulators and competitors alike, as well as lower enforcement costs. Moreover, it 
reduces the need for courts to make in-depth economic judgments which they are ill-equipped 
to do.193 Notwithstanding these positive aspects, the adoption of a per se approach also has its 
drawbacks. For instance, there is a concern that economic freedom would be restricted and 
undertakings would be unfairly punished in cases where the conduct prohibited under the per 
se rule did not in fact generate anti-competitive effects, or worse, the conduct that prohibited 
could be pro-competitive. These scenarios represent ‘type I’ errors, or false positives.194 
 
Whilst EU competition law has many form-based prohibitions, in the US they play a 
secondary role in antitrust analysis.195 In the US, antitrust enforcement relied frequently on 
per se rules until the 1960s, when criticism, especially from scholars of the Chicago school, 
influenced antitrust legal reasoning by giving prominence to economic considerations. As a 
result, the US approach moved towards the rule of reason.196 
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3.1.2 Rule of reason 
 
Pursuant to the US antitrust analysis, the existence of actual or likely harm has to be 
demonstrated for a conduct to be deemed monopolistic. Such harm can be extremely difficult 
to prove under the rule of reason, reinforcing a liberal antitrust policy. A precursor to the rule 
of reason can be found in the reasoning of Board of Trade of Chicago,197 a 1919 decision 
from the US Supreme Court which stated: 
 
The court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the 
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature 
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil 
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end 
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.198 
 
The rule of reason presents many benefits. Each case is assessed in relation to its individual 
merits and circumstances and the risk of type I errors is likely to be lower than when applying 
per se rules. In addition, supporters of the rule of reason state that type I errors are more 
detrimental to the market than type II errors.199 
 
Nevertheless, research conducted by Michael A. Carrier,200 who analysed antitrust cases 
judged by the US federal courts pursuant to the rule of reason from 1977 until 2009, raised 
concerns about the consequences of type II errors, i.e., false negatives. Carrier observed that 
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the US federal courts tend to follow a three-stage approach when applying the rule of reason: 
(1) the complainant will first have to show a significant anti-competitive effect; (2) if this is 
demonstrated, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant who then needs to show a legitimate 
pro-competitive justification; (3) if the defendant satisfies this burden, the complainant will 
need to prove that the alleged conduct is not reasonably necessary or that the goals of the 
defendant could be achieved by less restrictive means. Only then will the court balance pro 
and anti competitive effects.201 Therefore, the rule of reason results in a higher standard of 
proof and, in contrast with what members of the Brazilian competition authority stated, it 
does not differ from the per se rule solely by the fact that efficiencies, harm and other 
elements of the market are taken into consideration.202 
 
The standard and burden of proof differs considerably from the per se approach given that, 
when the rule of reason is adopted, the claimant has to show a significant actual or likely anti-
competitive effect. If the defendant manages to provide a justification, the burden shifts back 
to the claimant and the standard of proof becomes even higher. This explains why the rule of 
reason results in a more laissez-faire enforcement of competition law as it becomes 
increasingly more difficult to find the defendant firm liable.203 
 
When there are no actual effects, the competition authority or the claimant will need to be 
able to demonstrate that the effects are likely to take place and take into account the market 
                                                 
201
 See Ibid. 
202
 According to one member of the BCPS, the rule of reason differs from the per se rule because ‘...it is a cost-
benefits analysis’. Another interviewee stated that ‘When we mention the rule of reason, we mean something 
that is not a per se offence and that needs to be analysed methodically with reasonableness’. It was also noted by 
another interviewee that ‘...after defining the market you apply the rule of reason, i.e., you check the barriers to 
entry, rivalry in the market, etc’. 
203
 De Smet, “The Diametrically Opposed Principles of US and EU Antitrust Policy.” 
95 
 
power of the defendant and other market elements.204 This higher standard differentiates the 
US model from the EU model, as only in the latter the risk of elimination of effective 
competition has to be demonstrated.205 In this respect, the general standard of proof of the 
Brazilian rule of reason is closer to the EU model, since Article 21 of Law 8,884/94 prohibits 
any conduct to the extent that a dominant firm is capable of producing anti-competitive 
effects.206 
 
A fact noted by Carrier207 that supports the view that the US rule of reason results in a 
laissez-faire competition policy is that courts tended to dismiss most claims on the first stage 
of the procedure. Between 1977 and 1999 84% of claims were dismissed in this first stage 
and only 4% of claims involved the last stage of reasoning, i.e., balancing pro and anti-
competitive elements. Between 1999 and 2009 the figures were 97% and 2% respectively.208 
When the rule of reason is adopted, according to statistics, claimants or prosecutors are 
overwhelmingly unsuccessful. Only one of the claims between 1999 and 2009 which 
managed to reach the balancing analysis was won by the claimant.209 In almost all rule of 
reason decisions the claimant failed to prove actual or likely anti-competitive effects. These 
effects can be demonstrated in one of two ways: 
 
First (...) [the claimants] can show an actual adverse effect, such as an increase in 
price, reduction in output, or deterioration in quality. Second, they can show a 
potential adverse effect, as revealed by market power. (...) [Claimants] proving this 
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element must delineate relevant product and geographic markets and offer proof of the 
defendant’s power in the markets.210 
 
Carrier’s findings demonstrate that the burden and standard of proof in the rule of reason 
constitute a difficult obstacle for claimants and prosecutors to overcome in proceedings 
before American courts.211 It could be argued that, given such difficulties, there would be a 
lower number of vexatious claims in the US and claimants would gather a greater amount of 
evidence before initiating a claim.212 However, what appears to be clear is that the American 
rule of reason results in a considerably non-regulatory or laissez-faire approach, as only a 
negligible amount of abusive conduct resulted in liability. This may explain why the EU has 
shown resistance to adopt the rule of reason, as the essence of the EU competition law is 
aimed at achieving the goals set forth in the EU Treaties which imply a more regulatory 
approach.   
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3.2 Proof of effects 
 
On the one hand, one could argue that competition authorities should prohibit abusive 
conduct only in cases where it is possible to identify actual anti-competitive effects, i.e. 
where the conduct has materialised and resulted in harm to competition. On the other hand, it 
could be argued that competition law should not be concerned solely with effects; rather it 
should serve a ‘prophylactic purpose’ to deter attempts to commit offences.213 If proof of 
actual effects was required, this ‘...would be a standard of proof if not virtually impossible to 
meet, at least most ill-suited for ascertainment by courts’.214 The application of competition 
law would only occur ex post facto. This would be undesirable as the harm would have 
occurred, at times irreversibly.  
 
In common with the EU and Brazil, it is clear that proof of actual anti-competitive effects is 
not a necessary requirement in the US. This was confirmed by the US Supreme Court in 
American Tobacco:  ‘[n]either proof of exertion of the power to exclude nor proof of actual 
exclusion of existing or potential competitors is essential to sustain a charge of 
monopolization under the Sherman Act’.215 
 
A link between the conduct and the acquisition and maintenance of the firm’s market power 
forms part of the legal analysis. Conduct of firms with market power should not pose 
‘...restraints that are not reasonably “necessary” to competition on the merits and [should not] 
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reasonably appear capable of making a significant contribution to creating or maintaining 
monopoly power’.216 
 
It should be noted that Section 2 of the Sherman Act ‘...does not condemn monopolies as 
such, [but] it is directed at unreasonably exclusionary conduct that would make more likely 
the future exercise of market power’.217 Producing expert economic analysis to prove that 
anti-competitive effects are likely rather than probable is very expensive and laborious. The 
standard of proof would be therefore higher and the expert evidence would be based on 
hypothetical calculations. 
 
Initially, one could assume that the EU adopts a similar approach to the US with respect to 
market power regulation. Both jurisdictions prohibit conduct that foreclose the market and 
have adverse effects on consumers. Moreover, the EC Guidance on the Commission's 
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct 
by Dominant Undertakings (EC Guidance) declares that conduct is prohibited if it hampers or 
eliminates ‘...effective access of actual or potential competitors to supplies or markets and 
(...) [are] likely to have an adverse impact on consumer welfare, whether in the form of 
higher price levels than would have otherwise prevailed or in some other form’.218 
 
From a literal interpretation of the Guidance one could assume that, in common with the US 
approach, the European Commission would require the proof of the likely anti-competitive 
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effects of the conduct. However, in Microsoft219 the Commission stated that if the anti-
competitive behaviour of Microsoft were to continue there would be: 
 
...a serious risk that Microsoft will succeed in eliminating all effective competition in 
the work group server operating system market (...) [and] this would have a significant 
negative effect on its incentives to innovate as regards its client PC and work group 
server operating system products.220 
 
The standard of proof required was a ‘serious risk’ of eliminating all effective competition. 
Therefore, the reasoning of the Commission reiterated the EU standard based on risk, which 
is easier to prove than the US standard based on the likely effects.  
 
Microsoft argued that the Commission had to demonstrate that the elimination of competition 
was likely, rather than basing its decision on a serious risk. The General Court stated as 
follows: 
 
For the purposes of application of Article 82 EC, the expressions ‘risk of elimination 
of competition’ and ‘likely to eliminate competition’ are used without distinction by 
the Community judicature to reflect the same idea, namely that Article 82 EC does not 
apply only from the time when there is no more, or practically no more, competition 
on the market. If the Commission were required to wait until competitors were 
eliminated from the market, or until their elimination was sufficiently imminent, 
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before being able to take action under Article 82 EC, that would clearly run counter to 
the objective of that provision, which is to maintain undistorted competition in the 
common market and, in particular, to safeguard the competition that still exists on the 
relevant market.221 
 
The General Court did not expressly clarify whether the standard of proof ought to be risk-
based or likeliness-based. However, the reasoning of the decision implies that the standard 
for proving probable effects ought to be set at a lower level than in the US on the grounds 
that the Commission must not be prevented from acting by requiring that the effects were 
sufficiently imminent. 
 
Moreover, the General Court stated ‘...that no effects-based analysis was required even 
though the Commission thought it should be’ and ‘...the Commission’s findings in the first 
stage of its reasoning are in themselves sufficient to establish that [foreclosure of competition 
as a] constituent element of abusive bundling is present in this case’.222 
 
Microsoft223 follows the previous reasoning of Michelin II,224 where the court set a low 
standard of proof by declaring that ‘...it is sufficient to show that the abusive conduct of the 
undertaking in a dominant position tends to restrict competition or, in other words, that the 
conduct is capable of having that effect’.225 In the view of Professor Anderman, the General 
Court’s judgments enunciate a test to be applied in respect to Article 102 cases which are 
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‘...not concerned with proof of effects, but rather with proof of conduct that could possibly 
produce effects. This is in line with previous ECJ case law on Art.82 EC’.226 
 
The Brazilian competition authority generally follows a similar approach to the EU. The 
competition law 8,884/94 prohibits conduct that is capable, rather than likely, of producing 
anti-competitive effects. Pursuant to the provisions of Law 8,884/94, the competition 
authority only needs to prove the existence of a conduct that could potentially produce anti-
competitive effects. Thus, the analysis of possible harm to consumers, under an impact-based 
approach does not necessarily mean that the Brazilian competition authority is under an 
obligation to prove the likely effects and the quantum of such harm.227 
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3.3 The role of efficiency defences and objective justifications 
 
This section will deal with how efficiencies form part of the legal reasoning in the US as 
efficiency defences and in the EU as objective justifications in the analysis of abuse of 
dominance. When analysing a conduct pursuant to the US rule of reason, efficiencies play a 
role in the balancing of pro and anti competitive effects, in addition to forming a central part 
of the defence arguments. Therefore, a conduct that, under a preliminary analysis, meets all 
the legal requirements to constitute an antitrust offence could nonetheless be permitted if the 
defendant demonstrates that it results in economic efficiencies. In doing so, both the US 
competition authorities and courts demonstrate a belief that harm to competition can be 
outweighed by the benefits of efficiencies.  
 
However, this policy may also result in a non-interventionist approach where very few 
practices are prohibited.228 Future developments of US antitrust law could mirror policy 
changes proposed by the Obama administration.229 The current political momentum in favour 
of regulation in the US may result in an approach where the intention of firms, as well as the 
potential harm to competition, could be given prominence over efficiency considerations.  
 
If the EU were to take a similar approach to the US with respect to abuse of dominance, one 
would expect efficiencies to be treated as defences as in the American rule of reason and in 
common with the approach currently undertaken under Article 101 TFEU.  
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In the EU, there would be two possible types of defence: objective justifications and 
efficiency defences. Differently from efficiency defences, objective justifications are 
exemptions, as they refer ‘...to a form of reasoning that takes potentially unlawful behaviour 
outside the scope of a Treaty prohibition rather than finding a breach of the law first and then 
considering the application of a defence’.230 Objective justifications can be an objective 
necessity231 or the need to meet competition.232  
 
For an efficiency defence to the conduct of a dominant firm to be accepted, the defendant has 
to prove that: (1) economic efficiencies result from its conduct; (2) the conduct is 
indispensable in achieving such efficiencies; and (3) the conduct benefits consumers.233  
Moreover, it is necessary to prove that ‘...competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
products concerned is not and will not be eliminated’.234 Thence, if an undertaking is 
‘superdominant’, i.e., if it has a market share greater than 75% and there is almost no 
competition left in the market,235 it would be very difficult to argue successfully an efficiency 
defence as it is likely that the conduct would result in a significant market foreclosure. 
 
The EC Guidance236 published in 2008 states that a dominant firm may justify its anti-
competitive conduct ‘...on the ground of efficiencies that are sufficient to guarantee that no 
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net harm to consumers is likely to rise’.237 This would suggest a similar approach to the US 
analysis pursuant to the rule of reason where efficiencies are balanced with the harm to 
consumers and competition. Notwithstanding the interest of the Commission towards an 
effects-based approach that admits efficiency defences, the European courts do not yet appear 
to share this view, as the latter see efficiencies as objective justifications having the potential 
to exclude the alleged conduct from the application of competition law, rather than 
legitimising it.  
 
The use of objective justifications in EU case-law involving abuse of dominance is a 
consolidated practice. In Sirena,238 the Court of Justice of the European Union (COJ) 
acknowledged the use of objective justifications. In United Brands,239 the COJ clarified that 
the objective justification requirement could be satisfied by the fact that a dominant firm is 
pursuing a legitimate commercial interest. However, if the actual purpose of the conduct is to 
strengthen the dominant’s firm position, the justification should not be accepted. In fact, in 
Hilti240 the General Court reaffirmed the view that the purpose of the conduct could affect the 
satisfaction of the objective justification requirement, owing to the fact that the defendant’s 
argument failed to show a genuine concern with the safety of its products. 
 
The European courts have acknowledged that conduct could be objectively justified by the 
pursuit of legitimate commercial interests or where the harm was genuinely the result of 
causes external to the actions of the dominant firm, such as the shortage of a particular 
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product.241 There is not an exhaustive list of possible objective justifications, as they appear 
on a case by case basis; nevertheless, they will generally fall within these two main 
categories. 
 
In some cases, the European courts have gone as far as acknowledging that efficiency 
arguments could satisfy objective justifications, albeit not as efficiency defences as suggested 
by the Commission. For instance, in Microsoft,242 the General Court stated that the reduction 
of incentives to innovate as a result of the intervention should be dealt as objective 
justifications and not as efficiency defences.   
 
...the court did not engage with the Commission’s attempt to balance the possible 
negative impact of an order to supply on Microsoft’s incentives to innovate and the 
positive impact on the whole industry including Microsoft. It contented itself with the 
conclusion that Microsoft had not made out an adequate case for objective 
justification. This suggests that the court will in future deal with arguments about pro-
consumer efficiencies and incentives to innovate as an attempted objective 
justification.243 
 
The fact that efficiencies are dealt with by the EU courts as objective justifications, rather 
than as defences, as is the case in the US, reduces their scope. Instead of accepting all 
arguments about efficiencies, there are a limited number of categories into which the 
efficiency arguments must fit. This differs from the US approach pursuant to the rule of 
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reason, where pro and anti competitive effects are balanced, so a conduct that harms 
consumers or competition may be approved if the efficiency defence arguments are 
stronger.244 
 
In the EU, once it is proven that there is a risk of elimination of effective competition and 
harm to consumers, it is highly unlikely that any justifications will be able to outweigh the 
anti-competitive effects of the conduct. It would be hard to successfully submit the 
applicability of objective justifications, as they would be rejected by the Commission and the 
courts in the EU.245 
 
In terms of the burden of proof, in essence, the defendant has to come forward with evidence 
of justificatory efficiencies and the Commission either has to accept or disprove them in its 
response. In Microsoft the General Court stated that: 
 
...although the burden of proof of the existence of the circumstances that constitute an 
infringement of Article 82 EC [now Article 102 TFEU] is borne by the Commission, it 
is for the dominant undertaking concerned, and not for the Commission, before the 
end of the administrative procedure, to raise any plea of objective justification and to 
support it with arguments and evidence. It then falls to the Commission, where it 
proposes to make a finding of abuse of a dominant position, to show that the 
arguments and evidence relied on by the undertaking cannot prevail and, accordingly, 
that the justification put forward cannot be accepted.246 
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As will be discussed in the following chapters, the Brazilian competition authority has not 
clarified whether the US efficiency defence or EU objective justification approaches ought to 
be adopted in Brazil. Nevertheless, it is possible to observe from the reasoning of case-law 
that its understanding is closer to the EU.247 
 
In Brazil, the burden of proof falls initially on the competition authority to demonstrate the 
existence of a conduct of a dominant firm that, taking into account the market conditions, is 
capable of achieving anti-competitive effects.  Then, the defendant is given the possibility of 
raising efficiencies and other justifications that could exempt the conduct from the 
application of competition law. These justifications will then be analysed by the competition 
authority in its response. However, in harmony with the provisions of Article 1 of Law 
8,884/94,248 the defendant’s argument will not succeed as a defence if market foreclosure and 
harm to consumers result from the conduct. 
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3.4  Conclusion 
 
The elements discussed in this section are not the only diverging aspects of the US and EU 
models of competition law. For instance, it has been argued that the American adversarial 
model of competition law enforcement, which is different to the EU administrative model, 
may have contributed to the caution in the US when assessing cases under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.249 According to this view, if there had not been private rights of action, i.e. 
legal grounds for initiating proceedings, or if the damage remedy was less punitive250  the 
American antitrust doctrine would probably have assumed a more ‘regulatory-oriented’ 
character.251 
 
Aspects which have influenced the development of the American and European competition 
policies, as well as their divergence and convergence, deserve in-depth and comprehensive 
investigation. However, for the purpose of this research, it has been worth highlighting the 
elements discussed in this section given that they are aspects that will assist the understanding 
of the development of the Brazilian competition policy. 
 
Many of the elements of divergence between the US and the EU have resulted from the 
influence of liberal or more regulatory policies on the development of their respective 
systems of competition law. Indeed, the acceptance of efficiency defences, combined with the 
high standard of proof of actual or likely effects in the US appear to result from a laissez-
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faire ideology, which has led to a more conservative competition policy. Conversely in the 
EU, the need to prove the risk of elimination of competition, combined with the view of 
efficiencies as objective justifications allows for a more interventionist competition policy.252 
This places dominant firms in a larger liability zone in comparison to the US. These are 
considerations that should be borne in mind when assessing elements of convergence and 
divergence as well as the development of Brazilian competition law and policy.  
  
It emerges from the analysis that there has been convergence between the EU and the US 
models, especially in recent years, on the treatment of certain types of conduct. A point of 
convergence is the will in both jurisdictions to protect the process of competition rather than 
competitors themselves.253 In order to do so, competition authorities look for evidence of an 
anti-competitive conduct that causes consumer harm before acting, embracing an effects-
based analysis of the conduct. Both jurisdictions also adopt market shares as an aid to identify 
monopoly power, but also consider many other circumstances in the relevant market, such as 
the power of the firm to exclude competitors, entry barriers and so on. 
 
However, there are still many areas where the US and the EU approaches to abusive conduct 
diverge and most of them seem to reflect a different philosophical understanding about the 
way in which the process of competition ought to be protected. For instance, in the EU it has 
been accepted that dominant firms have special responsibilities to avoid harming the process 
of competition,254 whilst in the US there are no such restraints.255  
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Finally, it emerged that in the US, efficiency defences are used to balance pro and anti 
competitive effects; this, combined with the high standard of proof of likely effects, seems to 
drive the adoption of a more conservative approach to antitrust. In the EU, by contrast, the 
need to prove the risk of elimination of competition, combined with the view of efficiencies 
as objective justifications allow for a competition policy that places dominant firms in a 
larger liability zone than in the US. These are aspects that influence or reflect the adoption of 
an apparently more ‘liberal’ approach to competition policy in the US.256 Nevertheless, such 
a ‘liberal’ approach is far from ‘set in stone’, especially considering the declared intention of 
the US Department of Justice (DOJ) to be tougher on monopolisation issues and recent 
political changes under the Obama administration.257 
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4.  Chapter Three - Market Power Control in Brazil 
4.1  Introduction 
 
Previous chapters have set the scene for an analysis of the Brazilian competition case-law and 
for a comparative analysis of the Brazilian competition law and policy with the US and EU 
approaches to abuse of dominance.  
 
Chapter three explains how competition law is interpreted and applied in Brazil with respect 
to the establishment of market power. It explores how the BCPS has developed a policy 
shaped by the peculiarities of its legal system, economy and institutional framework. This 
chapter also discusses how the BCPS has sought to reconcile the different views of the EU 
and the US when enforcing its competition law. Brazil has also adopted a unique legal 
approach in regards to the constituent legal elements of abuse and the underlying philosophy 
for conceptualising market power. In order to identify the areas of influence of the US and 
EU models upon the approach of the Brazilian competition authority to dominance, as well as 
the peculiarities of the Brazilian application of the law, various decisions dealing with the 
control of market power are analysed.  
 
Monopoly power, or dominance, is generally understood as a situation where an undertaking 
has enough economic power to behave independently from competitors and consumers in the 
market. Analysing the manner in which a country enforces its competition law in regards to 
abuse of dominance or market power may reveal the views of policy-makers on how the 
market should be regulated. In order to explain where the Brazilian competition policy is 
positioned in the spectrum of control of market power, consisting on the one hand of the 
more liberal American approach and on the other hand of the more regulatory approach of the 
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EU, this chapter analyses the constituent elements of dominance under Brazilian statute law 
and case-law.     
 
The goals of the Brazilian competition policy are examined, from the legislative purpose 
behind the law to the view of members of the BCPS in relation to the future of competition 
policy in Brazil. Moreover, the definition of the relevant market is explained to identify the 
elements taken into consideration during the analysis of the market, as well as elements of 
convergence or divergence with the US and EU models. The Brazilian conceptualisation of 
dominance is assessed, highlighting misunderstandings created by the legal threshold of 
presumption of dominance, as well as the approach of the competition authority to collective 
dominance. This chapter also discusses the Brazilian rule of reason and the per se rule and 
explores the role of efficiencies and objective justifications. Finally, the concept of abuse is 
analysed, followed by a discussion on the special responsibilities of dominant firms. 
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4.2 The goals of competition policy 
 
Law 8,884 of 1994 was enacted within the framework of the policies of the then President 
Itamar Franco258 as a means to fight inflation259 and support the monetary stabilisation 
plan.260 This differs from other jurisdictions, where competition law was enacted due to 
concerns with abuse of economic power. For instance, in the United States antitrust law261 
began in the late nineteenth century which was a period of industrialisation and considerable 
socioeconomic change, when powerful corporations were able to control emerging markets 
via the creation of trusts.262 This practice was perceived to be against the public interest, as 
well as harmful to competition, to the existence of smaller firms, consumer welfare and to 
some extent, to the democratic process.263 
 
In Brazil, the few years that followed the enactment of the law were characterised by a liberal 
approach of the competition authority and the Executive even interfered in CADE’s 
enforcement of the law264 in an attempt to increase the competition authority’s intervention in 
the economy. Under Gesner Oliveira’s presidency of the CADE, between 1996 and 2000, the 
approach of the BCPS in formulating competition policy appeared to be largely in harmony 
with the neo-liberal stance of the President of the Republic, Fernando Henrique Cardoso.265 
In fact, the CADE declared in 1997 that competition law and policy had the goal of 
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stimulating the entry of new players into the market.266 This can be understood as the desire 
to counter the creation of entry barriers by private and public undertakings that prevented the 
entry of new players. This is significant from a historic perspective in light of the fact that a 
considerable number of multinationals were entering the Brazilian market at the time. 
Moreover, the CADE declared that the development of competition law in Brazil was 
founded on the promotion of competition which would lead to enhanced allocative and 
productive efficiencies and hence greater wealth for society as a whole. This policy aimed at 
promoting the entry of new players into the market, countering barriers to entry by 
eliminating the previous protectionist policies, import prohibitions and high import duties, 
which were obstacles to the efficient and autonomous functioning of markets. 
 
The above stance against barriers to entry was in harmony with the liberalisation of the 
economy that was taking place in the 1990s. Nevertheless, there are still high barriers to entry 
in many markets in Brazil and the removal of these barriers is important for the development 
of the economy, as well as for the increase in foreign direct investment (FDI).267 In common 
with other BRIC countries, Brazil has attracted more FDI than many OECD countries in the 
recent years:268 almost 45,058 billon US dollars in 2008.269 Moreover, as a result of the 
growth of the Brazilian economy during the global economic recession, as well as the 2014 
World Cup and the 2016 Rio Olympics, it could be expected that there will be further FDI 
growth in Brazil in the years to come. In this respect, as revealed by the interviews, members 
of the BCPS seem to be willing to demonstrate that competition rules are interpreted in Brazil 
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in a similar manner to other major jurisdictions. Indeed, the interviews indicated that most 
members of the BCPS had the intention to formulate a policy that is in general harmony with 
the American and EU interpretations of competition law, thus reassuring multinationals that 
they will be judged under general principles of competition law. As one Councillor 
explained: 
 
The first reason [for citing EU and US cases in CADE’s decisions] is to give more 
authority to the decision, especially when dealing with situations that have not been 
decided previously by the CADE or if the cases are too old, in order to show that we 
are aligned to what is being done outside Brazil. The second reason is to make sure 
that we are treating a conduct in a similar fashion to other countries. 
 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the majority of the interviewees believed that the CADE 
would create its own unique policy over the coming years, albeit one based upon the 
foundations derived from both the American and EU models of competition law. According 
to one Councillor, the Brazilian competition policy ‘...will be something unique; closer to the 
EU than it is now, but definitely unique’. Another Councillor made the following comment in 
respect to where the Brazilian policy is heading: 
 
...the US [influence] is still very important, but it is not predominant anymore. There is 
an attempt to search for a Brazilian system of its own, taking into consideration the 
peculiarities of the Brazilian market and Brazilian law, but this is difficult. However I 
believe that in the next 15 years the CADE will consolidate its jurisprudence authority 
and coherence of its body of case-law.  
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In essence, there is evidence of an intention to adapt the international definitions and 
standards to the particular socioeconomic needs of the Brazilian market. Promoting market 
fairness and allowing companies to act freely, but at the same time being mindful of not 
harming the development of competition in the market. Despite this policy goal, there remain 
obstacles to the creation of a level playing field for multinational companies. For instance, 
imports cannot compete with national products in many sectors because of high barriers to 
entry, such as transportation costs, the existence of brand-fidelity as well as complex and 
expensive distribution systems.270 
 
Many efforts have been made to improve the enforcement of competition law in Brazil.271 
However, it seems that the Brazilian competition authority is falling behind in terms of 
regulation of abuse of dominance. In fact, many Councillors highlighted in the interviews 
their concern with unilateral behaviour because of the level of concentration of markets in 
Brazil.272 
 
In addition, a Councillor pointed out that because of the level of concentration in the markets 
‘...unilateral behaviour in Brazil causes much more harm to society than cartels’. Such 
comments were not intended to diminish the relevance of cartels, but to make it clear that 
unilateral behaviour should receive greater consideration in Brazil. Indeed, one Councillor 
stated that ‘...there are cartels in important sectors of the Brazilian economy, but when you 
focus too much on cartels, you may neglect unilateral behaviour that can be even more 
harmful’. Therefore, many members of the CADE seem to be worried about the lack of 
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strong control over unilateral behaviour. Although the institutional reforms273 that will place 
the SDE within the CADE’s institutional body will not give the CADE the power to define 
the policy agenda, these may increase the talks between the two institutions. This, together 
with the increase in the resources available, may enhance the control of abuses by dominant 
firms.    
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4.2.1 Consumer welfare 
 
Although it could be said that competition law is intended to protect consumers from the 
harm caused to competition, the sort of consumer welfare envisaged may change from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For instance, in the United States competition policy pursues 
consumer welfare through an increase of overall economic efficiency.274 In fact, it could be 
argued that the prevailing influence that has shaped modern antitrust law in the US is still 
Chicagoan.275 Under the economic analysis of the Chicago school of thought, ‘...the income 
distribution effects of economic activity should be completely excluded from the 
determination of the antitrust legality of the activity. It may be sufficient to note that the shift 
in income distribution does not lessen total wealth’.276 Therefore, consumer welfare is 
understood in the US within the context of overall economic efficiency, with neutrality in 
relation to how the welfare is distributed. It appears to follow Kaldor-Hicks’ view that total 
welfare is increased assuming that the benefits generated by a conduct are greater than the 
harm caused by it.277 Thus, there is no immediate concern with how many of the benefits of 
the conduct are passed on to consumers. 
 
Consumer welfare is pursued by EU competition law as well, but it appears from the courts’ 
decisions278 and the speeches279 of Neelie Kroes, the Ex-Competition Commissioner, that the 
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adverse effects of anti-competitiveness in the market upon consumer welfare should be 
understood as the wealth transfer from consumers to anti-competitive undertakings. A 
consumer welfare approach to competition policy in the EU would therefore refer to a 
concern with a decrease in consumer surplus.280 Examining the EU courts’ decisions281 and 
the DG Competition Ex-Commissioner’s speeches, it can be argued that EU competition 
policy pursues consumer welfare in ‘Pareto’ terms.282 Thus, the conduct of dominant firms 
can benefit producers as long as they do not harm consumers directly or indirectly by 
eliminating effective competition in the market.283 This view does not assume that benefits 
resulting from efficiencies will automatically be passed on to consumers. Moreover, ‘[t]he 
economic goal of EC competition law appears to be concerned with improving allocative 
efficiency in ways that do not impair productive efficiency so greatly as to produce no 
increase (or even a net reduction) in total consumer welfare’.284 This therefore differs from 
the US view discussed above,285 which does not have such concern with allocative efficiency 
and consumer surplus. 
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In Brazil, Law 8,884/94 states that competition law should protect consumers.286 This 
statement implies that consumers should not be harmed by anti-competitive conduct. 
However, in the view of one Councillor of the CADE, the welfare created by competition 
should be understood ‘...according to Kaldor-Hicks’. Another Councillor stated that he did 
‘...not believe that a policy that impedes the increase of total welfare because of a discussion 
about who is going to get which slice of the pizza is fair’.  
 
Nevertheless, the predominant view expressed in the interviews was that consumer welfare 
was pursued in the sense that for the conduct in question to be considered permissible its 
resulting efficiencies had to benefit, at least in part, consumers. According to one Councillor, 
‘...in a case where there is efficiency, in the sense that costs would be reduced, but there is an 
increase in prices for consumers, the conduct would be allowed in other countries, but would 
be illegal in Brazil. There cannot be harm for consumers’. In addition, another Councillor 
stated that the Council looked ‘...only at harm to consumers in terms of price, choice and 
quality’. It can be said that consumer surplus is pursued in Brazil in a similar manner as that 
of the EU, given that efficiencies cannot justify harm to consumers and the competition 
authority tries to ensure better products, more choice and better prices.287 Conduct resulting 
in the maximisation of productive efficiency would not be automatically considered as 
benefiting consumers, since there is no guarantee that the benefits of these efficiencies will be 
passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices. Moreover, it is possible for such 
efficiencies to occur without benefiting consumers, as they might be retained by the 
undertakings in question.  
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At present, considerable attention is paid by the BCPS to ways of enhancing efficiencies that 
increase consumer welfare.288 However, there was no consensus amongst those interviewed 
regarding the need for a conduct to directly benefit consumers. Some Councillors were of the 
view that as long as there was no harm to consumers, conduct should be considered lawful 
under competition law289 whilst others thought that there had to be benefits for consumers.290 
There also appeared to be a minority view which was sceptical about the benefits of 
productive efficiencies to consumers.291 
 
These opinions may be explained by the composition of the Council. In ideological terms, 
some Councillors regard themselves as left-wing or socialists whilst others declared 
themselves as liberals. However, this divergence has to be placed in perspective, as 
Councillors are aware that their decisions are expressed within the context of a plenary 
session,292 so they have to compromise or at least appear moderate to convince others to 
follow their decisions. Thus, it is very unlikely that decisions would be politicised by views at 
either end of the ideological spectrum.  
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4.3 Defining the relevant market 
 
The CADE’s Resolution 20293 of 1999 contains brief guidelines as to how to analyse a 
conduct under Law 8,884/94. The resolution’s recommended first step is to identify the 
nature of the practice, its legal classification and the existence of evidence of the conduct. 
Arguably, this stage would be unnecessary if it is found that the defendant does not have 
dominance, so this could be part of the final analysis of the conduct. In the second step, the 
Brazilian competition authority defines the relevant product and geographic markets, the 
market shares of the defendant and its actual and potential competitors, as well as the 
existence of barriers to entry. As a third step, it analyses the specific practice, including its 
harm and benefits, and, according to the Resolution, the competition authority ‘balances’ 
them to determine whether the harm caused by the conduct could be offset by its benefits. 
There are no explanations as to how this final step should be undertaken.294 
 
Resolution 20 does not offer a proper structure for the analysis and arguably should be 
replaced by more suitable guidance. Detailed guidelines offering a structure of analysis 
following the definition of the relevant market, the establishment of dominance and the 
finding of abuse (reflecting Article 20 of Law 8,884/94 which prohibits the abuse of 
dominance) could offer more certainty not only for undertakings and practitioners, but also 
for members of the BCPS. Indeed, the lack of a clear structure for the analysis has resulted in 
the development of a policy which is at times incoherent, especially considering the use of 
international literature and authorities in the analysis of conduct.    
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In contrast to the approach of Resolution 20 described above, the first step in the assessment 
of a conduct in the US and the EU is to define the relevant market. According to the CADE, 
the concept of the relevant market can be understood as the space where competition takes 
place.295 It encompasses the various competing products in a particular geographic area, 
taking into account their substitutability. When determining the relevant market, it is 
necessary to take into account a product’s characteristics, purpose, geographic and temporal 
dimension, as well as the real and potential competition.296 
 
One of the earliest definitions of the relevant geographic market after the enactment of Law 
8,884/94 was made in Siderúrgica Laisa,297 which was decided in 1995. The CADE 
established that the relevant geographic market could be understood as the territory where 
companies that offer certain products compete under relatively homogeneous conditions that 
are substantially different from neighbouring markets.298 The relevant product market, 
instead, encompasses products that can reasonably substitute each other with respect to their 
purpose, quality and price.299 
 
As established in 1997 in Panex,300 the standard procedure for determining the relevant 
market is to identify the substitute products whose demand is sufficiently elastic in response 
to a small, but significant and non transitory increase in price by a hypothetical monopolist, 
i.e., the SSNIP test. The SSNIP test supposes a small but significant and non-transitory 
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increase in price, considering that all other market conditions remain the same.301 If the price 
increase causes a reduction in the number of consumers that would make it unprofitable for 
the undertaking to increase prices, then the next best substitute product will be added to the 
product group.302 A similar approach is undertaken to determine the relevant geographical 
market,303 where the analysis begins with the area of the undertaking and applies the SSNIP 
test. If the reduction in the number of purchasers is sufficient to make it unprofitable to the 
undertaking to increase prices, then the location which best substitutes the geographic area of 
the undertaking will be added and the SSNIP test will be applied on the expanded area. This 
process is repeated as many times as necessary until it is determined that, within a certain 
geographical area, the undertaking would be able to apply a small but significant and non-
transitory increase in price. 
 
The SSNIP test is also used for defining the relevant market in the EU, even though the test 
has American origins. However, the SSNIP test is applied with caution in both jurisdictions 
in order to avoid the ‘cellophane fallacy’.304 The cellophane fallacy originated from the 
American Du Pont case, where Du Pont, a cellophane producer, argued that cellophane did 
not constitute a separate relevant market because it competed with other packaging materials 
(e.g. aluminium foil, wax paper and polyethylene). The issue was that Du Pont was a 
monopolist in regards to the production of cellophane and it had set monopoly prices for its 
product. These were the prices that consumers had in mind when considering substitutes for 
cellophane. Had the prices been at a competitive level, consumers would have perceived 
cellophane as a separate market. The US Supreme Court failed to find that the high prices 
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could be a sign that Du Pont was already exercising its monopoly power. Although the 
SSNIP test has its limitations for the analysis of cases on Section 2 of the Sherman Act, given 
that it often deals with firms that have market power, and other factual elements help the 
analysis of market power, there is no definite alternative in the US to the SSNIP test.   
 
The SSNIP test was followed by the EU for the first time in 1992 in Nestlé/Perrier305 and 
was officially adopted by the Commission in 1997 in its Notice for the Definition of the 
Relevant Market.306 In the EU, concerns involving the use of the SSNIP test for abuse of 
dominance cases seem to have reinforced the use of a qualitative analysis for the definition of 
the relevant market.307 The reliance on qualitative analysis to define the relevant market can, 
however, result in a narrow definition of the relevant market. In any case, the SSNIP test in 
the EU seems to be confined to a first-step in the analysis of the relevant market, especially 
considering the limitations posed by the cellophane fallacy.308  
 
Moreover, there are cases where it is not possible to apply the SSNIP test. For instance, in the 
British Interactive Broadcasting309 decision, the Commission declared that it was not possible 
to define the relevant market using the SSNIP test because there was no data available since 
the product in question had yet to be launched.310 
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In Brazil, the CADE published Resolution 15311 in 1998, which stated amongst other things 
that the relevant product market referred to all the goods and services considered 
substitutable in respect of consumer demand because of their characteristics, price and 
purported use.312 The Resolution did not mention the adoption of the SSNIP test, as it was 
only in 2001, with the publication of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of SDE and SEAE, 
that the SSNIP test was formally adopted in Brazil; as stated therein: 
 
The definition of a relevant market is the process of identifying a set of economic 
agents, consumers and producers which impact prices and quantities for the firm that 
results from the operation [e.g. a merger]. Within the limits of the market, the reaction 
of consumers and producers to changes in relative prices – the degree of substitution 
between products or the producers’ sources – is greater than outside these limits. The 
‘hypothetical monopolist’ test (...) is the analytical tool to define the relevant market 
used to check the degree in which goods and services can be substituted.313 
 
When applying the SSNIP test, the CADE establishes the smallest group of products and 
geographic area where a hypothetical monopolist would be able to impose a small, but 
significant and non-transitory increase in prices.314 For the increase in price to be material, it 
would generally need to be in the region of 5% and 15% depending on the particular case. 
The relevant time period to be considered under the test is of at least a year. In the US and the 
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EU the price increase considered under the SSNIP test is only between 5% and 10%,315 whilst 
in Brazil an increase up to 15% may be considered as well. This different approach was 
adopted by the SEAE/SDE Horizontal Merger Guidelines316 and seems to reflect a view that, 
in certain cases, an increase in prices of 15% could represent a more realistic approach to the 
reaction of consumer behaviour with respect to price increases. This is especially the case 
considering that Brazilian consumers are generally ill-informed about price formation and 
tend to pay purchases in instalments. As a result, an increase in price would have to be 
greater to impact demand.  
 
The CADE does not appear to have developed a consistent position in regards to avoiding the 
cellophane fallacy when using the SSNIP test. This may be due to the fact that guidance for 
the definition of the relevant market via the use of the SSNIP test is offered under the 
SDE/SEAE Horizontal Merger Guidelines whislt Resolution 15 of the CADE suggested the 
use of product substitutability. This appears to have resulted in an inconsistent use of the 
SSNIP test for the definition of the relevant market. The case-law illustrates this issue. For 
instance, in Microsoft/TBA,317 an abuse of dominance case decided in 2004, both the SDE 
and the CADE showed concerns to avoid the cellophane fallacy and it was stated that, in 
accordance with the European Commission’s notice on the definition of the relevant market 
for the purposes of Community competition law,318 the criteria for the definition of the 
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relevant market should be differentiated if the case involved a merger or a conduct.319 
However, as demonstrated by AmBev,320 an abuse of dominance case decided later on in 
2009, this approach does not appear to be always taken into consideration. In fact, when 
defining the relevant market in the AmBev case, the presiding Councillor simply used the 
same definitions of two previous merger cases in which AmBev was involved.321 
  
The definition of the relevant market is subject to a certain degree of discretionary 
interpretation. On some occasions the relevant market can be defined narrowly322 but it can 
also be defined widely,323 encompassing even the whole international market. However, the 
competition authority stated that for a geographic market to be considered as global, the mere 
presence of imports is not enough. The international trade flux has to be at least equivalent to 
the domestic consumption and the product has to be homogeneous, so it would be impossible 
to distinguish between the product commercialised internationally and the one 
commercialised nationally.324 
 
In Merck/M.B. Bioquímica,325 the relevant product market was defined as the market of 
vacuum glass and plastic tubes for collecting blood samples. The various types of these tubes 
were used for different medical exams, so in theory each type of tube could constitute a 
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distinct product market. However, the CADE affirmed that, if this approach were to be 
adopted, too much emphasis would have been placed on the demand side, resulting in a 
market that would be defined too narrowly.326 The integration of the production lines was 
such that the manufacturers produced a whole range of tubes and there would be no 
significant costs if they decided to switch production. The CADE decided not to distinguish 
between the types of tubes when defining the relevant product market.327 The low sunk costs 
resulting from manufacturing new ranges of tubes is an element that would be taken into 
consideration both in the US and in the EU when analysing potential competition. In regards 
to the geographic product market, although imports were significant (64.9% in 1994 and 
70.9% of the market in 1995), the relevant geographic market was defined as national. This 
was due to the fact that it was difficult for medical clinics to purchase the tubes directly from 
foreign manufacturers because of distribution obstacles, as well as costs and difficulties 
involved in the storage of excess stock. Therefore, a variety of aspects in the light of the 
particular circumstances of the case were taken into consideration when defining the relevant 
market. 
 
Some Brazilian authors have argued that the CADE tends to define the relevant market too 
narrowly when formulating a decision.328 However, the majority of the interviewed members 
of the BCPS rejected claims that there is a tendency to define the relevant market either too 
narrowly or too widely. According to one Councillor: 
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In merger cases, when we believe that it might be too expensive to go in depth into the 
relevant market analysis, we tend to adopt a narrow definition, but then we are ‘more 
lenient’ when analysing barriers to entry, etc. In abuse of dominance cases things are 
different because the relevant market is very important to find dominance, so we tend 
to be more precise.   
 
Interviewed members of the competition authority appeared to be willing to define the 
relevant market for abuse of dominance cases in a wider sense than when analysing mergers. 
This may result from the relevance that the finding of dominance may have to the outcome of 
an abuse of dominance case. The concern of some Councillors with defining the relevant 
market in a way that is not considered as ‘too narrow’ results in a definition of the relevant 
market that appears to be wider than the EU definition. In fact, interviewed UK lawyers that 
notified mergers to the BCPS stated that they were surprised by the way that the competition 
authority defined the relevant market. According to one of them:  
 
We are used to the EU definition of the relevant market,329 so we defined it in the 
same way and we thought that we would be in trouble with the Brazilian competition 
authority. However, to our surprise, they defined it very widely and we ended up with 
a very low market share. We are still wondering how they came to that conclusion.   
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In AmBev,330 the relevant downstream product market was defined as the market relating to 
the sales of beers in bars and other traditional distribution channels, including snack bars, 
restaurants, discotheques and other types of entertainment venues.331 This definition resulted 
from the fact that in these distribution channels there is not generally a wide variety of beer 
brands and the consumer demand is not substantially affected by higher beer prices; the 
demand is relatively inelastic. The loyalty programme of AmBev consisted in giving 
discounts in the form of loyalty points to the purchaser of beers bottled in reusable glass 
bottles332 for the purposes of selling cold beer to be consumed within the premises of the 
points of sale.333 AmBev did not give loyalty points for sales of their canned beers, or beer 
sold outside points of sale. The relevant downstream geographic market was defined as ‘the 
local area’, which could be understood as the geographical surroundings of points of sale. 
This definition took into consideration the fact that consumers of beer sold in points of sale 
often venture to surrounding areas of where they reside.   
 
It was stated by a Councillor that ‘...if the results indicate that there is no dominance even in a 
narrowly defined market, (...) then we can define it narrowly and there would be no need to 
endeavour into an in-depth analysis of the conduct’. This is an interesting comment, as it 
suggests an adjustment of the definition of the relevant market in accordance with the market 
share that would result from it, which is not a method that ensures certainty to companies 
operating in the market.  
 
                                                 
330
 Primo Schincariol Indústria de Cervejas e Refrigerantes SA v Companhia de Bebidas das Américas - Ambev 
- 08012.003805/2004-10. 
331
 Ibid., para. 14-16. 
332
 As opposed to aluminium cans that could be taken away from the point of sale.  
333
 Points of sale include places where beers are consumed in the premises, such as bars, entertainment venues, 
discotheques. In this respect, supermarkets are not points of sale. 
132 
 
It was also mentioned in the interviews that there is an inclination to define the relevant 
market narrowly in simpler cases, where the conduct is unlikely to be anti-competitive or 
dominance was unlikely. Conversely, considerable caution was used when defining the 
relevant market in abuse of dominance cases where there was great media interest.334 This is 
likely to be the result of the need to ensure that every step is undertaken in a clear manner to 
minimise the risk of a decision being reversed by the courts on appeal. It was also highlighted 
by one interviewee that  ‘...for the most controversial cases there is no systematic way of 
defining the relevant market, but there may be a propensity in being slightly more 
conservative in these cases’. In widely publicised cases some members of the competition 
authority are of the view that the market should be defined in a wide sense. It appears that the 
considerable scrutiny that a widely publicised case involves results in some members of the 
competition authority being more cautious in their analysis to mitigate any negative 
repercussions of the definition of market power.  
 
From the discussion above, it seems that, although not constantly, Brazil tends to apply a 
wider definition of the relevant market rather than the narrow definition generally applied in 
the EU. This would place the Brazilian approach to the definition of the relevant market 
closer to that adopted in the US.335 According to the interviews, the reasons for this approach 
are linked to concerns of potential criticism from the courts and the business community that 
might arise if the CADE generally opted for a narrow definition of the relevant market. In the 
words of a member of the competition authority: ‘We are always careful with the analysis of 
the relevant market. Finding dominance is especially important for abuse of dominance cases 
and we do not want to send the wrong message to the business community’. Another member 
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of the competition authority stated that the competition authority ‘...tries not to define the 
relevant market too widely or too narrowly in abuse of dominance cases as we always bear in 
mind that our cases are likely to be reviewed by the Courts.’ 
 
Brazilian competition law does not deal in great detail with the definition of the relevant 
market, so this is a concept open to interpretation. According to one member of the BCPS: 
‘...the professional support staff is in need of more guidance in relation to how to define the 
relevant market’. Some interviewees even indicated that, although they look at the EU and 
the US for guidance when defining the relevant market, they were unaware of the existence 
of any differences concerning the definition of the relevant market in these jurisdictions. It 
appears, therefore, that there is a considerable variance of knowledge among members of the 
BCPS with regards to the interpretation of concepts used to define the relevant market. The 
variation of how the relevant market is defined may have therefore roots on the training issue 
discussed previously,336 as a better training could result in more accurate relevant market 
definitions. This would ensure that the relevant market definition is not so influenced by the 
publicity that is given to a certain case; instead, the same standards would be applied to all 
abuse of dominance cases, resulting in more legal certainty.    
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4.4 The concept of dominance 
 
Under Brazilian competition law, the determination of a dominant position requires the 
undertaking or group of undertakings to have either the exclusivity of the offer or demand of 
a given product or service, or substantial competition must be nonexistent in regards to such 
offer or demand.337  
 
In the US a monopolist is a firm ‘...with significant and durable market power - that is, the 
long term ability to raise prices or exclude competitors. (...) [A] "monopolist" is a firm with 
significant and durable market power’.338 The undertaking should have the capacity to 
increase prices substantially above competitive levels for a durable period of time.339 
Therefore, the central criterion for qualifying an undertaking as a monopolist rests on its 
capacity to maintain elevated monopolistic prices in the long term. 
 
A similar concept of dominance is adopted by the EC Guidance.340 In order to establish 
dominance, it is necessary to determine if a firm has sufficient market power to behave 
independently from competitors and consumer demand. However, this independence is not 
absolute, given that the EC Guidance and the COJ expressly mention that the firm has to 
behave independently ‘to an appreciable extent’. Even if a firm has its consumers, 
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competitors or potential competitors in mind, it can still be considered dominant if it has a 
high degree of independence from them. 
 
In Brazil, according to Law 8,884/94, dominance will be presumed when a company has a 
20% market share.341 In the US and the EU, the thresholds are set higher at usually 50%342 
and 40%343 respectively. The lower thresholds in Brazil probably result from the fact that its 
markets tend to be concentrated. This suggests that Brazilian policy-makers endorse the view 
that market pluralism is beneficial for economic development.  
 
It should be noted that the 20% threshold is only a presumption of dominance which can be 
challenged by the defendant company. Moreover, the competition authority will need to 
prove the existence of other factors that allow or would allow the defendant to behave 
independently in the market irrespective of competitors and consumers. Thus, in practice, the 
determination of a 20% market share would just form part of the evidence supporting the 
likelihood of dominance, so further evidence and arguments need to be presented to establish 
whether the defendant enjoys market power. In this respect, the Brazilian mechanics of 
defining market power are consistent with the US and EU approaches. 
 
It emerged from the interviews that there is some misunderstanding among members of the 
BCPS in respect to the 20% threshold for presuming market power. Some Councillors stated 
that if a firm has more than 20% market share it will automatically be presumed dominant. In 
the view of one Councillor, in accordance with the law the definition of dominance in Brazil 
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is structural and ‘...the legal presumption of 20% market share is respected’. Other 
Councillors and members of the BCPS stated that the defendant firm would be considered 
dominant if it had a market share equal to or greater than 20%, but only if other elements 
supported this view, such as the state of actual competition, market shares and quality of 
actual competitors, as well as the contestability of the market by potential competitors. In the 
words of a Councillor: ‘...the 20% presumption represents market power and the concept of 
dominance is more than that, because the defendant company needs market power in 
conjunction with the power to behave independently in the market’.  
 
The lack of clarity in respect of the definition of dominance evidenced by these contrasting 
views of members of the BCPS is worrying, as it clearly shows that some of them are 
unaware of the proper role of the market share in defining market power. The view requiring 
the defendant company to have market power plus an ‘extra’ power in order to be dominant 
may in reality refer to the need to verify, after defining the market share of the defendant, 
who are the actual competitors of the defendant and their market shares, as well as the 
definition of potential competitors and barriers to entry. If this analysis indicates that a 
defendant could behave independently in the market, it would be deemed to have market 
power and, therefore, to be dominant.  
 
The contrasting views and the lack of clarity among members of the BCPS may be the result 
of a lack of proper guidelines, as well as a training issue, which was discussed previously.344 
The drafting of the competition law345 does little to resolve this confusion, since it states that 
dominance is presumed when a company has a 20% market share. The straightforward 
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understanding of the presumption is that it could be rebutted by a defendant. However, in 
practice the reasoning that takes place in order to determine the existence of dominance 
consists of the competition authority anticipating the rebuttal of the presumption by arguing 
that not only the defendant firm must have 20% of the market share, but also that other 
market conditions allow it to behave with a high degree of independence from its competitors 
and consumers.  
 
The 20% market share is only a minimum threshold; if it is not met it is unlikely that 
dominance will be determined. The market power of the firm has to be calculated by taking 
into account additional factors such as the existence of competitors and barriers to entry. It 
seems that in practice many members of the BCPS already adopt this reasoning when 
analysing abuse of dominance cases. However, it is important for a standard analysis to be 
adopted by the majority of Councillors to facilitate the emergence of a coherent case-law.  
 
In regards to the analysis of market contestability and barriers to entry, potential competitors 
are considered as such if they have the potential to produce the relevant product or service 
promptly and with ease. Moreover, the competition authority analyses whether there are 
sufficient incentives for a company to enter the market; e.g. whether the price of a product 
encourages market entry.346 The CADE acknowledges the need to analyse competition in a 
dynamic manner,347 considering not only the present structure of the market, but also the way 
that it adapts and develops. In Center Norte,348 the CADE stated that it is important to look at 
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barriers to entry as to consider competition in a dynamic manner.349 The elasticity of supply 
and demand is analysed and actual or potential competition is established. If all these 
elements point to the capacity of exercising economic power, the competition authority will 
find that the firm is dominant.  
 
One important aspect of the antitrust analysis regards barriers to entry, i.e. obstacles for 
competitors to enter the relevant market as they have the potential to strengthen an 
undertaking’s market power. There are two main definitions of barriers to entry, namely the 
Bain and the Stigler definitions. According to Joe Bain, a barrier to entry is an obstacle that 
allows companies to charge monopoly prices without attracting entrants into the market, for 
instance this would be the case of economies of scale.350 George Stigler’s definition, instead, 
views barriers to entry as production costs that firms currently operating in the market do not 
need to bear, whilst new do.351 
 
Stigler’s definition has been widely adopted by exponents of the Chicago school.352 However, 
according to Hovenkamp,353 most antitrust enforcement agencies and scholars prefer the 
Bainian definition of barriers to entry. Indeed, it has been adopted by the US Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines of 1992354 even if many of the guidelines’ provisions have been 
influenced by the approach of the Chicago school. In practice, the interpretation of the courts 
also tends to conform to the Bainian definition, although the FTC has been more receptive of 
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the Stigler approach.355 Barriers to entry have to ‘...meet three requirements. First, there must 
be some relatively high cost that the prospective entrant must bear. Second, there must be a 
significant risk of failure. Third, a significant percentage of these costs must be "sunk," or 
unrecoverable, in the event of failure’.356 
 
As with the US, the EU appears to have adopted a Bainian definition towards barriers to 
entry. The EU may consider barriers to entry any of the following: legal barriers; capacity 
constraints; economies of scale and scope; privileged access to supply; a highly developed 
distribution and sales network; the established position of the incumbent firms in the market 
and other strategic barriers to entry, such as the high costs to switch to a new supplier.357 One 
important difference between the EU and the US approaches to barriers to entry is that in the 
EU an element such as advertising would be a barrier to entry per se, whilst in the US it 
would have to be proven that the new competitor would not be able to recover the sunk costs 
of advertising through entry, or that failure would be so likely that it would dissuade potential 
competitors.358 
 
In common with the US and the EU, the Brazilian Horizontal Merger Guidelines adopt a 
Bainian definition of barriers to entry, which are regarded as any element in a market that 
places a potential competitor at a disadvantage in relation to the incumbent firms. The 
SEAE/SDE Horizontal Merger Guidelines state that the following are considered barriers to 
entry: sunk costs, legal or regulatory barriers, resources belonging exclusively to established 
firms, economies of scale or scope, the level of integration of the productive chain, the 
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loyalty of consumers to established brands, as well as the threat of reaction or retaliation by 
established competitors.359 
 
In Condomínio Shopping Center Iguatemi,360 it was stated that the scarcity of suitable places 
for building regional shopping centres could be considered a barrier to entry.361 In addition to 
the geographic factor, the high construction costs of new shopping centres were considered to 
be barriers to entry, suggesting a Bainian approach. 
 
In AmBev,362 barriers to entry were considered high because of the significant marketing and 
distribution costs involved in the beer sector.363 The relevant market was characterised by 
high investments in marketing to change the preferences of consumers in the short and long 
terms. There were also barriers resulting from the distribution structure, which was extensive 
and complex, requiring high levels of logistical know-how and investments to allow a 
competitor to enter the market. In the decision, it was found that competitors also enjoyed 
similar distribution structures, but they differed from AmBev in terms of efficiency and 
capacity. 
 
In AmBev it was stated that substantial investments in advertising by a competitor could be 
neutralised by the foreclosure of distribution channels, which would increase the unitary cost 
of advertisements and distribution for competitors. This suggests that in Brazil high 
                                                 
359
 SDE/SEAE, “Horizontal Merger Guidelines,” 52. 
360
 Procuradoria Geral do Cade, Associação dos Lojistas de Shopping do Estado de São Paulo v Condomínio 
Shopping Center Iguatemi - 08012.006636/1997-43. 
361
 Ibid., 2750. 
362
 Primo Schincariol Indústria de Cervejas e Refrigerantes SA v Companhia de Bebidas das Américas - Ambev 
- 08012.003805/2004-10. 
363
 Ibid., para. 19-23. For a discussion on barriers to entry in Brazil, see Schymura, “Barreiras à Entrada: o caso 
do setor de creme dental brasileiro.” 
141 
 
advertising costs are not considered a barrier to entry per se as they are in the EU. The CADE 
appears to have taken an approach that is similar to the US view of barriers to entry. It stated 
that potential competitors were unlikely to be capable of incurring such high costs to enter the 
market as AmBev could neutralise the effects of advertisement through the foreclosure of its 
complex distribution system. This placed AmBev in an advantageous position that allowed it 
to behave with relative independence from other market players and consumers.    
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4.4.1 Collective dominance 
 
In the EU, the COJ affirmed for the first time in 1988, in Bodson,364 that collective 
dominance was possible under Article 86 of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
Treaty, now Article 102 TFEU. In accordance with that decision, for collective dominance to 
be established, undertakings had to be part of the same economic entity. In Kali & Saltz,365 
the COJ stated that collective dominance was found when the undertakings were linked by 
economic or other elements. In Gencor,366 the General Court extended the concept of 
collective dominance to include structural ties between the undertakings with a common 
policy or deduced from the market structure even where such ties did not exist. This aspect 
was referred by the COJ in Compagnie Maritime Belge: 
 
The existence of a collective dominant position may therefore flow from the nature 
and terms of an agreement, from the way in which it is implemented and, 
consequently, from the links or factors which give rise to a connection between 
undertakings which result from it. Nevertheless, the existence of an agreement or of 
other links in law is not indispensable to a finding of a collective dominant position; 
such a finding may be based on other connecting factors and would depend on an 
economic assessment and, in particular, on an assessment of the structure of the 
market in question.367 
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Collective dominance is applicable for horizontal and vertical relations and abuse can be 
perpetrated even by only one of the collective dominant firms.368 In case where there is no 
collusion or agreements among the firms, the concept of collective dominance in the EU 
allows firms to have their practices prohibited as an abuse of collective dominance.369  
 
In the United States, the economic entities that form part of the same corporate group are 
considered to form a single economic unit. However, if economic entities do not belong to 
the same corporate group but nonetheless behave collectively, the conduct could still fall 
within Section 2 of the Sherman Act as a conspiracy to monopolise.370 In the view of Gerald 
F. Masoudi, an Ex-Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the US DOJ, there is little 
difference between conspiracy to monopolise and the prohibition of cartels. According to 
him, it may be easier to prove the existence of a cartel than a unilateral conduct and situations 
that would be considered as collective dominance in the EU, tend to be dealt with in the US 
under the cartel prohibition of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.371 
 
According to Brazilian competition law,372 dominance can be attributed collectively to a 
group of undertakings. Indeed, during the interviews, when questioned about the existence of 
the concept of single economic entity in Brazil, one member of the BCPS stated that the 
concept: 
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...is considered in the widest way possible. The Council considers even a relevant 
influence of one company over the other. Any control that exists over another 
undertaking places the company as part of the group. (...) For instance, [even outside 
the sphere of corporate control via share ownership] if a company is in great debt to 
another, this is already a reason for including the company in the economic group.  
 
However, in contrast to the EU and in common with the US, the Brazilian competition 
authority analyses the abusive conduct of a collectivity of undertakings under the cartel 
provisions. It seems, though, that the choice of dealing with collective dominance under 
cartel provisions was not entirely a conscious decision. A member of the BCPS stated that 
‘...we have not arrived to this area of the debate regarding single economic entities, the level 
of responsibility of holding companies and so on’. One Councillor also stated that ‘I have 
never seen a collective dominance and I am not aware of its existence in Brazil, the US or the 
EU’. This suggests that there is not an overall familiarity with the exact meaning of collective 
dominance within the Brazilian competition authority.373 Members of the BCPS seem to 
understand that the single economic entity concept is relevant only in respect of merger and 
cartel cases, so when abuse of dominance results from collective dominance it is immediately 
conceptualised as a cartel because in their view there would always be a certain degree of 
collusion among the parties. In fact, one Councillor of the CADE stated that ‘...it is 
impossible for firms that are collective dominant in a market to abuse their position without 
colluding in a certain way, so these cases are always considered as cartels’.  
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The current approach of the Brazilian competition authority seems to differ from what some 
academics predicted in the past. In one of the first books on Brazilian competition law, in 
1966, it was advocated that a group of undertakings could abuse their power collectively and 
that this should be prohibited as an abuse of dominance.374 This modern approach of the 
BCPS seems to be a reminiscent of the predominant influence that the US model had over 
Brazilian competition law and policy, especially in the 1990s, since in the United States 
collective dominance is usually treated as a cartel.375 
 
In addition, according to the interviews, in order for undertakings to be considered as part of 
the same group there has to be a legal link in terms of ownership or control and there has to 
be some sort of economic control exercised by one firm over the other. In the words of one 
Councillor:  
 
There is no respect for the corporate veil. Here it has not been mentioned like that [as 
collective dominance] but the CADE has been considering that, although it is dealing 
with different undertakings, if they do behave as one unit, they are considered as such. 
However, they have to be under the control of the same legal unit.  
 
Indeed, in the case of abuses practised by Unimed, an association of medical practitioners, 
the CADE did not decide against all private cooperatives associated to Unimed.376 The 
decision was issued only against the cooperatives that were accused of the behaviour. The 
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reason for this approach is that Unimed consists of cooperatives of medical practitioners and 
its legal structure did not have a central holding company. Although there is a federation of 
the cooperatives, all Unimed practices were legally independent from each other and could 
not control each other. In addition, there was no proof that all the ‘branches’ were dominant 
in their regions and that exclusivity arrangements were always imposed. Therefore, a general 
decision could not be made against all the cooperatives.  
 
It appears that there is a similar, although much narrower, concept of collective dominance in 
Brazil than the EU. In fact, in the EU collective dominance can be found in respect of legally 
independent undertakings which present themselves or act in the market collectively.377 
When questioned about the possibility of a similar approach in Brazil, the vast majority of the 
members of the BCPS said that the concept of single economic entity was relevant only for 
the analysis of mergers and cartels as for the latter there would always be a certain degree of 
coordination. This may explain why there has never been a case of abuse of collective 
dominance in Brazil to date.  
 
The Brazilian understanding of collective dominance appears to dismiss the possibility of 
abuse by firms that are dominant without any form of collusion. This view seems to result in 
an approach that is closer to the US, where even though such cases could be dealt with under 
the prohibition of conspiracy to monopolise, they are usually treated as cartel offences. Apart 
from the lack of knowledge of the existence of abuses practised by collectively dominant 
firms without collusion, another possible explanation for this approach may be that the 
enforcement of competition law against cartels is much stronger in Brazil than against 
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unilateral behaviour. Most of the resources are focused on fighting cartels which are easier to 
investigate and punish than collective abuses, due to the regulatory structure currently in 
place and the possibility of coordinating efforts with other branches of the government.378  
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4.5 Rule of reason, per se rule, and the role of effects, efficiencies and other 
justifications 
 
It is important to note that due to Brazil’s hybrid system of competition law, although the 
CADE adopts the EU definition of abuse, a version of the American rule of reason is used to 
determine whether a conduct is abusive or not.379 The interviews with members of the BCPS 
suggested different levels of knowledge amongst some members in relation to the rule of 
reason in this context. While some had a fair idea of the meaning of rule of reason, others 
seemed to have a rather less thorough understanding of its meaning. In addition, some 
interviewees believed that it was always the case that the US applied the rule of reason and 
the EU the per se rule.  
 
The Brazilian concept of the rule of reason falls somewhere between the US and EU 
approaches. Whilst in the United States the competition authority has to prove the power of 
the company, as well as the purpose of the conduct and the likely effects, in the EU it is 
necessary to prove only the power, purpose and risk of effects.380 In Brazil, when configuring 
dominance, the competition authority has to demonstrate that an undertaking has at least a 
20% market share381 and that the market conditions allow it to exercise its market power and 
potentially harm competition and consumers. According to Brazilian competition law, a 
conduct is deemed an abuse if the dominant firm is capable of squeezing competitors out of 
the market or creating difficulties for other firms, resulting in harm to competitors and 
consumers. There is no need to prove the likely effects but there has to be a genuine risk that 
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the effects will take place. The rule of reason approach is applied in the sense that the benefits 
of the conduct are considered against the possible harm to the market and the outcome of that 
balance should not harm consumers. In the words of a Councillor: 
 
...in a conduct that is considered per se in Brazil there is no need to prove the 
economic power. There is no need to prove the effects of the conduct and eventual 
economic or legal justifications are not accepted. When a conduct is analysed under 
the rule of reason, instead, there has to be proof of economic power, proof of the 
effects of the conduct or at least of its potential of causing anti-competitive effects and 
the CADE has to reject eventual economic and legal justifications.   
 
This statement demands clarification in three aspects. Firstly, it was stated that under the per 
se rule there would be no need to prove economic power. This would conflict with the views 
of other Councillors who stated that cartels are usually treated as per se only when there is 
proof of economic power. Secondly, according to other members of the BCPS, the difference 
between the per se rule and the rule of reason would be the fact that for per se conduct,382 
efficiency defences would not be acceptable ‘...because until today nobody has managed to 
demonstrate an efficiency resulting from them’. Finally, the Councillor stated that the 
analysis of the CADE would have to reject eventual economic and legal justifications. This is 
an important statement because it implies that the burden of proof of efficiencies lies on the 
defendant. Although there is no legal requirement for the undertaking to prove the existence 
of justifications, this appeared to be present in the approach of the CADE in some 
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occasions.383 Therefore, it would be extremely helpful if this was clarified by the competition 
authority in decisions or guidelines. 
 
Under the Brazilian rule of reason there is no need to follow the US structured approach.384 
Complainants and the competition authority do not have to face the extremely hard standard 
of proof of the rule of reason, especially in respect to the first stage of the analysis, where it 
would be necessary to prove the likely effects of the conduct. Article 20 of Law 8,884/94 
states that ‘Notwithstanding malicious intent, any act in any way intended or otherwise able 
to produce the effects listed below, even if any such effects are not achieved, shall be deemed 
a violation of the economic order’.385 The conduct of the dominant firm only needs to be 
aimed at or to be capable of producing anti-competitive effects and even if these effects do 
not materialise, the conduct shall be prohibited. Therefore, the competition authority and 
complainants only have to demonstrate that the conduct aspires to or is capable of producing 
anti-competitive effects.   
 
Members of the competition authority stated in the interviews that the CADE is concerned 
only with the potential anti-competitive effects of a conduct. The competition authority does 
not necessarily examine the concrete effects of the conduct in order to establish abuse of 
dominance, as the possibility that the effects could result from the conduct of the dominant 
firm offers sufficient grounds to prohibit an anti-competitive practice. In the words of one 
Councillor ‘...a behaviour will be an offence only if (...) it has the potential of causing harm 
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to the entry conditions, to the market or if they result in a transfer of wealth from consumers 
to producers at an anti-competitive level’.  
 
It is important to highlight that market dominance per se is not prohibited in Brazil. The 
CADE clarified this by stating that Law n. 8,884/94 does not prohibit market dominance,386 
as long as it is a result of a natural process based on superior efficiencies of the undertaking 
in relation to its competitors.387 Therefore, in common with the US and the EU, the 
attainment of a position of dominance through internal growth is not prohibited in Brazil.  
 
Moreover, there was no evidence from the case-law that the Brazilian competition authority 
equally balances pro and anti competitive effects. For those accustomed to the American use 
of the rule of reason, the Brazilian rule of reason would make little sense. Despite the ‘rule of 
reason’ label that is given to the Brazilian antitrust analysis, the reality is that Law 8,884/94 
does not allow for a balancing process as in the US model. The law protects ‘...free enterprise 
and open competition, the social role of property, consumer protection, and restraint of 
abuses of economic power’.388 Although these concepts leave some room for interpretation 
by the competition authority, their meaning cannot be completely changed. No matter what 
kind of interpretation is used, it becomes difficult to justify accepting possible harm for 
consumers and competition that could be balanced with efficiencies. 
 
In addition, no discussion on the use of efficiencies as defences or objective justifications 
were found in the case-law, although interviews and cases suggested that members of the 
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BCPS view efficiencies as objective justifications. It is necessary to demonstrate the 
existence of dominance and the conduct; it is up to the defendant to provide objective 
justifications, which can be objective reasons for practising the conduct and the goal of 
achieving certain efficiencies. In common with the EU, the Brazilian competition authority 
has to analyse the justifications but these will not be accepted if the conduct raises artificial 
barriers to entry and is capable of excluding competitors, given that competition would be 
harmed directly and consumers would be harmed indirectly. Therefore, efficiency defences 
are perceived in Brazil as objective justifications. As explained previously,389 objective 
justifications are exemptions, as they refer those justifications which can take potentially 
unlawful conduct out of the scope of the prohibitions of competition law. A different 
approach is undertaken for efficiency defences, as first a breach of competition law is found 
and then the application of a defence is considered.390 This approach can be observed in the 
case-law which will be studied in the following chapter. 
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4.6 The concept of Abuse in Brazil 
 
The Brazilian concept of abuse has changed over the last two decades following the 
developments of competition law and policy and substantive changes in the market 
structure.391  
 
Although distortions resulting from governmental intervention have reduced drastically, it is 
still not easy to establish successfully what conduct can be deemed as abusive. One reason for 
this is the lack of a legal definition of the concept of abuse of dominance, in addition to the 
lack of published guidelines on this issue.  
 
The fact that an undertaking has market power does not mean that its mere existence is 
prohibited. In fact, in the US the Supreme Court stated that it is necessary to establish ‘...the 
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (...) the wilful acquisition or 
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of 
a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident’.392  
 
It can be said that competition which is not based on the merits ought to fall within the scope 
of competition law. However, the difficulty arises in determining what constitutes 
competition on the merits.393 
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Conduct that is regarded as competition on the merits in one jurisdiction may not be regarded 
as such in another, given that the merits relate to what is socially accepted as a fair way to 
compete in the market. For instance, in the United States, the use of certain strategies, such as 
raising artificial barriers to entry, could be considered competition on the merits,394 whilst in 
the EU such behaviour is likely to constitute an offence, given that there still seems to be a 
strong view about the need to ensure the access and existence of multiple players in the 
market.395 Therefore ‘competition on the merits’ ought to be defined on a case by case basis 
as it relates to the ‘fairness’ of the conduct. The above argument has been the subject of much 
debate among academics and has also posed difficulties to courts.396 Nevertheless, it could be 
argued that a conduct is fair when it is not aimed at artificially maintaining or increasing the 
market power of a monopolist, and results in efficiencies.  In the EU:  
 
Companies with a dominant position in a particular market may not abuse (...) [their] 
power to squeeze out competitors. (…) In doing business with smaller firms, large 
firms may not use their bargaining power to impose conditions which would make it 
difficult for their supplier or customer to do business with the large firm’s competitors. 
The Commission can (and does) fine companies for all these practices. (…) The 
overriding considerations are whether consumers will benefit or other businesses be 
harmed.397 
 
Similarly to the EU, causing difficulties to competitors or driving the latter out of the market 
seems to be considered in Brazil an abuse to the extent that it is done through the creation of 
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artificial barriers to entry. The creation of artificial barriers was regarded by many 
interviewees as undesirable. This is understandable as Brazil has many concentrated markets, 
thereby justifying the concern with dominant firms that could behave independently from 
competitors and consumers.  
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4.6.1 The analysis of abuse in Menthor 
 
Menthor398 demonstrates the need for guidance in regards to what can be considered an 
abuse. In this case, the CADE decided unanimously399 that Menthor, an internet provider, 
abused its dominance by creating difficulties for a competitor, so its conduct was prohibited 
under Articles 20(I) to (IV) as well as 21(V), (VI) and (XV) of Law 8,884/94. Douranet 
accused Menthor of interfering with its telephonic communications and, consequently, with 
the internet services it offered. Both companies were the only internet providers in the city of 
Dourados, but also offered their services in other areas. Douranet began to have problems 
with its computer servers which blocked without any apparent reason, thereby causing 
problems for its customers. With special tracing software it became possible to detect that the 
problem was caused by a ‘nuke’ program that was attacking Douranet’s systems and the 
attacks came from a computer used by Menthor. During the investigations it was revealed 
that the program used for the attacks was found in a computer in Menthor’s premises.  
 
The presiding Councillor, João Bosco Leopoldino da Fonseca, concluded that the goal of 
Menthor was to harm the image and the services of Douranet in order to capture its 
unsatisfied customers. Councillor Fonseca also stated that if the conduct had continued, it 
would have been harmful not only for Douranet, but also for the process of competition, 
given that any new provider in the market could have suffered the same kind of attacks from 
Menthor and this would alter the structure of the market. This type of conduct was considered 
by Councillors to be illegitimate because of the means used to harm a competitor. The 
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conduct prohibited was the creation of difficulties to competitors. This could be interpreted as 
the use of unfair practices400 to exclude competitors or impede their access to the market.  
 
It could be argued that Menthor concerned a case of unfair competition, rather than 
competition law,401 as the conduct of Menthor could not be considered an abuse of 
dominance. Although Menthor had a market share above the 20% threshold and could 
therefore be presumed as dominant by law, it only had a market share of 33% compared to 
the higher share of Douranet of 67%. The Councillors have not expressly declared Menthor 
dominant, but have nonetheless prohibited its abuse of dominance. The finding of dominance 
was therefore implicit, which is arguably a mistake in the analysis. In addition, from the 
reasoning of the case it is not clear whether Councillors used the legal threshold to 
presuppose dominance or if they believed that it was not an important element in reaching the 
decision, as this was not debated. It appears that the policy consideration behind the decision 
was to prohibit a conduct that was clearly unfair and had elements of illegality. Moreover, the 
presiding Councillor highlighted that Menthor did not deny committing the offence and its 
defence was limited to the procedural inadmissibility of the evidence. Menthor had a weak 
defence and, as stated by Councillor Fonseca, they relied on procedural defences rather than 
giving objective justifications to avoid liability.  
 
Menthor raises questions about the methodology used to define dominance as well as abuse. 
Dominance seems to have been found implicitly, although arguably this constituted a flaw in 
the analysis. While it did fulfil the 20% market share threshold, this alone should not have 
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been sufficient to lead to a determination of dominance since not every firm that has 20% 
market share is dominant. For a firm to be dominant it has to be able to behave independently 
from competitors and consumers. This was certainly not the case in this instance as the 
defendant not only had a much lower market share than the claimant, but it was not 
demonstrated that it could behave independently from the claimant either. This is the factor 
which would be required in order to consider Menthor dominant and, therefore, to be able to 
assess its abuse.  
 
With respect to the structure of the competition law, although the list of anti-competitive 
offences under Article 21 is not exhaustive402 and the competition authority could argue that 
the conduct of Menthor was anti-competitive, in reality it should have not been considered 
anti-competitive as far as competition law is concerned. It could be argued that there was no 
dominance in the first place and without dominance there would be no unilateral anti-
competitive conduct that could be penalised pursuant to competition law. It is unlikely, 
though, that the conduct of Menthor was fair. However, the dispute between Menthor and 
Douranet was a matter to be decided under unfair competition law.  
 
There is no specific unfair competition law in Brazil but the Industrial Property Law 9,279403 
contains in its chapter six provisions that regulate unfair competition. It was enacted in 1996 
and since the conduct of Menthor started in 1997, the CADE should have declared that the 
matter should be judged by the courts under this law. Although the law does not exclude the 
application of competition law, if a proper analysis of the behaviour had been conducted, 
Menthor would not have been declared dominant and therefore Law 8,884/94 should not have 
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been applied. Unfair competition offences are considered crimes under Law 9,279/96 and 
Article 195 of the law typifies in fourteen sub-sections unfair competition conduct. The 
statutory offence is imprisonment from three to twelve months or the payment of a fine. With 
respect to the case above, Article 195(III) prohibits the fraudulent diversion of trade and this 
would have given legal grounds for Douranet to ask for relief in the form of an interim 
injunction and for the prosecution of Menthor.  
 
The approach of the CADE resulted in the misuse of competition law. The argument based on 
the assertion that Menthor would have acquired dominance if it had continued to use the 
‘nuke’ program to sabotage the internet service of Douranet did not sit well with the factual 
and legal requirements. Firstly, there was no proof that Douranet’s customers were switching 
to Menthor. Secondly, even if they were, this would not guarantee that Menthor would 
become dominant. Thirdly, even if there was the possibility of Menthor becoming dominant, 
this could not be prohibited by evoking the American ‘attempt to monopolise’ doctrine, 
because pursuant to the latter the proof of a dangerous probability would have to be 
established and this was not present in the case.404 
 
In Menthor it was wrongly alleged405 that there was no legal provision to punish Menthor’s 
behaviour other than general principles under Brazilian tort law. As a result, it appears that 
Councillors had a strong inclination to intervene in order to attain justice, even if it resulted in 
the misuse of competition law. Consumers were surely harmed by Menthor’s practice, but the 
case could have been referred to the Consumer Protection Department of the SDE, instead of 
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dealing with the practice under competition law. As will be discussed later on,406 an 
imprecise delimitation of the jurisdiction of the CADE and other authorities responsible for 
enforcing consumer protection and unfair competition may blur the distinction between these 
areas of law. Thus, more effort should be put in improving the coordination between these 
organisations and clarifying their areas of competence. This would improve legal certainty 
and increase the enforcement efficiency of these matters. 
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4.7 Special responsibilities of dominant firms 
 
In the EU, once a firm is considered dominant due to its market power it will have ‘special 
responsibilities’.407 This concept was expressed for the first time by the COJ in Michelin I:408 
 
It is not possible to uphold the objections made against those arguments by Michelin 
NV, supported on this point by the French government, that Michelin NV is thus 
penalised for the quality of its products and services. A finding that an undertaking has 
a dominant position is not in itself a recrimination but simply means that, irrespective 
of the reasons for which it has such a dominant position, the undertaking concerned 
has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted 
competition on the common market.409 
 
The special responsibilities of dominant firms refer to the requirement not to behave in a way 
that can distort competition in the common market. Conversely, in the United States 
companies do not have extra responsibilities as a result of their monopolist position in the 
market.410  
 
The CADE seems to have adopted the EU doctrine of special responsibilities of dominant 
firms, although it emerged from the interviews that most Councillors are not fully aware of 
the incorporation of this doctrine in the Brazilian system. When asked about the existence of 
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special responsibilities, most interviewees’ first reaction was to say that no such doctrine 
existed in Brazil. For instance, a Councillor stated ‘...that it is a bit too strong to say that a 
company has a special responsibility because it has dominance’.  
 
Nevertheless, when discussing the doctrine, the interviewees were almost unanimous in 
saying that dominant firms could not always behave in the same manner as non-dominant 
firms, in the sense that certain types of conduct that could be practised by non-dominant firms 
were likely to be considered anti-competitive if practised by dominant firms. As stated by one 
Councillor: ‘I would not say that the dominant firm has a special responsibility, but that 
certain types of behaviour carried out by a dominant firm could constitute an offence, whilst 
they may not if practised by a non-dominant firm’. Other members of the BCPS were even 
clearer in this respect, stating for instance that ‘...there is a strong presumption that a 
dominant firm cannot do what non-dominant firms do’.   
 
Therefore, it appears that dominant firms do, in fact, have special responsibilities in Brazil. In 
the 2004 Microsoft/TBA411 case, Microsoft was held responsible for establishing and 
operating its distribution network of independent resellers and, as a result, it was held to be 
under a special duty to adopt measures to counter the harmful effects that could result from 
the monopolistic practices of its distributors.412 
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Most of the members of the BCPS mentioned that elements of the doctrine could be 
identified in the 2009 AmBev decision,413 where the presiding Councillor, Fernando de 
Magalhães Furlan, stated that ‘...dominance results in additional responsibilities’. According 
to the reasoning of the decision, a company with circa 70% of the market share should be 
responsible and careful enough to seek to prevent any negative repercussions of its 
commercial practices. In the words of the presiding Councillor: ‘...the steps of elephants have 
a greater impact, in a limited space, than those of felines’. Although the special 
responsibilities doctrine was not expressed as such, the statements in the decision implied that 
AmBev was deemed to be under a special duty to avoid or mitigate any potential negative 
repercussions of its commercial practices. It can be said that AmBev represents a move 
towards a greater convergence between the EU and Brazilian competition policy. Many of the 
interviewees agreed with the views expressed in AmBev, suggesting that the substance of the 
EU doctrine of special responsibilities has been adopted by the Brazilian competition 
authority and is likely to be applied in future abuse of dominance cases. 
 
An instructive point in AmBev is that Councillor Furlan reflected on Montesquieu’s thoughts 
that all those who have power tend to abuse it. Within the context of competition law, he 
stated that that these thoughts of Montesquieu414 were applicable not only in the context of 
political power, but also for economic power, given that power could be understood as the 
capacity, faculty and means of achieving anything in any sort of human activity.  
 
It should be noted that Montesquieu is also credited with the solution to the problem of abuse 
of power by stating that power should be a check to power. In the context of the 
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enlightenment, Montesquieu’s thoughts were against the unchallenged power of the French 
Monarch and consequently in favour of a more balanced model, as was the case in England 
where Parliament and the courts were at times able to challenge the decrees and authority of 
the Monarch. Montesquieu’s thoughts inspired the separation of the Executive, Legislative 
and Judiciary in modern Constitutions, as each branch of government could function as a 
check if other branches abused their powers. The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 also 
contained such checks and balances as it was enacted after decades of dictatorship and was 
based on the respect of the principles of the rule of law, democracy and human rights. In this 
context, the separation of powers seeks to reduce its concentration in a single branch of 
government and consequently the possibility of abuse.415 According to Montesquieu, if one 
person or body held many or all these powers he would be able to behave tyrannically and 
people would not have confidence in their security.  
 
If Montesquieu’s thoughts can be applied to economic power, as suggested by Councillor 
Furlan, then it could be said that in order for competitors and for society as a whole to feel 
confident in their economic well-being and on the proper functioning of the market economy, 
concentrations of economic power must be shared or challenged. However, dominance is not 
prohibited per se; economic power does not need to be shared. Therefore, it appears that the 
competition authority has to fulfil the role that other economic players would be able to play 
in the market to avoid abuses from dominant firms. The role of the competition authority 
could be conceptualised as a check at an institutional level to counter the abuse of economic 
power by dominant firms.416 
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The enunciation of a relationship between dominance and special responsibilities in the 
AmBev decision may also be justified by other principles in the Brazilian Constitution, which 
proclaims the protection of free competition, the right to private property and the social 
function of property.417 Although many aspects of the Brazilian Constitution were inspired by 
the Constitution of the United States of America, the former also reflects many of the 
characteristics of Constitutional texts found in Continental Europe, especially in regards to 
social rights.418 
 
One Constitutional principle enshrined by the Brazilian competition law419 that seems to 
influence the enforcement of abuse of dominance is the social function of property. This 
principle does not mean that private enterprise is only a means to an end, but that companies 
do indeed have social commitments and responsibilities.420 In the United States the 
enjoyment of private property is a fundamental right per se and there is no additional social 
function of property required by the Constitution. As in the United States, companies in 
Brazil can enjoy their property as they please to the limits established by the Constitution. 
The fundamental difference lies on the limits imposed by both Constitutions. The American 
Constitution does not have any principles evoking a social responsibility of property owners, 
whilst the Brazilian Constitution does. The enjoyment of economic power in Brazil is 
guaranteed by the same Constitution that also places limitations on it in order to safeguard 
society as a whole.  
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In common with the US and the EU, private property is respected and protected in Brazil421 
and unlike other BRIC countries, such as China, Brazil is a western democratic country, so 
the government will not interfere in the enjoyment of private property unless it is strictly 
necessary. However, in Brazil, the ownership of private property, or market power in the 
context of competition law, does bring about special responsibilities. The presiding 
Councillor of the AmBev case could not have been more unequivocal when stating that a 
dominant undertaking has to be careful with the consequences of its conduct in the market.  
 
The social function of property and the special responsibilities of dominant firms do have an 
influence on the development of competition law and policy. This has been demonstrated in 
the recent AmBev decision. Undertakings holding market power must be aware of the special 
social responsibilities that are attached to their power, namely that their conduct should not 
be detrimental to society. In essence, they should act not only in their self interest but in the 
interest of society as a whole.   
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4.8 Conclusion 
 
Although Brazilian competition law states that competition should benefit society as a whole, 
there is no general agreement in relation to which specific type of welfare should be pursued. 
Most of the interviewed members of the BCPS seemed to believe that consumers should not 
be harmed. Even those who thought that consumers could be harmed by a legitimate conduct 
without offending competition law also stated that this would be acceptable only in limited 
cases; for instance, if an increase in prices were to be offset by another benefit to consumers, 
such as an increase in choice or quality, so the overall outcome would therefore benefit 
consumers. The majority of the members of the BCPS believe that competition law should 
bring benefits to consumers in terms of consumer surplus. This differs from US competition 
policy, which pursues consumer welfare in terms of overall economic efficiency and is closer 
to the EU, which also views consumer welfare in terms of consumer surplus.422 
 
In relation to the definition of the relevant market, it emerged that this is defined by way of 
the SSNIP423 test. One particular characteristic of the SSNIP test in Brazil is that the 
percentage used to simulate an increase in prices ranges from 5% to 15%, whilst in the US 
and the EU it ranges from 5% to 10%. The use of a 15% increase proxy seems to reflect an 
approach of the Brazilian competition authority that is more realistic, i.e. reflecting an 
increase that would be likely to be felt by consumers.  
 
There is a frequent concern among members of the BCPS not to define the relevant market 
too narrowly in abuse of dominance cases, particularly in cases that generate considerable 
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public opinion. As stated by members of the competition authority, the reason for this is the 
impact that a narrow definition of the relevant market can have on the outcome of a case, as 
well as concerns with possible judicial reviews of the CADE’s decisions as the courts may 
disagree and overrule a decision where the market was defined too narrowly.424 Proceeding in 
this way, the CADE generally defines the relevant market in a similar manner to the US and 
in a wider manner when compared with the EU.  
 
There is a considerable discrepancy of knowledge among members of the BCPS with regards 
to the interpretation of concepts used to define the relevant market. Whilst some interviewees 
had a good understanding of how the relevant market is defined in Brazil and what the 
differences between the US and EU approaches are in this area, others did not. It appears 
fundamentally important for members of the competition authority to receive more thorough 
guidance of how the relevant market ought to be defined.425 This would not only benefit 
competitors, but also allow the emergence of a coherent approach to competition policy 
within the BCPS. 
 
It is common to encounter the citation of foreign cases in the CADE’s decisions426 and, as 
confirmed by some interviewed members of the BCPS, the cases cited are at times selected 
randomly to support the view of the member of the competition authority on the matter being 
analysed. While the citation of American and EU cases in Brazilian decisions is to be 
welcomed in most respects, this practice may generate uncertainty in certain cases because of 
the different treatment given to some types of conduct in the US and the EU. In addition, 
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many members of the competition authority stated that they tend to lean more towards either 
the US or EU doctrines. This, according to interviewees, results from the education and 
professional training that some Brazilian officials received in the US and in the EU. 
Therefore, once again the issue of training becomes important.  
 
The unequal knowledge among members of the BCPS, as well as the random use of US and 
EU doctrine in Brazilian cases could be addressed by providing more uniform training to its 
members with the specific aim of clarifying these issues. This problem becomes even more 
relevant when considering the competition bill that is currently being deliberated in Congress. 
When enacted, it will increase considerably the number of administrative staff and 
institutional funding. This could prove to be a historic opportunity to make improvements in 
this area.427 
 
Dominance is found when there is no substantial competition in the relevant market or when 
there is exclusivity of offer or demand. There is a rebuttable legal presumption that if an 
undertaking has a 20% market share or more, competition is not deemed substantial enough 
and therefore the firm is considered dominant. It emerged from the interviews that this legal 
threshold caused confusion among many members of the competition authority as some 
believed that if a firm has a 20% market share, it would be dominant. In fact, this seems to 
have been the case in Menthor,428 where a firm with 33% market share was punished for its 
abusive practice even though its competitor had a 67% market share. However, currently the 
presumption seems to be usually interpreted in a similar manner as the US and EU market 
share thresholds. The 20% market share is a threshold for examining abuse of dominance 
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offences and does not necessarily correlate to dominance. After establishing that the 
defendant has 20% market share or more, the CADE examines other elements to verify 
whether the firm would be able to behave independently in the market by disregarding 
competitors and consumers; if this proves to be the case, the undertaking will be considered 
dominant. It is essential that the definition of dominance is clarified in future decisions or 
guidelines, given that this is a fundamental concept and members of the BCPS should have a 
shared understanding of it.  
 
It has emerged from this study that although the Brazilian competition authority states that it 
applies the ‘rule of reason’,429 in reality this is implemented differently from its American 
counterpart. According to Law 8,884/94, the competition authority does not need to prove the 
actual or likely effects of the conduct; only that it is capable of causing the anti-competitive 
effects.430 In this respect, the standard of proof under the Brazilian rule of reason is similar to 
that of the EU model and different from that of the US, due to the fact that it is not necessary 
to prove the actual or likely effects of the conduct.  
 
The BCPS does not differentiate between efficiency defences or objective justifications. 
These are both categorised as justifications. Case-law suggests that, in practice, efficiencies 
and other justifications are treated in the same way as objective justifications under the EU 
per se rule. If a conduct has the potential to result in market foreclosure and harm to 
consumers, the defendant would be unlikely to justify successfully the alleged conduct. 
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The acceptance of the EU doctrine of special responsibilities of dominant firms appears to be 
gradually gaining momentum in Brazil. Although Brazilian policy-makers are wary of using 
the term ‘special responsibilities’, in substantive terms this doctrine already forms part of 
Brazilian case-law. In the recent AmBev decision it was made clear that dominant firms have 
greater responsibilities than non-dominant firms. The adoption of the special responsibilities 
doctrine in Brazil is likely to result from the influence of the continental European tradition 
on the values underpinning the Brazilian constitutional and competition law.431 
 
In Brazil, the doctrine of special responsibilities is ideologically linked to the social function 
of property. The latter concept is enshrined in the Brazilian constitution, in Article 1 of Law 
8,884/94 and embedded in the legal system, as well as widely accepted and understood by 
policy-makers as the need to balance private property rights with the socioeconomic interest. 
The gradual acceptance of the doctrine of special responsibilities in Brazil may result from 
the acknowledgement that the ownership property is inherently linked to a special 
responsibility, in the same way that private property rights are inherently linked to a social 
function. The more property or economic power one gains, the greater the responsibilities one 
attains. Constitutional principles and values are incorporated into Brazilian competition law, 
so the social function of property could manifest itself in the interpretation of the special 
responsibilities doctrine. Consequently, undertakings that have considerable economic power 
ought to be subject to special responsibilities.  
 
The elements discussed in this and the previous chapters also give a framework for the 
analysis of how specific abuse of dominance offences are dealt with by the Brazilian 
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competition authority. This will allow the identification of peculiar aspects of the 
enforcement of competition law in Brazil and will shad some light on which types of offences 
tend to follow a US or EU orientation.    
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5. Chapter Four - Non-Pricing Abuse of Dominance in Brazil 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Having examined the assessment of market power in Brazil and undertaken a comparative 
analysis of the two major models that have inspired the Brazilian competition law and policy, 
namely the US and the EU, the following chapters will examine specific exclusionary 
conduct deemed to constitute abuse of dominance.  
 
The study of the US and EU dominance models illustrated a contrasting approach to abuse of 
dominance. In the United States the rule of reason is the predominant approach requiring 
proof of actual or likely effects, efficiency defences and proof that the aim of the dominant 
firm could have been achieved by less restrictive means. After these elements are 
demonstrated, the pro and anti competitive effects of the conduct are balanced. This high 
standard of proof and complex analysis results in a more laissez-faire policy in the US than 
the EU, where the value of economic freedom is still strong, resulting in concerns with 
restrictions to market access. Thus, in the EU it is required to prove only the risk of anti-
competitive effects which cannot be justified objectively if the conduct eliminates 
competition in regards to a substantial part of the market, and the per se rule is still prevalent.  
 
This chapter explores how non-pricing cases of abuse are examined and adjudicated by the 
BCPS. The purpose is to reveal the approach that the Brazilian competition authority has 
undertaken in respect of some of the main abuses. The underlying argument is that the 
development of a predictable and relatively uniform interpretation of competition law is of 
fundamental importance in ensuring the emergence of a system of competition law in Brazil 
which, amongst other resulting benefits, would ensure an adequate degree of legal certainty 
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for companies. Indeed, the fact that Brazilian competition law incorporates broad principles 
that can be interpreted in a variety of ways432 may create legal uncertainty and contrasting 
dicta often aggravate this problem. Moreover, the analysis of the case-law and the input given 
by interviewees will allow for a better understanding of the influence that the EU and the US 
competition law and policy had over the Brazilian interpretation and enforcement of 
competition law.  
 
Specific non-pricing types of conduct are examined. The study of each abuse includes a brief 
overview of the conduct, followed by the relevance of effects and the role of justifications, as 
well as a discussion of the analysis performed by the BCPS, which is referred to as the 
‘Brazilian rule of reason’. Final observations conclude this chapter.    
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5.2 Refusal to deal 
5.2.1 Overview 
 
Refusing to deal is a competition law offence under Article 21 of Law 8,884/94, which 
prohibits the following conduct: 
 
XIII - to deny the sale of a certain product or service within the payment conditions 
usually applied to regular business practices and policies;  
XIV - to hamper the development of or terminate business relations for an 
indeterminate period, in view of the terminated party's refusal to comply with 
unreasonable or non-competitive clauses or business conditions; (...)  
XX - to discontinue or greatly reduce production, without proven good cause;  
XXII - to retain production or consumer goods, except for ensuring recovery of 
production costs.433 
 
In common with other offences under Article 21, the above are prohibited to the extent that 
they are capable of breaching Article 20 of Law 8,884/94.434 
 
In principle, the BCPS considers that a dominant undertaking does not have an obligation to 
cooperate with its rivals. Undertakings are free to choose who they do business with. For 
instance, refusing to deal with a middleman or reseller is generally accepted. In fact, in 
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Goodyear435 it was decided that the exclusion by a manufacturer of a reseller from its list of 
distributors, as well as its refusal to accept a qualified distributor,436 did not constitute an 
offence as long as the market remained competitive.437 This approach is similar to both the 
US438 and the EU439 models, where undertakings are generally allowed to choose their 
business partners. 
 
An exception to the rule that allows firms to have a free choice of whom they want to do 
business with is the ‘essential facilities’ doctrine. This doctrine was first pronounced in the 
US Terminal Railroad Association440 case where it was decided that a joint venture 
composed of many railroad companies was obliged to give access to the use of its terminals 
to other railroad companies. The terminals were considered essential facilities, since 
companies would not be able to operate efficiently without access to them.    
 
Although the essential facilities doctrine originated in the US, the American courts appear to 
have adopted a cautious approach towards accepting this doctrine and finding a refusal as an 
offence.441 Indeed, American courts have narrowed the application of the essential facilities 
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doctrine to exceptional circumstances,442  i.e. where an undertaking holds the monopoly of a 
product or service which is essential and the product cannot be substituted.443 
 
Unlike the US Supreme Court, which has stated that it would not adopt nor reject the 
doctrine,444 the European courts appear to have adopted the substance of the essential 
facilities doctrine without expressing it,445 although the current approach of the EU courts 
narrowed the scope of the essential facilities doctrine as well. In Bronner446 it was decided 
that for a refusal to be abusive, it should not merely create difficulties for competitors, but it 
should also be likely to – and not merely be able to – eliminate competition.447 In addition, 
the refusal should not be objectively justifiable and should concern a product that is 
indispensable, i.e. not economically viable for the competitor to maintain the business in 
question resulting in the elimination of competition, without mentioning the need to assess 
whether the competitor was as efficient as the dominant firm, which is similar to the US 
approach to refusal to deal.448 The need to prove that the product is indispensable made it 
extremely difficult for the court to find an abusive refusal. Nevertheless, it seems that the 
doctrine of essential facilities has received less approval in the US than in the EU.449 
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Bearing in mind this comparative framework, the sections below are aimed at identifying the 
approach adopted by the BCPS in regards to refusals to deal.  
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5.2.2 Proof of effects 
 
Under Brazilian competition law it is not necessary to prove that an offence produces anti-
competitive effects.450 Article 20 of Law 8,884/94 clearly states that a practice is prohibited 
even if its effects fail to materialise.  However, this is not always made clear in the case-law, 
as demonstrated by TV Globo.451 The 2001 CADE decision involved TV Globo, Brazil’s 
largest aerial TV broadcaster. The Brazilian National Telecommunication Agency 
(ANATEL) brought a claim on behalf of TVA Sistema de Televisão and Directv (Directv), 
against TV Globo Ltda and TV Globo São Paulo Ltda (TV Globo). The claim was based on 
TV Globo’s refusal to supply to Directv. The facts leading up to the case consisted of 
Directv’s proposal to purchase the licence rights of TV Globo’s programmes, with the aim of 
allowing the former to include them in its satellite TV services in the cities of São Paulo, Rio 
de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre.  
 
The refusal allegedly resulted in anti-competitive effects in the market of distribution of TV 
and audio programmes via satellite. This claim was supported by four main assertions: (1) 
TV Globo had authorised the satellite distribution of its aerial  TV programmes to Sky TV, 
which was Directv’s main competitor; (2) Sky TV formed part of the same corporate group 
as TV Globo, so the latter had a vested interest in refusing Directv’s proposal; (3) TV Globo 
was the undisputed leader in the Brazilian aerial TV sector, which is the most common 
method of TV signals distribution in Brazil and therefore (4) TV Globo’s refusal to license its 
programmes allegedly resulted in the creation of a considerable barrier to entry in the satellite 
TV market.  
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Directv argued that although TV Globo’s programmes were broadcasted freely via aerial TV, 
most consumers of satellite services preferred to subscribe to comprehensive satellite channel 
packages that included TV Globo’s programmes, so as to avoid the inconvenience of 
switching between aerial TV and satellite services. It was also argued that TV Globo’s refusal 
served the purpose of harming competition by allowing Sky TV to dominate the market. 
However, studies of ANATEL indicated that the market share of Directv was not smaller 
than that of Sky TV in areas where the latter distributed TV Globo’s programmes. This data 
suggested that anti-competitive effects were unlikely to occur, as Directv’s market share was 
largely unaffected.  
 
Although proof of effects is not required under Law 8,884/94, Councillor Campilongo was of 
the opinion that Directv needed to have demonstrated that it sought to provide alternative TV 
programmes but that this had not been enough to mitigate its losses.452 This reasoning 
appears to be flawed for two reasons: (1) it presupposes that the effects would have had to 
materialise before a claim against TV Globo was brought; (2) it makes mitigation a necessary 
condition before a claim can be brought; this would to be contrary to Law 8,884/94, which 
does not make these requirements. TV Globo was acquitted because the refusal was not 
considered to be part of an exclusionary strategy. 
 
MATEC453 is another refusal to deal decision which took place in 2003 and was highlighted 
by interviewees as relevant to the development of the analysis of this conduct. The claimant 
company, Power-Tech Teleinformática Ltda (Power-Tech), brought a claim against Matel 
Tecnologia de Informática SA (MATEC), submitting that the latter abused its dominance by 
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refusing to supply spare parts for telephone switchboards MD 110 from Ericsson. MATEC 
was the only company in Brazil which had entered into licence agreements with Ericsson to 
manufacture and sell Ericsson branded products in the national market. In its submissions, 
Power-Tech argued that as a result of MATEC’s refusal to supply, it was not able to procure 
new clients or to fulfil existing technical assistance agreements with its clients. 
 
MATEC was found liable and Councillor Pfeiffer argued that MATEC was intentionally and 
deliberately454 abusing its dominance to maintain its position, control prices and exclude 
competitors in the downstream market.455 
 
Power-Tech proved that it would not have been able to compete in the maintenance market as 
a result of MATEC’s refusal to supply, as it would not have been commercially viable for 
Power-Tech to import spare parts directly. Power-Tech’s arguments appear to have been 
reasonable, given that it often needed spare parts urgently and there were many delays and 
logistical complications involved when importing products.  
 
It emerges from TV Globo and MATEC that although by law there is no need to prove the 
actual or potential effects of the conduct, if the alleged effects materialised before the 
proceedings, these are taken into consideration by the CADE. Moreover, there does not yet 
appear to be a consensus among members of the BCPS as to whether it is necessary to prove 
the likely effects in refusal to deal cases. Indeed, Councillor Campilongo’s opinion456 
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according to which Directv would have had to demonstrate that it sought to provide 
alternative TV programmes would result in the need to prove effects. 
 
The disparities between dicta were noted by Councillor Macedo Júnior in MATEC by stating 
that there is no universal consensus in regards to the economic reasoning in competition cases 
and that this was especially evident in Brazil. He also noted that the proof of a dangerous 
probability of the effects is considered relevant to some Councillors but not to others.457 
 
In common with the EU and in contrast with the US, where proof of likely effects is required, 
Brazilian competition law does not require proof of actual of potential effects of the 
conduct.458 This seems to be the majority view in the competition authority. The Brazilian 
competition policy seems to be much closer to the EU in this respect, as it adopts a 
preventative approach in relation to anti-competitive effects. However, this approach is not 
always consistent and, as the two cases discussed above suggest, there may be situations 
involving refusals to deal where the likely effects must be demonstrated.  
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5.2.3 Efficiencies and other justifications 
 
If the competition authority is satisfied with the evidence that anti-competitive effects could 
be created by a refusal, the defendant is given the opportunity to demonstrate the existence of 
justifications to escape liability. Article 21(XIII)459 does not express the possibility of 
justifying the conduct. However, as the Constitution gives every party the right to be heard, to 
defend itself and to have the due process of law respected,460 the defendant can provide 
justifications and such justifications can be accepted.  
 
The competition authority often adopts a more impartial approach and tries to identify, by its 
own initiative, any objective reasons that may justify the conduct. Even if the defendant fails 
to justify its refusal, the CADE may be convinced that findings of the SDE and the SEAE 
demonstrate that the practice could be justified.461 
 
In TV Globo, the defendant attempted to justify its refusal on the grounds that it had 
legitimate reasons for the control of the distribution of its TV channels. This was supported 
by the allegation that 70% of TV Globo’s profits on advertisements originated from local 
advertisers. According to TV Globo, the control of the distribution of its TV channels would 
ensure that local programmes were transmitted effectively. This justification, however, does 
not seem to have been the reason for acquitting TV Globo as the reason for this was the 
disagreement among Councillors in respect of the existence of dominance and abuse.462 In 
fact, Councillors of the CADE are allowed to have dissenting opinions and in TV Globo most 
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of the Councillors made use of such right, disagreeing to a certain extent with the decision of 
the presiding Councillor, João Bosco Leopoldino da Fonseca, resulting in the vote of 
Councillor Romano being the one finally adopted. 
 
In MATEC, Councillor Pfeiffer stated that in order to avoid liability under competition law, 
the refusal to supply by a dominant undertaking must be justified in economic terms.463 The 
defendant submitted many justifications. The first one was based on cross product elasticity, 
stating that consumers would be able to switch brands if prices were abusive in the 
downstream market. This argument was not accepted because the replacement of the original 
products that needed maintenance would not have been convenient for consumers. There 
were high replacement costs involved so consumers would be locked into MATEC’s 
maintenance services after purchasing the products. MATEC counter argued by submitting 
that many of its clients were large corporations and public institutions that were aware of the 
maintenance costs involved before purchasing products. However, MATEC had earlier 
submitted that the existence of competing maintenance companies in the downstream market 
would have been harmful to its commercial reputation and goodwill if they failed to perform 
their services properly. Therefore, this argument appears to have backfired, as Councillor 
Pfeiffer stated that if MATEC’s customers were sufficiently knowledgeable of the 
complexities of the product and services involved, they ought to have been sufficiently 
knowledgeable to avoid competing companies tarnishing MATEC’s reputation.464 
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MATEC brought a final submission based on the fact that the complainant had the option to 
purchase spare parts directly from Ericsson. However, this justification was rejected, as 
maintenance services required the occasional acquisition of spare parts without incurring long 
delays of logistical complications. The CADE found that no justifications applied. Therefore, 
it could be argued that the justification of a refusal to deal must demonstrate a legitimate 
commercial reason,465 which would be an objective justification, rather than offering an 
efficiency defence, i.e. demonstrating benefits that outweigh the exclusion of competitors 
from the market.466 
 
In contrast with the US and in common with the EU, there is no clear shift of the burden of 
proof from the competition authority to the defendant when submitting justifications. The 
defendant is given the opportunity to submit justifications and the competition authority is 
free to consider whether these or other justifications apply. However, in contrast with both 
the US and the EU, there is no clear distinction between efficiency defences and objective 
justifications.467 These are all mentioned simply as justifications. What the Council will 
assess is whether the justification proves that the conduct was put in practice for reasons 
other than to raise barriers to entry artificially and eliminate competition from the market.  
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5.2.4 Brazilian rule of reason 
 
Under the US rule of reason, if the defendant provides valid efficiency defences, the burden 
of proof shifts to the claimant, who in turn will need to prove that the alleged offence is not 
reasonably necessary or that its objectives could be achieved by less restrictive means. If the 
claimant is able to satisfy this burden, the pro and anti competitive effects are balanced.468 
 
In Brazil, the concept of the rule of reason is conceived in a different fashion. The 
competition authority considers the reasonableness of the conduct, the commercial strategy 
implemented by the undertaking and its possible justifications.469 The rule of reason in Brazil 
refers to whether the conduct is reasonable or objectively justifiable.  
 
In accordance with CADE’s reasoning, refusing to deal is not an offence under competition 
law per se because it is subject to an assessment based on the reasonableness of the 
conduct.470 Reasonableness is determined from legal and economic perspectives as well as in 
relation to the possible effects of the conduct. The CADE has declared that it would be legal 
for a producer to refuse to sell to a non-qualified471 wholesaler in distribution markets 
regulated by exclusivity arrangements, even if such refusal restricts competition to a certain 
extent. It would be declared legal as long as it also generates net efficiency gains which 
ultimately benefit consumers.472 The specific reference to the restriction of competition ‘to a 
certain extent’ implies that competition must not be totally eliminated. For instance, in TV 
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Globo, Councillor Romano stated that there was no elimination of competition as Directv was 
not being excluded from the market and had a similar market share to Sky TV and the TV 
Globo group. 
 
However, a refusal could be deemed unreasonable if it forms part of an exclusionary 
strategy,473 so the commercial strategy of an undertaking must be analysed.474 The 
exclusionary effects have to appear reasonable in relation to possible harm to consumers and 
competition. As shown in the case-law, refusing to deal appears to be unlawful when it is 
used by a dominant firm to unreasonably raise entry barriers to harm competition and 
consumers.475 
 
There is no need to prove the stringent requirements of the US rule of reason, i.e. that the 
alleged conduct is not necessary, or that the goals of the defendant could be achieved by less 
restrictive means, as well as the pro and anti-competitive effects of the alleged offence. These 
are requirements that can be found in Article 54 of Law 8,884/94 which are applicable to 
concentrations.476 However, Councillors tend to refer to Article 54 for guidance rather than 
strictly applying it. Therefore, although these elements do not need to be proven, members of 
the competition authority do often check if they are present. If they are, the conduct is likely 
to constitute an offence under competition law.  
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In the EU, the degree of market power of the undertaking is particularly important in 
determining whether a refusal to deal constitutes an abuse under Article 102 TFEU.  
According to Monti, market power has to be much greater in a refusal to deal case than in 
those of predatory pricing and rebates, especially when dealing with a de novo refusal, when 
the undertaking must generally enjoy a quasi-monopolist position to be held liable.477 In TV 
Globo, Councillor Romano appears to have adopted a similar reasoning, stating that the 
Directv group already enjoyed a considerable market share in the Americas and for this 
reason TV Globo was not deemed to have acted unreasonably when refusing to grant the 
licence rights of its television programmes to Directv. This argument highlights the 
importance placed by the BCPS on market power when assessing the reasonableness of the 
conduct. According to Councillor Romano, it would have been preferable for Directv to 
invest in new programmes rather than merely duplicating the transmission of TV Globo. This 
would have advanced the goal of competition policy in terms of consumer welfare and the 
dynamic efficiencies that would have resulted from the creation of new television 
programmes.  
 
Councillor Fonseca stated in TV Globo that Article 20 of Law 8,884/94 followed the 
parameters of the EU model in determining which types of conduct are abusive. He stated 
that there were two fundamental criteria for the prohibition of an abusive conduct: (1) the 
undertaking whose conduct is being examined must have dominance in the relevant market; 
(2) the undertaking must abuse its dominance. Councillor Fonseca decided that TV Globo’s 
dominant position had been established and, by limiting or impeding the access of Directv 
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into the relevant market, TV Globo was harming the economic development of a competitor, 
as well as impeding its access to a source of materials, equipment or technology. Further, it 
was refusing to sell goods or services within the standard payment conditions in accordance 
with uses and customs. In essence, Councillor Fonseca was of the opinion that TV Globo’s 
unreasonableness was manifested as it was seeking to maintain its dominant position by 
creating artificial barriers to entry and not competing on the merits. In his opinion, TV Globo 
was dominant and the concession of the broadcasting licences to a company that was part of 
its own group, and the refusal of the same signals to a competitor, was enough to constitute 
an abuse. 
 
The per se approach of Councillor Fonseca in TV Globo seems to have been followed by 
Councillor Pfeiffer in MATEC. According to Councillor Pfeiffer the dominant position of 
MATEC in the upstream market, i.e. the distribution and manufacture of Ericsson branded 
products, allowed it to leverage its economic power in the downstream market, i.e. the 
maintenance and repair of Ericsson branded products. In his view there was no evidence that 
competition in the upstream market would in itself be sufficient to impede an increase in 
prices in the downstream market. All the justifications brought forward by the defendant were 
rejected and the main reason for this seemed to be the fact that, if acquitted, MATEC would 
have a monopoly of the relevant market, given that Power-Tech would not have access to the 
necessary spare parts, allowing MATEC to continue charging high prices. 
 
Although the competition authority has declared many times that there are no per se offences 
in Brazil, and this is included in the competition bill, in practice the reasoning of some 
Councillors in TV Globo and MATEC has opposed this view. The reason for the objection to 
accept the existence of a per se analysis in Brazil results from a misunderstanding of the per 
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se concept. In fact, it emerged from the interviews that most interviewees believed that a per 
se rule signified that the competition authority would not be able to accept any justifications 
from the defendant. As seen previously,478 this is not the case and therefore, the approach of 
many Councillors to the refusal cases above resembled a per se analysis. 
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5.2.5 Essential facility 
 
In TV Globo, submissions in relation to the uniqueness of the product took an interesting turn, 
as it resulted in the qualification of the product as an essential facility by Councillor Fonseca, 
but not by other Councillors. Councillor Fonseca affirmed that TV Globo was refusing an 
essential facility.479 In his view, when a dominant undertaking controls an essential facility, it 
should not refuse its access; if it did, there would be a legal presumption of abuse. This 
reasoning implies the use of a per se approach when the product or service refused is deemed 
to constitute an essential facility. This follows a similar reasoning formulated in the US 
decisions Terminal Railway480 and Aspen.481 However, Councillor Fonseca’s reasoning 
appears deficient, as he failed to mention the existence of criticism to the essential facilities 
doctrine in the US. With respect to the EU authorities, Councillor Fonseca mentioned the 
Commercial Solvents482 and Sea Containers v Stena Sealink483 decisions to reinforce the idea 
that the essential facilities doctrine was accepted on both sides of the Atlantic. Due to the 
popularity of TV Globo’s programmes and the fact that consumers preferred integrated 
Satellite TV services that included TV Globo’s programmes that were normally available via 
aerial TV, the licensing over TV Globo’s programmes equated, in his view, to an essential 
facility.484 However, the Councillor did not mention that although the essential facilities 
doctrine was adopted in the EU, the COJ restricted the ambit of the doctrine in Bronner485 by 
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establishing that the refusal should not simply create difficulties for competitors;486 it should 
also be indispensable and result in the risk of eliminating effective competition. It is 
questionable whether the refusal of TV Globo met these criteria. 
 
According to Councillor Campilongo the product refused was not an essential facility. He 
highlighted that the doctrine was developed in the United States for extreme cases where the 
exclusive ownership of a product, structure or infrastructure made it impossible for 
competition to exist, given that the product or service refused could not be replicated.487 In 
his opinion, TV Globo’s programmes did not fulfil the requirements of an essential facility.488 
 
Although it is understandable that the Councillors followed the US and the EU approaches to 
essential facilities, it is important to note that the Brazilian competition law does not require 
the refused product to be an essential facility. It appears that this doctrine has been given 
disproportionate significance in TV Globo, where the key deciding arguments of Councillors 
Fonseca and Romano regarded the essentiality of TV Globo’s television programmes. 
Instead, the focus of the decision should have been on the stimulus to innovation that the 
refusal could create and the benefits that this would bring to consumers. 
 
In MATEC, Councillor Pfeiffer affirmed that the essential facilities doctrine was not only 
applicable to infrastructure such as ports and railways, but also to products that were 
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unquestionably indispensable for the entry or survival of competitors in the market and 
therefore this doctrine could be applicable to the case in question.489 
 
It was not questioned, in MATEC or TV Globo, whether Brazilian competition law allowed 
for the adoption of the essential facilities doctrine. Neither the existence of criticism of the 
essential facilities doctrine in the US and in the EU was mentioned. Before adopting 
international doctrines to assist the interpretation of Brazilian law, it is important to question 
their suitability to avoid the adoption of a hybrid approach to the Brazilian competition law 
that results in an application of the law without due regard to the interpretation of the national 
legal text. Clarifications on this matter would be welcomed if guidelines on abuse of 
dominance are issued in Brazil. 
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5.2.6 Observations 
 
It is possible to refuse to deal as long as there is no attempt to eliminate competition.490 If a 
refusal to deal is practised by a dominant firm that is not attempting to eliminate competition, 
the conduct can only constitute an offence under Brazilian consumer protection law.491 
 
As noted by Councillor Macedo Júnior in MATEC, there is no general consensus in regards to 
many aspects of competition law among Councillors, including in respect of the need to 
prove the probability of the effects.492 The case-law seems to reflect the provisions of 
competition law in this respect, i.e., that there is no need to prove the effects of the refusal. 
However, the competition authority took into consideration the fact that no actual effects 
resulting from the refusal were present in TV Globo, whilst the effects had already 
materialised in MATEC. In any case, the competition authority does not need to prove the 
likely effects of a conduct as in the US. 
 
In Brazil there is no distinction between efficiency defences and objective justifications as in 
the US and the EU and there is no discussion among Councillors about which conduct can be 
accepted as competition on the merits. However, Councillors gave opinions suggesting what 
they perceived as competition on the merits. For instance, in MATEC, Councillor Pfeiffer 
made reference to the US Kodak493 decision and stated that MATEC was harming Power-
Tech by refusing to supply it with spare parts because Power-Tech offered much lower 
maintenance prices. The refusal was understood as a means to harm competition, rather than 
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a legitimate business practice. In regards to acceptable justifications, in TV Globo and 
MATEC, efficiencies raised were considered in the same way as objective justifications, 
although Councillors did not expressly make any distinctions between objective justifications 
and efficiency defences.  
 
In TV Globo the majority of the Councillors agreed with the decision of Councillor Romano, 
which ‘balanced’ the pro and anti-competitive effects of the conduct. It was stated that there 
would be more harm to consumers if TV Globo was forced to licence its programmes. This 
was because if such a licence was not granted to Directv, the latter would have to invest in 
innovation, creating new and better programmes to compete with TV Globo instead of 
replicating what was already available in the market. This analysis reflects the Brazilian rule 
of reason. All the factors are taken into consideration and the competition authority assesses 
which alternative would be the best for consumers and would, at the same time, enhance 
competition. 
 
Moreover, a refusal cannot result in competition being eliminated in the market. In TV Globo 
it was stated by Councillor Romano that there was no abuse because there was no elimination 
or risk of elimination of competition. In MATEC, it was established that Power-Tech, the 
only competitor of MATEC in the downstream market, would be excluded from the market 
as a result of the refusal to supply. This finding was fundamental for the outcome of the 
decision.  
 
There was no debate as to whether Power-Tech was as efficient as MATEC. The key element 
was that it offered better prices and it would be excluded from the market. In TV Globo, 
Councillor Romano highlighted that Directv should be able to find a way to compete with TV 
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Globo given that they were both competitors of a similar calibre. The issue, however, did not 
rest on whether Directv was as efficient as TV Globo or not. Councillor Campilongo 
highlighted that the refusal of TV Globo to licence its programmes to Directv would have 
been assessed under another light if Directv had shown that it tried to offer different TV 
programmes but this had not been enough to mitigate its need to have access to TV Globo’s 
programmes. If that was the case, it is likely that TV Globo would have had to licence its 
programmes to Directv, no matter how efficient it was.  
 
There is not yet a clear competition policy in regards to refusal to deal. Brazil is finding its 
own way which appears to reveal a development of the policy towards an EU standpoint. The 
main concern of the BCPS when analysing this conduct is ensuring that no artificial barriers 
to entry are created and that competition in the market is maintained in order to provide better 
and cheaper products to consumers.  
 
It is worth noting that Brazil is a civil law jurisdiction; therefore, there is no judicial doctrine 
of stare decisis or binding precedent. This may partly explain a greater disharmony in the 
Brazilian body of case-law in comparison with its common law counterparts, as Brazilian 
decisions are persuasive rather binding law. In any case, coherence and consistency in 
decisions is important in ensuring legal certainty. In this respect, the publication of guidelines 
to aid in the enforcement of competition law could prove beneficial in aspiring to legal 
certainty and aiding the development of Brazilian competition policy. 
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5.3 Tying arrangements 
5.3.1 Overview 
 
Tying arrangements are prohibited pursuant to Article 21(XXIII) which describes the practice 
as ‘...to condition the sale of a product to the acquisition of another good or service, or to 
condition the performance of a service to contracting another service or purchasing another 
good’.494 In common with other types of abusive offences, tying arrangements are prohibited 
to the extent that they are able to breach Article 20.495 
 
The products that are tied must be distinct from each other, i.e., there must be consumer 
demand for each product independently. This seems to be a simple test; for instance, it would 
not be reasonable for a single shoe to be sold separately. However, it can be difficult to define 
the extent to which there is enough consumer demand to justify the sale of some products 
separately, especially if they are technological products that are integrated.496 
 
The products must not be available separately or, if they are, there has to be an element of 
coercion. The CADE has determined in Basf497 that in addition to the objective characteristics 
of the offence, tie-in sales are deemed to contain an element of coercion or duress, as the 
purchaser is forced, at least at a commercial level, to purchase the subordinate good or 
service. This appears to be appropriate, as tying arrangements are often imposed on final 
consumers, i.e. consumers at the final stage of the commercial chain, as well as on weaker or 
dependant commercial parties within the commercial chain such as suppliers or distributors.  
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Tie-in sales can also be implemented by alternative means of conditioning the purchase of 
another product in the actual contractual arrangement. The characteristics of the primary 
product could be modified, so it would inherently require the purchase of the subordinate 
product to serve its function. This method has the added advantage of impeding the purchase 
of competing primary and subordinate products by consumers.498 However, a firm has never 
been found guilty in Brazil for adapting a product in order for it to require the purchase of a 
subordinate good or service.  
 
Tying arrangements used to be considered per se prohibitions in the United States.499 
However, the situation seems to be changing. In Microsoft,500 the decision of the D.C. Circuit 
Court stated that the per se prohibition should not be applicable for technical bundling 
resulting from the integration of software. Further, the Appellate Court held that even an 
intentional creation of incompatibilities by changes in the product would not be an offence 
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act since it would fall within the category of innovation.501 
 
This approach appears to be in line with the statements made by the Assistant Attorney 
General and the Chief of Staff of the Antitrust Division of the US DOJ at the end of 2008. 
According to them ‘...[t]he historical hostility of the law to tying is unjustified, and the 
qualified rule of per se illegality applicable to tying is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's 
modern antitrust decisions and should be abandoned’.502 Bearing in mind that a few months 
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afterwards the DOJ stated that it will be tougher with the conduct of monopolies,503 it is still 
to be seen how the contrasting decisions and statements will play out and which view will 
prevail. 
 
Conversely, in the EU tying arrangements are prohibited per se. Microsoft504 is arguably the 
most notorious tying case in the EU. In 2004, the European Commission decided that 
Microsoft was liable for abusing its dominance by including Windows Media Player in the 
Windows operating system. The reasoning for the decision was that the practice weakened 
competition on the merits, discouraged innovation and reduced consumer choice.505 The 
decision of the Commission was upheld by the General Court. A similar concern was brought 
to the attention of the competition authority in the United States, i.e., the bundling of Internet 
Explorer to Windows operating system. In the EU, Microsoft was found liable for breaching 
Article 102 TFEU, fined and ordered to provide PC manufacturers the versions of Windows 
without its Media Player. In contrast, the US DOJ withdrew its tying claim against Microsoft. 
While the analysis of tying arrangements has been shifting in the US from a per se rule to 
what could be called a quasi per se rule, the EU still seems to take a more formalistic 
approach.506 The different outcomes to similar circumstances suggest a more tolerant 
approach of the American competition authorities to the use of market power in a primary 
market to obtain advantages in a secondary market as long as it would not likely result in a 
monopoly in the secondary market as well.  
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In Brazil the CADE has stated that tying is not prohibited per se.507 However, as will be seen 
below, the analysis of the conduct is closer to the EU approach to tying arrangements. 
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5.3.2 Proof of effects 
 
According to CADE’s Resolution 20, the principal anti-competitive effects resulting from 
tying arrangements are: (1) Abusive increase of profits; (2) harm to purchasers and 
consumers, and (3) the creation of barriers to entry in the downstream market with respect to 
actual and potential competitors.508 This is consistent with the concern suggested by the case-
law with ensuring market access and the maintenance of competition in the market.  
 
In 2004 the CADE judged Microsoft,509 which concerned the inclusion of the program 
‘Money 97’ in the Brazilian version of the software package of ‘Microsoft for Small Business 
97’. According to the claimant, Paiva Piovesan Engenharia & Informática Ltda, Microsoft’s 
inclusion of Money 97 constituted a tying arrangement that blocked the entry of competitors 
into the market. The case also concerned the practice of discounts and rebates to distributors 
which resulted in the latter giving preference to Microsoft’s products.510 Both practices were 
considered legitimate. The presiding Councillor, Thompson Almeida Andrade, affirmed that 
the anti-competitive effects of tie-in sales would be analysed in relation to the leverage, i.e. 
the use of market power in the main product market that could increase its market power in 
the tied product market. If the tie-in sales allowed the defendant to leverage its market power, 
thereby foreclosing downstream markets, the anti-competitive effects would be market 
foreclosure and harm to consumers, given that the creation of artificial market barriers in the 
secondary market could result in price increases.511 
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This decision suggests that proof of likely effects is not required by the BCPS and that it is 
concerned with market access, as well as the maintenance of competition in a market free 
from artificial barriers to entry, reflecting the constitutional principles enshrined in the 
competition law.512 
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5.3.3 Efficiencies and other justifications 
 
In Brazil, the defendant has the right to present justifications in its defence arguments. In 
cases where the defendant is silent or submits a defence with a restricted scope, the 
competition authority can also unilaterally decide that justifications apply to the case under 
analysis.513 
 
In Microsoft, the defendant successfully justified its conduct. It was decided that including 
‘Money 97’ into the Brazilian version of the software package of ‘Microsoft for Small 
Business’ did not constitute a tie-in offence, as each version of the software could be 
purchased individually, so there would not be in fact tying.514 In addition, selling the software 
together allowed users to access various programs that were completely integrated with each 
other for substantially lower prices than purchasing them separately.515 
 
Moreover, efficiency considerations based on the technological advantages resulting from 
Microsoft’s integrated software package were relevant in justifying the alleged offence. 
However, Councillor Andrade highlighted that even if the tie-in sales allowed for lower 
prices, it had to be assessed whether it increased the network effects of Windows Operating 
System. In this case, the network effects were not considered sufficient to constitute an 
offence.  
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The innovation justification relates to dynamic efficiency and is frequently raised by 
defendants that operate in technological sectors, such as the IT sector, or that acquired IP 
rights through innovation. Thus far, there have not been any offences found in cases where 
the innovation justification has been reasonably argued, suggesting that, similarly to the US, 
the BCPS is cautious due to the adverse consequences that the enforcement of competition 
law against IP rights could have on economic and technological development. Thus, the 
technological integration defence is likely to be justified by the fact that innovation promotes 
economic growth.   
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5.3.4 Brazilian rule of reason 
 
The reasoning in Microsoft suggests that the Brazilian competition policy adopts an approach 
to tying similar to that of the EU as a more formalistic approach is undertaken by the 
Brazilian competition authority. In fact, in Microsoft the pro and anti competitive effects of 
tying were not balanced as they would be in the US and there was no mentioning of the need 
to prove that the goals could have been achieved by less restrictive means. This demonstrates 
the existence of differences between the Brazilian rule of reason and its American 
counterpart.516 However, it must be noted that the Brazilian competition authority seems to be 
less reluctant than the EU when it comes to the analysis of justifications based on innovation 
and the existence of IP rights, so the application of the law in these situations appears to be 
closer to the US approach.  
 
In addition, Councillor Andrade examined some situations where in his view it would be 
likely that an offence would exist due to network effects in the technological sector, i.e. when 
dominant undertakings: (1) refuse the compatibility of their competitor’s programs with their 
software systems, thus prohibiting the entry of new competitors that could further improve 
the existing technological standards; (2) advertise before the launch of a new product version 
without allowing the consumer to choose a particular program to suit their needs, thereby 
discouraging purchases of other brands; (3) upgrade programs with the introduction of new 
technology that is not accessible to other competitors; (4) impose the incompatibility of 
products developed by competitors in the aftermarket with the systems of the dominant firm’s 
competitors in the main market; (5) attempt to purchase a successful software of a competitor 
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that, combined with the market share of the dominant firm would result in an increase in 
barriers to entry.517 These statements help to increase certainty, by clarifying the practices of 
dominant undertakings that are unlikely to allow for justifications. 
 
  
                                                 
517
 Paiva Piovesan Engenharia & Informática Ltda v Microsoft Infomática Ltda - 08012.001182/1998-31, 6. 
207 
 
5.3.5 Observations 
 
It emerges from the analysis above that tying arrangements are prohibited from the moment 
that they allow the dominant firm to leverage its market power in the secondary market, as 
they could result in artificial barriers to entry and elimination of competition. If it is proved 
that the dominant firm is able to leverage its market power, the CADE will consider the 
justifications submitted by the defendant and the ones that appear applicable to the particular 
case.  
 
It is not clear whether it is necessary for the competition authority to prove that the effects 
could have been achieved by less restrictive means, given that in Microsoft this was not 
stated. Furthermore, there has been no discussion in the case-law about what could be 
regarded as competition on the merits, although the main concern appears to have been the 
creation of artificial barriers to entry. 
 
The analysis of the case-law reveals that the BCPS does not appear to have given much 
attention to tie-in sales. There are less than ten administrative cases dealing with this conduct 
in CADE’s database,518 and only in one of them was the defendant held liable. This was 
Unimed of Santo Ângelo,519 where a private health care provider was held liable for tying its 
medical services to laboratorial and pharmaceutical services. The reason for the apparent 
neglect of tying arrangements may result from the fact that this conduct is generally 
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associated with consumer protection and it is expressly prohibited under the Brazilian 
Consumer Code.520 Moreover, consumer protection bodies can intervene even in situations 
where there are tie-ins which are exploitative and exclusionary at the same time. Therefore, 
complaints are likely to be referred to the Consumer Protection Department rather than to the 
Competition Protection Department of the SDE.521 Thus, at an institutional level, there appear 
to be organisational problems that hamper the coordination of competition and consumer 
protection policies. In the words of one interviewed member of the BCPS:  
 
...the consumer protection policy is enforced by the consumer protection department of 
the SDE. There may be a bridge between the consumer and competition departments 
within the SDE, but I do believe that they do not exchange any kind of information. 
They behave almost as completely different organisations. 
 
Another reason that might explain the neglect of tie-in sales is that the BCPS may not have 
the resources to monitor the markets and identify potential competition law offences.522 In 
addition, competitors themselves may not be aware of the possibility of complaining to the 
BCPS over this offence. According to one interviewed Councillor ‘...the Brazilian population 
is not usually aware of what competition law is or of its benefits for society; even when they 
complain to the competition authority, they are not capable of identifying properly the kind of 
conduct that is taking place’.  
 
                                                 
520
 See Brazil, Law n. 8,078 of 11 September 1990, Article 39. See also section 2.3.2. 
521
 See section 2.4.   
522
 See section 2.4.3.1. 
209 
 
Competition advocacy could play an essential role in clarifying the harmful consequences of 
tying arrangements, not only to consumers, but also to the process of competition. This is 
relevant, as there is a danger that the scope of application of the Brazilian Consumer Code 
could extend to the point of blurring the distinction between competition and consumer 
protection policies. Proposed administrative reform pursuant to the competition bill should 
address this issue by incentivising and allowing the BCPS to play a more proactive role in 
competition law advocacy.523 
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5.4 Exclusive dealing 
5.4.1 Overview 
 
Exclusive dealings are prohibited pursuant to provisions of Article 21 of Law 8,884/94. 
Although the following subsections usually refer to some of the consequences of exclusive 
dealings, together with Article 20524 of Law 8,884/94 they form the legal basis for prohibiting 
anti-competitive exclusive dealings in Brazil:525  
 
IV - to limit or restrain access to the market by new companies; V - to pose difficulties 
for the establishment, operation or development of a competitor company or supplier, 
purchaser or financier of a certain product or service; VI - to bar access of competitors 
to input, raw material, equipment or technology sources, as well as to their distribution 
channels.526 
 
In addition, exclusive dealing is specifically prohibited in relation to the mass media sector if 
an agreement or conduct ‘requires or grants exclusivity in mass media advertisements’.527 
 
Exclusive dealing consists of the imposition by dominant undertakings of exclusivity 
covenants on other economic players, such as producers, suppliers and distributions. The 
imposition of covenants to deal exclusively with a dominant firm could be done by means 
which are either (1) formal or legal, or (2) informal or commercial. An example of a 
‘formal/legal’ means of practising exclusive dealing is via the inclusion of exclusivity 
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covenants or trade restrictions in commercial agreements. An example of an 
‘informal/commercial’ means is the adoption of a commercial strategy where there is a 
common understanding or perception that the dominant firm would retaliate against 
commercial parties that deal with its competitors. A Brazilian decision exemplifying the use 
of informal commercial means to impose exclusivity is AmBev.528 
 
Together with refusal to deal,529 exclusive dealings represent the most common complaints 
and decisions registered against dominant undertakings in Brazil. Due to a greater corpus of 
case-law, in comparison with other offences discussed in this research, this section will 
examine a greater number of decisions, which allows for a better understanding of the policy.  
 
Frigelar530 exemplifies the CADE’s initial view of exclusive dealing before Law 8,884/94 
was enacted. In this 1992 decision, which has since been overruled, it was established that 
exclusivity clauses, whereby dominant undertakings imposed exclusivity covenants on 
distributors, were not abusive per se, as they could be rescinded unilaterally by the 
contractual parties. This understanding was in favour of dominant undertakings and was 
based on the principle of freedom of contract, which is how contracts between commercial 
parties are commonly interpreted. The CADE has moved away from this approach, as the 
commercial strength of the parties involved has shifted in favour of dominant firms.  
 
As exclusive dealings became increasingly relevant under Brazilian competition law, the 
competition authority began to deal with the practice outside a traditional law of contract 
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context. As a result, many challenges to exclusivity agreements or contractual clauses have 
been heard by the CADE over the past two decades. Examples include the various cases 
against Unimed,531 a well-known and dominant Brazilian medical cooperative of associated 
private clinics and medical professionals, which provides medical cover to members of the 
Unimed health care plan. Unimed regulates its activities by a common charter and separate 
membership contracts with affiliated medical practitioners. These often contained restrictions 
against providing medical services to patients from competing health care providers. In 
situations where affiliated members breached their exclusivity obligations, they were 
expelled from Unimed. This practice resulted in severe commercial consequences for medical 
practitioners, patients and competitors, as Unimed was and remains, Brazil’s leading private 
health care provider. With the Unimed cases, the Brazilian approach towards exclusive 
dealing began to be more concerned with the creation of artificial barriers to entry and this 
was the reason why Unimed was found guilty. 
 
This differs from the US, where exclusive dealing is prohibited only if, under the rule of 
reason, it would result in a significant and unjustified exclusion of competitors and harm to 
consumers. In fact, in the US exclusive dealings are usually perceived as pro-competitive532 
and are only prohibited in cases where they substantially lessen competition.533 
 
The Brazilian analysis is similar to the EU per se approach which prohibits the imposition of 
exclusivity by dominant firms unless there is an objective justification. Indeed, the freedom 
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of firms to operate in the market without artificial obstacles created by dominant firms 
appears to play a central role in the assessment of exclusive dealings in Brazil.534  
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5.4.2 Proof of effects 
 
One of the first cases where an exclusivity agreement was prohibited concerned a claim 
against Unimed Santa Maria,535 a health care provider. It was based on the premise that 
exclusivity covenants imposed upon affiliated medical practitioners increased barriers to 
entry into the health care market for Unimed’s competitors. There was no need to 
demonstrate the likely effects, but simply that the exclusivity could create difficulties for the 
entry of new competitors.536 
 
White Martins537 is a more recent exclusive agreement decision from 2002, which regarded 
the industrial gas sector. The parties were the claimant, Messer Grisheim, and the defendant, 
White Martins. The claim was based on the allegation that White Martins had anti-
competitive exclusivity agreements with producers of raw materials for the production of 
CO2. White Martins entered into a ten-year exclusivity agreement with Ultrafértil, one of the 
key suppliers in the market. Messer Grisheim argued that the exclusivity agreements resulted 
in: (1) the creation of barriers to entry; (2) the monopolisation of all the sources of raw 
material, and (3) the exclusion of competitors. Messer Grisheim also alleged that White 
Martins lacked the capacity of processing and commercialising all the raw material that it 
purchased and was dispersing the production surplus of CO2 into the air. This practice was 
inefficient and was allegedly undertaken because White Martins sought to exclude 
competitors. In this case, there was no need to show the existence of likely effects as in the 
US. It was sufficient to demonstrate that there were no suppliers of raw material that were 
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equivalent in terms of quality and distance as those of Ultrafértil.538 As a result, White 
Martins was found in breach of competition law. 
 
Two years later, the CADE decided Microsoft/TBA,539 which concerned exclusive agreements 
in the software sector. Microsoft had entered into an exclusivity agreement with TBA 
Informatics (TBA) which conferred the latter exclusivity over the sale and distribution of 
Microsoft software products in the federal district of Brasilia. Although in formal terms the 
exclusivity agreement had a limited geographic scope, it substantially conferred TBA 
exclusivity in respect of public procurements involving the federal government. When 
analysing the anti-competitive effects of Microsoft’s distribution network in term of its 
territorial division, the CADE acknowledged that the main issue was the monopolisation of 
the software market. There was no effective competition amongst distributors, which would 
have resulted in higher prices. In this case, the effects had already taken place, i.e., the 
exclusivity agreement harmed competition in the relevant market and deprived the federal 
government of a pool of competing distributors to participate in its public procurements. 
Therefore, the actual effects of the conduct were demonstrated, suggesting the existence of a 
competition law offence. As will be seen in the cases discussed below, this does not appear to 
be the approach of the CADE to those situations where the effects have not yet materialised. 
 
In 2005, the CADE heard Center Norte,540 a case that concerned a dispute between shopping 
centres. The claimant, Condomínio Shopping D, accused Center Norte SA of breaching 
competition law by imposing a non-competition covenant in its commercial tenancy 
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agreements. Consequently, Center Norte’s commercial tenants were restricted from 
undertaking the same or similar commercial activities within the vicinity of 1,000 metres 
from Center Norte. The only exception concerned tenants that were already established 
within the restricted area when the agreement came into force or who obtained the express 
authorisation of Center Norte. Condomínio Shopping D argued that the covenants in the 
tenancy agreements acted as barriers to entry, reduced consumer choice and allowed the 
defendant to charge higher rents. In this case, the claimant only had to prove that that the 
restrictive covenants impeded shop owners from opening shops within 1,000 metres from 
Center Norte and this would impede the entry and limit the development of competitors.541 
 
Three years later, Iguatemi542 was decided by the CADE. The facts of this decision largely 
mirrored those of Center Norte as it also concerned territorial exclusivity covenants imposed 
on commercial tenants. The defendant, Condomínio Shopping Center Iguatemi, is one of 
Brazil’s largest shopping centre groups. In the same way as in Center Norte, the claimant 
only needed to demonstrate that the tenancy agreements restricted the freedom of tenants to 
open new shops in competing shopping centres.543 
 
In the same year as Iguatemi, Celular CRT544 was decided by the CADE. This decision 
concerned exclusive agreements in the mobile phone sector. The claimant, Telet SA, was a 
mobile phone operator that brought a complaint in respect of the exclusivity agreements 
between the defendant, Celular CRT SA (CRT) and distributors from the State of Rio Grande 
do Sul. The claimant argued that the exclusivity agreements of CRT had the effect of 
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increasing barriers to entry, given that CRT’s competitors had to incur into considerable risks 
and expenses in order to implement their own distribution channels. This was due to the fact 
that the largest retailers of mobile phones and services were operated by parties to the 
exclusivity agreements with CRT.  
 
In Celular CRT it was not necessary for Telet SA to prove that effects were likely, but rather 
that such effects could take place. Indeed, Telet SA stated that the exclusivity agreements 
caused unjustified difficulties for competitors and had the scope to raise the costs of rivals.545 
This understanding is in harmony with Law 8,884/94, which prohibits conduct to the extent 
that it is capable of producing the anti-competitive effects listed by Article 20, even if they 
have failed to materialise.546 The plenary of the CADE547 had to decide whether CRT’s 
exclusivity agreements had the potential to foreclose the market at the time in which they 
were agreed, rather than at the time of the decision. A main issue resulted from the delay in 
the investigations as the harm to competition failed to materialise by the time that the 
decision was heard by the CADE. Councillors faced the difficult decision of whether to find 
an undertaking liable for a past conduct that could have potentially harmed competition, 
although no harm had actually occurred.548 Notwithstanding the fact that the standard of 
proof in Law 8,884/94 was satisfied, the delays during the investigations appear to have 
resulted in the acquittal of the defendant. This suggests that when a decision is made ex post 
facto and, with the benefit of hindsight, there is proof that the effects have not materialised, it 
is unlikely that a defendant will be held liable, even if the conduct had the potential to harm 
competition.  
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5.4.3 Efficiencies and other justifications 
 
In White Martins,549 the defendant submitted the argument that there was no intention of 
increasing the prices of raw materials. However, the presiding Councillor, Celso Fernandes 
Campilongo, highlighted that the exclusion of competitors by the artificial creation of barriers 
to entry would still be unjustified if prices of raw materials remained unaffected and the anti-
competitive strategy would still be effective if prices remained the same and competition was 
restricted or eliminated.550 
 
In AmBev551 it was stated by the CADE that a dominant undertaking should not condition 
discounts to an obligation on its retailers to maintain high levels of stock, since this would 
constitute a barrier to entry by impeding retailers to purchase competing products.552 These 
observations were made in relation to AmBev’s strategy regarding its distribution agreements 
and commercial practices which resulted in exclusivity. AmBev’s conduct was considered to 
result in prohibited and unjustified harm to competition. According to Councillor Furlan, in 
the alternative scenario where the loyalty programme would have been limited to the 
accumulation of discounts by points-of-sale,553 calculated in relation to the volume of 
purchases of bottled beer, a priori there would be no violation of competition law.554 In his 
view, without the exclusivity and minimum stock requirement imposed on points of sale, the 
loyalty programme would not have been capable of generating a significant increase in the 
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purchase of AmBev beers. Therefore, the exclusivity imposed on points of sale and the 
artificial creation of barriers to entry were perceived as the main reasons for finding an 
offence. 
 
According to Councillor Furlan, imposing exclusivity by legal or commercial means in the 
beer market could not be justified by arguing that it resulted in a reduction of transaction 
costs.555 However, this justification could be valid in dynamic markets in technical and 
innovative sectors, where exclusivity arrangements could be necessary to market effectively 
new technological products to consumers. Exclusivity in the downstream market could be 
justified if the dominant undertaking invested a considerable amount in aspects such as 
training, sales and technical assistance teams.556 
 
In the view of Councillor Furlan, the justification raised by AmBev based on the need to 
protect its commercial reputation could not be accepted.557 The product differentiation in the 
beer sector resulted from marketing and branding, rather than differences in quality or taste of 
the product. Therefore, the presence of competing brands sold at the points of sale, contrary 
to AmBev’s loyalty programme, was not deemed capable of causing damage to the reputation 
and commercial goodwill of AmBev’s beer brands.  
 
The justification based on the allegation that AmBev had made specific investments was not 
accepted either, because it was not necessary for AmBev to invest in catering equipment and 
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shop-fitting of points of sale.558 These practices were deemed to constitute incentives or 
‘perks’ to induce them into the exclusivity scheme. In addition, given the cash flow generated 
by sales and the fact that AmBev’s beer brands were advertised in shops and catering 
equipment, there were no significant sunk costs in the event that the exclusivity arrangements 
ceased.  
 
With regards to the justification based on achieving efficiencies via economies of scale, the 
presence of AmBev in 97 percent of points of sale and a market share of circa 70 percent in 
the national market signified that AmBev had already consolidated an unchallenged dominant 
position. Thus, it was not deemed reasonable for AmBev to justify exclusivity arrangements 
on the need to achieve economies of scale.559 
 
The defence submission based on the argument that AmBev’s market share did not increase 
was rejected because AmBev was pursuing a commercial strategy primarily aimed at 
excluding competitors and raising barriers to entry. Therefore, its loyalty programme was 
deemed to be anti-competitive even if AmBev maintained its market share. This 
understanding is stricter than the one in Kellogg’s, where the lack of an increase in the 
defendant’s market share was considered to demonstrate that no anti-competitive offence had 
taken place. The CADE stated in AmBev that for anti-competitive effects to occur it was not 
necessary for the market to be foreclosed and AmBev’s market share to increase as the aim 
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and scope of the exclusivity programme had to be taken into consideration.560 This is similar 
to the per se rule in the EU.   
 
In Microsoft/TBA,561 the defendant submitted efficiency justifications for its conduct. As 
explained below,562 the CADE felt that there was no need for an in-depth analysis of such 
justifications, given that the conduct would result in a monopoly and consequently in higher 
prices and less product choice.563 
 
Justifications were also raised in Center Norte564 and Iguatemi.565 In both decisions the 
defendants argued that the exclusivity covenants reflected common market practice, which 
was openly encouraged by the Brazilian Association of Shopping Centres as a way of 
ensuring a greater diversity and quality of tenants. However, the justification was not 
accepted by the CADE. It appears that the justifications failed as a result of the anti-
competitive scope of the exclusivity covenants.  
 
From the cases above it remains clear that the competition authority will consider any 
possible justifications to the conduct. Although there is no legal burden of proof on the 
defendant to provide justifications, in practice these are usually raised by the defendant and 
the competition authority has the discretion to accept them. As will be discussed in the next 
section, in common with the EU and in contrast to the US, once it is found that the dominant 
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firm’s conduct could result in the foreclosure of the market and harm to consumers, it is 
unlikely that the CADE will accept any justification for the conduct. 
223 
 
5.4.4 Brazilian rule of reason 
 
The case analysis suggests an approach to exclusive agreements that differs from the 
American rule of reason. After the exclusivity dealing cases involving Unimed, the CADE 
published, in December 2009, in the Official Journal a statement which established that ‘...it 
is an offence to the economic order, a conduct, in any form manifested, that impedes or 
creates difficulties for cooperated medical practitioners to work outside the ambit of the 
cooperative when such cooperative is dominant’.566 Although Unimed was not expressly 
mentioned in the statement, it is implied that it was the intended recipient due to its previous 
and continuing breaches of competition law. Statements of the CADE are non-binding, as 
Brazil is a jurisdiction where administrative bodies do not have the constitutional mandate to 
issue legal decrees. However, the publication of the statement in the Official Journal will 
legitimise the grounds for any future prosecution against Unimed, as the latter was warned 
that continuing to impose exclusivity covenants on medical practitioners is interpreted as a 
conduct that could be deemed illegal pursuant to Law 8,884/94. The wording of the statement 
of the CADE against health care providers appears to contain a per se prohibition. This is 
likely to be due to the social importance of the health care sector as competition ensures 
greater choice, lower costs and higher quality of services.  
 
In White Martins, Councillor Macedo Júnior commented that it was plausible for some 
efficiency to result from exclusivity agreements, such as the reduction of transaction costs. 
However, he highlighted that the benefit of such efficiencies was offset by the inefficient 
                                                 
566
 Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica - CADE, “Súmulas n. 7.” 
224 
 
purchase of surplus raw materials from Ultrafértil SA.567 Initially, this suggests a balancing of 
pro and anti competitive effects, but this is, in fact, not the case. The practice of imposing 
exclusivity covenants over the whole of Ultrafértil SA’s production was considered contrary 
to competition law, because the surplus of raw material purchased did not serve a legitimate 
commercial purpose. It was deemed that the exclusivity over the whole production of raw 
materials created an artificial barrier to entry.568 As the conduct created artificial barriers to 
entry and harmed competition, it was deemed contrary to competition law, irrespective of the 
efficiency justifications raised. The Counsel for the defendant complained that the economic 
rationale of the exclusivity agreements was not considered when applying the ‘rule of 
reason’.569 This complaint would have been valid under the US rule of reason. However, 
although the same term is used in Brazil, the substance of the Brazilian rule of reason does 
not correspond to its American counterpart. Instead, the Brazilian rule of reason is closer to 
the EU per se approach, whereby it is possible, although unlikely, for the competition 
authority to accept efficiency justifications that balance the harm caused to competition. 
Indeed, Councillor Macedo Júnior considered that the efficiency justifications could not be 
accepted because the conduct could eliminate effective competition in the market. The 
Councillor stated that efficiencies were taken into consideration in the reasoning, but were 
not deemed applicable as they failed to exclude liability.  
 
In Microsoft/TBA,570 the CADE considered the approaches to vertical restraints in the US and 
the EU. With regards to the US, Councillor Cueva stated that vertical restraints were 
considered as quasi per se offences until GTE Sylvannia v Continental TV, whereby a more 
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liberal approach was adopted.571 Councillor Cueva stated that Microsoft opted for a vertical 
restraint rather than a vertical integration and that this showed that the first option was likely 
to be less costly for the producer.572 In relation to the EU approach, Councillor Cueva stated 
that there is a great degree of convergence between the EU and the Brazilian models of 
competition law and policy as in the EU vertical restraints are not analysed in an absolute 
manner and efficiencies and inefficiencies created by a conduct are examined carefully.573 
This is in harmony with the findings of the interviews conducted with the Councillors of the 
CADE. When asked about how the rule of reason is applied in Brazil, the vast majority stated 
that it meant that they took efficiencies and inefficiencies into account in the analysis. This 
finding reveals that the Brazilian rule of reason is substantially similar to the reasoning under 
the EU model.   
 
If a conduct results in market foreclosure or harm to competition and consumers, it is unlikely 
that efficiencies would justify the conduct. In the words of one Councillor: ‘You will not see 
me approving an anti-competitive conduct just because there are efficiencies resulting from 
it’. This statement mirrors the reasoning applied by another Councillor in Microsoft/TBA, 
where Councillor Cueva stated he would only consider efficiency justifications if the regional 
allocation of Microsoft’s distribution network had been planned via objective criteria. An in-
depth analysis of the efficiency justifications was not deemed necessary as Microsoft had 
intentionally planned to give TBA the monopoly over the federal district of Brasilia, and 
consequently over public procurement competitions at a federal level. 
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Although Councillor Cueva stated that he would apply the ‘rule of reason’,574 in substantial 
terms the reasoning demonstrates the adoption of an EU approach, as the efficiency 
justifications raised by Microsoft were analysed as objective justifications. The creation of a 
monopoly in relation to distributions to the federal government strongly suggested the 
existence of an offence because competition and ultimately consumers were harmed. The 
reasoning adopted by the CADE appears to be closer to the EU than to the US, given that in 
the former the existence of dominance together with a conduct that has the risk of eliminating 
competition is enough in itself to constitute an abuse of dominance.  
 
Although under the Brazilian rule of reason the competition authority does not need to prove 
that a conduct is not reasonably necessary or that the goals could be achieved by less 
restrictive means, in Center Norte575 the CADE stated that it would be reasonable in some 
cases for shopping centres to include non-competition covenants on tenants.576 For instance, 
this could occur when substantial investments are made in relation to new shopping centres 
and a return on investment can only be guaranteed via proportionate commitments from key 
anchor tenants. Therefore, the inclusion of non-competition covenants for an indeterminate 
period of time was deemed to be excessive and in breach of competition law.  
 
In Center Norte the CADE looked at the competition policy of another South American 
jurisdiction rather than solely the US and the EU as in most cases. Councillor Pfeiffer stated 
that the Chilean competition authority had declared void a radius exclusivity covenant 
imposed by a shopping centre which had similar effects to the non-competition covenants of 
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Center Norte’s tenancy agreements.577 The Chilean precedent seemed to play an important 
role in the decision, as the CADE stated that the defendant was not competing on the merits 
because it was imposing non-competition covenants on tenants, rather than using legitimate 
ways to maintain its market dominance, such as investing on structural improvements. 
Although it is not common for the Brazilian competition authority to look at decisions of 
other competition authorities apart from the US and the EU, the fact that the CADE took the 
Chilean decisions into account suggests that the enforcement policy of abuse of dominance in 
Brazil may have, to a certain extent, some influence from jurisdictions other than the US, EU 
and the Brazilian legal system.   
 
In Iguatemi,578 although the facts were largely similar to Center Norte, the SDE concluded its 
investigations by declaring that Iguatemi’s non-competition covenants were reasonable, as 
there was only one competitor within the territorial exclusivity radius, so its impact was 
negligible.579 Therefore, it would not be deemed to constitute an offence under competition 
law. However, the CADE disagreed with the SDE’s conclusions. Councillor Vasconcellos 
highlighted that the SDE’s investigations omitted the fact that the territorial exclusivity 
covenants were reinforced with nominal restrictions on tenants to open shops in other 
shopping centres.580 However, during proceedings, Iguatemi offered to settle with the CADE 
by proposing to waive its rights under the nominal restrictions in respect of shopping centres 
within its radius exclusivity. This offer was rejected by the CADE, as it considered that the 
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existence of a restrictive covenant, which could be either nominal or territorial, foreclosed the 
market.581 This suggests the adoption of a per se approach by the CADE in this decision. 
 
According to Councillor Vasconcellos, the vertical restraints imposed by the exclusivity 
covenants harmed competition. In his opinion, admitting that the exclusivity covenants could 
be deemed to favour competition via efficiency defences would be the same as stating that 
resulting social costs, consisting of the harm of competition in relation shop owners, were 
less important than Iguatemi’s economic interest.582 The reasoning in Iguatemi suggests that 
the Brazilian ‘rule of reason’ is closer to the EU approach than to the US rule of reason.  
 
Three years after Center Norte and Iguatemi, the CADE decided Celular CRT,583 where it 
declared that the imposition of exclusivity covenants on resellers or distributors could be 
contrary to competition law if competitors did not have a reasonable alternative channel to 
distribute or resell their products.584 In Celular CRT, the conduct was found legitimate 
because competitors managed to grow in the market by finding alternative distribution 
channels.585 However, it is questionable whether the outcome would have been the same if 
the decision had not been delivered seven years after the conduct took place. The CADE had 
the benefit of hindsight, notwithstanding the fact that the use of the alternative channels by 
CRT’s competitors may not have been foreseeable when the exclusivity agreements were put 
into place.  
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In AmBev,586 the reasoning of the CADE considered arguments from the Chicago school 
against the hypothesis of viably excluding competitors by way of discounts and rebates that 
require exclusivity.587 According to this view, it would not be rational for an inefficient firm 
to engage in exclusivity agreements with retailers in the downstream market. Councillor 
Furlan rejected the applicability of the Chicago school thoughts by stating that exponents of 
the Post-Chicago school maintain that in some cases there could be harmful exclusionary 
effects.588 A dominant undertaking might have sufficient market power to put commercial 
pressure on distributors or resellers to enter into exclusivity agreements. Under this scenario, 
when distributors first enter into the agreement or arrangement, this would create a negative 
externality and other distributors would enter into the agreement as well. As a result, the 
dominant producer would be able to act as a monopolist. 
 
The decisions discussed above suggest an analysis of exclusive dealings in Brazil that is 
quasi per se. If it is deemed that the conduct forecloses the market and harms consumers, the 
competition authority will analyse the justifications in a similar fashion as in the EU. Thence, 
it would be unlikely for the dominant firm to be acquitted. 
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5.4.5 Observations 
 
It appears that the formulation of legal principles has not yet matured to the point of allowing 
a precise definition of how each and every element of exclusive dealing is dealt with by the 
BCPS. However, in all the decisions examined the CADE has shown considerable concern 
with the creation of artificial barriers to entry. Such behaviour was not deemed to promote 
competition on the merits. In addition, there was a concern with indirectly protecting 
consumer choice and prices. 
 
In regards to proof of effects and the standard of proof, in none of the decisions discussed 
above was it necessary for the competition authority to prove the likely effects of the 
conduct; only that it would have been possible for the alleged effects to take place. This 
places the Brazilian competition law and policy closer to the EU and further from the US 
model, as in the latter actual or likely effects need to be proven under the first step of the rule 
of reason.589 
 
In White Martins, efficiencies were taken into consideration as they formed part of the 
defendant’s submissions, but they were considered immaterial in the reaching of the decision. 
In the view of Councillor Macedo Júnior, efficiencies were rejected because they failed to 
exempt the conduct. Efficiencies could not be admitted given that there was market 
foreclosure caused by the purchase of all raw materials produced by Ultrafértil, including raw 
material in excess of White Martins’ commercial purchasing capacity, thereby creating 
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barriers to entry. Therefore, efficiencies were assessed in a similar way to objective 
justifications in the EU. 
 
Although in formal terms exclusive dealing is not considered to be a per se offence under 
Brazilian competition law,590 efficiencies appear to be treated, in common with the EU, as 
objective justifications. It could be argued that, on this issue, the Brazilian competition law is 
different from its US counterpart. The provisions of Law 8,884/94 expressly protect 
consumers and the maintenance of a competitive market, free from artificial entry barriers 
created by dominant firms.591 This is mirrored in the Brazilian case-law, as in the 
aforementioned cases the creation of barriers to entry formed the basis of the decisions. 
Article 20 of Law 8,884/94 expressly prohibits any conduct that is capable of limiting, 
impeding or in any way injuring open competition or free enterprise.592 Such prohibition is 
reinforced by Article 1 of Law 8,884/94, whereby constitutional principles represent the goals 
of competition law, such as ‘...free enterprise and open competition, the social role of 
property, consumer protection, and restraint of abuses of economic power’.593 Consequently, 
many elements play a role in the Brazilian competition policy, which is concerned with 
society as a whole.  
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
Some elements of the reasoning of the CADE appear to differ in relation to the type of abuse 
of dominance, notwithstanding the fact that Law 8,884/94 provides a general regulatory 
framework and standards irrespective of the conduct involved. Nevertheless, there seems to 
be a general concern on the part of the BCPS with the artificial creation of barriers to entry.   
 
With regards to refusals to deal, the CADE considers that it could be deemed contrary to 
competition law if it forms part of an exclusionary strategy.594 The possible exclusionary 
effects have to be analysed in terms of potential harm to consumers and competition. In 
accordance with MATEC, refusing to deal would be deemed unlawful when it is utilised as a 
means of artificially creating barriers to entry. This approach is closer to the EU, given that in 
the latter the creation of artificial barriers to entry through refusing to deal is a reason for 
concern whilst it is not prohibited in the US. Moreover, the Brazilian competition authority 
does not need to prove the likely effects on competition as pursuant to the stringent standards 
under the US rule or reason.  
 
Law 8,884/94 and the case-law are silent in respect of the conditions that make an essential 
facility necessary for determining whether a refusal to deal or any other conduct constitutes 
an offence. However, it appears that the essential nature of a product has played an important 
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role in decisions such as TV Globo, suggesting that there has been an implied adoption of the 
essential facilities doctrine in Brazil.595 
 
In respect of tie-in sales, these are prohibited from the moment that they allow the dominant 
firm to leverage its market power in the secondary market. The tying arrangement is relevant 
as it could serve the purpose of creating artificial barriers to entry and eliminating 
competition. If it is proved that the dominant firm is able to leverage its market power, the 
CADE will consider the justifications submitted by the defendant or that appear applicable to 
the particular case. However, from the moment that it is shown that the conduct could result 
in market foreclosure and harm to consumers, it is possible yet unlikely, that the dominant 
firm will be able to justify its conduct. 
 
The Brazilian case-law is in a relatively early stage of development and has not yet matured 
in regards to tying arrangements. There are only ten relevant decisions on CADE’s 
database596 and only one where an undertaking has been fined for this offence thus far.597 The 
reason for this could be that tying is already prohibited under the Brazilian Consumer 
Code,598 hence it is an offence that generally falls within the scope of consumer protection. 
However, tying arrangements could result in serious harm to competition and this explains 
why they are considered a per se offence in the EU and a quasi per se offence in the US. The 
Brazilian approach does not seem to take into consideration the seriousness of the conduct 
within the ambit of competition policy and there seems to be an over reliance on the Brazilian 
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Consumer Code. Competition law advocacy, as well as improved training at the BCPS could 
play an essential role in resolving this issue.  
 
With regards to exclusive dealing, the case-law suggests a particular concern with the 
artificial creation of barriers to entry.599 In common with the US and the EU, economic 
efficiencies in Brazil can form part of the defendant’s submissions in order to justify the 
conduct. However, the Brazilian position appears to be closer to that of the EU, as the main 
concern of the competition authority seems to be the protection of the freedom of competitors 
to operate in a market without artificial barriers created by dominant firms. This contrasts 
with the US position where the primary concern regards overall economic efficiency.600 
 
The above findings in relation to non-pricing offences suggest that the Brazilian model is 
converging with the EU model. However, in some respects the development of the Brazilian 
system of competition law and policy is at a crossroads. For instance, there appears to be 
disagreement among members of the BCPS as to whether it is necessary to prove the 
dangerous probability of effects in refusal to deal cases.601 This suggests that the influence of 
the US on the development of Brazilian competition law and policy still persists.   
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6. Chapter Five - Pricing Abuse of Dominance in Brazil 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores how pricing offences are examined by the BCPS in relation to abuse of 
dominance. Particular attention is given to exclusionary offences, such as predatory pricing, 
price discrimination, as well as discounts and rebates. In order to provide a full account, this 
chapter also includes excessive pricing which can be exclusionary but is mainly an 
exploitative conduct. 
 
The purpose of analysing various types of offences is to determine whether there is coherence 
and consistency in the development of the Brazilian competition law and policy, particularly 
in relation to its legal standards. Moreover, it assists this study in determining where the 
hybrid model of competition law in Brazil is positioned in the spectrum of the EU and US 
models.   
 
This chapter first examines predatory pricing, followed by pricing discrimination, discounts 
and rebates and abusive pricing. The study of each offence includes a brief overview of the 
conduct, an analysis of the treatment given to effects and justifications, as well as a 
discussion of the reasoning adopted by the BCPS, i.e. the Brazilian ‘rule of reason’. 
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6.2 Predatory pricing 
6.2.1 Overview 
 
Pursuant to Article 21(XVIII) of Law 8,884/94, it is an offence to the economic order ‘to 
unreasonably sell products below cost to the extent that it may breach Article 20.602 
Therefore, predatory pricing in Brazil is essentially conceived as the unjustified sale of 
products below cost.603 Although similar definitions of predatory pricing are found in the US 
and the EU, many differences emerge in the assessment of the conduct and standards of proof 
in these jurisdictions.  
 
An element of divergence between the US and the EU concerns the cost criterion to qualify a 
price as predatory.604 In Brooke Group,605 the US Supreme Court failed to express whether 
prices set above total costs ought to be qualified as a safe harbour, although its reasoning 
suggested that this would unlikely constitute an offence.606 EU competition law, instead, 
adopts a per se rule whereby the conduct is deemed abusive if prices are set below average 
variable costs.607 Moreover, in Tetra Pak II608 the COJ considered that predatory pricing 
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603
 See section 2.3.3.2. 
604
 Fixed costs do not change regardless of the output. Variable costs are those that change in accordance with 
the quantity of products produced. Total costs are the sum of fixed and variable costs. The average costs mean 
the total costs divided by the amount of products produced. Finally, marginal costs regard a change in the total 
cost resulting from an increase of output of a certain product; for this reason, marginal costs are also called 
incremental costs. Avoidable costs regard all costs that could be avoided if the firm had decided not to sell the 
product in question during the period of the alleged conduct. For more details on the concept of costs, see 
Posner, Economic analysis of law, 684. 
605
 Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 
606
 Ibid., pt. II, A. 
607
 See Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European Communities - Case C-333/94, 4. 
608
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could occur when an exclusionary aim is present and prices are set above average variable 
costs but below average total costs.609 
 
In contrast to the COJ, the US courts tend to be sceptical about claims of predatory pricing.610 
In Brooke Group,611 the US Supreme Court stated that predatory pricing would require a 
dangerous probability of recoupment of losses.612 This makes it difficult to establish liability 
in the US and differs from the EU, where proof of dangerous probability of recoupment is not 
required. Indeed, the COJ expressly rejected the need for such requirement in Tetra Pak II.613 
As will be discussed below, the Brazilian treatment of predatory pricing appears to show a 
greater resemblance to the US approach than to the EU. 
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6.2.2 Proof of effects 
 
Under the general standard set forth under Articles 20 and 21 of Law 8,884/94, it is only 
necessary to prove that anti-competitive effects could potentially result from the conduct.614 It 
is not necessary to prove actual or likely effects in order to constitute the offence of predatory 
pricing. However, the enforcement on some occasions has departed from the general 
standards under Law 8,884/94. In the decisions discussed below, the reasoning of the CADE 
implied the need to prove the likely effects of the conduct, thereby adopting an approach 
similar to the US.615 
 
In Kellogg’s,616 Nutrifoods claimed that a previous merger which had been authorised by the 
CADE, between the multinational Kellogg’s and Superbom, a Brazilian company in the 
cereal sector, increased Kellogg’s market power and its ability to set predatory prices. When 
formulating its decision in favour of the defendant, the CADE departed from the general 
standards set forth in Law 8,884/94 by stating that even in the hypothetical scenario that the 
defendant committed predatory pricing, further evidence demonstrating a genuine possibility 
of direct harm to competitors would be needed to support the claim.617 Among other reasons, 
the CADE was not in favour of finding Kellogg’s liable as Nutrifoods did not lose substantial 
market share as a result of the conduct.618 However, it could be argued that the conduct of 
Kellogg’s might have hampered the growth of Nutrifoods’ market share.619 
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Kellogg’s was heard two years after the alleged conduct took place and the CADE had the 
benefit of hindsight when determining that no harm occurred to competitors.620 As the 
exclusionary effects failed to materialise, there was reluctance in finding Kellogg’s liable. 
This is a similar situation to Celular CRT.621 It emerged from the interviews that, in many 
cases, alleged breaches of competition law are permitted because of excessive delays in the 
investigatory phase. In such cases, some Councillors felt compelled to take into consideration 
what happened in practice, rather than adjudicating the alleged offence in the light of the facts 
and circumstances at the time that it occurred, i.e. by considering the potential harm to 
competition at the time of the alleged conduct in accordance with the standards set forth 
under Law 8,884/94.622 According to a member of the BCPS:  
 
Sometimes the investigation takes a long time and you can see that the anti-
competitive effects did not take place in practice. Although the law states that a 
conduct could be punished even if the effects do not materialise,[623] if there was no 
exclusionary effect or a substantial harm to competition you feel compelled to absolve 
the company.  
 
In the light of the above, although in formal legal terms only the potential harm needs to be 
proven, in substantive terms, the actual recoupment and a serious possibility of direct harm to 
competitors need to be proven.624 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
in immediate incremental price-output effects’.  Balto, “Proof of competitive effects in monopolization cases: a 
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In Merck/M.B. Bioquímica,625 Labnew brought a claim against Merck and its subsidiary M.B. 
Bioquímica for allegedly selling vacuum tubes for the collection of blood samples at prices 
below costs. In this decision it was suggested that even when a conduct results in 
exclusionary effects it would be permitted, unless the dominant firm is able to increase prices 
abusively at a later stage. Therefore, the CADE appears to have adopted a similar reasoning 
to that of US courts by requiring proof of a dangerous probability of recoupment. This 
approach ignores the fact that consumers would have less product choice, and competitors 
would be harmed as a result of the exclusionary practice. In effect, products would be subject 
to monopolistic prices, at least until a competitor managed to enter the market.  
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6.2.3 Efficiencies and other justifications 
 
Law 8,884/94 does not provide a list of acceptable justifications for the sale of products at 
below cost by a dominant undertaking. However, there are various justifications applicable to 
selling below costs626 as demonstrated by the reasoning in the decisions of the CADE. For 
instance, in Kellogg’s the justification accepted was based on the submission that the conduct 
was temporary and aimed at mitigating the operational loss from holding excess stock.627  
 
Moreover, in Merck/M.B. Bioquímica the presiding Councillor, Mércio Felsky, stated that 
one-off occurrences, such as an exceptional discounted sale that resulted in negligible harm to 
competitors would not constitute predatory pricing.628 Furthermore, sales below cost could be 
justified in a number of ways, as long as the conduct does not materially harm the process of 
competition, and consumers benefit from resulting efficiencies.   
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6.2.4 Brazilian rule of reason 
 
Law 8,884/94 prohibits the ‘unreasonable’ sale of products or services below cost.629 
Therefore, there is an objective standard, based on reasonableness, to evaluate the conduct. In 
1999, the CADE published Resolution 20 which sets forth additional standards for 
establishing predatory pricing. Pursuant to Resolution 20, predatory pricing is defined as the 
deliberate practice of setting prices below average variable costs with the aim of excluding 
competitors and with the ultimate purpose of setting monopolistic prices at a later stage.630 
Resolution 20 also states that the competition authority ought to conduct a detailed analysis 
of the costs and pricing conditions in the years surrounding the alleged offence, as well as the 
alleged strategic conduct of the undertaking, in order to determine effective or potential gains 
capable of compensating previous losses.631 Hence, the latter requirement provides a standard 
of proof based on purpose, effects and recoupment, which is higher than the standard set forth 
in Law 8,884/94. In this way it is similar to the US approach to predatory pricing. The 
drafting of Resolution 20 raises a serious issue, as it is a form of secondary legislation of an 
administrative nature whose purpose is to provide guidance in relation to the provisions of 
Law 8,884/94. The additional requirements contained in Resolution 20, which are not 
provided in Law 8,884/94, create law rather than provide guidance as it elevates the standard 
of proof. This creates incoherence within the system of Brazilian competition law, as the 
assessment of predatory pricing diverges from other offences regulated by the general 
standards pursuant to Law 8,884/94.  
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In Merck/M.B. Bioquímica632 proof of recoupment was required on the basis that if a predator 
fails to eliminate its rivals, it would not be able to recover its losses. Therefore, selling below 
cost would not in itself constitute an offence. Moreover, it was stated that the alleged conduct 
could be justified as efficiencies would be increased and consumers would benefit from lower 
prices. Councillor Felsky cited the recoupment requirement test based on market 
contestability set by the US Supreme Court in Brooke Group,633 whereby it was determined 
that the recoupment of losses would be unlikely when a market was highly diffused and 
competitive, barriers to entry were low and the supposed predator did not have excess 
capacity to absorb the market share of its rivals. 
 
In Merck/M.B. Bioquímica, Councillor Felsky adopted the Brooke Group test by stating that 
there are five indicative conditions, although not sufficient in themselves, for configuring 
predatory pricing: (1) the relevant market must be concentrated; (2) the predator must have 
dominance;634 (3) the barriers to entry must be high;635 (4) the predator must have excess 
installed capacity of production; and (5) the commercial goodwill of rivals expelled from the 
market must be taken over by the predator.636 The main purpose of analysing these conditions 
is to verify whether recoupment was likely. Nonetheless, the conditions were regarded as 
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indicative rather than necessary for proving the likely recoupment.637 In this sense, the only 
requirement that seems to constitute predatory pricing is recoupment itself.638 
 
The reasoning in Merck/M.B. Bioquímica represents a departure from the general standards 
set forth in Law 8,884/94. This appears to result from the ideological orientation or 
professional training received by policy-makers. In his opinion, Councillor Felsky stated that 
the predominant theoretical understanding on predatory pricing comes from the Chicago 
school.639 According to this school of economic thought, the theoretical definition of 
predatory pricing would result in an irrational conduct that is rarely observed in the real 
world. However, Councillor Felsky indicated that the Chicago school suffered criticism at 
times and in his view recoupment of losses would not always be the main goal of the 
strategy.640 In any case, it must be noted that this proof of recoupment is not required when 
assessing other forms of abuse and is not needed in accordance with Brazilian competition 
law. 
 
Law 8,884/94 defines predatory pricing as the sale of products below costs.641 Hence, it is 
necessary to establish which definition of costs ought to be adopted, i.e. fixed, variable, total, 
average or marginal costs.642 According to Resolution 20643 and Merck/M. B. Bioquímica,644 
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the Areeda-Turner test645 should be adopted to establish whether products were sold below 
cost. This test is primarily focused on average variable costs. However, in Merck/M. B. 
Bioquímica, the CADE also conceded that in some cases it may be difficult to distinguish 
between variable and fixed costs and that the Areeda-Turner test does not always reflect the 
real costs incurred.646 
 
When assessing the probability of predation, emphasis is given on the inability of other 
competitors to meet efficiently the prices set by the dominant firm. In common with the EU 
and the US, the Brazilian competition authority examines many considerations rather than the 
alleged predation in isolation. Moreover, an analysis of prices practised by the actual 
competitors avoids the complexities of speculating on the costs of hypothetical competitors 
that are deemed to be reasonably efficient.647 
 
Notwithstanding the above, there are aspects of divergence between the US and the EU that 
should be borne in mind by Brazilian policy-makers. The European Commission has 
admitted that in certain cases it may be necessary to protect competitors that are not yet as 
efficient as a dominant undertaking by ‘...taking account of economies of scale and scope, 
learning curve effects or first mover advantages that later entrants cannot be expected to 
match even if they were able to achieve the same production volumes as the dominant 
company’.648 Although there has not been a similar statement from the BCPS with regards to 
predatory pricing, the CADE has followed the reasoning of the European Commission in 
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decisions concerning exclusivity arrangements where it has taken into consideration elements 
such as the first mover advantage.649 Therefore, notwithstanding the drafting of Resolution 
20, which gravitates towards the US approach, it is possible for the Brazilian competition 
authority to apply the statements of the European Commission to predatory pricing as well. 
This unfortunately does not improve legal certainty in relation to the application of 
competition law to predatory pricing offences in Brazil. 
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6.2.5 Observations 
 
Although Law 8,884/94 prohibits the ‘unreasonable’ sale of products below cost, Regulation 
20 has raised the standard of proof by giving a greater emphasis on the recoupment 
requirement. In Merck/M.B. Bioquímica, the CADE appears to have applied an American 
inspired approach to predatory pricing by requiring proof of a dangerous probability of 
recoupment.650 Hence, in order to constitute predatory pricing, it would be necessary to prove 
that the alleged predator is likely to recover its losses at a later stage by charging 
monopolistic prices.  
 
The interviews revealed that some Councillors have questioned the need to always prove 
recoupment. This is in harmony with the statement of Councillor Felsky in Merck/M.B. 
Bioquímica. He highlighted that recoupment of losses would not always be the main goal of 
the dominant firm’s strategy and recoupment would be difficult to determine if practised by 
multi-product firms, such as conglomerates, as cross subsidises may be used strategically to 
exclude competitors.651 The CADE has not yet faced a scenario consisting of cross subsidies 
in this context, so it remains unknown how proof of recoupment would be assessed. 
 
The majority view among Councillors is that it is necessary to prove that recoupment is 
likely.652 Predatory pricing is perceived as an offence that is unlikely to materialise and 
whose attempt would result in lower prices benefiting consumers. According to a member of 
the BCPS: 
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...the initial phase of predatory pricing is good for consumers. The conduct would 
begin to cause harm to them only when the predatory firm that excluded other 
competitors from the market started to abuse its dominance. If the predator does not 
have the ability to recover the losses, then it will make no economic sense to keep its 
prices low for a long period of time. For the conduct to be considered predatory, the 
company would have to be able to increase prices at a later stage.653 
 
Law 8,884/94 is silent in respect to recoupment. However, one of its main goals is to protect 
consumers,654 which would in fact benefit from lower prices. The Chicagoan orientation of 
many members of the BCPS in respect to predatory pricing, the higher standards of proof set 
out in Regulation 20 and the pursuit of a policy that promotes low prices explain why no 
undertaking has yet been found liable for predatory pricing in Brazil.655 
 
In the light of the above, setting prices below cost is permitted, even if it results in 
exclusionary effects, unless it is proven that a dominant firm is likely to recoup losses and 
increase prices abusively at a later stage. This contrasts with the EU, where there is a greater 
concern with the exclusion of competitors from the market. The treatment of predatory 
pricing in Brazil also departs from the general standards set forth under Law 8,884/94 and 
sets it apart from other offences.  
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Notwithstanding the above findings, it is not clear whether the BCPS embracement of a US-
inspired approach to predatory pricing resulted from a conscious policy decision. When 
interviewed members of the BCPS were questioned about the fact that predatory pricing 
decisions in Brazil cited European and American cases, and how the divergences between 
these two models were resolved, some answered that there were no significant differences. 
One Councillor stated that ‘...the differences between the two systems are said to be bigger 
than they really are’. According to another interviewee, ‘...predatory pricing is a concept that 
is basically uniform around the world’. These statements appear to be a cause for concern, as 
there are different legal standards in the EU and the US in respect to predatory pricing.  
 
On the one hand, the citation of foreign decisions could harmonise Brazilian competition 
policy with international standards, or facilitate the application of Law 8,884/94. On the other 
hand, according to one member of the BCPS, ‘...the quotations are chosen randomly among 
these jurisdictions. [The Councillors] look for statements that justify their reasoning, but there 
is no concern with possible contradictions’. The unsystematic citation of foreign decisions, 
particularly if it results in a differential treatment given to a particular offence, has the 
potential of harming the coherent development of the Brazilian competition law and policy. 
Moreover, the contrast between the provisions of Law 8,884/94 and the manner in which 
competition law is applied results in legal uncertainty. A possible solution to this issue is to 
improve the quality of training of members of the BCPS, particularly in regards to the 
differences between the US and the EU models and the general standards under Brazilian 
competition law.656 
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Many interviewees of the BCPS expressed the concern with committing type I errors657 rather 
than type II errors658 as the reason for requiring proof of recoupment. According to one 
Councillor ‘...in uncertain cases, it is best to have a less interventionist stance to avoid 
harming innocent parties’. It appears that the non-interventionist position of most members of 
the BCPS in respect to predatory pricing is inspired from the prevalent US position, even if it 
is not supported by the general standards of Brazilian competition law. The only legal basis 
for the CADE’s non-interventionist position is Regulation 20,659 which mentions the 
requirement of recoupment as a standard of proof.660 However, Law 8,884/94 takes priority 
over any guidance or subordinate legislation. The fact that Law 8,884/94 is silent in relation 
to proof of recoupment661 does not legitimise the distortion of the general principles set 
therein by subordinate legislation.   
 
The adoption of a higher standard of proof for predatory pricing compared to other offences 
means that Brazil adopts a laissez-faire approach in terms of this offence, similarly to the US 
and in contrast with the EU. Due to the treatment given to predatory pricing, the CADE has 
never held a firm liable for this offence. It appears that the application of the law does not 
correspond with reality, as it is very unlikely that predatory pricing has never taken place in 
Brazil, especially considering that Brazil has many concentrated markets and powerful 
undertakings which have the resources for behaving in a predatory manner towards their 
smaller rivals.  
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The interviews revealed that the CADE is likely to find an undertaking liable for predatory 
pricing for the first time. This is supported by the statements of interviewees in relation to a 
complaint which is currently under investigation.662 The preliminary findings and opinions of 
members of the BCPS provide arguments in favour of the prohibition of the conduct. 
However, it still needs to be seen how the submissions raised by the defendant will affect the 
decision. In this respect, any eventual decision from the CADE should seek to clarify what 
the standard of proof is in relation to predatory pricing and, if necessary, restate the law to 
harmonise the treatment given to predatory pricing with the general standards set under Law 
8,884/94 and the case-law.  
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6.3 Price discrimination, discounts and rebates 
6.3.1 Overview 
 
Article 21(XII) of Law 8,884/94 prohibits dominant undertakings from setting discriminatory 
prices and conditions. According to Resolution 20, price discrimination is conceived as the 
use of market power to charge different prices to the same product, discriminating among 
purchasers.663 
 
Price discrimination does not always constitute an offence. Under the general principles of 
Brazilian private law, parties are free to set prices and conditions as they please. However, 
the setting of discriminatory prices by dominant undertakings has the potential to harm the 
process of competition and consequently falls within the scope of Brazilian competition law. 
For instance, this would be the case if a conduct forms part of a strategy to increase barriers 
of entry. 
 
A research on CADE’s database revealed that less than ten administrative cases concerning 
price discrimination have been decided thus far; this appears to be a low number in 
comparison, for instance, with the more than 60 cases on exclusive dealing that have been 
decided by the CADE to date.664 This finding suggests that either Brazilian dominant 
undertakings rarely commit the offence, which is unlikely, or that few cases have come to the 
attention of the CADE by way of claims from affected parties or investigations from the 
SDE. Another relevant finding is that in none of these cases was the defendant found liable.   
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Discounts and rebates can also fall within the scope of price discrimination if they are offered 
in a discriminatory fashion. Such practice was far more common on the database, though it 
was not formally classified as price discrimination. Indeed, the most notorious abuse of 
dominance decision in recent years, namely AmBev,665 concerned the practice of offering 
discounts and rebates, combined with the informal requirement of exclusivity of a large share 
of the distributors’ sales. Such practices were prohibited given that they increased barriers to 
entry and as efficient competitors would not be able to match the substantial discounts 
offered by AmBev. There was no need to prove the dangerous probability of recoupment. 
 
In the US, it is unlikely that discounts and rebates would be considered an antitrust offence, 
unless they are offered below cost and there is a dangerous probability of recoupment. In fact, 
in Brooke Group666 volume rebates were granted in a discriminatory fashion and the Supreme 
Court ruled that there were two conditions to find an offence under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act: prices should be below an appropriate measure of its rival’s cost and there would have to 
be a dangerous probability of recoupment.667 Consequently, a high standard of proof is 
required, namely, the dangerous probability of recoupment. Therefore, in the US the offence 
is conceptualised in a similar fashion to predatory pricing.  
 
The US approach is different from the EU, where the relationship between the costs and 
prices charged might not be fundamental.668 The key aspect concerns the effects that such 
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discrimination may have in the market. For instance, in Irish Sugar669 the Commission 
considered that the selective price cuts practised by a sugar beet monopolist in Northern 
Ireland were abusive. The reasoning was mainly based on the fact that Irish Sugar was a 
dominant firm which was seeking to exclude competition by practising selective and targeted 
price cuts as a response to the increase of imports from other Member States.670 
 
Moreover, the European Commission stated that it would analyse whether the conduct is 
‘…capable of hindering the expansion or entry of efficient competitors by making it more 
difficult for them to supply part of the requirements of individual customers’.671 However, 
EU courts do not appear to have embraced the efficient competitor test, as one of their main 
concerns is ensuring that unnecessary exclusionary conduct does not take place. Therefore, 
unlike US courts, EU courts appear to show a greater concern with type II errors rather than 
type I errors. For instance, in British Airways,672 the COJ stated that when balancing the pro 
and anti competitive effects of the conduct, ‘[i]f the exclusionary effect (...) bears no relation 
to advantages for the market and consumers, or if it goes beyond what is necessary in order to 
attain those advantages, that system must be regarded as an abuse’.673 
 
The EU understanding of discounts and rebates differs from the US particularly in regards to 
the relevance of the harm to consumers for a conduct to be deemed abusive. Such a 
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divergence became clear in British Airways.674 Virgin Airways brought claims against British 
Airways in the US and the EU simultaneously. The case involved retrospective bonuses to 
travel agents linked to the growth of sales of British Airways’ tickets. In the US, the Federal 
Court of the Second Circuit found that the agreements could affect output or quality, but there 
were pro-competitive justifications in terms of rewarding loyal consumers and the claimant 
did not suggest an alternative programme that would be able to achieve the same pro-
competitive effects. In the EU, however, the conduct was considered abusive because of the 
exclusionary effects resulting from the loyalty created by the scheme. 
 
The US courts seemed to be interested in allowing the pro-competitive effects to consumers 
while the COJ seemed to be concerned with the exclusion of firms from the market that could 
result in consumer harm. Therefore, the different approaches to discounts and rebates 
undertaken by these two jurisdictions are important and may have particular consequences for 
companies operating in these markets.675 
 
With respect to the Brazilian position, as a general principle, discounts and rebates that result 
in lower prices are regarded as beneficial for consumers, the process of competition and the 
greater economy.676 This demonstrates a traditional convergence with US competition policy. 
However, it appears that the Brazilian interpretation is currently shifting towards that of the 
EU. The recent AmBev677 decision demonstrates a concern with the potential anti-competitive 
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effects of discounts and rebates, especially if they form part of an anti-competitive strategy 
aimed at inducing consumer loyalty.678 
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6.3.2 Proof of effects 
 
In order to prove price discrimination in the US it needs to be shown that prices are below an 
appropriate measure of its rival’s cost and there is a dangerous probability of recoupment.679 
Conversely, in the EU, there is no need to prove the above and the co-relation between costs 
and prices is not essential.680 In the EU, the potential exclusionary effects resulting from the 
conduct are given a central importance.681 Even in cases where prices are above average total 
costs, offering discounts and rebates could be deemed a competition law offence, although 
only in exceptional circumstances.682 
 
The European Commission must prove that a conduct is ‘...likely in due course to undermine 
the competitive structure of the market and ultimately to permit the undertaking concerned to 
abuse the consumer’.683 However, the word ‘likely’ in the preceding sentence could be 
interpreted as the ‘risk’ or ‘potentiality’ of resulting in anti-competitive effects, as the 
standard of proof in the EU is lower than in the US.684 
 
In Brazil, according to the general standard of proof set forth pursuant to Law 8,884/94, it is 
not necessary to prove actual or likely effects of price discrimination. It only has to be 
demonstrated that the conduct is capable of producing anti-competitive effects.  
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Telemar685 exemplifies the treatment given to price discrimination in Brazil. The facts of the 
decision concerned a claim brought by Terra Networks against Telemar Internet Ltda 
(Telemar) and Telemar Norte Leste SA (Oi Internet). Telemar and Oi Internet formed part of 
the same corporate group and were jointly accused of adopting an anti-competitive 
discriminatory strategy. In 2005, the Telemar Group launched its broadband service, Oi 
Broadband, resulting in a complaint by Terra Networks that prices were set below costs as a 
result of combined discounts of Velox Telemar686 and Oi Broadband. The essence of Terra 
Networks’ claim was that the alleged price arrangements between the defendant companies 
resulted in discriminatory prices.687 The CADE did not follow a US interpretation by 
assessing whether the recoupment of losses would be required. Rather, the analysis focused 
on whether there were any cross-subsidises between the co-defendants and whether 
competitors were excluded from the downstream market.688 The co-defendants were not 
deemed to be liable as it was found that they had offered similar prices and conditions to their 
competitors.   
 
AmBev689 is a landmark and recent abuse of dominance decision concerning discriminatory 
pricing. The defendant company, AmBev,690 forms part of the multinational Anheuser-Busch 
InBev group. AmBev is the largest beer brewery in South America. It produces and sells 
many international and national brands of beers and soft drinks, such as Antartica, Brahma, 
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Guaraná, Pepsi and Stella Artois. AmBev was no stranger to competition law, as it came into 
existence in 1999 as a result of a controversial merger between Brahma and Antartica which 
was approved by the CADE.  
 
In AmBev, the defendant was held liable by a unanimous decision of the CADE for breaching 
Article 20(I) and (IV) and Article 21(IV), (V) and (VI) of Law 8,884/94. One of the key 
deciding factors concerned the anti-competitive scope of AmBev’s loyalty programme, which 
consisted of offering discounts and rebates in exchange for exclusivity commitments from 
points of sale. AmBev is widely regarded as the most significant abuse of dominance decision 
in Brazil to date, not only in respect to its contribution to the development of competition 
law, but also due to the considerable amount of publicity that it received. AmBev received 
the highest fine ever imposed in relation to an abuse of dominance offence, approximately 
133 million pounds sterling.691 
 
The leading opinion692 in AmBev was given by Councillor Furlan, who highlighted that in the 
EU discounts and rebates could be subject to competition law for their exclusionary effects, 
as consumers could be incentivised to purchase greater amounts of a particular product, 
thereby resulting in the creation of barriers of entry.693 This understanding was applied by the 
CADE, as the discounts and rebates offered by AmBev formed part of a loyalty programme 
involving distributors and retailers with the scope of strategically excluding competitors and 
increasing barriers to entry.  
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In AmBev the general standards of proof pursuant to Law 8,884/94 were applied, hence it was 
only necessary to prove that the conduct could potentially result in anti-competitive effects, 
rather than that the effects were actual or likely to occur.694 During the investigatory phase, 
the potential harm was alleged to result from the distortion of the process of competition due 
to the loyalty created by discounts and rebates. Therefore, the focus of the SDE’s 
investigation was centred on providing evidence of whether the conduct could potentially 
harm competition and consumers.695 
 
The SDE inspected AmBev’s premises by way of dawn raid similarly to what takes place in 
other jurisdictions. However, one particular characteristic of Brazilian dawn raids is that there 
is no element of surprise. The undertaking must be notified 24 hours in advance;696 thus, the 
Brazilian dawn raids may not be as effective, given that company officers have sufficient 
time to destroy or conceal incriminatory documents. Nevertheless, hardcopy and softcopy 
documents such as PowerPoint slides, emails and handwritten notes outlining the structure 
and anti-competitive scope of the loyalty programme were discovered. The documents were 
very important for the prosecution of Ambev’s conduct as they provided evidence not only of 
the loyalty programme, which formed the basis for the SDE’s investigations, but also of the 
specific aim to exclude competitors and to create barriers to entry. 
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6.3.3 Efficiencies and other justifications 
 
Not all discriminatory pricing, discounts and rebates, are prohibited pursuant to competition 
law. For instance, this would not be the case when an undertaking is competing with 
discounts offered by its competitors, e.g. ‘meeting competition’ or when the pricing 
differentiation is objectively justified and results in greater efficiencies and benefits for 
consumers.697 A typical example of this is when an airline charges different prices depending 
on the manner or the time that tickets were purchased. Although this type of conduct could 
appear to be abusive, it can be justified on the basis of keeping overall costs low and the 
ability to compete with other airlines. 
 
With regards to the burden of proof, the BCPS has the discretion to assess whether any 
justifications apply. However, in practice the defendant’s submissions are largely based on 
justifications. As a result, the burden lies with the defendant. Moreover, as cases of abuse of 
dominance generally involve highly specialised Counsel instructed by the parties, the 
competition authority appears to rely on the initiative of the defendant to provide evidence to 
prove whether any justifications apply.  
 
In Telemar,698 the CADE agreed with the findings of ANATEL which established that 
Telemar had offered similar prices and conditions to the co-defendant and other 
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competitors.699 Therefore, pricing discrimination was deemed not to have taken place and 
there was no need to determine whether any justifications applied.  
AmBev700 illustrates the Brazilian view of possible defences better than Telemar, as the 
defendant’s submissions were largely based on efficiencies and justifications. In addition to 
challenging the dawn raid on procedural grounds, the defendant submitted that it had the right 
to protect its business interests and that its loyalty programme was pro-competitive, given 
that similar loyalty programmes were created by its competitors.  
 
The CADE cited various EU cases701 to support its reasoning when rejecting the defendant’s 
submissions; it also highlighted the following three points: (1) although dominant 
undertakings have the right to protect their commercial interests, discounts and rebates should 
be justified in terms of economic efficiencies which are consistent with the interests of 
consumers;702 (2) loyalty discount schemes should result in efficiencies justified by 
economies of scale,703 and (3) the discount strategy should not create uncertainties in relation 
to the final price of the product or service, nor result in the dependence of the retailer or 
purchaser.704 
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In the light of the above, discriminatory pricing could be justified if it benefits consumers, 
results in economic efficiencies and is not discretionary. The discounted prices should be 
certain, transparent and based on objective criteria. Moreover, distributors or retailers should 
not be legally bound or commercially coerced to give commercial information to the 
dominant undertaking, as this would increase the dependency of the former and the market 
power of the latter.705 
 
Councillor Furlan stated that the justifications contained in CADE’s Resolution 20, i.e. the 
reduction of transaction costs, the protection of the reputation of the firm and the promotion 
of economies of scale and technological development were not applicable to the particular 
facts of the case.706 No economic efficiency raised by the defendants was deemed capable of 
justifying the scope of AmBev’s loyalty programme.707 The primary purpose of the 
programme was anti-competitive as AmBev sought to create barriers to entry in the 
downstream market by penalising distributors that failed to comply with the programme. On 
the one hand, distributors that abided by the commercial terms of the programme received 
discounts. On the other hand, distributors that sold competing beer brands where excluded 
from the scheme or subjected to unfair commercial treatment, thereby harming distributors, 
competitors and ultimately consumers. 
 
Points of sale in metropolitan areas were deliberately targeted by AmBev. Their strategic 
selection corresponded with the purpose of creating barriers to entry in specific geographic 
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markets. Therefore, the submission of AmBev alleging that the scope of the programme was 
not significant as it affected only 20 percent of the national beer market was rejected.708 
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6.3.4 Brazilian rule of reason 
 
In contrast with the US, the Brazilian rule of reason does not require proof that the conduct is 
not necessary and that its goals could be achieved by less restrictive means. In addition, there 
is no evidence that a balancing of pro and anti competitive efficiencies takes place in practice. 
The BCPS only needs to demonstrate that the conduct is not reasonable as it has the aim or 
capacity to harm competition.  
 
In Ambev, when investigating the potential anti-competitive effects of the loyalty programme, 
the SDE managed to prove the imposition of exclusivity obligations on points of sale on a 
commercial basis. Moreover, the SDE provided the CADE with documents found in the 
dawn raid that offered evidence of the incentives used in the scheme, e.g. supplying points of 
sale with branded catering equipment such as refrigerators, tables and chairs.709 Councillor 
Furlan highlighted that the provision of incentives would have been pro-competitive if it was 
not for the exclusivity obligations.710 This reasoning appears to be correct for the following 
three reasons: Firstly, incentives transferred wealth from AmBev to smaller points of sale. 
Secondly, AmBev’s competitors would have been faced with competitive pressure to offer 
similar incentives, thereby resulting in greater efficiencies. Thirdly, the provision of catering 
equipment lowered the capital expenditure faced by entrepreneurs wishing to open points of 
sale. It is only when incentives are conditional upon the exclusivity that the loyalty scheme 
breaches competition law by raising artificial barriers to entry. The non renewal of the loyalty 
programme and the discontinuation of supply were used to coerce points of sale suspected of 
selling a share greater than 10 percent of competing beer brands. Imposing such level of 
                                                 
709
 Ibid., para. 32. 
710
 Ibid., para. 222. 
266 
 
commitment to AmBev’s brands under the loyalty programme was considered anti-
competitive. 
 
An important element of AmBev is the non-linear correlation between total sales and 
discounts given to determine the anti-competitiveness of the loyalty programme.711 Points of 
sale that sold higher shares of AmBev’s beer brands received greater discounts, even if they 
sold smaller volumes of beer than others. This finding revealed that the main purpose of 
AmBev’s loyalty programme was to exclude competitors from distribution channels, rather 
than offering discounts based on the quantity of units.712 
 
Councillor Furlan acknowledged that his leading judgment had been inspired by EU 
academic literature and case-law,713 according to which discounts above cost can be illegal if 
they produce market foreclosure via product loyalty.714 With respect to US antitrust law and 
its relevance to AmBev, Councillor Furlan stated that American antitrust policy was gradually 
demonstrating a greater concern with discounts and rebates.715 He stated that in contrast with 
AmBev, in the US LePage’s case716 no exclusivity requirements were imposed on retailers by 
the dominant firm. Nonetheless, the concession of discounts resulted in retailers giving 
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preference to 3M products which resulted in 3M breaching US antitrust law for attempting to 
monopolise.717 
 
The statements above suggest that, in AmBev, the EU position on discounts and rebates was 
deemed to be more suitable for the Brazilian context than the US view. In addition, it was 
acknowledged that the US approach is changing and is becoming less permissive. Indeed, 
Councillor Furlan noted that in May 2009 the DOJ declared that it will no longer refer to the 
Report on the Application of Section 2 of the Sherman Act,718 as it was considered to be too 
lenient towards the exclusionary practices of dominant undertakings.719 
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6.3.5 Observations 
 
The corpus of the Brazilian case-law on price discrimination is relatively modest and no 
defendant companies have been held liable thus far.720 The exception is AmBev as the 
defendant’s loyalty programme consisted of offering exclusionary discounts and rebates in a 
discriminatory fashion.  
 
Discounts and rebates are generally seen by the BCPS as benign, unless they form part of an 
exclusionary strategy.721 It appears that as long as consumers benefit from the practice and 
the process of competition is not harmed, discounts and rebates will not only be deemed 
legal, but also pro-competitive. The determination of prices charged to final consumers is 
fundamental to the outcome of the analysis of cases involving discounts and rebates.722 As a 
general rule, in the interest of consumers, the CADE regards the imposition of discounts as 
beneficial723 and their prohibition as detrimental.724 This is similar to the EU and US 
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approaches, whereby price reductions by monopolists are assumed to be positive as long as 
prices are not set below cost. 
 
AmBev represents a change in Brazilian competition law and policy, as well as a different 
approach in relation to discounts and rebates offered by dominant firms. The latter may be 
considered harmful to the process of competition when it results in market foreclosure via the 
creation of artificial barriers to entry such as the inducement of consumer loyalty. AmBev 
follows the EU approach, whereby discounts and rebates could be deemed anti-competitive if 
they result in consumer loyalty and cannot be matched by smaller, though efficient, 
competitors. The European Commission will generally analyse whether a conduct is 
‘…capable of hindering the expansion or entry of efficient competitors by making it more 
difficult for them to supply part of the requirements of individual customers’.725 The adoption 
of the EU approach in relation to discounts and rebates appears to be appropriate, as Brazil is 
a country with concentrated markets. Consequently, competition policy should seek to 
promote market entry and contestability, particularly considering the fact that the Brazilian 
Constitution, as well as Law 8,884/94, protect free enterprise and open competition.726 
 
With respect to exclusionary effects resulting from discounts and rebates, in Microsoft727 the 
discounts given to distributors were based on the volume of sales of Microsoft for Small 
Business 97 and were deemed legitimate even if the practice resulted in the distributors 
giving preference to Microsoft’s products.728 One key difference between Microsoft and 
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AmBev is that in the former, discounts and rebates were calculated in relation to the volume 
of sales rather than a set market share.  
 
Moreover, although AmBev’s discounts amounted to a mere three percent of the final price, 
its competitors were forced to offer discounts which were disproportionally higher at 7.9 
percent because of the dominant position of AmBev and the additional benefits offered in the 
loyalty scheme. Moreover, AmBev had consolidated 72 percent of the relevant geographic 
market by way of the loyalty programme.729 
 
According to Councillor Furlan, it would have been possible, in an extreme case scenario, for 
AmBev’s loyalty programme to result in the exit from the upstream market of an equally 
efficient competitor.730 However, this seemed to be an obiter statement as it was not deemed 
necessary to prove that such effect was likely to occur. In conformity with the general 
standard of proof under Law 8,884/94, it was only necessary to prove that the conduct had the 
potential to harm competition by causing competitors to offer higher discounts than the 
defendant.731 
 
Pursuant to AmBev, if the effective price of discounts is set below average total cost, it would 
be deemed difficult, if not impossible, for efficient undertakings to compete with the 
dominant undertaking. Moreover, Councillor Furlan stated that AmBev could still have 
excluded or limited competition if the effective price charged was set above the average total 
cost. Competitors would not only have had to offer superior discounts, but also compensate 
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the points of sale for the losses suffered as a result of leaving the loyalty scheme. Therefore, 
in common with the EU, discounts and rebates can be prohibited in Brazil even if prices are 
set above average total costs. In this respect, the Brazilian approach diverges from the US, 
which requires higher standards of proof, e.g. in respect to recoupment. The fact that as 
efficient competitors would have had to offer their products below a viable measure of 
AmBev’s costs was one of the main factors for prohibiting the conduct. This is similar to the 
approach undertaken by the Commission in the Intel case, where the Commission found that 
‘...if in order to compensate an OEM [Original Equipment Manufacturers] for the loss of the 
Intel rebate, an as efficient competitor has to offer its products below a viable measure of 
Intel's cost, then it means that the rebate was capable of foreclosing the as efficient 
competitor’.732  
 
CADE’s appraisal of price discrimination contrasts with its assessment of predatory 
pricing,733 where prices are deemed predatory only when they are set below average variable 
cost and proof of recoupment is possible. This suggests a discrepancy in the treatment given 
to abusive offences as a result of the EU and US influences on the development of Brazilian 
competition law and policy. A restatement of the law in the form of published guidelines or 
authoritative decisions is needed to ensure greater coherence and consistency as to how 
abusive pricing offences ought to be analysed. As demonstrated by AmBev, the approach 
under the BCPS appears to be diverging from the more liberal US antitrust policy and 
converging with EU competition policy. AmBev demonstrates that the CADE is capable and 
willing to decide on controversial issues and adopt foreign models to develop further 
Brazilian competition policy. The implementation of EU inspired reasoning appears adequate 
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for Brazil, as the scope of EU competition law is shaped by the various goals under the EU 
treaties and its enforcement priority is the maintenance of competition in the market which 
ultimately benefits consumers.734 
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6.4 Abusive pricing 
6.4.1 Overview 
 
Article 21(XXIV) of Law 8,884/94 prohibits undertakings ‘to impose abusive prices, or 
unreasonably increase the price of a product or service’.735 In common with other offences 
under Article 21, this conduct is prohibited to the extent that it may potentially result in anti-
competitive effects.736 
 
The overriding goal of the Real Plan reform of 1993 was to combat accelerated and endemic 
inflation,737 which in turn explains the drafting of the abusive pricing offence under Article 
21(XXIV) of Law 8,884/94. During the 1970s and 1980s, the government adopted 
interventionist policies whereby it would step in if prices were deemed to be excessive. As a 
result, society in general expected the government to intervene to control high prices. 
Therefore, in the early years of Brazilian competition law, consumer organisations, agencies 
and private undertakings brought proceedings before the CADE based on alleged breaches of 
Article 21(XXIV) of Law 8,884/94. This finding was confirmed by interviewed members of 
the BCPS.738 Some interviewees went as far as to claim that President Itamar Franco only 
ratified Law 8,884/94 because he was convinced that it could serve the purpose of controlling 
inflation in the private sector, particularly in the field of pharmaceutical products because 
their price formed part of his political agenda.   
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Abusive pricing is perceived differently in the US and the EU. In the US the conduct of 
charging excessive or disproportionate prices is not an antitrust offence under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act739 and the possibility of charging high prices is considered to attract ‘business 
acumen’.740 Abusive pricing may signal that an undertaking has market power, but this in 
itself is not a breach of competition law. If an undertaking sets excessive prices, the high 
profits may even lure competitors into the market.741 This argument is linked to the ‘invisible 
hand’ premise supported by liberal economists. In essence, antitrust law should not intervene 
where the free market can correct itself.742 
 
High prices might indicate the existence of an antitrust offence, rather than an offence in 
itself. Indeed, it was stated by an Ex-Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the DOJ that: 
 
...we should be pleased when firms that legitimately obtain monopoly positions are 
able to obtain monopoly profits, since it is the prospect of obtaining higher-than-
normal profits that drives firms to become more efficient and to develop innovative 
products. Second-guessing the unilateral, non-exclusionary pricing decisions of 
dominant firms will lead to price regulation by the government, which is not 
consistent with the market-oriented goals of competition laws.743 
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This statement suggests that the DOJ wants to reassure undertakings that they can rightfully 
achieve monopoly status and attain higher profits by competing on the merits. Moreover, the 
case-law has precluded the deployment of Section 2 of the Sherman Act to address excessive 
pricing.744 Therefore, excessive pricing is not considered an offence under the US Sherman 
Act.    
 
The EU has a different approach to the US when it comes to abusive prices. In the EU 
excessive pricing can be an offence pursuant to Article 102 TFEU, although there are few 
cases where dominant firms were held liable.745 In fact, since United Brands,746 the 
Commission has rarely determined prices to be abusive747 and commentators such as David 
Howarth748 consider that this is likely to continue, except for exceptional cases where there 
are insuperable barriers to entry and there is evidence that the conduct has a purpose contrary 
to the EU Treaty.  
 
Although a proportionate interference to fix market imperfections is not conveyed as 
necessarily evil in the EU, the European Commission does not intend to become a price 
regulator either.749 However, it seems to be keener than the US to regulate the functioning of 
the market and perform a more preventive role if required. 
 
Notwithstanding the considerable concern with pricing demonstrated by the drafting of 
Article 21(XXIV) of Law 8,884/94, the CADE has adopted a similar posture to that of the 
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US. The CADE made it clear since the early years of the Law 8,884/94 that its competence 
was to protect the proper functioning of the market rather than establishing the 
reasonableness of commercial prices.750 As abusive pricing is also prohibited pursuant to 
Article 39 of the Brazilian Consumer Code,751 whenever claims of abusive pricing are not 
supported by circumstances that would make them relevant under competition law, they are 
deemed to fall within the scope of consumer law rather than competition law.752 
 
In 1997, the CADE heard Sindicato das Escolas Particulares do Distrito Federal,753 where 
the DPDE brought a claim against the Union of Private Schools of the Federal District. 
Private schools were accused of abusively increasing tuition fees. This resulted in more than 
a hundred separate cases of abusive pricing involving private schools decided by the CADE 
in the same year. In every instance, the CADE decided that abusively increasing prices was a 
consumer law matter rather than a competition law one. Consequently, all the claims were 
referred to the DPDC.754 
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6.4.2 Proof of effects 
 
Pursuant to the general standard of proof under Law 8,884/94, there is no need to prove that 
the alleged anti-competitive effects under Article 20 are actual or likely to occur. It is only 
necessary to demonstrate that the effects could potentially result from the conduct.755 
However, in respect to abusive pricing the BCPS has not yet reaffirmed the general standard 
under Law 8,884/94. 
 
In Xerox do Brasil Ltda756 the Brazilian subsidiary of the Xerox group was accused of 
abusing its dominant position. The claim was based on the terms of standard form 
agreements, whereby Xerox had the unilateral right to increase prices. Although deciding in 
favour of Xerox, the CADE formulated some legal requirements for determining whether a 
conduct amounts to abusive pricing. According to the CADE, the determination of an 
arbitrary increase in prices requires an evaluation of the normal standards of profit margin in 
the relevant market. The evaluation encompasses a comparison of the past and present levels 
of profitability in the relevant market, as well as of the particular undertaking in question. A 
factual link between the alleged conduct and the eventual abusive realisation of profits needs 
to be established.757 Given the reluctance of the CADE to recognise abusive pricing as a 
competition law offence, the latter requirement implies a higher standard of proof, whereby 
another competition law offence would need to take place, resulting in the undertaking 
arbitrarily charging excessive prices. 
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In Enila,758 the defendant was accused of increasing the prices of some of its medicines in an 
abusive manner. The plenary in the CADE decided unanimously that there was no offence to 
the economic order.759 It was established that abusive prices would exist when prices were 
fixed higher than the market price and if there was a pricing strategy aimed to distort 
artificially the process of competition. The offence would be triggered when an undertaking 
adopted strategic means to impose higher prices that would not sustainably exist in a 
competitive market. Therefore, the power to impose higher prices must result from the 
exclusion or obstruction of actual or potential competitors.760 The claimant would first have 
to prove the exclusion of actual or potential competitors in order to substantiate a claim for 
abusive pricing. Although this may suggest that proof of effects is required, it appears that 
Enila follows the reasoning in Xerox by requiring proof in respect of the existence of another 
anti-competitive offence that resulted in abusive prices. 
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6.4.3 Efficiencies and other justifications 
 
The CADE has not yet clarified whether the defendant needs to justify abusive pricing by 
way of an efficiency defence. In Xerox the defendant simply declared that the price increases 
were related to its costs and the CADE declared that the matter should be judged by the 
courts, which are competent to apply the provisions of the Consumer Code.761 This reasoning 
was justified by the fact that there was no evidence to suggest that the price increases resulted 
or formed part of an anti-competitive strategy.    
 
In Enila, the defendant raised a justification submitting that its price increase resulted from 
the monetary devaluation of the Brazilian currency.762 This mirrors a statement made by the 
CADE in Xerox, whereby in times when the economy is enduring unpredictable levels of 
inflation, it would be deemed practically impossible to determine what the normal market 
prices ought to be.763 The CADE did not decide on this justification and declared that the 
investigation of the SDE did not confirm whether Enila had dominance. However, rather than 
ordering a stay of proceedings and instructing the SDE to amend the scope of the 
investigations, the CADE decided to acquit the defendant.  
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6.4.4 Brazilian rule of reason 
 
It has not yet been elucidated by the CADE whether it is necessary to prove that the increase 
in prices is not reasonably necessary or that the goals of the dominant firm could have been 
achieved by less restrictive means. Neither is it possible to assess from the case-law whether 
pro and anti competitive effects ought to be balanced, as it appears that the CADE does not 
regard the conduct as an independent offence within the scope of competition law, 
notwithstanding the drafting of Law 8,884/94.  
 
In Enila, Councillor Prado declared that high prices, in most cases, offer a warning that an 
offence to the economic order is probably taking place, thereby implying that abusive pricing 
ought to be regarded primarily as a consequence of an anti-competitive conduct rather than an 
autonomous offence.764 This was also the view of most of the interviewed members of the 
competition authority. Given that the CADE considers abusive pricing as a consequence of an 
anti-competitive conduct rather than as an autonomous offence, claims based solely on 
breaches of Article 21(XXIV) of Law 8,884/94 are likely to be dismissed, rather than 
proceeding to an in-depth analysis.  
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6.4.5 Observations 
 
The CADE has not yet clarified the standard of proof in respect of abusive pricing, given that 
it does not consider the latter as an independent competition law offence, notwithstanding the 
drafting of Article 21(XXIV) of Law 8,884/94. To date, the CADE has never found a firm 
liable for abusive pricing, which confirms the CADE’s unwillingness to become a price 
regulator; a trend also featured in the US and the EU.765 
 
As a result of the stabilisation of the economy and the non-interventionist policy adopted by 
the CADE, the number of complaints in regards to abusive pricing has reduced considerably 
over the past decades. As suggested by interviewees, this may result from a shift in the 
Brazilian understanding of the concept of abusive prices. According to one Councillor 
‘...currently there are very few cases [of abusive pricing] and many wanted to remove this 
offence from the competition bill’. Abusive pricing has been excluded from the competition 
bill as an autonomous offence, although setting high prices will still fall under the proposed 
general prohibition pursuant to Article 36(III) of the competition bill.766 Abusive pricing will 
remain part of competition law in a purely formalistic sense. It is very unlikely that a claim 
based solely on breaches of Article 36(III) of the competition bill will be substantiated. 
Rather, it is likely that this provision will be interpreted to qualify a price increase as a 
symptom or as a tool of an anti-competitive offence.  
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According to one Councillor, there are currently two situations where abusive prices are 
examined by the competition authority:  
 
The first one regards when a consequence is considered to be an offence to the 
economic order; for instance, in a situation where a firm has an exclusivity that results 
in market foreclosure. The second regards when it is an instrument of an exclusionary 
conduct. This is especially important in vertically integrated markets such as the 
petrochemical sector, where a firm that is dominant in the mainstream market can 
increase prices considerably in the downstream market where it operates as well in 
order to exclude competitors. 
 
Other members of the BCPS also confirmed that abusive prices are not an independent 
offence. It was stated by one Councillor that there are some members of the BCPS that go as 
far as considering abusive prices to be outside the scope of competition law.767 Indeed, when 
questioned about this issue, one Councillor stated ‘I do not even consider the merits of claims 
for abusive pricing’.  
 
The fact that abusive pricing remained indirectly as a possible offence in the competition bill 
suggests that the Brazilian legislator wanted to ensure that the BCPS will still be empowered 
to curb excesses if necessary. In this respect, the Brazilian understanding of abusive pricing 
demonstrates some influence from the EU, where abusive pricing is regarded as a form of 
abuse of dominance, although prohibitions of this practice are rare.768 
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The hybrid influence over the Brazilian competition law and policy appears evident in the 
light of the above. This has resulted in a Brazilian approach that is non-interventionist in 
substantial terms, although the legitimacy of the BCPS to intervene exists in formal terms 
pursuant to Law 8,884/94. The competition bill will not materially change this position, 
although it will remove abusive pricing as an independent offence.  
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6.5 Conclusion 
 
The findings from this chapter suggest that the approach of the CADE has departed from the 
formal provisions of Law 8,884/94 in respect of pricing conduct. This differs from some of 
the non-pricing conduct examined previously, especially in relation to predatory and abusive 
pricing.769 
 
With regards to predatory pricing, the CADE has adopted the US approach, as proof of 
recoupment is required and it is necessary to prove that the effects of the conduct are likely, 
thereby resulting in a higher standard of proof. This approach departs from the general 
standards pursuant to Law 8,884/94.770 The difficulties in proving the recoupment of losses 
and likely effects have resulted in a Brazilian laissez-faire approach towards predatory 
pricing. This is confirmed by the fact that the CADE has never held an undertaking liable for 
predatory pricing.771 Nevertheless, there seems to be a growing concern among members of 
the BCPS about this policy. According to some interviewees, it is likely that in the near future 
the CADE will find an undertaking liable for predatory pricing in a case which is currently 
under investigation.772 
 
It is not clear from the case-law if the adoption of the US approach to predatory pricing 
resulted from a conscious policy decision. Interviews with members of the competition 
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authority revealed that, at times, there is a lack of knowledge regarding the differences 
between the US and the EU competition laws and policies, particularly in relation to the 
standards of proof, which make it more difficult to prohibit predatory pricing offences in the 
US. 
 
The Brazilian position towards predatory pricing is different from that of price 
discrimination. There are very few cases concerning price discrimination and the most 
important one, AmBev, concerns price discrimination in the form of discounts and rebates. 
The reasoning in AmBev has been largely inspired by the EU approach, whereby the 
relationship between costs and prices may not be fundamental773 as exclusionary effects are 
deemed more important.774 Documents found in the dawn raid provided evidence not only of 
the existence of the conduct, but also that it was aimed at excluding competitors and raising 
barriers to entry. In fact, it was found that as efficient competitors would not be able to 
compete with the substantial discounts offered by AmBev. These findings largely explain the 
adoption of the EU approach in AmBev. 
 
In terms of justifications for predatory pricing and price discrimination, there is no specific 
burden on the defendant to prove their existence. However, in practice, the defendant’s 
submissions are generally substantiated with justifications in order to avoid liability. In 
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addition to examining the justifications of the defendant, the CADE seeks to verify whether 
any applicable objective criteria775 would make the alleged conduct reasonable.  
 
The Brazilian ‘rule of reason’ is applied to both predatory pricing and price discrimination. It 
differs from the American rule of reason, as there is no need to prove that the goal of the 
dominant firm could be achieved by less restrictive means, and there is no evidence of a 
balance of pro and anti competitive effects in practice. The Brazilian rule of reason primarily 
focuses on the specific elements of the alleged conduct, the wider circumstances of the 
market and whether the conduct could be justified via the application of objective criteria. 
 
With regards to abusive pricing, the CADE does not appear to consider it as an autonomous 
offence, notwithstanding the provisions of Law 8,884/94. Abusive pricing appears to be 
regarded as a consequence or as a means of achieving an anti-competitive goal. The CADE 
has not clarified what the standards of proof are in respect to abusive pricing, nor has it 
provided an in-depth analysis of the conduct. This could be explained by the adoption of the 
US view of abusive pricing. In fact, the CADE has never held an undertaking liable for 
abusive pricing. The competition bill will abolish abusive pricing as an offence, though some 
general provisions will still make reference to setting unreasonable prices on a discretionary 
basis. Therefore, it is likely that the CADE will continue to view abusive prices under the 
same light as the US, but some influence of the EU seems to be present as in the latter 
abusive pricing is prohibited, although such prohibitions are rare.  
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7. Final Conclusions 
 
This research has examined how Brazil has developed its hybrid model of competition law in 
regards to abuse of dominance. Brazilian competition law and policy incorporates aspects of 
EU competition law and policy, such as the concept of abuse of dominance and the doctrine 
special responsibilities of dominant firms. At the same time, it adopts a version of the 
American concept of the rule of reason. The adaptation of foreign models raises the issue of 
how they are accommodated in the system of Brazilian competition law, as well as in the 
wider constitutional, political and socioeconomic context.  
 
The research analysed how abusive conduct is conceived and dealt with by the BCPS. The 
wide and hybrid nature of the drafting of Law 8,884/94 was intended to ensure that it 
conformed to international standards whilst offering flexibility and discretion to the 
competition authority and courts. However, although Law 8,884/94 has been largely 
successful as Brazil’s first comprehensive competition law, its particular drafting has resulted 
in some inconsistencies in terms of enforcement. Law 8,884/94 lacks a definition of the 
elements of abuse and contains a non-exhaustive list of practices that can constitute offences. 
In addition, the CADE’s Resolution 20,776 which contains brief guidelines about the analysis 
of conduct, is confusing and does not prescribe the common steps which have to be taken in 
order to define the relevant market, dominance and abuse to reflect the prohibition of abuse 
by Law 8,884/94. New guidelines, reflecting competition law provisions and the current 
analysis of conduct, as demonstrated by the case-law studied in this research, would be 
welcomed.  
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The lack of definition of the elements of abuse in Law 8,884/94, in conjunction with a lack of 
authoritative guidelines on abusive behaviour and institutional issues, result in a lack of 
clarity and coherence in terms of the required standard of proof and the general application of 
the law.  
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7.1 Institutional Issues 
 
Institutional issues were raised in this research with the aim of identifying why there have 
been at times inconsistent approaches to abuse of dominance in Brazil, as well as why the 
interpretation of the law has followed sometimes the views of the EU, the US or of none of 
them. Interviews were crucial to unveil some of the findings and to have an insight into the 
views of those who are part of the competition authority. It must be noted that the 
competition bill seeks to remedy many of the institutional problems discussed in this 
research,777 such as the shortage and the high rotation of administrative staff. This is of 
particular importance, as these problems are responsible for hampering the development of an 
‘institutional memory’ and a consistent development of competition policy in Brazil.  
 
With regards to the term of office of Councillors, the competition bill will extend the current 
term of two to four years and abolish the possibility of re-appointing the Councillor to a 
second term. The proposed single term of four years seeks to reduce the ‘indirect’ influence 
of the government on decisions.  
 
A significant problem that the draft of the competition bill does not remedy concerns the 
ineffectiveness of the CADE’s decisions as a result of the current system of judicial review. 
The causes of this problem are twofold: firstly, appeals to the courts result in considerable 
procedural delays which, in extreme cases, result in the preclusion of enforcement; secondly, 
judges lack the expertise to interpret competition law and review the CADE’s decisions. 
These problems could be addressed by allowing appeals from the CADE to go directly to the 
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appellate courts, rather than the first instance, or by creating specialised courts.778 However, 
this would be difficult to achieve, as it would require constitutional reform, given that the 
Constitution specifies the jurisdiction and the structure of the Judiciary, as well as clear 
political consensus at the institutional level. One proposed solution is a change in the drafting 
of Article 97 of the competition bill, which currently reflects the provisions of Article 64 of 
Law 8,884/94. By removing the possibility of appealing in the judicial district where the 
defendant is domiciled, all appeals would instead be adjudicated at the federal courts of 
Brasilia, resulting in faster and better quality decisions as these judges would be familiarised 
with competition law issues. This proposal could be criticised on the grounds that it unfairly 
impedes the adjudication of appeals at the judicial district where the defendant is domiciled. 
However, it is unlikely that the defendant would be significantly disadvantaged by this 
change, given that all such cases originate at the competition authority in Brasilia so the 
hearing of the appeal there would simply continue the proceedings in the same location. 
 
There are two main issues in relation to the training received by Specialists in Public Policy 
and Management and other administrative personnel at the BCPS. The first issue concerns the 
international training of members of the competition authority. One of the findings of this 
research is that the jurisdiction at which training was received, generally the US or the EU, 
had an impact in the manner that members of the competition authority interpreted and 
applied competition law in Brazil. This issue should not be neglected due to differences 
between these jurisdictions. Diverging approaches could adversely affect the coherent 
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development of Brazilian competition law and policy.779 This is linked to the second issue, 
i.e. the inadequate training received by Specialists and other members of the BCPS. Both 
these problems could be addressed if, as soon as Specialists are appointed, they received 
training tailored to the Brazilian case-law and in relation to economic sectors that the 
competition authority considers to be of central importance. It is fundamental that members 
of the BCPS share an understanding of key legal and economic concepts in order to avoid 
some of the inconsistencies in the interpretation of competition law that have been discussed 
in this research.  
 
On the one hand, the competition bill resolves some of the issues in regards to training, as 
administrative resources of the BCPS will increase. On the other hand, under the current draft 
of the bill one hundred new Specialists will be employed. Therefore, it is crucial that the 
quality, quantity and consistency of training are improved to ensure the development of a 
coherent competition policy.    
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7.2 The Relevant Market 
 
When determining the relevant market, in common with the approach of the EU and the US, 
the BCPS adopts the SSNIP test. However, one particular characteristic of the Brazilian 
version of the test is the criterion adopted to simulate an increase in prices. In Brazil, this 
ranges from 5% to 15%, whilst in the US and the EU it is from 5% to 10%. The adoption of a 
higher criterion in Brazil appears to reflect a more realistic approach by the competition 
authority suited to the current socioeconomic context of Brazil. Consumers generally lack 
information on prices, or cannot easily identify price increases. Due to the low levels of 
purchasing power of the poor and the emerging middle class, most purchases, even those of 
trivial items, are paid for in instalments. Therefore, consumers generally show a greater 
concern with payment plans proposed by retailers rather than the final price of the product.  
 
The research findings also revealed that most members of the BCPS are concerned not to 
define the relevant market too narrowly in abuse of dominance cases, particularly when there 
is considerable public interest.780 The reason for this is that a narrow definition of the relevant 
market would have an impact on the determination of dominance and there are concerns that 
when the decisions of the CADE are appealed to the courts, they may reverse the original 
decision because the market was defined too narrowly. The CADE therefore seems to be 
more careful in its analysis of the relevant market in these situations. This appears to result in 
a definition of the relevant market that is usually similar to the US and wider than the EU. 
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7.3 The Concept of Dominance 
 
The SDE/SEAE Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the CADE’s Resolution 20 both require 
the definition of the market share of the defendant and of its competitors. This serves the 
purpose of determining whether the undertaking is sufficiently large to exercise market 
power. In addition to determining the market share, the competition authority will assess 
whether other market conditions permit the exercise of market power to qualify the 
undertaking as dominant.  
 
However, Law 8,884/94 states that dominance will be presumed when an undertaking’s 
market share exceeds 20%.781 The US and the EU have higher market share thresholds for 
finding dominance at 50% and 40% respectively.782 In the light of the high concentration of 
the Brazilian market, the lower threshold for presuming dominance in Brazil probably results 
from the fact that policy-makers endorse the view that market pluralism is beneficial for 
economic development. The market share threshold for presuming dominance has caused 
many misunderstandings among members of the BCPS.783 The correct approach would be to 
treat the market share as a threshold for the analysis of dominance. In this way, after 
determining that the undertaking has a market share greater than 20%, the CADE should 
examine other factors to verify whether the undertaking would be able to behave 
independently from competitors and consumers; if this does not prove to be the case, the 
presumption should be rebutted.  
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When examining other factors for determining dominance, such as the existence of 
competitors and barriers to entry, the Brazilian competition authority seems to seek guidance 
from the SDE/SEAE Horizontal Merger Guidelines. In common with the US and the EU 
models, the Brazilian guidelines adopt a Bainian definition of barriers to entry, i.e. any 
element in the market that places a potential competitor at a disadvantage in relation to the 
incumbent firms. According to the SDE/SEAE Guidelines, the following are considered 
barriers to entry: sunk costs, legal or regulatory obstacles, resources belonging exclusively to 
the established firm, economies of scale or scope, the level of integration of the productive 
chain, the loyalty of consumers to established brands and the potential retaliation by the 
established firm.784 
 
In practice, the interpretation of barriers to entry in Brazil appears to be closer to the US than 
the EU. In AmBev it was decided that potential competitors were unlikely to be capable of 
incurring high advertising costs to enter the market because AmBev could neutralise the 
effects of advertising through the foreclosure of its distribution system. Therefore, instead of 
considering high advertising costs as barriers to entry per se as in the EU, the CADE 
questioned whether the entrant would be able to recover the sunk costs of advertising through 
a successful entry, or whether failure to enter the market would be so likely that it would 
dissuade any potential entrant.785 
 
Dominance can also be held collectively in Brazil. However, in order for undertakings to be 
considered as part of the same group, there has to be a legal link in terms of corporate 
ownership or control. This Brazilian concept is narrower than its EU counterpart, whereby 
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links between companies could be established in cases where legally independent firms act 
collectively and their conduct can be deemed to be abusive.786 
 
In contrast with the EU787 and in common with the US,788 the BCPS analyses collective 
conduct under the cartel provisions, notwithstanding the adoption of the concept of single 
economic entity under Brazilian competition law.789 However, it seems that the choice of 
dealing with collective dominance under cartel provisions was not entirely a conscious policy 
choice. The interviews revealed that most members of the BCPS were not aware of the 
possibility of finding collectively dominant undertakings liable for abusive conduct. Instead, 
most interviewees accept the concept of single economic entity as relevant only in relation to 
mergers. Therefore, collective dominance is immediately conceived as a cartel in conduct 
cases. 
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7.4 Abuse Prohibitions under Law 8,884/94 and the Competition Bill 
 
The research has highlighted the fact that in order to understand the challenges facing 
competition law in Brazil it is important to appreciate that throughout its history the Brazilian 
market has been characterised by State intervention, monopolies and oligopolies. In addition, 
Brazil has undergone major socioeconomic and political changes over the past decades, such 
as the return to democratic rule in 1985, the enactment of the current Federal Constitution in 
1988 and the liberalisation of the economy in the 1990s, via the privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises and the opening of internal markets to international trade and foreign direct 
investment. 
 
This context, in addition to the need to fight high levels of inflation, had an influence on Law 
8,884/94. Its general provisions and goals seek to implement constitutional rights and 
principles, such as free enterprise, open competition, the social role of property, consumer 
protection, and the restraint of abuses of economic power. Law 8,884/94 is applicable not 
only to the private sector, but to the State as well, as the latter had abused its power and 
caused considerable economic inefficiencies prior to the return of democratic rule.   
 
Pursuant to the Real Plan of 1994, the current Brazilian currency, the Real, was adopted as 
part of a series of economic policies to combat endemic hyperinflation. Thus, it is 
understandable that Law 8,884/94 has provisions in relation to excessive pricing offences, 
such as Article 21(XXIV) which prohibits abusive prices or unreasonable increases in prices. 
Similar provisions are also present in the Consumer Code of 1990.790 
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Despite the express provision of excessive pricing offences in Law 8,884/94, the competition 
authority, in common with its US counterpart, has distanced itself from the role of a price 
regulator, so that to date none of these provisions have been enforced. The position of the 
BCPS is reflected in the competition bill, as the unreasonable price increase offence is no 
longer present in its current draft.  
 
The competition bill maintains the present structure under Law 8,884/94 of a non-exhaustive 
list of practices that become offences to the extent that they are capable of producing anti-
competitive effects. The main difference between the current law and the proposed 
competition bill is that the latter merged the provisions of Articles 20 and 21 of Law 8,884/94 
into a single provision, namely, Article 36 of the most recent draft of the competition bill. 
Therefore, all types of conduct, irrespective of being unilateral, joint, horizontal or vertical, 
will be prohibited under Article 36. 
 
In common with Law 8,884/94, the competition bill is structured and drafted in a manner that 
allows the discretion of the BCPS in interpreting and applying competition law. The 
legislative style of Law 8,884/94 was adopted as it allowed the competition authority to 
exercise flexibility and control over the development of competition law in Brazil. The early 
1990s was a period of rapid socioeconomic change, so the legislator at the time was not in a 
position to anticipate how competition law would develop.  
 
The continuation of a similar legislative style in the most recent draft of the competition bill 
is, in some ways, to be welcomed as it could allow the emergence of a coherent system of 
competition law and policy in Brazil. However, it also has the potential for making matters 
worse if there is no general consensus within the BCPS in respect to how competition law 
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ought to be interpreted and enforced. The need to ensure legal certainty and coherence seems 
to be a central issue in relation to the present state and future development of Brazilian 
competition law. In this respect, improvements are needed in professional training at the 
competition authority. The publication of guidelines and the pronouncement of decisions that 
restate the law would bring greater clarity. 
 
According to Article 21, the conduct of a dominant undertaking is prohibited as long as it is 
capable of causing anti-competitive effects. There is no need to assess the probability of the 
exercise of market power and efficiencies are considered as justifications which, in practice, 
are not balanced according to the American rule of reason. As observed during the analysis of 
abusive conduct,791 the reasoning undertaken by the CADE in relation to abuse of dominance 
offences appears to differ in respect to the type of conduct, notwithstanding the fact that the 
framework pursuant to Articles 20 and 21 of Law 8,884/94 provides a general standard. 
Therefore, it is imperative that the Brazilian competition policy develops into a coherent 
system, whereby the standards of proof and elements are applied in a similar fashion, 
irrespective of the conduct.  
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7.5 Proof of Effects 
 
In contrast with the US approach, Brazilian competition law does not require proof of actual 
or likely effects of the conduct.792 In this respect, the standard of proof is closer to the EU 
model, as it adopts a preventive approach in relation to anti-competitive effects. This is the 
majority view among members of the BCPS and is reflected in the case-law as well. It 
emerged from the case analysis that there is no need to prove actual or likely anti-competitive 
effects to constitute the offences of refusal to supply, tying arrangements or exclusive 
dealing; it merely has to be proven that anti-competitive effects could potentially result from 
the conduct.793 
 
However, on some occasions the Brazilian competition authority has departed from the 
general standards set forth in Articles 20 and 21 of Law 8,884/94. In predatory pricing 
cases,794 the reasoning of the CADE implied that there was a requirement to prove the likely 
effects of the conduct, thereby adopting an approach modelled on US antitrust policy,795 
which departs from the general standards set by Law 8,884/94. There is no requirement of 
recoupment under Law 8,884/94 and this additional factor is contained in Resolution 20 
published by the CADE. This discrepancy is an important issue that should be resolved, as 
Brazil is a democratic state with a consolidated legal tradition, where the provisions set out in 
secondary legislation should not diverge from the parameters of the primary legislation. 
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The findings of the case analysis suggested that when a conduct results in exclusionary 
effects it will not constitute a competition law offence, unless it is deemed that the dominant 
firm would be able increase prices abusively at a later stage.796 The Brazilian position appears 
to mirror the US approach to predatory pricing, which requires proof of a dangerous 
probability of recoupment. This standard of proof is very difficult to satisfy. As a result, the 
CADE has never held an undertaking liable for predatory pricing.   
 
However, it is not clear from the analysis of the opinions in the decisions whether the 
adoption of the US approach to predatory pricing resulted from a conscious policy decision. 
The interviews suggested that many policy-makers are not fully aware of the differences 
between the US and EU approaches to predatory pricing or of the impact of the recoupment 
criterion on the standard of proof. This finding highlights the importance of ensuring that 
members of the BCPS receive adequate training.  
 
With respect to the determination of costs in price discrimination cases, it appears that the 
CADE follows the position of the EU, as it does not require proof of dangerous probability of 
recoupment of losses. In AmBev it was not necessary to prove actual or likely effects as the 
potential harm was implied from the loyalty created by the discounts.797 
 
Irrespective of the drafting of Law 8,884/94, abusive pricing is not generally regarded as a 
standalone offence by members of the BCPS; rather, it is considered to be a symptom of an 
anti-competitive conduct. The CADE has never held a firm liable for abusive pricing. 
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According to the case-law, the power to impose monopolistic prices would result from the 
exclusion of effective or potential competitors.798 Therefore, evidence of exclusion would be 
needed to substantiate a claim where abusive pricing is alleged. This does not suggest a 
higher standard where effects need to be proven, but proof of the existence of another anti-
competitive conduct as abusive pricing is not considered to be a standalone offence. 
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7.6 Efficiencies and Justifications 
 
In Brazil there is no burden of proof in relation to efficiencies or other justifications. 
However, according to the Constitution, every party must be heard in accordance with the 
due process of law.799 Therefore, the defendant has the right to submit the existence of 
justifications and, in accordance with the Brazilian rule of reason and the impartiality of the 
CADE, such justifications could be accepted.  
 
The Brazilian competition authority does not distinguish between objective justifications and 
efficiency defences.800 Efficiencies are taken into consideration in the analysis of the conduct 
as they could offset the alleged harm to competition; a similar approach to that adopted in the 
United States. However, if the conduct is deemed to harm consumers and forecloses the 
market it is unlikely that the evidence of efficiencies submitted will substantiate a defence. In 
this sense, economic efficiencies play a similar role to objective justifications under EU 
competition law. 
 
In some cases the competition authority suggested the existence of a burden of proof on the 
defendant in relation to efficiencies. In accordance with AmBev, for a dominant undertaking 
to justify discounts and rebates, it would have to prove that one of the following efficiencies 
would result: (1) reduction of transaction costs; (2) protection of commercial reputation; (3) 
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protection of specific investments; (4) economies of scale or scope in the downstream 
market; or (5) technological development in the upstream market.801 
 
Moreover, the CADE would seek to verify whether any objective criteria would apply to 
make it reasonable for the dominant firm to practice the conduct. However, a defendant 
would generally submit justifications in its defence where there is evidence of an alleged 
breach of competition law. In terms of proposed reforms, the eventual publication of 
guidelines on abuse of dominance should clarify whether or not the defendant bears the 
burden of proving the existence of justifications. 
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7.7 Rule of Reason and Per Se Rule 
 
A significant finding which emerged from the study is that members of the BCPS are not 
fully aware of the meaning of the per se rule. Most interviewees incorrectly believed that the 
per se rule was only applicable in the EU and that it was a form of strict liability applicable 
only to dominant firms.802 According to this mistaken assumption, justifications would not be 
taken into account under any circumstance after the alleged conduct was proven. In turn, this 
demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the use of objective justifications under EU law, which 
are valid even in cases where the per se rule applies.  
 
In addition, most members of the BCPS were not aware of the scope of the rule of reason. 
Most interviewees did not know that under the rule of reason it is necessary to prove the 
actual or likely effects of the conduct and that the burden rests on the defendant to 
demonstrate efficiencies that justify the conduct. Similarly, some interviewees were not 
aware that the competition authority has to prove that a conduct was necessary and that the 
goal of the undertaking could not have been achieved by less restrictive means. The most 
common definition of the meaning of the rule of reason put forward by interviewees was that 
it meant taking into account wider circumstances of the market and considering efficiencies 
as justifications.  
 
Such a lack of information explains why, although the Brazilian competition authority 
officially rejects the use of the per se rule and adopts the ‘rule of reason’, it does not reflect 
what happens in practice. For instance, the Brazilian rule of reason is substantially different 
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from the US rule of reason and, according to the interviews, the per se rule is applicable at 
least in respect of cartels.803 
 
The Brazilian rule of reason lacks the high standard of proof required pursuant to its US 
counterpart, particularly in regards to the first stage, where it is necessary to prove the likely 
effects of a conduct. Under the general terms of the Brazilian rule of reason, the conduct of 
the dominant firm only needs to be capable of producing anti-competitive effects, even in 
cases where the latter fail to materialise. This standard of proof is in accordance with Law 
8,884/94. The only exception concerns predatory pricing, as the CADE has required proof of 
the effects for this type of conduct.804 
 
Unlike the US, under the Brazilian rule reason there is no legal burden on the defendant to 
demonstrate the existence of efficiencies. Moreover, there was no evidence in the case-law 
that the competition authority needs to prove that a conduct is necessary and that the aim of 
the conduct could be achieved by less restrictive means. However, it was found that the 
defendants generally, in fact, tend to present justifications. The competition authority takes 
into consideration evidence put forward by the complainant demonstrating that the goal could 
have been achieved by less restrictive means.  
 
In addition, there was no indication from the findings of the case analysis that the Brazilian 
competition authority balances pro and anti competitive effects. This is in accordance with 
Law 8,884/94 which does not provide a balancing process based on the US model. As the law 
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protects ‘...free enterprise and open competition, the social role of property, consumer 
protection, and restraint of abuses of economic power,’805 it would be difficult to justify harm 
to these interests by way of overriding efficiencies via a balancing process. Therefore, despite 
the fact that the Brazilian rule of reason is markedly different from its US counterpart, the 
label of the ‘rule of reason’ is given to the Brazilian assessment of abuse.  
 
The analysis of the case-law revealed that, in common with the EU model, the CADE 
considers a conduct abusive when it creates artificial barriers that exclude or impede the entry 
of competitors in the relevant market.806 The Brazilian rule of reason is understood as the 
requirement to take into consideration the benefits resulting from a conduct, as efficiency 
justifications form part of the analysis. Although the case-law failed to recognise a difference 
between efficiency defences and objective justifications, the findings suggest that the 
Brazilian justifications operate in the same way as the EU objective justifications. In Brazil, a 
range of justifications can be accepted, as long as they objectively demonstrate that the 
conduct is not capable of foreclosing the market, excluding competitors and, most 
importantly, harming consumers. With the exception of the assessment of predatory pricing 
and abusive pricing, which are dealt with by the CADE in the same way as in the US, the 
competition authority generally adopts an approach that is similar to the EU, especially for 
non-pricing conduct.  
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The Brazilian version of the rule of reason, as well as the adoption of the special 
responsibilities doctrine,807 suggests the pursuit of a competition policy which aims to protect 
market freedom, whilst allowing the BCPS to assess on a case by case basis whether the 
actions of dominant firms harm the interests of society at large. The CADE has adopted an 
approach which, although concerned with type I errors, demonstrates a willingness to take 
measures when dominant firms distort competition by artificially creating barriers to entry, 
excluding competitors and harming consumers. This suggests that the CADE is conscious of 
the interest protected by Law 8,884/94 and by the Brazilian Constitution and understands that 
the proper functioning of the market requires regulation and adequate enforcement.  
 
The decisions of the CADE are administrative in nature and can be reviewed by the courts. 
Therefore, the role of the courts is also important for the effectiveness of competition law 
enforcement. At the present time, it is not possible to identify a general approach by the 
courts, as the fora for appeals are generally scattered throughout the Brazilian territory. This 
issue could be resolved under the proposed reform made in this study to eliminate the 
possibility of appeals to the forum where the defendant resides, so all appeals would be heard 
by the federal courts of the federal district of Brasilia.808 This would facilitate the emergence 
of a consistent body of judicial decisions and judicial expertise on competition law. 
Notwithstanding the above, according to information given by Advocates at the CADE, the 
vast majority of the courts’ judgments confirm the CADE’s decisions. Therefore, it could be 
argued that courts in Brazil are also aware that the proper functioning of the market requires 
adequate regulation.  
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7.8 The Special Responsibility of Dominant Firms and the Social Function of Property 
 
The EU doctrine of special responsibilities of dominant firms appears to be gradually gaining 
momentum in Brazil. Although the CADE and other Brazilian policy-makers are wary of 
expressly adopting the term, this doctrine is substantially accepted under the Brazilian case-
law.  
 
The recent AmBev decision made clear that dominant firms do have more responsibilities 
than non-dominant firms. Therein, Councillor Furlan reflected on Montesquieu’s thoughts 
that everyone who holds power tends to abuse it.809 He stated that Montesquieu’s thoughts 
were valid not solely in relation to political power, but also for economic power, given that 
power could be understood as the capacity, faculty and means of achieving anything in any 
sort of human activity. This does not mean that dominance is prohibited. Rather, the 
competition authority must fulfil the role that other economic players would be able to play in 
preventing the abuse of dominant firms. Therefore, the competition authority provides a 
check at an institutional level to counter the abuse of economic power by dominant firms. 
 
Montesquieu’s thoughts have also inspired the Brazilian Constitution.810 Therefore, the 
declaration of a relationship between dominance and special responsibilities in AmBev by 
citing Montesquieu’s thoughts goes beyond a simple academic exercise. The doctrine of 
special responsibilities could be justified in the need to safeguard interests protected by the 
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Brazilian Constitution, such as free competition, the right to private property and the social 
function of property.811 
 
Brazil’s constitutional principles and the gradual acceptance of the doctrine of special 
responsibilities imply that the right to private property and market power are inherently 
linked to obligations, in the same way that the exercise of private property rights is 
conditioned to the social function of property. Therefore, the more property or economic 
power one acquires, the greater the responsibilities imposed by the legal system. This is how 
the Constitutional principle of the social function of property manifests itself in the 
application of the special responsibilities doctrine in Brazil. 
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7.9 The Long-Term Policy Prospects in Respect of Abuse of Dominance in Brazil 
 
The professional training of members of the BCPS will prove to be fundamental in 
determining the direction that the Brazilian competition policy will take, especially when 
considering the significant increase in the number of professional staff members which is due 
to take place when the competition bill is enacted.  
 
Members of the BCPS need to be fully aware of the different approaches taken by the 
competition authorities and courts in the US and the EU in respect of some types of abuse 
when citing decisions from both sides of the Atlantic. As foreign decisions are frequently 
cited, this could improve the consistency of the Brazilian decisions. More importantly, this 
would allow a conscious citation of foreign decisions to implement a desired policy, rather 
than the current random use of citations to illustrate a specific view on a particular concept. 
The bigger picture should always be borne in mind by members of the BCPS.      
 
Members of the competition authority would also need to become more familiar with the 
meanings of other concepts, such as the Brazilian ‘rule of reason’, since a clear understanding 
would ensure their proper application. The development of a predictable and relatively 
consistent interpretation of competition law would be of fundamental importance in ensuring 
the emergence of a coherent system of competition law in Brazil which, among other 
benefits, would ensure an adequate degree of legal certainty for competitors. Not only would 
guidelines on the enforcement of competition law on abuse of dominance be needed, but also 
authoritative decisions could serve an educational purpose to clarify some of the uncertainties 
revealed in this research. The rise of Brazil as one of the emerging economic powers of the 
21st century, with its growing economy and foreign direct investment, only emphasises the 
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importance of a clear and coherent understanding of competition law among members of the 
BCPS. 
 
It emerged from the interviews that members of the BCPS were aware of the benefits of 
effective competition law enforcement for the development of the economy and society. 
However, there was no intention to intervene in the market to address social problems. It was 
a common understanding among interviewees that such social improvements would result 
from a competitive market that benefits not only producers but also consumers. On the one 
hand, the majority of the interviewees were of the opinion that Brazilian competition law 
would continue to distance itself gradually from the US model and move towards the EU 
approach, particularly in relation to the abuse of economic power. On the other hand, they 
also pointed out that the Brazilian competition policy will not slavishly follow the EU; rather, 
they believed that the Brazilian competition authority would find its own way. They believed 
it would incorporate elements from the EU and US competition policies, but also take into 
account the particular characteristics pertaining to Brazil and tailor the policy to the needs 
and structure of the Brazilian markets. 
 
Brazil has not fully resolved the issues of reconciling the differences between the US and EU 
models of competition law and policy. Further reform is needed to bring greater coherence to 
its competition policy. Nevertheless, Brazil perhaps represents the only major developing 
country with the suitable conditions, in terms of its established competition law as well as its 
legal, political and socioeconomic environment, to allow it to develop a successful 
competition policy that is suited to the particularities of its legal system, economy, culture 
and institutional framework. One notable finding of this research is that Brazilian policy-
makers appear to have the determination and capacity to develop a unique model of 
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competition law and policy. The CADE has come a long way in the past fifteen years, and 
there appears to be enthusiasm and a desire by its members to develop a coherent and 
successful system of competition law and policy in the years to come. 
 
The mixture of elements from the US and the EU models is shaping the development of 
Brazilian competition law and policy. This, in conjunction with the need to adapt these 
elements to the Brazilian legal and socioeconomic context, could eventually result in a 
distinct Brazilian model of competition law and policy, particularly in respect to the 
regulation of market power. As was discussed in this research, the Brazilian competition 
authority has interpreted its competition law at times following the US, such as for abusive 
pricing, sometimes following the EU, for instance for discounts and rebates, and in its own 
way, for instance when determining a greater price increase for the Brazilian SSNIP test. The 
adoption of the view in accordance with one or another jurisdiction (or none of them) appears 
to correspond to the views of those who work in the competition authority. Interviews 
suggested that at times the adoption of one view may be linked to the fact that members of 
the staff have undertaken training in the US or the EU, but may also result from a random 
choice which may be related to the way in which one believes that competition should be in 
the market. The latter may be linked to social and historic factors, but also to the member’s 
legal and economic studies and views. It appears therefore that the transplantation of legal 
concepts from other jurisdictions has resulted in adaptations to conform with the views of 
those who enforce the law and legal and institutional framework where they operate. Thus, a 
‘third way’ in the sphere of competition law appears to be emerging in a developing 
economic power with a consolidated democratic system which does not endorse a laissez-
faire approach, nor does it seek to promote interventionism and where the reasonableness of 
the conduct could be balanced with its fairness.  
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7.10 Further lines of inquiry 
 
Much research has been undertaken in respect of the similarities and differences in the 
approach of the competition authorities in the US and the EU.812 This research has identified 
a number of elements that are relevant for the understanding of such differences and 
similarities and applies this theoretical framework to examine Brazilian competition law and 
policy. Very little has been said to date in Brazil in relation to abuse of dominance. Most 
authors have focused their researches on mergers813 and cartels814 and the very few who have 
proposed a comprehensive study of competition law and policy in Brazil have not dealt with 
abuse of dominance in any depth.815 Only one author has published case-law books on 
competition law in Brazil,816 but these do not offer an analysis of the cases. Moreover, they 
contain only some of the decisions that were considered by interviewees as leading cases and 
none of them contain cases decided after 2003.  
 
This is therefore the first research that combines the use of in-depth interviews, case-law 
analysis and literature review to examine how the Brazilian competition authority has dealt 
with the divergences between the EU and the US models when applying Brazilian 
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Fundamentos do Antitruste, chap. VII. 
815
 See e.g. Oliveira and Fujiwara, “Competition Policy in Developing Economies: The Case of Brazil.” 
Forgioni, Os Fundamentos do Antitruste. Forgioni, Direito Concorrencial e Restrições Verticais. Mattos, A 
Revolução Antitruste no Brasil: a teoria econômica aplicada a casos concretos, pt. II. Rocha et al., A Lei 
Antitruste - 10 anos de combate ao abuso de poder. 
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 See Franceschini, Direito da concorrência: case law. Franceschini, Jurisprudência do CADE de 1962 a 
2003. Franceschini, Lei da concorrência conforme interpretada pelo CADE. 
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competition law in respect of abuse of dominance. The identification, selection and analysis 
of the leading cases carried out in this study are useful for any further studies of the subject. 
Moreover, it identifies the elements of abuse in Brazil, placing Brazil in the competition 
policy spectrum between the US and the EU, currently leaning closer to the latter. This will 
also be useful to academics wishing to analyse abuse of dominance, the Brazilian model or to 
compare the latter with models from other jurisdictions. The comparative methodology and 
the mix of interviews with case-law adopted in this research will also help other academics to 
study the adoption of hybrid competition law systems in other jurisdictions, given that it 
identifies the elements that are relevant for the resulting policy. 
 
This research identified the relevance of professional training for the development of 
Brazilian competition policy. Further research should be undertaken on the issues identified 
herein, particularly in relation to matters outside the scope of this research, such as cartels 
and mergers. In collaboration with the BCPS, this could allow for the development of a 
suitable training programme for professional personnel. The training should ensure a coherent 
understanding of competition law and policy among members of the competition authority 
and should try to anticipate the future needs of the BCPS in terms of expertise. 
 
It emerged from the study that, although the Brazilian competition authority rejects a per se 
approach to any competition offence, the interviews revealed that this approach is in fact used 
in respect of cartel cases. As the study of cartels falls outside the scope of this research, this 
finding was not confirmed by the case-law analysis. The study of the Brazilian case-law on 
cartels would be an instructive source of information in identifying not only the existence of a 
per se approach in these cases, but also in assessing the coherence of the policy. 
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Finally, but not less importantly, an issue that emerged in this research which should be the 
subject of further research concerns the approval of controversial mergers, particularly those 
which resulted in dominant firms or increased the market power of existing dominant firms. 
The numerous accusations of abusive conduct against AmBev and the imposition by the 
CADE of the highest fine ever imposed by the competition authority on that company raises 
the question of whether the terms on which the competition authority has approved such 
mergers have been sufficient to avoid abusive conduct. Therefore, further research should be 
undertaken to analyse whether the remedies imposed on such mergers have been sufficient to 
avoid the distortion of competition at a later stage.  
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8. Appendix 
8.1 Interviews 
 
This research was conducted using a qualitative methodology which offered the best 
opportunity to understand the underlying competition policy in the analysis of abuse of 
dominance in Brazil. The views of those directly involved in the investigations and decisions 
of abuse of dominance, as well as in the defence of dominant firms were fundamental for 
fully understanding the decisions examined. Most importantly, the use of interviews 
minimised the risk of imposing the researcher’s own assumptions or expectations when 
analysing the case-law or when constructing explanations for the reasons of certain decisions 
or actions. 
 
The methodology was used in an inductive manner: rather than creating a hypothesis and 
testing it through empirical research, the researcher built up a theory based on the gathered 
data. Thus far, most researchers of Brazilian competition law and policy have used a 
deductive approach. In addition, the interviews were fundamental for this study, given the 
lack of in-depth research in Brazil concerning abuse of dominance. They were also very 
helpful for the identification of the leading cases and to clarify the contradictions evidenced 
by the case-law, as well as what has been stated by Brazilian scholars, which frequently 
assume that the Brazilian competition law is applied in the same way as in the EU and the 
US.   
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8.1.1 Methodology 
 
Within the BCPS, interviews were undertaken with seven Councillors of the CADE, two 
Assistants of Councillors, the Advocate General and three Advocates of the CADE, as well as 
one member of the SDE and two members of the SEAE. Moreover, one Ex-Councillor of the 
CADE was interviewed. In order to maintain the anonymity of the former Councillor 
interviewed, it was not possible to state throughout the thesis whether the statements 
belonged to a current or former member of the competition authority. The limitation of 
having only one former member interviewed was minimised by the fact that most of the 
current members interviewed gave valuable information in regards to the views of previous 
members of the competition authority. Moreover, the information given by the former 
Councillor was re-stated by many other current members of the competition authority. Three 
Brazilian competition lawyers and two UK competition lawyers were also interviewed. In 
total, twenty-two persons were interviewed. 
 
In order to have a full picture of the views of those making the decisions involving abuses, all 
Councillors of the CADE were interviewed. It was also helpful to have at least two Assistants 
interviewed, who could offer a different perspective as they were Specialists. Given that the 
SEAE and the SDE are not located in the same building as the CADE, this created a few 
difficulties to organise interviews with many members of these bodies. However, it was 
possible to interview one senior member of the SDE and two of the SEAE. In addition, one 
Ex-Councillor accepted to be interviewed over the phone, offering a perspective of how the 
CADE has developed its policy previously to the appointment of the current Council. 
Moreover, Brazilian competition lawyers were interviewed in order to bring the view of 
practitioners in respect to those responsible for enforcing competition law, namely the BCPS 
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and the courts. The researcher also had the chance of meeting and questioning UK lawyers 
that had experience in notifying mergers in Brazil in respect of the differences in approach of 
the Brazilian competition authorities and the UK and EU competition authorities, especially 
in terms of the definition of the relevant market.  
 
Except for the Ex-Councillor of the CADE, whose interview was conducted over the phone, 
all other interviews were conducted in person. They took place between July 2009 and 
December 2009. Generally, the interviews regarded: institutional issues, such as the 
difficulties faced by the competition authority as a policy-maker, training of staff and 
appointments, as well as policy matters, such as the Brazilian rule of reason, the per se rule, 
the proof of effects, the role of efficiencies and other justifications and the reconciliation of 
the Brazilian competition policy with the US and EU views on competition law. 
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8.1.2 Confidentiality and anonymity 
 
All the interviews were anonymous. Interviewees were given the possibility of being 
mentioned if they wished, but none manifested the intention to do so. Therefore, under no 
circumstances data which can lead to the person of the interviewee was or will be revealed.  
 
Precisely for this reason, the full notes of the interviews are not available in the appendix. 
The number of interviewees is relatively small and all members of the competition authority 
know each other relatively well. The kind and subject of comments made in the interviews 
would allow the identification of most interviewees so the full notes will not be published.   
 
Moreover, the researcher was advised by one Councillor of the CADE that interviews should 
not be recorded if honest answers (rather than the ‘official version’) were expected. 
Following this advice, interviews were not recorded; instead, notes were taken. Except for 
two, all the interviews were conducted in Portuguese. Every effort was made to offer a 
truthful translation.      
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8.1.3 Interviews guidelines sent to interviewees 
 
Laíse Da Correggio Luciano  
Law PhD Candidate  
Queen Mary, University of London 
School of Law 
67-69 Lincoln's Inn Fields 
London WC2A 3JB 
 
Re: authorisation to conduct interviews.  
 
I am a PhD student at Queen Mary, University of London, under the supervision of 
Professors Steven D. Anderman and Kate Malleson. My thesis concerns the Brazilian 
competition law and policy in regards to abuse of dominance cases in comparison with the 
US and the EU. 
 
In March this year I was authorised by the President of the CADE to undertake an 
observation internship in the CADE and conduct interviews, which will be fundamental to 
better understand the Brazilian competition policy in respect of abuse of dominance. In order 
to conduct these interviews, I have elaborated a topic guide, which can be found below. 
 
I would like to bring to your attention the fact that the data gathered will be treated with 
confidentiality and will respect the United Kingdom Data Protection Act of 1998. All the 
interviews will be confidential and no data that can lead to the person of the interviewee will 
be revealed, unless expressly authorised by the interviewee before publication. To ensure 
this, all data that can identify the interviewees will be omitted in the transcription of the 
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interviews and will be substituted randomly by numbers and letters. I will be the only person 
to have access to the transcriptions, which will be destroyed at the end of the research that is 
expected to be completed by September 2010.  
 
Interviews topic guide: 
 
a) The main challenges faced by the competition authority in regards to its role (as policy-
maker) and administrative structure. 
 
b) The reduction in the number of cases dealing with abuse of dominance in the past decade.  
 
c) The BCPS approach to the reconciliation of the Brazilian system of competition with the 
international thoughts and standards (considering the different, and at times contradictory 
views in respect of abuse of dominance, e.g. in the US and the EU)  
 
d) The possible effects of the international crisis in the application of the competition law in 
Brazil. 
 
e) The interaction between consumer protection and competition policy. 
 
Thank you very much for your collaboration. 
 
Sincerely, 
Laíse Da Correggio Luciano 
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8.1.4 Detailed topic guide 
 
Which are the challenges faced by the CADE in regards to its role (as policy-maker) and 
administrative structure? 
 
How is the effectiveness of decisions ensured? 
 
How is the training of the staff done? What is emphasised in regards to abuse of dominance? 
Do members of the SDE and the SEAE participate as well? 
 
Usually, do Councillors and the Advocate General remain for two mandates? Who decides if 
they stay in their positions? 
 
There was a reduction in the number of cases dealing with abuse of dominance. Why this is? 
 
Has the international crisis had an impact in the application of the competition law in Brazil? 
 
Is there an economic theory that is more aligned to the competition policy implemented by 
the CADE? Is this choice a conscious one? The definition of the dominant position in Brazil 
is close to a structural, Chicagoan or other concept? 
 
How does the CADE approach the reconciliation of the Brazilian system of competition law 
with the international thoughts and standards? What about the use of US and EU decisions to 
support decisions on predatory pricing? 
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Is it necessary to prove the effects of the conduct? 
 
How much is social harm taken into account by the economic analysis? 
 
How is the interaction between consumer protection and competition policy done? 
 
How legitimate and illegitimate competition are differentiated? 
 
Is there the concept of single economic unit or is the corporate veil respected? 
 
How is the rule of reason applied? 
 
Is there a tendency in defining the relevant market in a narrow or wide manner? 
 
Is there a special responsibility of dominant firms in Brazil? 
 
Are there per se prohibitions? 
 
Which were the most important unilateral cases? 
 
Where is the CADE’s policy heading towards? 
 
Is there an understanding of a competition policy of MERCOSUR, or is it still at a national 
level? 
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8.2 Cases analysis 
 
The research analysed the most significant cases involving abuse of dominance. The 
existence of a research of this nature, using an inductive approach to reveal in detail the 
analysis of the Brazilian case-law, is unknown to the researcher. Therefore, its findings will 
contribute to the academic literature and provide much needed information to the competition 
authority, practitioners and the academic community in respect of the suitability and 
consistency of the policy on abuse of dominance in Brazil.  
 
It is important to note that, in common with most civil law jurisdictions, Brazil does not have 
a system of case-law reporting as in England and Wales. Brazilian decisions can be found on-
line in CADE’s database, but it does not contain a complete body of case-law. Moreover, in 
most case searches it is not possible to separate abuse of dominance from other types of 
conduct such as cartels, given that keyword searches will lead to results based on the words 
contained in the often imprecise short description of the case. 
 
In order to ensure a good sample of abuse of dominance cases, in addition to keyword 
searches, the following search criteria was used: minutes of judgments, cases contained in 
Brazilian competition law publications and cases which, in the opinion of Councillors and 
other members of the BCPS, were the most relevant. The body of abuse of dominance cases 
was narrowed down in order to identify different types of abuses in the Brazilian 
jurisprudence and to single out the most significant cases. In total, fifteen cases were 
examined in detail. Their analysis can be found below. 
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8.3 Abusive Pricing 
8.3.1 Xerox 
 
In 1998, the CADE decided Xerox do Brasil Ltda.817 Farina and Fraga accused Xerox of 
abusing its dominant position by imposing standard form agreements whereby Xerox had the 
unilateral right to increase prices. Although deciding in favour of Xerox, the CADE 
formulated some legal requirements for determining whether a conduct amounts to an 
arbitrary increase in prices. It was established that the determination of the offence of 
increasing arbitrarily profits requires an evaluation of the normal standards of profit margin 
in the relevant market. The evaluation encompasses a comparison of the past and present 
profitability in the sector and relevant market, as well as of the undertaking in question. 
Moreover, with respect to establishing causation, a factual link between the alleged conduct 
and the eventual abusive realisation of profits needs to be established.818 
 
Increases in price are considered a symptom of an anti-competitive practice.819 Therefore, it 
is not CADE’s competence to punish an increase in price per se.820 However, the CADE will 
interfere if there is an anti-competitive conduct causing the increase in price. For instance, 
this would occur in cases where the undertaking responsible for increasing prices has a 
dominant position or there is an element of collusion in the conduct. 
                                                 
817
 Farina e Fraga Associados v Xerox do Brasil Ltda 2 - 0046/1992. 
818
 Ibid. 
819
 Andrade and Alves, “Distribuidoras de Veículos vs. Montadoras: Condutas Anticompetitivas e Relações 
Verticais,” 352. 
820
 Revalino Vieira da Cunha v Golden Cross Assistência Internacional de Saúde S/C - 08000.000178/90. 
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8.3.2 Laboratório Enila 
 
Enila821 is a decision of 2008 regarding the pharmaceutical sector. The defendant (Enila) was 
accused by the SDE of increasing the prices of some of its medicines in an abusive manner. 
The plenary of the CADE decided unanimously that there was no offence to the economic 
order. The CADE considered that there was not enough evidence to prohibit the conduct. 
Moreover, according to the presiding Councillor, Luiz Carlos Thadeu Delorme Prado, the 
complaint and the investigations of the SDE did not focus on determining dominance, which 
would be a fundamental element to be established before finding prices to be abusive under 
Brazilian competition law.  
 
The above suggests that preliminary investigations were completed in a flawed manner, as 
the factual findings did not correspond with the elements which needed to be proven at law, 
making it difficult for Councillors to decide the case properly. The fact that the SDE failed to 
focus on first establishing dominance may have resulted from the lack of clear procedural 
guidance within the BCPS. When questioned about the deficiency in the reasoning of some 
decisions, one member of the competition authority stated that: 
 
...the legal basis is randomly chosen. Many times paragraph IV [of Article 20, which 
prohibits conduct of firms that may result in abuse of dominance] is used to justify the 
prohibition of the abusive conduct, but many times it does not appear in the decision at 
all. The reality is that it should always be included when dealing with unilateral 
behaviour. This probably occurs because of a lack of technical skills of assistants. 
                                                 
821
 CPI - Medicamentos da Câmara dos Deputados v Laboratório Enila Indústria e Comércio de Produtos 
Químicos e Farmacêuticos SA - 08012.000903/2000-82. 
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Therefore, the lack of proper understanding of the structure that the investigations and the 
decisions should follow may result in flawed decisions and investigations. In this case, such 
problems with the investigation had an impact on the outcome of the case, given that without 
the proper establishment of dominance during investigations it became difficult for the CADE 
to analyse the conduct. 
 
In Enila it was established that abusive prices would be found when prices were fixed at a 
high rate or if there was a pricing strategy aimed at artificially distorting the competitive 
process. The abuse of dominance would refer to the strategic means of the undertaking to 
impose higher prices that would not sustainably exist in a competitive market. In essence, the 
power to impose higher prices would result from an exclusion or obstruction of effective or 
potential competitors. 
 
Councillor Prado declared that high prices in most case cases offer a warning that it is likely 
that an offence to the economic order is taking place. Indeed, they would suggest the 
existence of an anti-competitive conduct, such as abuse of dominance or cartel.822 In fact, the 
Enila decision stresses the idea that abusive pricing ought to be regarded as a consequence of 
an anti-competitive conduct, rather than an offence in its own right.  
                                                 
822
 Forgioni, Os Fundamentos do Antitruste, 353. 
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8.4 Predatory Pricing 
8.4.1 Kellogg’s 
 
In Kellogg’s,823 the claimant (Nutrifoods) argued that a previous merger between Kellogg’s 
and Superbom, the later being a Brazilian company in the cereal sector, increased Kellogg’s 
market power and facilitated its ability to set predatory prices. However, the practice of 
selling products at below cost after the acquisition of Superbom by Kellogg’s was considered 
reasonable, as the latter was eliminating excess stock purchased from the former. In addition, 
arguments in Nutrifoods’ claim against the merger were deemed unjustified as the CADE had 
previously cleared the merger.    
 
When formulating its decision in favour of the defendant, the CADE stated that even in the 
hypothetical scenario that the defendant committed predatory pricing, further evidence 
demonstrating a serious possibility of direct harm to competitors would be needed to support 
the claim. However, it is worth noting that the case was decided two years after the alleged 
conduct took place, so it was easy to determine that no harm occurred to competitors, given 
that Nutrifoods did not lose market share as a result of Kellogg’s practice.824 The 
exclusionary effects had not taken place, although it could be argued that Kellogg’s conduct 
might have impeded the growth of Nutrifoods’ market share.825 
 
                                                 
823
 Nutrifoods Indústria e Comércio de Alimentos Ltda v Kellogg Brasil & Cia - 08012.000349/1998-10. 
824
 Nutrifoods’ market share remained stable at circa 10%. 
825
 It has to be borne in mind that ‘...a focus on actual effects can produce misleading results where the claim is 
that the defendant’s exclusionary conduct helped to maintain its monopoly power without necessarily resulting 
in immediate incremental price-output effects’. Balto, “Proof of competitive effects in monopolization cases: a 
response to Professor Muris,” 312. 
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It emerged from the interviews that in many decisions a supposedly anti-competitive conduct 
is allowed because it took a considerable amount of time to investigate and decide the case. 
In such cases some Councillors felt compelled to take into consideration what happened in 
practice with the advantage of hindsight, rather than adjudicating the alleged conduct by 
considering the potential harm to competition at the time of the conduct.  
 
This is particularly important when analysing predatory pricing, given that proof of 
recoupment is necessary, so if the facts show that recoupment was not possible, there would 
be no offence to competition law. Therefore, although under a formal understanding of the 
law the competition authority would not need the proof of effects in predatory pricing 
cases,826 it seems that this is required by the CADE when the investigation takes place after 
the effects materialised.   
 
Although Kellogg’s was acquitted, the final remarks in this decision of the presiding 
Councillor, Lucia Helena Salgado e Silva, demonstrated a concern with its market power. 
The Councillor stated that ‘...although Kellogg’s has a worrying position in the market of 
ready-to-eat cereals, it was not proven in this case that an anti-competitive practice took 
place’.827 This statement could be interpreted as a warning to Kellogg’s with respect to the 
manner that it was behaving after the merger with Superbom was approved. These 
                                                 
826
 Not only the Competition Law 8,884/94 does not require the proof of the effects of the conduct, but also 
guidelines on predatory pricing clearly state that the conduct prohibited must either produce the anticompetitive 
effects or have the capacity of producing them. See SEAE, “Guidelines on the economic analysis of predatory 
pricing,” 4. 
827
 Nutrifoods Indústria e Comércio de Alimentos Ltda v Kellogg Brasil & Cia - 08012.000349/1998-10, 5. 
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concluding remarks suggest the acknowledgement of Kellogg’s special responsibility828 
resulting from its dominant position.      
  
                                                 
828
 See section 5.4 on exclusive dealing for more details on the competition authority’s view on special 
responsibility of dominant firms.  
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8.4.2 Merck/M.B. Bioquímica 
 
In Merck/M.B. Bioquímica,829 the claimant, Labnew Indústria e Comércio Ltda (Labnew), 
accused Merck SA and its subsidiary M. B. Bioquímica Ltda of selling tubes for the 
collection of blood samples under vacuum at prices below costs in public procurements in 
1994. Labnew also brought separate complaint proceedings to another federal institution, the 
Department for Commercial Defence of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism 
(DECOM/MICT),830 accusing the defendants of breaching anti-dumping laws as the tubes 
originated from the United States. The dumping was confirmed by DECOM/MICT and the 
defendants had to pay additional import tariffs. In contrast with previous cases, where 
breaches of anti-dumping laws were confused with elements of predatory pricing,831 in this 
decision there were elements of predatory pricing and dumping. Therefore, the dumping 
offence was taken care by the appropriate federal body (DECOM/MICT) and the predatory 
pricing offence was examined by the BCPS.  
 
The relevant market of vacuum tubes for collecting blood was concentrated as there were 
only five competitors: (1) Becton Dickinson, (2) Terumo (whose importer was the defendant 
Merck/M.B. Bioquímica), (3) Labnew, (4) Sherwood and (5) Greiner. On average, between 
1993 and 1999, the approximate market shares of the above companies were as follows: (1) 
Becton Dickinson at 65%, (2) Labnew at 15% and (3) Merck/M.B. Bioquímica at circa 15% 
and the remaining companies at 5%. After the defendants entered into the national market in 
                                                 
829
 Labnew Indústria e Comércio Ltda v Merck SA Indústrias Químicas and M.B. Bioquímica Ltda - 
08000.013002/1995-97. 
830
 Departamento de Defesa Comercial, Ministério da Indústria, do Comércio e do Turismo. 
831
 For a discussion on the lack of clarity on the differences among predatory pricing, dumping and unfair 
competition in the early days of Law 8,884/94, see Oliveira and Rodas, Direito e Economia da Concorrência, 
72. 
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1993, importing Terumo’s products, their market share rose from 2.88% in 1994 to a 
maximum of 24.55% in 1996. However, their market share reduced significantly to 16.84% 
in 1997 and 5.58% in 1998; in 1999 it was only 1.01% as a result of the fines imposed for the 
dumping offences.  
 
There were high entry barriers as a result of the considerable sunk costs for setting up 
operations for distributing and manufacturing the vacuum tubes. As a result, most 
competitors relied on foreign imports. Due to such entry barriers, there was no entry of 
competitors other than the defendants in the 1990s, notwithstanding the fact that it was a 
period when the Brazilian economy became more open for multinationals to setup operations. 
 
Although there were high sunk costs in setting local operations in Brazil, the prominence of 
imports suggests that barriers to import were low as a result of low transportation costs (the 
vacuum tubes could be shipped by sea without additional costs such as refrigeration) as well 
as efficiencies resulting from the instauration of a proper import channel, such as setting up a 
local representative or distributor. Low import costs help to explain two important findings: 
(1) the claimant was the only competitor that was 100% Brazilian in terms of manufacturing 
operations, and (2) defendant companies successfully managed to increase their market share 
between 1993 and 1996, which in turn coincided with a decrease of the claimant’s market 
share. These findings help to explain the commercial rationale for the proceedings in 
question. It must be noted that the CADE did not find in favour of the claimant, albeit it had 
succeeded in its anti-dumping claim, demonstrating that since the early years of Law 
8,884/94 competition law was not used to carry out protectionist policies by discriminating 
against importers or multinationals.  
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In Merck/M.B. Bioquímica, the decision of the presiding Councillor Mércio Felsky stated that 
the offence of predatory pricing should be understood as the conduct of setting prices below 
average variable costs with the aim of eliminating competitors. One-off occurrences, such as 
an exceptional discounted sale that had a low impact on competitors could not be considered 
predatory pricing. It is worth highlighting that Councillor Felsky’s definition connotes the 
principle that the conduct must result in actual or potential harm to competition to become a 
competition law offence. Therefore, simply selling products at below costs would not be an 
offence.  
 
According to Councillor Felsky, the predominant theoretical understanding on predatory 
pricing comes from the Chicago school. According to this school of economic thought, 
predatory pricing is an irrational conduct and is rarely observed in the real world. Moreover, 
one of the important goals of Brazilian competition law is to promote low prices, which 
explains the unwillingness of the CADE in finding an undertaking liable for predatory 
pricing.  
 
Councillor Felsky highlighted that in common with Section 2 of the Sherman Act 1890, 
Articles 20 and 21 of Law 8,884/94 consider predation as a strategy adopted by a firm in an 
attempt to monopolise the market of a product. In his view, only undertakings that have 
market power or dominance would be able to sustain a reduction of their earnings for a 
sufficient period of time until their rivals are eliminated832 and only after competitors are 
excluded from the market is that the predator would impose higher prices.833 However, 
                                                 
832
 The initial reduction of prices could be conceived as benefiting consumers in the short term.  
833
 The subsequent increase in prices could be conceived as harmful to consumers and the process of 
competition in the long term.  
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Councillor Felsky also stated that the lack of dominance was not enough to acquit the 
defendant. It was necessary to examine the complexities and dynamics of the market to 
identify the aims of the strategy. As stated above, Becton Dickinson was dominant as it had a 
market share of 65%; however, it was in danger of losing its dominance as it had been fined 
for dumping in 1993 and was losing a commercial battle with Labnew. Therefore, Councillor 
Felsky stated that the defendants might have engaged in predatory pricing against Labnew in 
the hope that Becton Dickinson would not be able to recover.   
 
This reasoning demonstrates an improper application of competition law. Merck/M.B. 
Bioquímica were not considered dominant, but nonetheless risked having their conduct 
prohibited. If the Councillor was considering the fact that Merck/M.B. Bioquímica imported 
their products from Terumo, which was the second largest company in the sector in the US, 
as an element that could allow Merck/M.B. Bioquímica to practice predatory prices and 
exclude competitors, then the Councillor should have assessed the existence of collective 
dominance. If that was not the case, then there was no reason for the Councillor to examine 
the conduct of Merck/M.B. Bioquímica. It is important to follow a certain structure in the 
decisions in order to avoid making flawed statements as the ones above.  
 
When analysing the conduct, Councillor Felsky stated that the correct application of the 
Brazilian competition law would require a detailed analysis of the effective variation of costs 
and the behaviour of prices over the long term. The strategic rationale of the conduct would 
have to be examined in the light of the objective conditions of the market; that is, if there was 
a probability of posterior extraordinary profits that would be capable of compensating the 
losses incurred by selling at below costs.  
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According to Councillor Felsky, recoupment was a requirement which meant the capacity of 
an undertaking to recover its losses834 from selling below costs with subsequent monopolist 
profits. The rationale for the recoupment requirement would be that if the predator failed to 
eliminate its rivals, it would not be able to recover its losses. Therefore, there would be no 
harm to competition and consumers. In fact, the latter would benefit from prices below cost. 
Councillor Felsky stated that the US Supreme Court used the recoupment requirement test in 
Brooke Group,835 where it determined that the recoupment of losses would be unlikely when 
a market was highly diffused and competitive, barriers to entry were low and the supposed 
predator did not have excess capacity to absorb the market share of its rivals.  
 
With the aim of moulding the aforementioned US reasoning  to the case in question, 
Councillor Felsky  stated that there would be five structural conditions, albeit not sufficient, 
for predatory pricing to occur: (1) the relevant market must be extremely concentrated; (2) 
the predator must have dominance;836 (3) the barriers to entry must be high;837 (4) the 
predator must have excess installed capacity of production; and (5) the goodwill or customers 
from rivals expelled from the market must be taken over by the predator.  
 
The main purpose of analysing these structural conditions would be to verify whether 
recoupment was possible. However, the conditions were regarded as indicative, rather than 
necessary for recoupment to exist, so the only requirement is recoupment itself. For instance, 
the condition of excess installed capacity of production was disregarded in Merck/M. B. 
                                                 
834
 Losses could be understood as an investment, given that the predator is seeking a monopolist return in the 
long term.    
835
 Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 
836
 It must be noted, however, that the defendant did not have dominance, so the Councillor appears to be 
contradicting himself. 
837
 High barriers to entry would be necessary to allow the predatory firm to charge high prices after excluding 
competitors from the market without the risk of having to compete with new entrants. 
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Bioquímica, given that a considerable proportion of the glass vacuum tubes were imported. 
According to Councillor Felsky, the important question to be answered was whether Merck 
had a supply agreement with Terumo, since this could suggest a long term strategy to gain 
dominance.  
 
Although the aforementioned conditions were regarded as not necessary, the reasoning of 
Councillor Felsky does not appear to express coherence. For instance, earlier in the decision 
it was stated that dominance by the defendant companies was not necessary for establishing 
the offence, whilst it was later mentioned that dominance would be needed to achieve 
recoupment.  
 
Although the decision appears to have been largely inspired by a Chicagoan approach to 
predatory pricing, Councillor Felsky highlighted that the Chicago school was not immune 
from criticism as recoupment of losses would not always be the main goal of the strategy. In 
this respect, recoupment would be difficult to determine if practised by multi-product firms, 
such as conglomerates, as the practice of cross-subsidises may be used as a strategy to 
exclude a competitor. 
 
The test used in Merck/M. B. Bioquímica to determine whether the products were sold at 
below costs was the Areeda-Turner test which considers the average variable costs. 
Councillor Felsky stated that the practice of setting prices below average variable costs was 
essential for the configuration of predatory pricing, but it had to be combined with the aim of 
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eliminating competitors to achieve monopolistic prices and profits.838 The results of the 
Areeda-Turner test showed that M. B. Bioquímica did set prices below average variable costs. 
With respect to Merck, there were a few of its products sold below average variable costs, but 
they represented only 2% of all the tubes sold between 1994 and 1995. In order to 
demonstrate the existence of predatory prices it was deemed necessary for prices to be clearly 
below production costs,839 relatively consistent for a long period of time, as well as capable 
of affecting a significant part of the relevant market. 
 
Finding in favour of the defendants, Councillor Felsky concluded that the commercial 
hardships of Labnew began well before the alleged conduct took place. Furthermore, even if 
this was not the case, it would not have been an offence to the economic order if prices were 
above average variable costs. Given that the prices of Merck and M. B. Bioquímica were 
generally capable to cover all other costs incurred in their commercialisation, the conduct was 
deemed to be legitimate. 
  
                                                 
838
 This was the understanding of CADE also in the 2009 AmBev decision. In this case there was an accusation 
of the use of predatory prices with respect to the Antartica beer brand. The evidence showed that AmBev placed 
Antartica in various markets at an inferior price than it was practising previously, apparently as a response to the 
increase in sales of competing brands. However, the data did not show sales consistently below the average 
marginal cost or the existence of an exclusionary strategy resulting from this behaviour in order to increase 
prices and recover the losses at a later stage. Therefore, Ambev’s conduct was not deemed to be anti-
competitive.        
839
 It must be noted that the products were imported, not produced by the defendants. 
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8.5 Price Discrimination 
8.5.1 Telemar 
 
Telemar840 is a case decided in 2008 resulting from a complaint from Terra Networks in 
respect of the pricing practices of Telemar Internet Ltda (Telemar) and Telemar Norte Leste 
SA (Oi Internet), the latter being companies of the Telemar Group. Telemar and Oi Internet 
were jointly accused of practising an anti-competitive promotional discriminatory strategy. 
 
In 2005, the Telemar Group launched its broadband service (Oi Broadband). The claimant 
stated that prices were below costs as a result of combined discounts of Velox Telemar841 and 
Oi Broadband. It was alleged that the price arrangements between the defendants would 
result in discriminatory prices. This was supported by the fact that the Telemar Group was 
capable of practising cross-subsidises.  
 
The relevant market and the existence of dominance were not assessed in the decision. This is 
an important aspect, because if the defendants lacked dominance, there would have been no 
need to analyse the conduct, as the conduct would not have been relevant under competition 
law. The formulation of the decision was deficient, as it should have commenced with the 
definition of the relevant market and followed with the verification of dominance before 
dealing with the conduct.  
 
                                                 
840
 Associação Brasileira dos Provedores de Acesso, Serviços e Informações da Rede Internet-ABRANET, et al. 
v Telemar Internet Ltda and Telemar Norte Leste SA - 53500.013140/2005. 
841
 An ADSL connection service. 
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The presiding Councillor, Paulo Furquim de Azevedo, agreed with the findings of 
ANATEL842 in favour of the defendant companies, as it established that Telemar had offered 
similar conditions to Oi Internet and to other competitors. The plenary of Councillors decided 
unanimously for the legitimacy of the practice. It appears that the main reason for this 
outcome was that the same conditions were offered to competitors. This in part explains why 
the reasoning in the decision did not go through the steps of defining the relevant market and 
establishing dominance.  
 
The decision did not clarify whether proof of recoupment of losses is needed in cases where 
prices charged to certain undertakings are much lower than those charged to competitors. 
Furthermore, it was not made clear who had the burden of proof of justifications. Clarity in 
this respect is fundamental for ensuring legal certainty, so legal reform in the shape of 
amendments to the existing procedural rules, as well as guidelines in the form of official 
publications, or a consolidated judicial position would be welcome in the years to come.      
  
                                                 
842
 ANATEL is the Brazilian national telecommunications regulator. 
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8.5.2 AmBev 
 
In July 2009, one of the biggest beer breweries in the world, AmBev, was held liable under 
competition law in a unanimous decision by the CADE for its loyalty programme, which 
consisted of giving discounts as part of a strategy to increase barriers to entry. AmBev843 is 
widely regarded as the most significant abuse of dominance decision judged thus far. In 
addition to the legal impact of the decision, its importance originates from the fact that the 
defendant came into existence as a result of a highly publicised merger approved by the 
CADE a decade earlier. Moreover, AmBev was penalised with the highest fine ever imposed 
for an abuse of dominance offence in Brazil, circa 133 million sterling pounds.844 
 
The presiding Councillor, Fernando de Magalhães Furlan, stated in this decision that the 
previous merger that resulted in AmBev was polemic, notwithstanding its approval, as it 
resulted in one of the largest companies in the beverage sector in the world. He also 
mentioned that there were many complaints presented in the past few years to the BCPS 
involving possible abuses by AmBev where the defendant was cleared of the charges. Such 
statements suggest an intention to make it clear that AmBev was not being wrongly accused 
by the competition authority solely because it was dominant. According to Councillor Furlan, 
the enforcement of competition law in Brazil had improved considerably in forensic terms as 
a result of properly conducted dawn raids, the procurement of specialised institutes to 
conduct field researches, as well as the use of in-depth economic analysis. Councillor Furlan 
stated that there has also been an increased concern in the BCPS in respect of the due process 
                                                 
843
 Primo Schincariol Indústria de Cervejas e Refrigerantes SA v Companhia de Bebidas das Américas - Ambev 
- 08012.003805/2004-10. 
844
 As of September 2010 exchange rate for Brazilian Reais 352,693,696.58. 
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of law, by way of ensuring that the arguments of the defendant are always heard and that 
constitutional principles are observed in cases before the CADE, as well as during its 
interface with the courts. These statements summarise the thoughts of many members of the 
BCPS. Although there is a general awareness that there are many aspects that need 
improvement, the interviews and field research revealed a common feeling amongst 
interviewees that much has been achieved towards building a functioning competition law 
regime in Brazil. This in part is demonstrated by the fact that recent decisions by the CADE 
are superior in terms of the legal reasoning and content to decisions emanated in the last 
decades.     
 
AmBev regarded a complaint concerning the use of the defendant’s loyalty programmes 
known as ‘Tô Contigo’ and ‘Festeja’845 as part of an exclusionary strategy, together with the 
offence of predatory pricing involving its Antartica brand. AmBev was deemed to have 
breached Article 20(I), (II), (IV) and Article 21(IV), (V), (VI), (XI) of Law 8,884/94. 
  
                                                 
845
 Which translate as ‘I am with you’ and ‘Celebrate’ respectively. 
342 
 
8.5.2.1  The Definition of the Relevant Market 
 
AmBev’s exclusionary strategies were horizontal846 as well as vertical847 in nature. Therefore, 
Councillor Furlan defined both the upstream and downstream relevant markets. Given that 
there were pre-existing complaints against AmBev, as a matter of administrative efficiency, 
Councillor Furlan adopted the definitions of the relevant market formulated in previous cases. 
The relevant upstream product market for the horizontal practices was previously defined as 
the ‘beer market’, and the relevant upstream geographic market for the horizontal practices 
was defined as the ‘regional markets all over the national territory’. 
 
In AmBev, the relevant downstream product market was defined as the market relating to the 
‘...sales of beers in bars and other traditional distribution channels, including snack bars, 
restaurants, discotheques and other types of entertainment venues.’ This definition resulted 
from the fact that in these distribution channels there is not usually a great variety of beer 
brands. In addition, in these distribution channels consumer demand is not substantially 
affected by higher beer prices, i.e. the demand is relatively inelastic.  
 
The loyalty programme of AmBev consisted in giving discounts in the form of loyalty points 
to purchasers of beers sold in reusable glass bottles,848 to be consumed cold within the 
premises of the points of sale. AmBev did not give loyalty points in respect of canned beer, 
or beer sold outside the points of sale.  
 
                                                 
846
 Possible predatory pricing resulting from the tacit positioning of the brands of AmBev’s portfolio and abuse 
of advertising. 
847
 Anti-competitive effects of the loyalty programme ‘Tô Contigo’. 
848
 As opposed to aluminium cans which could be taken away from the point of sale. 
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The relevant downstream geographic market was defined as ‘the local area’, which could be 
understood as the geographical surroundings of points of sale. This definition took into 
consideration the fact that consumers of beer sold in points of sale often venture to 
surrounding areas of where they reside.   
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8.5.2.2 The Definition of Dominance 
 
Following the definition of the relevant market, Councillor Furlan went on to consider 
whether AmBev was dominant. With respect to AmBev’s market power and barriers to entry, 
he highlighted that imports did not have an impact in the market supply. In addition, it was 
found that there were high barriers to entry as a result of the considerable marketing and 
distribution costs, as well as consumer loyalty to AmBev’s beer brands. Even substantial 
investments in advertising by a competitor could be neutralised by the foreclosure of 
distribution channels, which would increase the unitary cost of advertisement and distribution 
by competitors. The relevant market was also characterised by high investments by AmBev 
in marketing strategies aimed at changing the preferences of consumers in the short and long 
terms. The resulting brand loyalty allowed the charge of higher prices of those brands. 
Moreover, the marketing strategies undertaken consisted of the prominent presence of 
AmBev’s brands in points of sale, which allowed the ‘fixation’ of the brands to points of sale 
and consumers. 
 
The distribution channels were considered as another significant barrier to entry, especially 
with respect to the sale of beer in points of sale. AmBev’s distribution channels were 
complex, requiring know-how and substantial investments in marketing and logistics. 
AmBev’s competitors also had distribution channels, which varied in terms of efficiency and 
impact on demand. However, none of AmBev’s competitors had distribution channels as 
effective as AmBev and it would have been necessary for them to spend considerable 
amounts of money to implement a similar distribution strategy. Therefore, the high costs 
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faced by competitors to mitigate the effects of AmBev’s distribution channels by 
implementing similar channels were deemed to be high barriers to entry.849 
 
AmBev was considered an unchallenged market leader in terms of sales and turnover. Its beer 
brands enjoyed the largest consumption share in all Brazilian geographic regions. In addition, 
AmBev’s brands were heavily advertised and well perceived by consumers, so they were sold 
at higher prices as a result of consumer loyalty.  
 
The above findings, in addition to the fact that AmBev’s beer brands had the highest 
penetration in distribution channels and points of sale, resulted in the CADE finding AmBev 
as dominant and therefore capable of unilaterally exercising market power. 
                                                 
849
 This is in harmony with the provisions of the Brazilian Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which adopt a Bainian 
definition of barriers to entry. See section 4.4. 
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8.5.2.3 The Analysis of the US and EU Approaches to Discounts and Rebates 
 
Councillor Furlan highlighted that, according to the European Commission, the fact that an 
undertaking is dominant will generally in itself ensure that consumers purchase a greater 
amount of goods or services from the dominant firm. For instance, this often occurs in cases 
where loyalty to the dominant undertaking’s brands results in its products or services 
becoming indispensable for many consumers. In addition, if the dominant undertaking begins 
to offer discounts for consumers purchasing higher quantities of the branded product, 
consumers will be induced to buy greater amounts than usual. 
 
According to Councillor Furlan, the European Commission’s analysis of discounts and 
rebates takes into consideration the difference between the price effectively paid and the 
normal purchase price.850 If the effective price is below the average total cost, then it would 
be difficult, if not impossible, for a competitor to enter the market or compete with the 
dominant undertaking.  
 
Many EU cases dealing with discounts and rebates were cited in AmBev to highlight the 
following points:851 (1) Although a dominant undertaking has the right to protect its 
commercial interests, its discounts should be justified in terms of economic efficiencies 
                                                 
850
 According to European Commission, “DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of 
the Treaty to exclusionary abuses.” in Primo Schincariol Indústria de Cervejas e Refrigerantes SA v Companhia 
de Bebidas das Américas - Ambev - 08012.003805/2004-10, para. 84. 
851
 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities - Case 85/76, Hilti AG v 
Commission of the European Communities - Case T-30/89, Irish Sugar plc v Commission of the European 
Communities - Case C-497/99 P, AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities - Case C-
62/86, Manufacture française des pneumatiques Michelin v Commission, vol. 2003 and Van den Bergh Foods 
Ltd v Commission of the European Communities - Case T-65/98. 
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which are consistent with the interests of consumers.852 Loyalty discount schemes should also 
result in efficiency gains justified by economies of scale.853 The discount strategy should not 
create uncertainties in relation to the final price of the product or dependence of the retailer. 
Therefore, prices should be certain, transparent and based on objective criteria.  
 
With respect to the arrangements between the dominant undertaking and its distributors, the 
latter should not be forced to give financial information to the former, since such information 
would increase the dependency of the retailer and the market power of the dominant 
undertaking. In addition, the dominant firm should not link the discount to an obligation on 
the retailer to acquire and maintain excessive quantities of stock, since this would impede or 
make it difficult for retailers to purchase from competitors.  
 
Councillor Furlan concluded that the academic literature and case-law in the EU consider that 
discounts above costs could be illegal if they produced market foreclosure by way of 
generating product loyalty. He also highlighted that in 2005, the European Commission made 
an agreement with Coca-Cola854 regarding the fizzy-drinks market in order to increase 
consumer choice in points of sale such as bars and shops. The agreement prohibited the 
conclusion of exclusivity agreements, except for public purchases, or quantity or performance 
discounts, together with the promotion of strong brands to sell less popular products. Also, in 
                                                 
852
 According to Irish Sugar plc v Commission of the European Communities - Case C-497/99 P in Primo 
Schincariol Indústria de Cervejas e Refrigerantes SA v Companhia de Bebidas das Américas - Ambev - 
08012.003805/2004-10, para. 95. 
853
 According to Manufacture française des pneumatiques Michelin v Commission, vol. 2003 in Primo 
Schincariol Indústria de Cervejas e Refrigerantes SA v Companhia de Bebidas das Américas - Ambev - 
08012.003805/2004-10. 
854
 European Commission, “Competition: Commission makes commitments from Coca-Cola legally binding, 
increasing consumer choice” in Primo Schincariol Indústria de Cervejas e Refrigerantes SA v Companhia de 
Bebidas das Américas - Ambev - 08012.003805/2004-10. 
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order to prevent market foreclosure, 20 percent of Coca-Cola refrigerators could be stocked 
with products from other brands if there were no other refrigerators available in the shop. 
 
The 2009 Intel855 decision of the European Commission was also mentioned. In this decision 
the Commission imposed a fine on Intel as a result of discounts given to manufacturers of 
computers and to Media Market, one of the largest European computer retailers. Although the 
lower prices generated by the discounts indirectly benefited consumers, the practice harmed 
Intel’s rival AMD as well as consumers as they had less choice because Intel’s products had 
been given preference.   
 
With respect to the US position and its relevance to the facts in AmBev, Councillor Furlan 
stated that American antitrust policy was slowly showing its concerns with discounts and 
rebates. Under LePage’s,856 there were no exclusivity requirements imposed on retailers by 
the undertaking in question. However, a concession of small discounts resulted in 3M being 
held liable for attempting to monopolise. 
 
In any case, the statements above suggest that the presiding Councillor believed that the EU 
view on discounts and rebates was the right approach and that the US was moving towards 
the right direction. In fact, after mentioning LePage’s, Councillor Furlan stated that in May 
2009 the DOJ declared that it will no longer apply the Report on the Application of Section 2 
                                                 
855
 European Commission, Case COMP/C-3/37.990 - Intel, vol. 227. 
856
 LePage's Inc et al. v Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co et al., vol. 324. 
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of the Sherman Act,857 as it was too lenient in respect of exclusionary practices of dominant 
undertakings.  
                                                 
857
 See Department of Justice, “Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law: Antitrust 
Division to Apply More Rigorous Standard with Focus on the Impact of Exclusionary Conduct on Consumers.” 
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8.5.2.4 Abuse of dominance 
 
Councillor Furlan analysed AmBev’s loyalty scheme to determine if the conduct was 
abusive. The economic value of the prizes awarded by AmBev to resellers in exchange for 
loyalty points equated to approximately three percent of the average purchases of the points 
of sale. According to Councillor Furlan, in the alternative scenario where the loyalty scheme 
would have been limited to the accumulation of points by points of sale, calculated in relation 
to the volume of purchases of bottled beer, a priori there would be no violation of 
competition law. In his view, without the exclusivity and stock requirement imposed in the 
form of informal covenants on retailers, the loyalty programme would not have been capable 
of generating a significant increase of purchases of AmBev branded beers. In addition, 
considering the fact that AmBev enjoyed market dominance, these covenants harmed 
competition and increased barriers of entry.  
 
During preliminary investigations, the SDE made enquiries to owners of points of sale in 
regards to the terms of the loyalty scheme. There was a common commercial understanding 
in the shape of a gentlemen’s agreement implying that there was an exclusivity covenant 
imposed on owners of points of sale, although there was no formal agreement to this effect.858 
 
The onus of the exclusivity covenants on owners of points of sale varied in relation to their 
commercial relationship with AmBev in the sense that, after negotiating with an AmBev’s 
                                                 
858
 The fact that no formal exclusivity agreements were in place strengthens the argument against AmBev, as the 
latter is one of the largest multinational breweries in the world and had been the subject to proceedings by 
CADE in the past. Moreover, AmBev had a large in-house legal team and access to expert competition law 
advisers. Therefore, one could reasonably argue that AmBev’s directors and advisers contemplated that there 
was an element of illegality (at least in the civil sense) with the commercial terms of the loyalty scheme, so they 
tried to avoid prosecution or civil claims by not entering into any formal exclusivity agreements with owners of 
points of sale.  
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representative, the owners of points of sale could sometimes be allowed to stock small 
quantities of competing beer brands. There were routine checks by AmBev’s agents to ensure 
compliance and to exercise commercial control over the operations of points of sales. 
Moreover, AmBev kept comprehensive and detailed databases of the historic volumes of beer 
purchased from individual points of sale, which allowed it to easily calculate if there was an 
unjustified drop in demand and strategically retaliate against those suspected of breaching the 
exclusivity arrangements.   
 
During investigations undertaken by the Brazilian Institute of Research and Statistics (IBGE) 
it was verified that almost half of the surveyed owners of points of sale believed that the 
participation in the loyalty programme required the obligation of selling exclusively 
AmBev’s beer brands. In addition, a third of the surveyed owners of points of sale stated that 
they believed that although there was no legal agreement in place, there would be commercial 
retaliations from AmBev if they breached their gentlemen’s agreement and sold products 
from other companies, alongside the forfeiting of any accumulated loyalty points. The survey 
suggested that exclusivity covenants existed, albeit at an informal level.859 
 
AmBev was dawn raided by SDE inspectors in a procedure similar to EU and US dawn raids. 
However, one main difference in Brazil is that the SDE is granted a judicial authorisation and 
the undertaking subject to the dawn raid is notified 24 hours in advance. Therefore, the 
Brazilian dawn raids may not be as effective as there is no element of surprise given that the 
                                                 
859
 Primo Schincariol Indústria de Cervejas e Refrigerantes SA v Companhia de Bebidas das Américas - Ambev 
- 08012.003805/2004-10, para. 136-139. 
352 
 
notice should allow undertakings to prepare in advance.860 Nevertheless, many incriminating 
documents, such as PowerPoint slides and handwritten notes outlining the structure and aims 
of the loyalty scheme were discovered in AmBev’s premises. These documents provided the 
CADE with tangible evidence that exclusivity arrangements were in place, albeit not in a 
formal legal sense.  
 
In addition to demonstrating the imposition of exclusivity covenants, the documents provided 
additional supporting evidence of benefits connected with the scheme, such as supplying 
points of sale with branded refrigerators, tables and chairs. Councillor Furlan highlighted that 
the offer of such benefits would be pro-competitive if they were not conditional on the 
exclusivity of the points of sale. This reasoning appears to be correct for the following 
reasons: (1) Benefiting points of sale by supplying catering equipment transferred wealth 
from AmBev to smaller points of sale; (2) The practice forced AmBev’s competitors to offer 
similar benefits; (3) Providing catering equipment lowered costs for entrepreneurs wishing to 
open points of sale. 
 
In respect of AmBev’s wider strategy, figures revealed in its internal documents 
demonstrated a sharp increase in sales as a result of the loyalty programme. Internal 
documents sent to AmBev’s sales representatives contained a step-by-step guide on how to 
proceed if they suspected that a point of sale was selling products from competitors. 
According to internal memos, there should be a commercial retaliation by disconnecting the 
point of sale from the scheme. In order to avoid civil claims or prosecutions, the 
                                                 
860
 For instance, AmBev’s officers could have destroyed incriminating documents, or obtained legal advice in 
order to challenge SDE’s inspectors by arguing that incriminating documents were subject to legal privilege and 
consequently cannot be disclosed.    
353 
 
discontinuation would be justified by informing the point of sale that it resulted from an 
objective reason, such as a reduction in the geographical dimension of the scheme. 
 
The non renewal of the loyalty scheme was used as a coercion tool against the points of sale 
suspected of selling a share greater than 10 percent of competing beer brands. According to 
Councillor Furlan, imposing an obligation on points of sale to sell a 90 percent share of 
AmBev’s brands was considerably onerous and anti-competitive. Moreover, there was a non-
linear correlation between total sales and prizes. The points of sale that sold higher shares of 
AmBev’s brands received more prizes and benefits, even if they sold smaller volumes than 
other points of sale. This finding suggested that AmBev’s loyalty scheme was used to carry 
out an exclusionary practice. In support of this view, AmBev’s internal documents discovered 
during SDE’s dawn raid stated that the main aim of the loyalty programme was to increase 
barriers to entry by creating difficulties for competitors to have access to distribution 
channels.  
 
The reasoning in AmBev considered arguments from the Chicago school against the 
hypothesis of viably excluding competitors by way of discounts and rebates.861 Under the 
theories of the Chicago school, it would not be rational for an inefficient firm to engage in 
exclusivity agreements with retailers in the downstream market. Councillor Furlan stated that 
according to Posner and Bork, in order to impose exclusivity agreements, the manufacturer 
would have to offer the distributor or reseller advantages or benefits.862 Under this thesis, a 
rational reseller would not accept to enter into an agreement to exclusively purchase products 
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 Primo Schincariol Indústria de Cervejas e Refrigerantes SA v Companhia de Bebidas das Américas - Ambev 
- 08012.003805/2004-10, para. 225. 
862
 Ibid., para. 227. 
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from an inefficient manufacturer. Therefore, a priori exclusivity agreements would not be 
regarded as anti-competitive. In fact, in some cases there would be even favourable effects, 
such as lower costs for retailers and incentives for competitors to become more efficient.  
 
However, Councillor Furlan dismissed the Chicago school approach to exclusivity 
agreements, as well as discounts and rebates, by stating that exponents of the Post-Chicago 
school sustain that in some cases there could be harmful exclusionary effects resulting from 
these practises.863 A dominant undertaking might have sufficient market power to 
commercially add pressure on distributors or resellers to enter into exclusivity agreements, 
which could consist of formal legal agreements or de facto commercial arrangements. In this 
scenario, when a limited number of distributors first enter into the agreement or arrangement, 
this will create a negative externality and other distributors will enter into the agreement as 
well. As a result, the dominant producer is able to act as a monopolist because distributors 
outside of the exclusivity scheme are harmed.  
 
It is possible that discounts and rebates offset the detrimental effects of the exclusivity 
covenants in some specific cases. However, the monopolist producer is the party that receives 
the greatest commercial benefit, as it could abusively foreclose the market by impeding the 
entry of equally efficient competitors into the market. This could be done by enforcing the 
exclusivity scheme in a commercial sense, as the monopolist could retaliate against 
distributors which fail to abide the exclusivity covenants.  
                                                 
863
 Ibid., para. 226. 
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Although AmBev’s discounts amounted to a mere three percent, its competitors were forced 
to offer discounts which were disproportionally higher at 7.9 percent.864 Be that as it may, 
these higher discounts were not capable to mitigate AmBev’s monopolistic power, as it had 
acquired 72 percent of the relevant geographic market by way of the loyalty scheme which 
combined discounts and rebates with exclusivity covenants.  AmBev could impose barriers to 
entry on its competitors even in cases where the effective price would still be over its average 
total cost. An entrant or existing competitor would not only have to offer higher discounts 
than AmBev’s, but it would have to compensate the participating points of sale for the losses 
suffered for leaving the loyalty scheme.  
 
Discount strategies with the magnitude of AmBev’s loyalty scheme reduced the contestability 
in the downstream market, harming competition and consumers by reducing product choice 
and artificially giving AmBev the power to unilaterally increase prices. In essence, the 
incontestability of the beer market in respect of points of sale resulted from the fact that 
AmBev was not competing on the merits. According to Councillor Furlan, it would have been 
possible in an extreme case scenario that AmBev’s loyalty scheme could have the long term 
effect of causing the exit of an equally efficient competitor from the upstream market. The 
adoption of this reasoning in AmBev demonstrates an influence of EU competition law over 
the current development of Brazilian market control, as the former’s goal is not only to 
protect consumers, but to protect equally efficient firms as well.865 
                                                 
864
 The real economic value of the discounts given by AmBev and its competitors could not be precisely 
calculated, other than discounts and prizes resulting from the exclusivity programme, as there were also other 
benefits given to induce loyalty, such giving branded catering equipment to participating distributors.  
865
 See European Commission, “Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 
EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings,” 42, 43, 59. 
356 
 
8.5.2.5 Efficiency justifications 
 
In regards to possible efficiencies, Councillor Furlan stated that none of the justifications 
contained in CADE’s Resolution n. 20866 applied. The relevant justifications that can be 
admitted in respect to discounts and rebates concern effects deemed as beneficial, such as the 
reduction of transaction costs, the protection of the reputation and specific investments of the 
dominant undertaking, the stimulation of the development of economies of scale in the 
downstream market and the protection of technological development in the upstream 
market.867 The burden of proof for proving these justifications appears to fall on the 
defendant, although the CADE can find their applicability to the case in question, even if they 
have not been mentioned in the claim or defence.  
 
According to Councillor Furlan, imposing exclusivity by legal or commercial means in the 
beer market could not be justified by arguing that the practice resulted in a reduction of 
transaction costs. This defence argument could be valid in complex markets in technical and 
innovative sectors,868 where exclusivity arrangements could be necessary to advertise or 
effectively market new technological products to consumers. For instance, exclusivity 
arrangements could be justified if they were necessary for the dominant undertaking to train 
sales and technical assistance teams in the downstream market.  
 
In the view of Councillor Furlan, the justification of protecting AmBev’s reputation could not 
be accepted either. The product differentiation in the beer sector resulted from marketing and 
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 Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica, “Resolution n. 20.” 
867
 See Primo Schincariol Indústria de Cervejas e Refrigerantes SA v Companhia de Bebidas das Américas - 
Ambev - 08012.003805/2004-10, para. 260. 
868
 Such as the IT sector, given that it is innovative and dynamic and certainly not the beer sector.  
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branding and not from differences in the quality or taste of the product. The presence of 
competing brands in points of sale, contrary to AmBev’s exclusivity scheme, was not deemed 
capable of causing damage to the reputation and goodwill of AmBev’s beer brands.    
 
The justification of making specific investments was not accepted either, because it was not 
necessary for AmBev to invest in catering equipment and shop fitting of points of sale. These 
practices were deemed to constitute incentives or ‘perks’ to pressurise points of sale into the 
exclusivity scheme.  In addition, given the cash flow generated by the exclusivity scheme and 
the fact that AmBev’s beer brands were advertised in shops and catering equipment, there 
were no significant sunk costs in case the exclusivity arrangements ceased. 
 
With respect to the justification of achieving efficiencies via economies of scale, the presence 
of AmBev in 97 percent of points of sale and its market share of circa 70 percent in the beer 
market meant that AmBev had a consolidated and unchallenged dominant position, so there 
was no reasonable justification for imposing exclusivity arrangements to achieve economies 
of scale.  
 
As a result of the above findings, there were no economic efficiency arguments capable of 
justifying AmBev’s loyalty programme. A substantial reason for this was that consumers and 
owners of points of sale were the most harmed parties by the loyalty programme. With 
respect to consumers, those living in the suburbs of large cities were harmed the most, as 
points of sale were strategically targeted in such regions. The strategy of selection of the 
points of sale by AmBev was also coherent with the exclusionary aim of the scheme. 
Therefore, the argument made by AmBev that the reach of the programme was not 
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significant, as it affected only 20 percent of the beer market share, was rejected because the 
points of sale had been strategically selected.  
 
The defence argument stating that the conduct in question did not result in an increase of 
AmBev’s market share was also rejected as AmBev was not competing on the merits, so the 
exclusivity programme could also have the effect of artificially maintaining AmBev’s market 
share, or abusively exclude competitors from the market. This understanding is less 
permissive than the one in Kellogg’s,869 where the CADE interpreted the lack of increase in 
market share as a signal that there was no anti-competitive offence. In addition, the CADE 
stated in AmBev that for anti-competitive effects to occur it was not necessary for the market 
to be foreclosed as the aims and scope of the exclusivity programme had to be taken into 
consideration.870 
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8.6 Exclusive dealing 
8.6.1 Unimed Santa Maria 
 
In 1999, one of the first cases involving exclusivity agreements in the health sector was filed 
by the Public Prosecutor of the State of Rio Grande do Sul against Unimed Santa Maria.871 
The Prosecutor’s arguments were based on the allegations that exclusivity covenants imposed 
upon affiliated medical practitioners increased barriers to entry into the health care market.  
 
Unimed Santa Maria was considered dominant by the CADE because 719 out of the total of 
967 registered medical practitioners in the relevant geographic market were affiliated to 
Unimed. In its defence, Unimed Santa Maria admitted that exclusivity covenants were 
included in membership agreements. However, it also made a submission based on the 
principle of freedom of contract by stating that affiliated medical practitioners were made 
aware of the exclusivity covenants before entering into membership agreements. Moreover, 
they were free to leave Unimed if they decided to work for a competing health care provider. 
According to Unimed, the exclusivity clauses were perfectly legitimate under principles of 
the law of contract, as well as the Brazilian Cooperatives Law of 1971.872 
 
Notwithstanding the above submissions in favour of exclusive dealing, the presiding 
Councillor, Hebe Teixeira Romano Pereira da Silva, affirmed that when the Brazilian 
Cooperatives Law of 1971 was enacted, the legislator was content with the liberal doctrine of 
freedom of contract and was not aware of greater socioeconomic considerations, such as the 
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protection of consumers and competition. In her view, the Brazilian law of contract has 
evolved considerably since the enactment of the aforementioned cooperatives law. For 
instance, under the Brazilian Consumer Protection Code of 1990,873 standard form 
agreements made with consumers could have specific clauses declared void by the courts if 
they were deemed unreasonable or harmful to consumers. Although medical practitioners 
were not consumers, the membership agreements were standard form agreements as members 
did not have the power to negotiate the terms with Unimed. Therefore, in Unimed Santa 
Maria the CADE acknowledged that it could be possible to depart from a traditional 
understanding of the law of contract that favoured the validity of exclusivity agreements, 
albeit the provisions of the Brazilian Consumer Protection Code of 1990 did not apply to 
facts of the decision.  
 
Following the above reasoning, Councillor Teixeira mentioned that the competition law 
8,884/94 was created to protect competition and the interests of society, so it would not be 
fair to allow a company to harm such interests. In its defence, Unimed Santa Maria submitted 
that they had won a previous case in the courts based on similar facts, whereby the practice of 
imposing exclusivity covenants on affiliated medical practitioners was deemed to be 
legitimate. The CADE did not accept these submissions, as exclusivity agreements which are 
not void under the law of contract could nonetheless be contrary to competition law. As a 
result, Unimed Santa Maria was held liable unanimously for breaching Articles 20(I), (II) and 
(IV) and Article 21(IV), (V) and (VI) of Law 8,884/94. Unimed’s imposition of exclusivity 
covenants was deemed to be abusive because they impeded the entry of competitors in the 
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relevant market. Moreover, the conduct was considered anti-competitive and detrimental to 
society as it resulted in higher prices and less choice of health care providers. 
 
Notwithstanding the Unimed Santa Maria decision, Unimed remains the dominant private 
health care provider in Brazil and has continued to use commercial practices which run 
contrary to the provisions of Law 8,884/94. In December 2009, the CADE issued a statement 
which was published in the Official Journal where it clarified that ‘...it is an offence to the 
economic order, a conduct, in any form manifested, that impedes or creates difficulties for 
cooperated medical practitioners to work outside the ambit of the cooperative when such 
cooperative is dominant’.874 Although Unimed was not specifically mentioned in the 
statement, it is clear that it was the intended recipient of the message due to its past offences, 
as well as its continuous breaches of competition law and unchallenged dominance 
throughout the Brazilian territory.   
 
Statements by the CADE are non-binding, as in Brazil administrative bodies do not have the 
constitutional mandate to issue legal decrees. However, the publication of such statement in 
the Official Journal will support the grounds for a future prosecution against Unimed, as it 
has been specifically warned that continuing to impose exclusivity covenants on medical 
practitioners would be illegal under Law 8,884/94. Therefore, as long as Unimed continues to 
have dominance and associated medical practitioners are restricted from practising outside of 
the cooperative system of Unimed, there is a substantial possibility that competition law will 
be breached. Given the particular social importance of health care services, it could even be 
argued that CADE’s statement against Unimed would develop into a per se prohibition in in 
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relation to exclusivity agreements by dominant firms in the health care sector. The CADE 
appears to be willing to ensure that the health care sector remains competitive, so consumers 
have access to greater choice, lower costs and higher quality services.  
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8.6.2 White Martins 
 
White Martins875 is a 2002 decision concerning the industrial gas sector. The parties were 
Messer Grisheim as the claimant and White Martins as the defendant. The claim was based 
on the complaint that White Martins had exclusivity agreements with producers of raw 
materials for the production of CO2. The merits of these allegations were supported by the 
fact White Martins was dominant as it had a 73 percent market share. One of White Martin’s 
key suppliers, Ultrafértil SA, had a ten-year exclusivity agreement with it. Messer Grisheim 
argued that the exclusivity agreements resulted in the creation of barriers to entry. It stated 
that it could not enter the market because Ultrafértil refused to supply due to the exclusivity 
agreement. White Martins was accused of breaching competition law by monopolising all the 
sources of raw materials and creating barriers to entry which hindered the normal functioning 
of the market. Messer Grisheim supported its claim by submitting that the intent of White 
Martins was to exclude competitors. The claimant alleged that the defendant was not capable 
of processing and commercialising all the raw material that it purchased and inefficiently 
dispersed the production surplus of CO2 into the air.  
 
The CADE was familiar with the sector and circumstances of the case as it had earlier cleared 
the acquisition of Unigases by White Martins in 1999. Given the similarity of many material 
facts between these two decisions, as a matter of administrative and procedural efficiency, the 
CADE adopted the same definition of the relevant market. The relevant product market was 
defined as the specific gas in question, namely CO2. The relevant geographic market was 
defined in regional terms in relation to South-Eastern States of Brazil.  
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In its defence, White Martins made the submissions that its market share in 1999 was 73 
percent, whilst it had decreased to 59 percent in 2002. The presiding Councillor Macedo 
Júnior stated that these submissions were questionable and that, even if they were true, they 
were immaterial to White Martins’ defence as a 59 percent market share established 
dominance as well and supported the argument that the market was excessively concentrated.  
 
Councillor Macedo Júnior also highlighted that it was immaterial if the purpose of the 
conduct was to increase the price of raw materials. The conduct of excluding competitors by 
the artificial creation of barriers to entry would still be illegal if prices for raw materials 
remained unaffected. Such type of anti-competitive strategy would be effective even if prices 
remained high and competition was restricted or eliminated.  
 
It was decided that it was plausible to believe that some efficiency resulted from the 
exclusivity agreements, such as the reduction of transaction costs. However, Councillor 
Macedo Júnior highlighted that the benefit of such efficiencies were counteracted by the 
inefficient purchase of surplus of raw materials from Ultrafértil SA. In his view, in the 
hypothetical scenario that there was exclusivity only of a certain quota, allowing Messer 
Grisheim and other competitors to purchase any surplus materials for the production of CO2, 
there would be nothing to suggest an abusive exclusionary practice by White Martins. The 
practice of imposing exclusivity covenants over the whole of Ultrafértil SA’s production was 
considered contrary to competition law because the surplus of raw material purchased did not 
have a commercial use for White Martins. Therefore, the only explanation for such inefficient 
practice was the creation of artificial barriers to entry for Messer Grisheim and other 
competitors.  
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In common with the EU, the efficiencies of the exclusivity, in terms of reduction of 
transaction costs, seem to have been analysed as objective justifications. Indeed, the 
defendant complained about the fact that the economic rationale of the exclusivity 
agreements did not form part of the analysis when applying the rule of reason. Efficiencies 
appear to have been rejected as justifications because the conduct could eliminate effective 
competition in the market. In fact, Councillor Macedo Júnior stated that the arguments of 
White Martins based on efficiencies were taken into consideration in the reasoning, but were 
rejected because they did not exempt the defendant’s conduct. This statement reinforces the 
argument that CADE’s ‘rule of reason’ can be in practice more similar to the EU analysis of 
objective justifications instead than the American rule of reason.   
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8.6.3 Microsoft/TBA 
 
In 2004, the CADE heard Microsoft/TBA,876 which concerned exclusivity arrangements in the 
software sector. In this case, Microsoft entered into an exclusivity agreement with TBA 
Informatics (TBA), which gave the latter exclusivity over the sale and distribution of 
Microsoft software products to the Brazilian federal government.  
 
Microsoft’s distribution network in Brazil was very complex and effective. Resellers 
throughout were classified in accordance with a variety of criteria and allotted specific 
geographical areas that would allow them to sell Microsoft software to certain types of 
clients. In 1998, Microsoft modified the classification system of its distribution network when 
it was aware that, by using the new criteria, TBA would be the only distributor of Microsoft 
that would be allowed to sell Microsoft’s products in the federal district of Brasilia. After 
changing the classification criteria, Microsoft informed the federal government that the 
exclusive distributor of Microsoft in the federal district of Brasilia was TBA. As a result of 
the strategic geographical partition of Microsoft’s distribution network, TBA effectively 
became the sole distributor allocated to the federal government, given that administrative 
agencies of the latter are based in the federal district of Brasilia. Therefore, the government 
was disadvantaged because there was no need for public procurements given that TBA was 
the only reseller of Microsoft software products in the region. 
 
With respect to the analysis of the relevant market and the establishment of dominance, 
Microsoft had a 90 percent market share of the software market and TBA effectively had the 
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exclusivity of distribution of software to the federal government from 1998 until 2002. 
Therefore, TBA was effectively a monopolist at a regional level and the market was highly 
concentrated at the national level.  
 
As in the EU, the presiding Councillor, Ricardo Villas Bôas Cueva, stated that although a 
high level of concentration was necessary to establish market power, it was not a sufficient 
condition to make it an offence under Brazilian competition law. Thus, existence of market 
power, the creation of barriers to entry and the specific characteristics of the software market 
were taken into consideration to determine whether the defendants were acting contrary to 
competition law.  
 
The US and the EU approaches to vertical restraints formed part of the decision. With regards 
to the US view, Councillor Cueva stated that vertical restraints were considered as almost 
illegal per se for a long period of time, but that the American view changed with GTE 
Sylvannia v Continental TV,877 when a more liberal approach was adopted. In this respect, he 
stated that the fact that Microsoft opted for a vertical restraint instead of a vertical integration 
showed that the first option was likely to be less costly for the producer and therefore, more 
efficient. Due to the different efficiencies which could potentially legitimate Microsoft’s 
conduct, it was acknowledged that exclusivity arrangements needed to be analysed on an 
individual basis utilising the rule of reason. 
 
In relation to the EU approach, Councillor Cueva stated that there is a great degree of 
convergence between the EU and the Brazilian competition law regimes, as the former has 
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influenced considerably the development of Brazilian competition policy. Councillor Cueva 
stated that in the EU vertical restraints are not analysed in an absolute manner and that 
efficiencies and inefficiencies created by the conduct are examined carefully. 
 
When discussing the anti-competitive effects of Microsoft’s distribution network, it was 
acknowledged that the main issue was the monopolisation of the market, as there was no 
effective competition amongst distributors, resulting in higher prices for software products. 
From a legal perspective, there was no contractual relationship between Microsoft and the 
ultimate consumers of its software, which included the federal government. In addition, 
Microsoft did not exercise absolute control over the price charged by TBA and other 
resellers. Therefore, Microsoft could have argued that it was not liable under competition 
law. Nevertheless, Microsoft was responsible for establishing and operating its distribution 
network of independent resellers and it was held to be under the special duty to adopt 
measures to counter the harmful effects that could result from the monopolistic practices of 
its distributors. This finding supports the argument in favour of the emergence of the special 
responsibilities doctrine in Brazil.878 
 
After determining that the conduct of the defendant companies was contrary to competition 
law and before dealing with the efficiencies argued by Microsoft, Councillor Cueva made it 
clear that in reality he would seriously consider the efficiency justifications only if the 
regional allocation of Microsoft’s distribution network had been done by way of objective 
criteria. An in-depth analysis of the efficiencies was not deemed necessary, as Microsoft had 
intentionally planned to give TBA a monopoly over the federal district of Brasilia. It had 
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achieved this by restructuring its distribution network, adapting the regional classification 
criteria of resellers.  
 
Although the Councillor stated that he would apply the rule of reason, in substantial terms the 
above reasoning demonstrates the adoption of a different approach. Microsoft had the burden 
of proof of efficiencies that could justify its behaviour, but these were not taken into 
consideration as efficiency defences; rather, they appear to have been analysed as objective 
justifications, in the same way as in the EU.   
 
Given that TBA’s monopoly resulted from the deliberate and planned strategy of Microsoft, 
there was no need to look at possible efficiency justifications. The existence of an artificial 
monopoly of sales to the federal government was already enough to constitute an offence to 
competition law since it eliminated effective competition and harmed consumers (in this case 
the federal government).  
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8.6.4 Center Norte 
 
The Center Norte879 decision concerned a dispute between shopping centres and was judged 
by the CADE in 2005. The claimant was Condomínio Shopping D, who accused the 
defendant, Center Norte SA, of breaching competition law by imposing a non-competition 
covenant in its commercial tenancy agreements. Center Norte’s commercial tenants were 
prohibited from undertaking the same or similar commercial activities within the vicinity of 
1,000 metres from Center Norte, with the exception of tenants that were already established 
in the shopping centre when the agreement came into force or who obtained express 
authorisation of Center Norte. Condomínio Shopping D claimed that the commercial tenancy 
agreements breached Brazilian competition law as they had the effect of harming 
competition, impeding the entry and development of competing businesses, reducing the 
choices of consumers and allowing the defendant to charge higher rents.  
 
Center Norte admitted that the non-competition covenants were included in most of its 
commercial tenancy agreements. However, it argued that these types of covenants were a 
common market practice and were openly encouraged by the Brazilian Association of 
Shopping Centres as a way of ensuring a greater diversity of tenants. As it will be revealed 
below, these arguments were not accepted by the CADE as a reasonable justification for 
Center Norte’s conduct.  
 
In the analysis of the relevant market, it was determined that Center Norte and Condomínio 
Shopping D had market shares of 69.57 and 30.43 percent respectively.  As a result of these 
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findings, the defendant acknowledged that it had market dominance. However, it argued that 
it resulted from its previous investments in the area when there were considerable 
commercial risks. Therefore, Center Norte’s defence was primarily based on submissions that 
it had acquired its dominance based on its own merits. The presiding Councillor, Roberto 
Augustos Castellanos Pfeiffer, stated that Center Norte was established in the area ten years 
before Condomínio Shopping D and this gave the former a ‘first-mover’ advantage. Although 
this advantage was not deemed to constitute an abuse, it was argued that it allowed the 
defendant to behave strategically by creating barriers of entry.  
 
According to the decision, it could be reasonable in some cases for shopping centres to 
include non-competing covenants on tenants. For instance, this would be reasonable when 
new shopping centres are developed in a specific area and needed to ensure the return of 
investments from key anchor tenants. However, the inclusion of non-competition covenants 
in most tenancies, which were valid for an indeterminate period of time, was considered 
excessive and in breach of competition law.  
 
This decision sought inspiration from another South American jurisdiction, not only from the 
US and the EU as it occurs in most cases. Councillor Pfeiffer stated that in Chile, the 
competition authority had declared void a radius exclusivity clause imposed by a shopping 
centre which had similar effects to the non-competition covenants in Center Norte’s tenancy 
agreements.  
 
When determining the existence of market foreclosure, Councillor Pfeiffer stated that, in the 
US, the courts and the FTC often require a market foreclosure of at least twenty percent in 
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respect of exclusive dealing. CADE’s Resolution 20880 does not mention such a percentage 
and there were no judicial precedents that clarified this issue in Brazil. Although there was no 
total foreclosure in the case in question, the Councillor did not base his reasoning on how 
much of the market was being foreclosed. The decision was based on the argument that the 
process of competition was being harmed by the imposition of non-competition covenants on 
tenants. Center Norte was not competing on the merits against Condomínio Shopping D. 
Rather than using legitimate ways to maintain its market dominance, such as investing on 
structural improvements of its shopping centre, Center Norte’s abusive practices were 
harmful to the process of competition in a wider sense, given that they adversely affected its 
tenants as well as Condomínio Shopping D.  
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8.6.5 Condomínio Shopping Center Iguatemi 
 
The 2008 Iguatemi decision881 concerned the territorial radius exclusivity covenants imposed 
on commercial tenants by Condomínio Shopping Center Iguatemi (Iguatemi), one of Brazil’s 
biggest shopping centre groups. There are many common features between the Center 
Norte882 and Iguatemi decisions. As in Center Norte, the defendant justified the adoption of 
territorial exclusivity covenants with the need to promote tenant diversity and with the fact 
that it was a common market practice. The presiding Councillor, Luis Fernando Rigato 
Vasconcellos, considered that Iguatemi had a ‘first-mover’ advantage because it represented 
the first group of upmarket shopping centres in Brazil. This resulted in Iguatemi’s dominant 
position in relation to upmarket tenants selling high priced goods to the most affluent sections 
of the Brazilian population. In contrast with Center Norte, Iguatemi had a strong brand as a 
result of its upmarket status which attracted considerable goodwill and consumer loyalty. 
These factors allowed it to behave strategically towards potential competitors.  
 
Although the material facts of Iguatemi were largely similar to Center Norte, in the former 
the SDE concluded that Iguatemi’s imposition of non-competition covenants in tenancy 
agreements based on a territorial radius was reasonable and did not constitute an offence 
under competition law. The SDE based its reasoning on the fact that there was only one 
competitor within the territorial exclusivity radius, so its impact was negligible. The CADE 
disagreed with the SDE’s findings. Councillor Vasconcellos highlighted that the SDE omitted 
the fact that the exclusivity covenants based on a territorial radius were often reinforced with 
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nominal exclusivity covenants which placed restrictions on tenants to open shops in other 
shopping centres. However, during proceedings, Iguatemi offered to settle with the CADE by 
proposing to waive its rights under the nominal exclusivity covenants in respect of shopping 
centres existing within its radius exclusivity area. This settlement offer was rejected by the 
CADE, as it deemed that the existence of a restrictive covenant, which could be either 
nominal or territorial, foreclosed the market.  
 
In the light of the Brazilian rule of reason, Councillor Vasconcellos stated that the 
unreasonableness of Iguatemi’s conduct was clear, as the defence did not submit any strong 
arguments in favour of efficiencies to render the conduct legitimate. Therefore, it appears that 
as a result of the anti-competitive scope of the non-competition covenants, the burden of 
proof in respect of the possible harm and efficiencies was placed on the defendant. According 
to Councillor Vasconcellos, the vertical restrains imposed by the exclusivity covenants 
clearly harmed competition. Therefore, admitting that the exclusivity clauses could favour 
competition would be the same as stating that resulting social costs, consisting of the 
lessening of competition among shop owners, were lesser than the social benefits alleged in 
Iguatemi’s defence.883 
 
The economic power of the Iguatemi group was also highlighted in the decision. It is 
plausible that a different outcome, in accordance with the SDE’s initial findings, would have 
been reached had the Iguatemi group not enjoyed such a strong market power in the upmarket 
retail sector at the national level. The outcome of this case suggests that a private dispute 
between a landlord and its tenants based on covenants drafted in standard commercial terms 
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can become a competition law matter as a result of market dominance. Therefore, this 
decision in some ways supports the argument in favour of the emergence of the special 
responsibilities doctrine in Brazil.  
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8.6.6 Celular CRT 
 
In 2008, the CADE heard Celular CRT,884 which dealt with exclusivity agreements in the 
mobile phone sector. The claimant, Telet SA, is a mobile phone operator that brought a 
complaint against the exclusivity agreements between the defendant, Celular CRT SA (CRT) 
and distributors situated in the State of Rio Grande do Sul. It was alleged that the exclusivity 
agreements were implemented by CRT to create unjustified difficulties for its competitors, as 
well as to create barriers to entry in respect of distribution channels in the mobile phone 
sector.  
 
It was argued by Telet SA that the exclusivity agreements of CRT had the aim of increasing 
entry costs for its competitors, given that they would have had to incur into considerable risks 
and expenses to implement their own distribution channels, as the largest retailers of mobile 
phones and services were operated by companies that had entered into exclusivity agreements 
with CRT.  
 
The presiding Councillor, Luis Fernando Rigato Vasconcellos, declared that the exclusivity 
agreements resulted in indirect negative effects on consumers and direct negative effects on 
retailers. The indirect negative effects on consumers could be understood as the possibility of 
an increase in prices and a reduction in product choice. The direct negative effects on retailers 
could be understood as their inability to sell other mobile phone brands. In regards to the 
latter effect, it was demonstrated by Telet SA that many retailers would have sold other 
mobile brands if this was not contrary to the exclusivity agreements with CRT.  
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The plenary of the CADE885 had to decide whether the CRT’s exclusivity agreements had the 
potential to foreclose the market at the time in which they were made. A main issue with this 
decision is that it was heard ex post facto; therefore the CADE had the advantage of 
hindsight. The delay in the investigations resulted in an awkward situation, as the findings 
revealed that the harm to competition did not materialise. Consequently, Councillors had to 
decide whether to hold an undertaking liable for a past conduct that had the potential to harm 
competition, although the anti-competitive effects did not actually occur.886 According to 
some interviewees it is essential to prove at least that the possibility of causing the effects 
was significant, even if the effects did not materialise. It seems that whilst the normal 
standard of proof is the risk of causing any of the effects listed in Article 20 of Law 8,884/94, 
if the conduct is analysed ex post facto and it is proven that the effects did not materialise, the 
standard of proof increases, requiring the proof that the conduct was likely to result in anti-
competitive effects. The majority of the Councillors in Celular CRT were of the opinion that 
the evidence suggested that the creation of exclusivity agreements with large retailers was not 
an effective way of foreclosing the market, since there were alternative distribution channels 
in the mobile phone sector available to competitors which in some cases were not being used. 
The CADE’s understanding was that the imposition of brand loyalty on resellers or 
distributors by way of exclusivity agreements could be considered illegal only if competitors 
did not have a reasonable alternative channel to distribute or resell their products. 
 
The conduct was found legitimate because other companies managed to grow in the market 
by finding alternative distribution channels. However it is questionable if the outcome would 
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have been the same if the decision had not been delivered seven years after the complaint 
took place. The CADE had the advantage of hindsight when deciding that other distribution 
channels were available and there was no harm to competition, notwithstanding the fact that 
the use of the alternative channels by CRT’s competitors may not have been foreseeable 
when the exclusivity agreements were put into place.  
 
According to a member of the BCPS: 
 
...there are two main negative consequences of the delays in completing preliminary 
investigations. Firstly, there is a danger that offences dealing with potential harm will 
be incorrectly decided with hindsight in cases where the harm did not materialise. 
Secondly, in cases where the harm materialised, there is a danger that the evidence 
will be challenged or dismissed given that it is against the due process of law to 
unreasonably delay the course of preliminary investigations. 
 
The delay in completing preliminary investigations is a notorious problem which hinders the 
correct formulation of decisions and when asked about the difficulty in deciding cases where 
the conduct was practised a long time ago, many members of the BCPS stated that although 
there have been considerable improvements in the duration of investigations, it was important 
for preliminary investigations to be completed more promptly.  
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8.7 Tying arrangements 
8.7.1 Microsoft 
 
This case regarded the inclusion of the program ‘Money 97’ in the software package of the 
Brazilian version of ‘Microsoft for Small Business 97’. The decision also concerned other 
offences, as Microsoft had sold without public procurement 250,000 licences of ‘Money 97’ 
to the Bank of Brazil and 110,000 licences to another public financial institution, Caixa 
Econômica Federal. According to the claimant, Paiva Piovesan, a company in the IT sector, 
Microsoft’s tie-in arrangements blocked the entry of competitors into the market. In addition 
to this complaint, Microsoft was also accused of exclusionary practices by restricting the 
access of its competitors to its distributors. 
 
The presiding Councillor, Thompson Almeida Andrade, established that Microsoft was 
dominant given that between 1995 and 1997 it had a market share greater than 80 percent in 
relation to the national software market. With respect to the conduct, he affirmed that the 
anti-competitive effects of tie-in sales would be analysed in relation to the leverage of market 
power of one product over the other. This was due to the fact that, according to him, the tie-in 
sale could result in an increase in prices in the primary market, harming competitors, 
distributors and ultimately consumers. Moreover, it could result in the creation of artificial 
barriers to entry in the secondary market. 
 
Microsoft justified the conduct by stating that its software package, which included Money 
97, allowed users to access various programs that were completely integrated with each other 
for substantially lower prices than purchasing them separately. In the view of Councillor 
Andrade, there was no imposition of tie-in sales because Money 97 could be purchased 
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separately from Microsoft Office as well. However, the Councillor highlighted that there was 
a risk of abuse of dominance because the software package widened the scope of Microsoft 
operational software, namely Microsoft Windows.  
 
Councillor Andrade also examined some situations where it would be likely that an offence 
would occur in the technological sector due to network effects, i.e. when dominant 
undertakings (1) refuse the compatibility of their competitor’s programs with their software 
systems, thus prohibiting the entry of new competitors that could further improve the existing 
technological standards; (2) advertise before the launch of a new product version without 
allowing the consumer to choose a particular program to suit their needs, discouraging users 
to change brands; (3) upgrade programs with the introduction of a new technology that is not 
accessible to other competitors; (4) require the incompatibility of products developed by 
competitors in the aftermarket with the systems of the dominant firm’s competitors in the 
main market; (5) attempt to purchase a successful software of a competitor that, combined 
with the market share of the dominant firm, would result in an increase in the barriers to 
entry.887 
 
The facts of the decision were in favour of the defendant, as the addition of ‘Money 97 to the 
package of Microsoft for Small Business 97 did not fall within any of the situations described 
above. Therefore, Microsoft was not held liable, as the conduct was not perceived to form 
part of an abusive strategy. The decision was unanimous in favour of Microsoft. A main 
factor that contributed to the outcome was that purchasers were given the option of buying 
the products separately as well. 
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In respect of the alleged breaches of public procurement laws as a result of the sale of 
software licences to the Bank of Brazil and Caixa Econômica Federal, Councillor Andrade 
concluded that, although the sales had an impact on the relevant market, there was no illegal 
conduct from a competition law perspective and recommended the notification to federal 
authorities to verify the legality of the transactions. 
 
In regards to the restriction of access of Microsoft’s distributors to the products of 
competitors, only one exclusivity arrangement was found during the investigations; even so, 
this arrangement was not anti-competitive as it involved the financial assistance of Microsoft 
to the distributor in order to cover start-up costs. There was no evidence that Microsoft 
imposed any sort of exclusivity obligations on its distributors in respect of Microsoft for 
Small Business 97.  
 
In relation to exclusionary effects resulting from discounts and rebates, according to 
Councillor Andrade, Microsoft’s discounts were based on the volume of sales of Microsoft 
for Small Business 97 and legitimate even if the practice resulted in the distributors giving 
preference to Microsoft products. This reasoning differs from AmBev,888 where the defendant 
was found in breach of competition law rules as a result of the exclusionary effects of its 
discounts and rebates. One key difference between these cases is that Microsoft did not 
condition discounts or rebates to the achievement of a set market share in relation to the 
distributor’s products, whilst AmBev imposed such condition. Therefore, in AmBev the 
discounts were not given proportionally to the quantity of products sold as in Microsoft, but 
to the share of products sold. 
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 Primo Schincariol Indústria de Cervejas e Refrigerantes SA v Companhia de Bebidas das Américas - Ambev 
- 08012.003805/2004-10. 
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8.8 Refusal to deal 
8.8.1 TV Globo 
 
TV Globo889 is a 2001 decision involving TV Globo, Brazil’s largest aerial TV broadcaster. 
The Brazilian National Telecommunication Agency (ANATEL) brought a claim on behalf of 
TVA Sistema de Televisão/Directv (Directv), against two companies of the TV Globo Group, 
TV Globo Ltda and TV Globo São Paulo Ltda (TV Globo). The facts leading up to the case 
consisted of TV Globo’s refusal to license its channels to Directv’s satellite TV services in 
the cities of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre. According to 
Directv, the refusal created anti-competitive effects in the market of distribution of TV and 
audio programmes via satellite, as TV Globo authorised the satellite distribution of its aerial 
TV channel to Sky TV. Directv’s claim was supported by the fact that Sky TV, Directv’s 
main competitor in the market of distribution of TV and audio programmes via satellite, was 
part of the same corporate group as TV Globo. 
 
TV Globo is the leader in the Brazilian aerial TV sector, which is the most common TV 
signal distribution method in Brazil. Consequently, its programmes attract the largest 
audiences. It was argued by Directv that TV Globo’s refusal to license resulted in the creation 
of a considerable barrier to entry in the satellite TV market. Directv stated that most 
consumers of satellite services preferred to subscribe to satellite channel packages that 
included TV Globo’s programmes, even if they were freely available via aerial TV, to avoid 
the hassle of switching between TV and satellite services. As a result, TV Globo’s refusal to 
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deal was allegedly intended to harm competition and to allow Sky TV to dominate the 
satellite TV market, as these companies belonged to the same corporate group.  
 
The dicta in TV Globo were conflicting. Although the presiding Councillor, João Bosco 
Leopoldino da Fonseca was of the opinion of holding TV Globo liable, the majority of the 
other Councillors disagreed by following the opinion of Councillor Hebe Teixeira Romano. 
As a result, TV Globo was not found liable. The conflicting opinions of Councillors resulted 
in rich argumentation in relation to the definition of the relevant market, dominance and 
abuse. 
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8.8.1.1 The relevant market 
 
In the view of Councillor Fonseca, there were three different types of TV services available 
by subscription: wired TV via cable, MMDS via microwaves and DTH via satellite. During 
his analysis of the relevant product market, Councillor Fonseca mentioned the EU decisions 
Continental Can890 and United Brands891 and stated that the criterion used to determine the 
relevant product market was product interchangeability. This criterion had to take into 
consideration the superior quality of DTH signals, the need for customers to purchase a 
specific decoder in relation to each provider, as well as the higher price of DTH decoders in 
respect to other TV distribution systems. After taking these factors into account, Councillor 
Fonseca decided that the relevant product market was the DTH distribution of audio and TV 
signals via satellite. 
 
With regards to the determination of the relevant geographic market, Councillor Fonseca 
mentioned that, although Directv’s request of authorisation to transmit TV Globo 
programmes via satellite concerned a limited number of Brazilian federal states, the reach of 
TV Globo’s aerial distribution signals in conjunction with Sky TV satellite signals were 
much wider. Therefore, the presiding Councillor determined that the relevant geographic 
market was national rather than regional.  
 
Councillor Romano defined the relevant product market differently from Councillor Fonseca. 
In her decision, she agreed with an argument given by Directv from a former Councillor, 
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 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v Commission of the European 
Communities - Case 6-72. 
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 United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v Commission of the European Communities - 
Case 27/76. 
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Professor Arthur Barrionuevo Filho, who did not define the relevant product market as 
narrowly as the presiding Councillor. According to Professor Barrinuevo Filho, the relevant 
product market should be defined as the subscription of TV services because subscribers 
would migrate to cheaper types of subscription TV services if there was a small but 
significant and non-transitory increase in prices of DTH TV via satellite. The opinion of 
Councillor Romano seems to disregard the costs involved in switching providers that were 
highlighted by Councillor Fonseca.   
 
Councillor Celso Fernandes Campilongo stated that the relevant product market should be 
defined on the basis of origin and destination. The market of origin would be the competing 
channels whilst the market of destination would be the service of distribution of DTH TV via 
satellite, given that the transmission technology was very different from other types of non-
aerial TV services. 
 
Councillor Afonso Arinos de Mello Franco Neto stated that the subscription TV market had 
different characteristics from the aerial TV market. In common with Councillor Fonseca’s 
view, in his opinion the market could be subdivided in wired TV, MMDS and DTH services. 
However, Councillor Neto did not clearly express which one he regarded as the relevant 
product market, albeit one could imply that he agreed with the presiding Councillor.   
 
In relation to the relevant geographic market, Councillor Neto agreed with all the above 
Councillors in the sense that the relevant geographic market was national. The reason for this 
understanding was different from Councillor Fonseca, as it was based on the fact that DTH 
signals are distributed nationwide, rather than by examining the combined positions of TV 
Globo and Sky Satellite TV.   
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Councillor Thompson Andrade defined the relevant product market as the distribution of 
DTH signals. He omitted reference to the relevant geographic market. However, it could be 
implied that it was defined at a national level, as he stated that that only two firms, namely 
Sky TV and Directv, offered the product in the national market. Nevertheless, he also stated 
that in some regions in Brazil there were other products, such as cable TV that competed with 
satellite TV; therefore part of his reasoning is unclear.   
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8.8.1.2 Dominance 
 
Following the determination of the relevant market, the Councillors continued to disagree 
when determining dominance. Councillor Fonseca declared that TV Globo dominated the 
aerial distribution of TV signals because it captured 50 percent of the audience and 70 
percent of the TV advertisement revenues. He also relied on a report produced by Goldman 
Sachs for TV Globo for the purpose of selling depositary receipts of TV Globo in the US, 
which stated that only the TV Globo’s subsidiary had access to TV Globo’s programmes, 
whilst Directv was excluded.  
 
Councillor Romano agreed that TV Globo had dominance in the aerial TV market, but 
highlighted that the same was not true in the subscription TV market, where TV Globo and 
Sky TV had similar market shares to TVA and Directv. Therefore, in her opinion, both of 
these corporate groups could be considered dominant, since each of them had market shares 
greater than twenty percent. It must be noted that the understanding that two competing 
companies can be dominant in the same market goes against the very concept of dominance. 
A dominant firm must be able to behave in the market with a considerable degree of 
independence from competitors and consumers. If a firm has a strong competitor, they are not 
both dominant.892 Instead, there is an oligopoly and oligopolies can be competitive.   
 
Councillor Romano also mentioned that Councillor Fonseca relied too much on the document 
prepared by Goldman Sachs and sustained that it was questionable if its data could be used to 
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competitor is actually accusing TV Globo of abusing its dominant position. 
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determine whether there was an offence in the form of refusal to deal. However, it is worth 
noting that Goldman Sachs prepared the document on the instructions of TV Globo and the 
statements made in the document did show that TV Globo was using the licence to give a 
competitive advantage to Sky TV.  
 
Councillor Campilongo omitted an in-depth analysis of TV Globo’s dominance in his 
decision. He only made a remark that the ‘...indisputable market power of TV Globo would 
be able to limit competition in the satellite TV market’. 
 
Councillor Neto did not consider that TV Globo was dominant in the subscription TV market. 
His findings were based on published studies from ANATEL which showed that the market 
share of Sky TV within the geographical regions where it distributed TV Globo’s channel 
was not greater than those of the TVA/Directv group. Therefore, Councillor Neto concluded 
that TV Globo was not dominant in this specific case. This is an out of the ordinary approach 
to the definition of dominance. The Councillor did not take the steps of looking into the 
market share, then actual competition, followed by potential competition. He jumped all this 
analysis and looked at the changes in the market share of Sky TV where it had access to TV 
Globo’s channel. It can be argued therefore that Councillor Neto skipped the analysis of 
dominance and went on directly to the analysis of the conduct.  
 
Councillor Andrade did not deal with the definition of dominance. After defining the relevant 
market, he immediately started analysing the conduct, implying that he was of the opinion 
that TV Globo was dominant.  
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8.8.1.3 Abuse 
 
Councillor Fonseca stated that Article 20 of Law 8,884/94 followed the parameters of the EU 
legislation in determining which types of conduct are abusive. He stated that there were two 
fundamental criteria for the prohibition of an abusive conduct under Brazilian competition 
law: (1) the company whose conduct is being examined must have dominance in the relevant 
market; (2) the company must abuse its dominance. Indeed, this is the abuse of dominance 
criteria under Article 102 TFEU. With respect to the application of competition law to the 
case in question, Councillor Fonseca decided that TV Globo was dominant and, by limiting 
or impeding the access of TVA into the relevant market, TV Globo was infringing Article 
21(IV), (V), (VI), (X) and (XIII). TV Globo was allegedly creating difficulties to the function 
and development of a competitor, as well as impeding the access of a competitor to a source 
of materials, equipments or technology and refusing to sell goods or services under normal 
payment conditions in accordance with uses and consuetude. In essence, Councillor Fonseca 
was of the opinion that TV Globo’s abuse consisted of the fact that it sought to maintain its 
dominant position by creating artificial barriers to entry and not competing on the merits.  
 
Councillor Fonseca affirmed that TV Globo was refusing an essential facility.893 In his view, 
when a dominant undertaking controls an essential facility, it should not refuse its access; if it 
did, there would be a legal presumption of abuse. This reasoning implies the use of a per se 
approach when the product or service refused is deemed to constitute an essential facility. 
This follows principles formulated in the US decisions Terminal Railway894 and Aspen.895 
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However, Councillor Fonseca’s reasoning appears deficient, as he failed to mention the 
existence of criticism to the essential facilities doctrine in the US. 
 
Moreover, Councillor Fonseca stated that the US Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 
1999 forced satellite TV providers in the United States to transmit local TV programmes. 
Therefore, Councillor Fonseca’s argument was based on the idea that the regulation of the 
satellite TV sector in the US rightfully dealt with many of the specific issues of this case. 
Although Brazil lacked such regulation, in his view the BCPS should step in and combat 
abusive practices which sought to foreclose the market via the application of competition law.  
 
With respect to EU authorities, Councillor Fonseca mentioned the Commercial Solvents896 
and Sea Containers v Stena Sealink897 decisions to reinforce the idea that the essential 
facilities doctrine was accepted in both sides of the Atlantic. Due to the popularity of TV 
Globo’s programmes and the fact that consumers preferred integrated Satellite TV services 
that included programmes normally available via aerial TV, the licensing over TV Globo’s 
programmes equated, in his view, to an essential facility as understood by the European 
Commission.898 
 
It must be noted, however, that although the essential facilities doctrine has been adopted in 
the EU, the COJ restricted the ambit of the doctrine in Bronner,899 establishing that the 
refusal should not only create difficulties for the competitors. It should also result in the risk 
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of eliminating them and should be indispensable, i.e. not economically viable for a firm with 
a similar capacity of the one refusing access to the facility. It is questionable if the refusal of 
TV Globo met these criteria. 
 
Councillor Romano made some criticisms in relation to Councillor Fonseca’s reference to EU 
competition law. According to her, the use of foreign decisions is a useful tool to aid the 
interpretation of Brazilian competition law, but EU law has a supranational aspect that 
Brazilian competition law does not. Although there is some truth is Councillor Romano’s 
reasoning, her justification appears to be flawed. EU law is supranational in terms of its 
constitution and historic development, given that it is the product of international treaties 
amongst Member States that sought to achieve European unity in political, social and 
economic terms. However, this does not mean that legal principles formulated under EU law 
cannot be transplanted into the Brazilian legal system. If her statement was correct, it would 
lead to the result that only principles formulated under US antitrust law should be considered, 
given that the US and Brazil are both federal republics.  
 
Both the EU and the US models of competition law influenced the development of Brazilian 
competition law and there are many reasons to seek inspiration from EU competition law. For 
instance, the historical development of EU competition law was heavily influenced by the 
competition law tradition developed in continental Europe and the Brazilian legal system is 
modelled on the continental European civilian tradition as well. Moreover, many European 
national markets are characterised by concentration of market power and the same can be said 
about many Brazilian markets.  
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Councillor Romano stated that all the cases cited by the presiding Councillor Fonseca 
regarded the elimination of competition. In her opinion, this was not the issue in this 
particular case as the Directv/TVA group were not being eliminated from the market because 
they had a similar market share to Sky TV/TV Globo group. Councillor Romano also 
disagreed with the citation of EU decisions regarding the essential facilities doctrine. Her 
judgment is nevertheless questionable, given that whether competition was eliminated or not 
was immaterial under Brazilian competition law, as TV Globo could have been in breach of 
Articles 20 and 21 of Law 8,884/94 if it committed an abuse of dominance, irrespective of 
whether competition was eliminated or not.   
 
Councillor Romano’s reasoning appears to be influenced by a laissez-faire ideological 
position, as she considered it better for aerial TV broadcasters and satellite TV providers to 
enter into agreements as they saw fit. According to the Councillor, the case regarded a mere 
commercial dispute between commercial parties, so there was no public interest that merited 
protection. Therefore, in her view the CADE should not intervene, given that a company that 
does not have the intent to create a monopoly is free to decide with whom it wants to do 
business.  
 
To support her decision, Councillor Romano stated that Directv was the biggest provider of 
DTH services in the Americas and that there was no evidence of the adoption of illegal 
practices by TV Globo to acquire dominance. Once again, her reasoning merits criticism as a 
refusal to deal by a dominant undertaking may suggest the adoption of an anti-competitive 
strategy to maintain its dominance. Indeed, three years after the TV Globo decision, the 
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CADE has decided Condomínio Shopping Center Iguatemi900 where it was stated that a 
dominant undertaking can breach Brazilian competition law by raising artificial barriers to 
entry in order to maintain its dominance. Nevertheless, Councillor Romano did not deal with 
the strategy of the defendant in terms of maintenance of dominance.  
 
One argument of Councillor Romano that influenced other opinions against Councillor 
Fonseca regarded economic efficiency and consumer welfare. The Directv group already 
enjoyed a considerable market share in the Americas and for this reason, in the view of 
Councillor Romano, it was acting unreasonably by insisting that TV Globo granted it licence 
rights of its television programmes, which were freely available to the general population via 
aerial transmission. According to Councillor Romano, it would have been preferable for 
Directv to invest in new programmes rather than merely duplicating the transmission of TV 
Globo’s programmes. This argument was particularly important, given that it stated that 
Directv should invest in innovation, focusing on the goal of competition law in terms of 
consumer welfare that, in this case, would result from the creation of new television 
programmes.  
 
Councillor Campilongo sided with Councillor Romano against Councillor Fonseca. He stated 
that the CADE should not establish a general obligation on all aerial TV broadcasters, but 
only analyse the factual situations of the specific case. He considered inappropriate the 
examination of foreign telecommunication legislation which supported Councillor Fonseca’s 
arguments. Nevertheless, according to Councillor Campilongo, the fact that the Brazilian 
telecommunications regulation legislation did not oblige TV Globo to authorise the broadcast 
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of its signals by Directv did not mean that TV Globo could simply refuse licences to Directv 
from a competition law perspective. In his view, the central issue should be whether the 
refusal of TV Globo would cause or could potentially cause anti-competitive effects. In this 
respect, it was crucial to determine whether the transmission of TV Globo’s programmes was 
so essential that as a result of TV Globo’s refusal, Directv would not be able to operate in the 
market; in other words, if TV Globo’s programmes could be considered an essential facility. 
The answer of the Councillor to this question was negative, justified by an explanation that 
the doctrine was developed in the United States for extreme cases where the exclusive 
ownership of a product, structure or infrastructure made it impossible for competition to 
exist, given that the product or service refused could not be replicated.901 Therefore, although 
Councillor Campilongo acknowledged Councillor’s Fonseca’s arguments for the essential 
facilities doctrine, in his opinion TV Globo’s programmes did not fulfil the requirements of 
an essential facility.902 For TV Globo’s refusal to be material in the light of the essential 
facilities argument, Directv would have had to demonstrate that it tried to offer different TV 
programmes but that this had not been enough to mitigate the essentiality of TV Globo 
programmes.  
 
Although Councillor Campilongo found in favour of the defendant, his opinion was 
somewhat balanced and not as laissez-faire as that of Councillor Romano. He was against 
equating TV Globo’s programmes to an essential facility in this specific case, but he stated 
that this finding was not absolute, so the outcome could be different under other 
                                                 
901
 In the sense that was a natural monopoly. 
902
 In the sense that: i) [...] without the access to that structure there was no chance to competition, i.e., it was 
indispensable for competition; ii) that it was not economically efficient or possible, for new entrants, to 
duplicate the structure; iii) that the control of the structure gave to its owner the potential to eliminate 
competition; iv) that the facility was effectively essential, literally, and not only a mere convenience or a less 
costly opportunity to a competitor; v) that the refusal of access to the essential facility did not have an economic 
or legal reasonable reason. 
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circumstances. Councillor Campilongo also gave TV Globo and Sky TV a warning by stating 
that the CADE was well aware that their vertical arrangements were not ideal and could 
hamper competition in the subscription TV market.  
 
Councillor Franco Neto did not analyse the conduct. As mentioned above, according to him 
TV Globo was not dominant. Since Directv’s claim failed to pass the first limb to find TV 
Globo liable for abuse of dominance, there was no need to determine whether TV Globo’s 
conduct was abusive.    
 
Councillor Andrade established that the existence of exclusive licensing rights on certain 
channels or programmes in the subscription TV sector was a common market practice which 
supported the process of competition. Although TV Globo’s programmes had a significant 
audience in the aerial TV market, Councillor Andrade considered it an overstatement to 
qualify them as an essential facility. According to him, an essential facility ought to be 
indispensable and impossible of being substituted. Therefore, there was no breach of 
competition law because Directv was able to compete in the market and TV Globo’s 
programmes were not essential; thus, the former could overcome the latter’s refusal by 
procuring licences over substitute TV programmes. 
 
Councillor Andrade rebutted Councillor Campilongo’s concern with the vertical 
arrangements between TV Globo and Sky TV. According to him, there was no concern under 
Brazilian competition law in regards to the fact that these companies sought to gain 
dominance artificially by vertical arrangements rather than via organic growth. The defence 
of TV Globo and Sky TV’s vertical arrangements by Councillor Andrade went as far as to 
state that it did not impede the access of other satellite TV providers to the markets of aerial 
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and non-aerial TV channels. It may be true that dominance is not prohibited per se, but it 
seems that the intention of Councillor Campilongo was to warn in respect of TV Globo/Sky 
TV conduct, suggesting the existence of special responsibilities for dominant firms. 
 
Following Councillor Romano’s leading opinion, and contrary to the dissenting opinion of 
the presiding Councillor Fonseca, the CADE dismissed Directv’s complaints and decided in 
favour of TV Globo. The decision was justified on the following grounds: (1) Directv had 
‘dominance’ in the subscription TV market; (2) the licensing rights over TV Globo’s 
programmes were not deemed to constitute an essential facility.  
 
With respect to the first reason, it is incorrect to consider that Directv was dominant in the 
subscription TV market, given that according to the vote of Councillor Romano both firms 
were dominant. It must be highlighted that in any case this is an incorrect interpretation of the 
definition of dominance, as only one firm can be dominant, unless they behaved collectively 
and both are dominant in respect to all other firms.903 
 
In regards to the second reason, under Brazilian competition law a refusal to deal by a 
dominant undertaking could be deemed abusive irrespective of the classification of the 
product as an essential facility. As long as the abusive conduct of a dominant undertaking 
harms free competition and free enterprise, such conduct should be considered an offence to 
the economic order under Brazilian competition law.904 Bearing in mind that the Brazilian 
competition law does not require the refused product to be an essential facility in order to find 
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an offence to the economic order, the focus of the decision should have been on the stimulus 
to innovation that the refusal could create and the benefits that this would bring to consumers.  
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8.8.2 MATEC 
 
In MATEC,905 the claimant, Power-Tech Teleinformática Ltda (Power-Tech), brought a 
complaint against Matel Tecnologia de Informática SA (MATEC) for abusing its dominance 
by refusing to supply spare parts for telephone switchboards MD 110 from Ericsson. MATEC 
was the only company who had entered into licence agreements with Ericsson to manufacture 
and sell Ericsson branded products in Brazil. In its submissions, Power-Tech argued that as a 
result of MATEC’s refusal to supply, it was not able to fulfil its contractual obligations in 
relation to technical assistance agreements with third parties, or to procure new clients. 
MATEC did not deny the refusal to supply. Its defence arguments were based on the 
existence of good reasons that justified the conduct. 
 
The presiding Councillor, Roberto Augusto Pfeiffer, stated that MATEC was the only 
licensed producer and distributor of Ericsson products in Brazil and held the monopoly of the 
manufacture and sales of some parts of the telephone switchboards. Therefore, MATEC was 
declared dominant. Nevertheless, Councillor Pfeiffer acknowledged that the monopoly was a 
product of MATEC’s own merits, as it had invested in patents, technical data and technology 
that allowed it to conclude the licence agreement with Ericsson. 
 
With respect to the nexus between dominance and abuse, Councillor Pfeiffer was of the 
opinion that the dominant position of MATEC in the upstream market, i.e. the distribution 
and manufacture of Ericsson products, allowed it to leverage its economic power in the 
downstream market, i.e. the maintenance and repair of Ericsson products. There were two 
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observations to support this view: (1) Power-Tech was the only company to participate in the 
intra-brand market and the difference in prices between Power-Tech and MATEC in the 
downstream market was considerable (Power-Tech’s prices were much lower than 
MATEC’s); (2) the refusal to supply spare parts to Power-Tech would also strengthen 
MATEC’s economic power in the downstream market as consumers were locked-in and 
could not use maintenance services from other companies.  
 
Councillor Pfeiffer stated that there was no evidence that competition in the upstream market 
would in itself be sufficient to impede an increase in prices in the downstream market. In this 
respect, he mentioned the US Kodak906 case when declaring that in theory low prices in the 
maintenance sector, i.e. the downstream market, could prove beneficial to increase the sales 
of products in the upstream market, but that, as in the Kodak case, the manufacturer was 
harming competitors in the downstream market because they were charging low prices.   
 
Councillor Pfeiffer argued that MATEC was intentionally and deliberately abusing its 
dominance to maintain its position in the upstream and downstream markets to arbitrarily 
increase prices and exclude competitors in the downstream market.907 In addition, Councillor 
Pfeiffer stated that to avoid liability under Brazilian competition law, the refusal to supply of 
a dominant undertaking must be justified in economic terms. The Councillor seems therefore 
to require an objective justification to exclude the firm’s liability. This view appears to follow 
the EU approach to abuse of dominance, where a conduct is considered a competition law 
offence when there is dominance and purpose to harm competition, unless there are objective 
                                                 
906
 Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services Inc, vol. 498. 
907
 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the mens rea of intention is not a required element of competition law 
offences in Brazil. 
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justifications. In fact, Councillor Pfeiffer mentioned that in the EU there are many 
judgments908 which prohibited conduct similar to the one in question. He affirmed that the 
essential facilities doctrine, although obviously applicable in respect of infrastructure such as 
ports and railways, could also be applied to products that are absolutely indispensable for the 
entry or survival of competitors in the market. Therefore it could be applied to the case in 
question.909 
 
Councillor Pfeiffer rejected each of the justifications raised by MATEC in its defence. 
MATEC’s arguments were based on product cross elasticity, i.e. that consumers would be 
able to switch brands if MATEC charged abusive prices in the downstream market. This was 
not accepted because the replacement of the products was not convenient, given that there 
were high replacement costs involved and consumers would be locked-in after purchasing 
products from MATEC. To counter this statement, MATEC argued that many of its clients 
were large corporations or public institutions, so they were aware of the costs involved 
beforehand. However, this argument appears to have backfired, as Councillor Pfeiffer stated 
that it was incongruent with another defence raised by MATEC. This was because its 
submissions alleged that the existence of competing maintenance companies in the 
downstream market would be harmful to its commercial reputation and goodwill if they did 
not perform their services properly. If MATEC’s consumers were sufficiently knowledgeable 
of the complexities of the product and competitors in both upstream and downstream 
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 To corroborate his statement, the Councillor mentioned some EU cases, such as Istituto Chemioterapico 
Italiano S.p.A. and Commercial Solvents Corporation v Commission of the European Communities - Joined 
cases 6 and 7-73. Hugin Kassaregister AB and Hugin Cash Registers Ltd v Commission of the European 
Communities - Case 22/78 and Centre belge d'études de marché - Télémarketing (CBEM) v SA Compagnie 
luxembourgeoise de télédiffusion (CLT) and Information publicité Benelux (IPB) - Case 311/84. 
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 Therefore, Councillor Pfeiffer adopted the essential facilities doctrine, notwithstanding the fact that it is not 
expressly mentioned in the Brazilian competition law. In this sense, he adopted a similar reasoning to Councillor 
Fonseca in TV Globo. See TVA Sistema de Televisão v TV Globo Ltda - 53500.000359/1999. Section 8.8.1.2. 
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markets, then they ought to be sufficiently knowledgeable to avoid competing companies 
tarnishing MATEC’s reputation.    
 
MATEC brought a final argument based on the fact that Power-Tech had the option to 
purchase the spare parts directly from Ericsson. However, this justification was rejected given 
that maintenance services required the acquisition of spare parts as they were needed and it 
would take too long to import them. Therefore, it would have been inefficient for Power-Tech 
to import the parts directly from Ericsson; for instance, Power-Tech would need to purchase 
parts in bulk, setup logistical operations, and so on.  
 
The decision was reached unanimously in favour of holding MATEC liable for refusing to 
deal. MATEC was deemed to be dominant in the upstream market and its conduct was 
considered abusive because the company was using its power to eliminate competition in the 
downstream market.   
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8.9 English Version of Competition Law 8,884/94 
 
The following version of the Brazilian competition Law 8,884/94 was made available by the 
SDE910 and does not substitute the original text in Portuguese. 
 
Brazilian antitrust laws  
Law n. 8,884  
June 6th, 1994 
LAW # 8884 OF JUNE 11, 1994 
(OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE, JUNE 13, 1994) 
Changes the Administrative Council for Economic Defence - CADE into an independent 
agency, regulates antitrust measures, and makes other provisions.  
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC:  
I hereby make known that the Congress decrees and I sanction the following Law:  
TITLE I  
GENERAL PROVISIONS CHAPTER I  
OBJECT  
Article 1. This Law sets out antitrust measures in keeping with such constitutional principles 
as free enterprise and open competition, the social role of property, consumer protection, and 
restraint of abuses of economic power.  
Sole Paragraph. Society at large is entrusted with the legal rights protected herein.  
CHAPTER II TERRITORY  
                                                 
910
 SDE, “Legislation.” 
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Article 2. Without prejudice to any agreements and treaties to which Brazil is a party, this 
Law applies to acts wholly or partially performed within the Brazilian territory, or the effects 
of which are or may be suffered therein.  
Sole Paragraph. Foreign companies that operate or have a branch, agency, subsidiary, office, 
establishment, agent or representative in Brazil shall be deemed situated in the Brazilian 
territory.  
§ 1. A foreign company is deemed resident in the Brazilian territory if it operates or 
has a branch, affiliate, subsidiary, office, place of business, agent or representative in 
Brazil.  
§ 2. The person in charge of the branch, affiliate, subsidiary, office, or place of 
business in Brazil shall be notified and informed on behalf of the foreign company of 
all procedural acts, notwithstanding any power of attorney or contractual or statutory 
provision"  
TITLE II  
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL FOR ECONOMIC DEFENSE - CADE CHAPTER I  
INDEPENDENT AGENCY  
Article 3. The Administrative Council for Economic Defence - CADE, an agency with 
authority throughout the Brazilian territory and created by Law # 4137 of September 10, 
1962, shall henceforth become a federal independent agency (autarquia federal) reporting to 
the Ministry of Justice, with headquarters and jurisdiction in the federal district, and duly 
commissioned for performance of the duties set forth herein.  
CHAPTER II  
THE CADE BOARD  
Article 4. The CADE Board shall be composed of a President and six Board Members chosen 
from among citizens older than thirty years of age reputed for their legal or economic 
404 
 
knowledge and unblemished reputation, duly appointed by the President of the Republic after 
their approval by the Senate.  
Paragraph 1. The term of office of the President and Board Members shall be two years, one 
re-election being hereby permitted.  
Paragraph 2. The President and Board Member duties shall be discharged on an exclusive 
basis; accordingly, no overlapping of positions will be permitted, unless otherwise provided 
for in the Constitution.  
Paragraph 3. In the event of resignation, death or termination of a CADE President, the senior 
or eldest Board Member (in this order) will take office as President until further appointment 
thereof, without prejudice to his/her corresponding duties as Board Member.  
Paragraph 4. In the event of resignation, death or termination of a CADE Board Member, a 
new Board Member shall be appointed for the remaining term of office of the replaced 
member.  
Paragraph 5. In the events set forth in the preceding paragraph or upon expiration of the terms 
of office of the council members, the Council shall be reduced to less than the number 
established in article 49, the time frames set out in articles 28, 31, 32, 33, 35, 37, 39, 42, 45, 
46, sole paragraph, 52, paragraph 2, 54, paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 10, and 59, paragraph 1 of this 
law shall be considered automatically interrupted, and the case development shall be 
suspended, and the new terms shall begin immediately after restructuring of the quorum.  
Article 5. The CADE President or Board Members may only be ousted by a decision of the 
Senate, a request of the President of the Republic, as a result of unappealable criminal 
sentencing of any such member for malicious crime, or in light of disciplinary action as set 
forth in Law # 8112 of December 11, 1990 and Law # 8429 of June 2, 1992, as well as owing 
to violation of any of the limitations dealt with in article 6 hereof.  
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Sole Paragraph. Any CADE Member's absence at three consecutive ordinary meetings, or 
twenty intermittent ordinary meetings, shall cause automatic termination of his/her term of 
office, except for leaves of absence duly approved by the CADE Board.  
Article 6. The President and Board Members shall not:  
I - receive fees, percentages or other compensation in any way or on any pretext; II - act as a 
self-employed workers;  
III - participate--as controlling parties, officers, managers,agents or attorneys in fact-in any 
civil, commercial or like companies;  
IV - render opinions on matters of their specialty, even if on a theoretical basis, or act as 
advisers to companies of any kind;  
V - avail themselves of the media to render opinion on cases pending decision, or otherwise 
disparage orders, votes or sentences handed down by the courts, except for critique in case 
records, technical works or in the exercise of court duties; and  
VI - carry out politics- or party-oriented activities.  
CHAPTER III  
AUTHORITY OF THE CADE BOARD  
Article 7. The CADE Board shall:  
I - ensure compliance with this Law and its regulations, as well as with the Board in-house 
rules;  
II - resolve on purported violations of the economic order, and apply the penalties provided 
for by law;  
III - resolve on proceedings instituted by the Economic LawOffice - SDE of the Ministry of 
Justice;  
IV - resolve on ex officio appeals from the SDE Secretary;  
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V - order that action be taken in restraint of violations of the economic order within the term 
scheduled therefore;  
VI - approve both the cease-and-desist commitment (compromisso de cessação de prática) 
and the performance commitment, as well as order SDE to monitor compliance therewith;  
VII - judge appeals against preventive action adopted by SDE or by the Board reporting 
official;  
VIII - make its decisions known to interested parties;  
IX - request information from individuals, agencies, authorities and other public or private 
entities, with due regard for the confidentiality ensured such information pursuant to law, if 
any, as well as determine the investigations required for performance of its duties;  
X - request from the federal Executive branch agencies and from state, municipal, the federal 
district and territorial authorities the taking of all acts required for compliance with this Law;  
XI - retain the performance of examinations, inspections and studies, approving the 
respective professional fees and other expenditures on a case by case basis, all of which shall 
be borne by the company if it is eventually punished under this Law;  
XII - analyze acts or conduct under any circumstance, subject to approval thereof pursuant to 
article 54 below, and establish a performance commitment as the case may be;  
XIII - request court execution of its decisions pursuant to this Law;  
XIV - request services and staff from any federal public agencies or entities;  
XV - determine the adoption of administrative and court action by the CADE Attorney 
General Office;  
XVI - sign contracts and agreements with Brazilian agencies or entities, and advance to the 
Minister of Justice for approval any such documents that are to be signed with foreign or 
international organisms;  
XVII - answer consultations on matters within its sphere of authority;  
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XVIII - make the forms of violation of the economic order known to the public;  
XIX - draft and approve its in-house rules on operations, criteria for resolutions, and 
organization of in-house services, including for the purpose of establishing the recess of the 
Board and the Attorney General Office on account of vacation; during such period, the statute 
of limitations as well as the term set forth in article 54, paragraph 6 hereof shall be 
suspended;  
XX - draft the structure applying to the CADE staff, with due regard for article 37, II of the 
Constitution;  
XXI - draft budgetary proposals pursuant to this Law; and  
XXII - appoint the possible substitute of the Attorney General in the event of absences, 
dismissal or impairment.  
CHAPTER IV  
AUTHORITY OF THE CADE PRESIDENT  
Article 8. The CADE President shall:  
I - act as the CADE legal representative in and out of court;  
II - preside over the CADE Board meetings, with the right to vote thereat, plus a casting vote;  
III - distribute processes by lot at the Board meetings;  
IV - call meetings and organize the corresponding agenda;  
V - comply and cause compliance with the CADE decisions;  
VI - determine that the CADE Attorney General Office take all court action required for 
execution of the CADE decisions and sentences;  
VII - sign the cease-and-desist commitments, as well as performance commitments; VIII - 
submit to the CADE Board for approval the budgetary proposal, as well as the intended 
assignment of the staff that is to render services to CADE; and  
IX - guide, coordinate and supervise the CADE administrative activities.  
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CHAPTER V  
AUTHORITY OF THE CADE BOARD MEMBERS  
Article 9 - The CADE Board Members shall:  
I - vote on cases and matters submitted to the CADE Board;  
II. - issue orders and decisions on the cases for which they act as reporting members;  
III. - submit to the CADE Board any requirements as to data and documents from individuals, 
agencies, authorities and other public or private entities, which data and documents are to be 
kept confidential pursuant to law, as the case may be, as well as order all investigations 
deemed required for performance of their duties;  
IV - adopt preventive action, and establish a daily fine for noncompliance therewith; and  
V - discharge all further duties ascribed thereto under the applicable rules.  
CHAPTER VI  
THE CADE ATTORNEY GENERAL OFFICE  
Article 10. An Attorney General Office shall be commissioned with CADE to:  
I - render legal assistance to CADE, and provide for defence thereof in court; II - arrange for 
judicial execution of CADE decisions and sentences;  
III - subject to the CADE Board preliminary approval, request court measures with a view to 
curbing violations of the economic order;  
IV - arrive at court settlements for cases involving violations of the economic order, subject 
to the CADE Board preliminary approval after hearing a representative of the Attorney 
General of the Republic;  
V - render opinion on cases under the CADE authority; VI - ensure compliance with this 
Law; and  
VII - perform all further action incumbent thereon under the in-house rules.  
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Article 11. The Attorney General--appointed by the Minister of Justice, and duly 
commissioned by the President of the Republic after consultation and approval of the Senate-
-shall be a Brazilian citizen with unblemished reputation and renowned legal expertise.  
Paragraph 1. The Attorney General shall attend the CADE meetings, with no right to vote 
thereat.  
Paragraph 2. The Attorney General shall be subject to the same rules on term of office, re-
election, disqualification, termination and replacement as those applying to the CADE Board 
Members.  
Paragraph 3. In the event of absences, temporary separation or impairment of the Attorney 
General, the plenary body will indicate and the CADE President will appoint a possible 
substitute to act for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days, with no need for federal senate 
approval; such substitute shall be entitled to compensation for the position held during such 
substitution.  
TITLE III  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC AND CADE  
Article 12. The Attorney General of the Republic, after hearing the Higher Council, shall 
appoint a member of the Attorney General Office of the Republic to handle the cases 
submitted to CADE for review.  
Sole Paragraph. CADE may request that the Attorney General Office of the Republic cause 
enforcement of the CADE decisions or of the cease-and-desist commitments, as well as that it 
adopt all court action provided for in article 6, XIV (b) of Supplementary Law No. 75 of May 
20, 1993.  
TITLE IV  
THE ECONOMIC LAW OFFICE  
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Article 13. The Economic Law Office of the Ministry of Justice - SDE, as structured pursuant 
to law, will be headed by a Secretary appointed by the Minister of Justice from among 
Brazilian citizens of renowned legal or economic expertise and unblemished reputation, duly 
commissioned by the President of the Republic.  
Article 14. SDE shall:  
I - ensure compliance with this Law by monitoring and following up on market practices;  
II - provide for ongoing follow-up on business activities and practices from individuals or 
legal entities with overriding control over a relevant market for a certain product or service, 
in order to prevent violations of the economic order; for such purposes, all pertinent data and 
documents may be required, with due regard for the confidential status thereof pursuant to 
law, if any;  
III - carry out preliminary investigations on purported violations of the economic order, for 
further instatement of administrative proceedings;  
IV - acknowledge the lack of grounds or evidence, and shelve the preliminary investigation 
records;  
V - request data from individuals, agencies, authorities and other public or private entities, 
with due regard for the confidential status thereof under the law, if any, as well as determine 
the action required for exercise of its duties;  
VI - commence administrative proceedings intended to investigate and restrain violations of 
the economic order;  
VII - appeal ex officio to CADE for shelving of preliminary investigations or administrative 
proceedings;  
VIII - send on to CADE, for review, any cases commenced by SDE, if a violation of the 
economic order has been duly evidenced;  
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IX - sign a cease-and-desist commitment on the agreed conditions and submit it to CADE, as 
well as monitor compliance therewith;  
X - advise CADE of certain conditions for signing of a performance commitment, and 
monitor compliance therewith;  
XI - adopt preventive measures intended to cease the act characterized as a violation of the 
economic order, and establish the deadline for compliance therewith as well as a daily fine 
applying to default thereon;  
XII - receive and substantiate cases to be judged by CADE, including consultations, and 
monitor compliance with the CADE decisions;  
XIII - advise the public authorities as to the adoption of any action required for compliance 
herewith;  
XIV - carry out studies and researches with a view to improving antitrust policies;  
XV - advise the public of the various forms of violation of the economic order, as well as the 
means to curb such violations; and  
XVI - perform other duties as provided for by law.  
TITLE V  
VIOLATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ORDER CHAPTER I  
GENERAL PROVISIONS  
Article 15 - This Law applies to individuals, public or private companies, as well as to any 
individual or corporate associations, established de facto and de jure - even on a provisional 
basis - irrespective of a separate legal nature, and notwithstanding the exercise of activities 
regarded as a legal monopoly.  
Article 16. The company and each of its managers or officers shall be jointly liable to the 
various forms of violation of the economic order.  
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Article 17. The companies or entities within a same economic group de facto and de jure 
shall be jointly liable to violations of the economic order.  
Article 18. The legal nature of any party charged with violation of the economic order may be 
disregarded whenever any such violation entails abuse of power and rights, violation of the 
law, illicit facts or acts, or any breach of bylaws or articles of association. This legal nature 
shall also be disregarded in the event of bankruptcy, insolvency, discontinuance or suspended 
operations of the underlying company owing to poor management thereof.  
Article 19. The antitrust measures set forth herein do not exclude any punishment inflicted on 
other legal acts pursuant to law.  
CHAPTER II VIOLATIONS  
Article20. Notwithstanding malicious intent, any act in any way intended or otherwise able to 
produce the effects listed below, even if any such effects are not achieved, shall be deemed a 
violation of the economic order:  
I - to limit, restrain or in any way injure open competition or free enterprise; II - to control a 
relevant market of a certain product or service;  
III - to increase profits on a discretionary basis; and  
IV - to abuse one's market control.  
Paragraph 1. Achievement of market control as a result of competitive efficiency does not 
entail an occurrence of the illicit act provided for in item II above.  
Paragraph 2. Market control occurs when a company or group of companies controls a 
substantial share of a relevant market as supplier, agent, purchaser or financier of a product, 
service or related technology.  
Paragraph 3. The dominant position mentioned in the preceding paragraph is presumed when 
a company or group of companies controls twenty percent (20%) of the relevant market; this 
percentage is subject to change by CADE for specific sectors of the economy.  
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Article 21. The acts spelled out below, among others, will be deemed a violation of the 
economic order, to the extent applicable under article 20 and items thereof:  
I - to set or offer in any way--in collusion with competitors--prices and conditions for the sale 
of a certain product or service;  
II - to obtain or otherwise procure the adoption of uniform or concerted business practices 
among competitors;  
III - to apportion markets for finished or semi-finished products or services, or for supply 
sources of raw materials or intermediary products;  
IV - to limit or restrain market access by new companies;  
V - to pose difficulties for the establishment, operation or development of a competitor 
company or supplier, purchaser or financier of a certain product or service;  
VI - to bar access of competitors to input, raw material, equipment or technology sources, as 
well as to their distribution channels;  
VII - to require or grant exclusivity in mass media advertisements;  
VIII - to agree in advance on prices or advantages in public or administrative biddings; IX - 
to affect third-party prices by deceitful means;  
X - to regulate markets of a certain product or service by way of agreements devised to limit 
or control technological research and development, the production of products or services, or 
to dampen investments for the production of products and services or distribution thereof;  
XI - to impose on distributors, retailers and representatives of a certain product or service 
retail prices, discounts, payment conditions, minimum or maximum volumes, profit margins, 
or any other marketing conditions related to their business with third parties;  
XII - to discriminate against purchasers or suppliers of a certain product or service by 
establishing price differentials or discriminatory operating conditions for the sale or 
performance of services;  
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XIII - to deny the sale of a certain product or service within the payment conditions usually 
applying to regular business practices and policies;  
XIV - to hamper the development of or terminate business relations for an indeterminate 
period, in view of the terminated party's refusal to comply with unreasonable or non-
competitive clauses or business conditions;  
XV - to destroy, render unfit for use or take possession of raw materials, intermediary or 
finished products, as well as destroy, render unfit for use or constrain the operation of any 
equipment intended to manufacture, distribute or transport them;  
XVI - to take possession of or bar the use of industrial or intellectual property rights or 
technology;  
XVII - to abandon of cause abandonment or destruction of crops or harvests, without proven 
good cause;  
XVIII - to unreasonably sell products below cost;  
XIX - to import any assets below cost from an exporting country other than those signatories 
of the GATT Antidumping and Subsidies Codes;  
XX - to discontinue or greatly reduce production, without proven good cause;  
XXI - to partially or fully discontinue the company's activities, without proven good cause;  
XXII - to retain production or consumer goods, except for ensuring recovery of production 
costs;  
XXIII - to condition the sale of a product to acquisition of another or contracting of a service, 
or to condition performance of a service to contracting of another or purchase of a product; 
and  
XXIV - to impose abusive prices, or unreasonably increase the price of a product or service.  
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Sole Paragraph. For the purpose of characterizing an imposition of abusive prices or 
unreasonable increase of prices, the following items shall be considered, with due regard for 
other relevant economic or market circumstances:  
I - the price of a product or service, or any increase therein, vis-a-vis any changes in the cost 
of their respective input or with quality improvements;  
II - the price of a product previously manufactured, as compared to its market replacement 
without substantial changes;  
III - the price for a similar product or service, or any improvement thereof, on like 
competitive markets; and  
IV - the existence of agreements or arrangements in any way, which cause an increase in the 
prices of a product or service, or in their respective costs.  
Article 22. (VETOED)  
Sole Paragraph. (VETOED)  
CHAPTER III PENALTIES  
Article 23. The following antitrust penalties shall apply:  
I - for companies: a fine from one to thirty percent of the gross pre-tax revenue thereof as of 
the latest financial year, which fine shall by no means be lower than the advantage obtained 
from the underlying violation, if assessable;  
II - for managers directly or indirectly liable to their company's violation: a fine from ten to 
fifty percent of the fine imposed on said company, which shall be personally and exclusively 
imposed on the manager; and  
III - in the case of other individuals and other public or private legal entities, as well as any de 
facto or de jure associations of entities or persons, even temporary ones, with or without legal 
identity, that do not engage in business activities, when it is not feasible to use the gross sales 
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value, the fine will be 6,000 (six thousand) to 6,000,000 (six million) UFIR or any other 
index replacing it.  
Sole Paragraph. Fines imposed on recurring violations shall be doubled.  
Article 24. Without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding article, the fines listed below 
may be individually or cumulatively imposed on violations, whenever the severity of the facts 
or the public interest so requires:  
I - at the violator's expense, half-page publication of the summary sentence in a court 
appointed newspaper for two consecutive days, from one to three consecutive weeks;  
II. - ineligibility for official financing or participation in bidding processes involving 
purchases, sales, works, services or utility concessions with the federal, state, municipal and 
the federal district authorities and related entities, for a period equal to or exceeding five 
years;  
III. - annotation of the violator on the Brazilian Consumer Protection List; IV - 
recommendation that the proper public agencies:  
(a) grant compulsory licenses for patents held by the violator; and  
(b) deny the violator instalment payment of federal overdue debts, or order total or partial 
cancellation of tax incentives or public subsidies;  
V - the company's spin-off, transfer of corporate control, sale of assets, partial discontinuance 
of activities, or any other antitrust measure required for such purposes.  
Article 25. If any acts or situations detrimental to the economic order are not discontinued 
after a CADE Board decision to this effect, or in the event preventive measures or any cease-
and-desist commitment set forth herein are not complied with, a daily fine equal to or higher 
than 5,000 (five thousand) Fiscal Reference Units - UFIR or replacing index shall apply, 
which fine may be increased as many as twenty times in accordance with the severity of the 
violation and the violator's economic status.  
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Article 26. In the event any data or documents requested by CADE, SDE, SEAE or other 
public entity acting under this Law are unreasonably denied, concealed, tampered with or 
delayed, this shall constitute a violation subject to a daily fine of 5,000 (five thousand) UFIR, 
which fine may be increased up to twentyfold in keeping with the violator's economic status.  
§ 1. The amount of the daily fine mentioned in the opening paragraph of the present 
article shall be included in the document containing the request of the competent 
authority.  
§ 2. The fine provided for in the present article is calculated daily until ninety days 
after the date set in the document mentioned in the previous paragraph.  
§ 3. The requesting authority is fully responsible for imposing the fine provided for in 
the opening paragraph of this article.  
§ 4. The branch, affiliate, subsidiary or office of the foreign company in Brazil is 
jointly liable for the payment of the fine provided for in the present article.  
§ 5. Should the principal or a third party unjustifiably fail to appear when summoned to 
provide oral clarification during the course of administrative procedure, preliminary 
inquiry or administrative proceeding, he shall be subject to fine ranging from R$ 
500.00 (five hundred reais) to R$ 10,700.00 (ten thousand seven hundred reais) 
depending on his economic situation, which shall be imposed by means of a notice of 
violation issued by the competent authorities.  
Art. 26-A. Any attempt to impede, hinder or prevent the inspection authorized by SDE or 
SEAE (the Secretariat for Economic Monitoring - Secretaria de Acompanhamento 
Econômico) under a preliminary inquiry, administrative procedure or proceeding shall 
subject the inspected entity to fine ranging from R$ 21,200.00 (twenty-one thousand two 
hundred reais) to R$ 425,700.00 (four hundred and twenty-five thousand, seven hundred 
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reais), depending on the offender's economic situation, by means of a notice of violation 
issued by the competent authorities.  
Article 27. The penalties provided for in this Law shall apply with due regard for:  
I - the severity of the violation; II - the violator's good faith;  
III - the advantages obtained or envisaged by the violator; IV - actual or threatened 
occurrence of the violation;  
V - the extent of damages or threatened damages to open competition, the Brazilian economy, 
consumers, or third parties;  
VI - the adverse economic effects on the market; VII - the violator's economic status; and  
VIII - recurrences.  
CHAPTER IV  
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS  
Article 28. (REPEALED).  
CHAPTER V CAUSE OF ACTION  
Article 29. Injured parties may - for themselves or for the privies under article 82 of Law #. 
8078 of September 11, 1990 - defend their individual or diffuse interests in court by way of 
antitrust measures and the awarding of losses and damages suffered in connection therewith, 
irrespective of the corresponding administrative proceeding which shall not be stayed in view 
of the court action.  
TITLE VI  
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS CHAPTER I  
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS  
Article 30. The SDE shall carry out preliminary inquiries, in the discharge of official duty or 
upon written, justified request by any interested party, when all circumstantial evidence of the 
infringement of the economic order do not suffice for the institution of an administrative 
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proceeding. Paragraph 1. During the preliminary inquiries, the SDE Secretary is entitled to 
take any measures provided for in articles 35, 35-A and 35-B herein, including summoning 
the principal or third parties to provide explanations in writing or in person.  
Paragraph 2. Commencement of administrative proceedings out of formal complaints 
addressed by the Senate or the House of Representatives is not conditioned to preliminary 
investigations.  
Paragraph 3. At the discretion of the SDE Secretary, preliminary inquiries shall be kept 
confidential in the interest of the investigations.  
Article 31. After conclusion of preliminary investigations within sixty days, the SDE 
Secretary shall order commencement of a corresponding administrative proceeding or the 
shelving thereof, subject to ex officio appeal to CADE in this latter case.  
CHAPTER II  
COMMENCEMENT AND DISCOVERY OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS  
Article 32. Administrative proceedings shall be instituted no later than eight days after 
cognizance of the underlying fact, formal complaint or closing of the preliminary 
investigations, as per order issued by the SDE Secretary providing for the facts to be verified 
there under.  
Article 33. The defendant shall be summoned to file a defence within fifteen days. Paragraph 
1. The initial summons shall bear the entire tenor of the order providing for institution of the 
administrative proceeding and the corresponding formal complaint, as the case may be.  
Paragraph 2. The defendant shall be first personally summoned by mail against receipt or, in 
case of failure thereof, by notice published in the Official Gazette of the federal Executive 
and in a newspaper widely circulated in the state in which the defendant is resident or 
headquartered, with due regard for the periods required for attachment of the receipt notice or 
publication, as the case may be.  
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Paragraph 3. Any summons under subsequent proceedings shall be made by publication in 
the Official Gazette of the federal Executive, in which the name of the defendant and 
respective attorney shall be mentioned.  
Paragraph 4. The defendant's holders, officers or managers, or duly appointed attorney, may 
follow up on administrative proceedings, with full access to the case records at SDE and 
CADE.  
Article 34. Failure to file a defence in due course after duly notified to that effect will entail 
the defendant's judgment by default and acknowledgment of the charges against it/him, 
subject to all further terms irrespective of prior notice in that respect. The in absentia 
defendant may take part in any phase of the proceeding without recourse of preceding acts.  
Article 35. Upon the end of the period for defence, the SDE shall call for investigations and 
the production of evidence in the interest of the SDE to be submitted within 15 days. The 
SDE is also entitled to exercise its fact-finding powers as provided for herein, maintaining 
confidentiality when necessary.  
Paragraph 1. All investigations and evidence gathering procedures called for by the SDE 
Secretary, including the inquiry of witnesses, are to be concluded within 45 days, with the 
possibility of a 45-day extension if deemed justifiably necessary.  
Paragraph 2. In compliance with the object of the preliminary inquiry, administrative 
procedure or proceeding, the SDE Secretary is entitled to authorize, by means of a 
substantiated decision, the inspection of the head office, place of business, headquarter, 
branch or facilities of the company under investigation. The company shall be given at least 
24 hours' notice and the investigation shall not start before 6 a.m. or after 6 p.m.  
Paragraph 3. Under the circumstances of the previous paragraph, inventories, objects, papers 
of any nature, books and records, computers and magnetic files are subject to inspection. In 
addition, copies of any document or electronic data can be made or requested  
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Article. 35-A. The Federal Attorney's Office (Advocacia-Geral da União), upon request by 
the SDE, may ask the courts to issue a search warrant to seize objects, papers of any nature, 
books and records, computers and magnetic files of individuals and corporations in the 
interest of the production of evidence under the administrative procedure, preliminary inquiry 
or administrative proceeding, with the enforcement, when applicable, of the provisions of 
article 839 and following articles of the Code of Civil Procedure, the proposal of main action 
being unclaimable. 
Paragraph 1. During the course of administrative procedure aiming at the production of 
evidence for representation to be brought to SDE, SEAE may exercise, when applicable, the 
powers provided for in the opening paragraph of the present article and in art. 35 herein.  
Paragraph 2. At the discretion of SEAE, the administrative procedure mentioned in the 
previous paragraph may be kept confidential in the interest of the investigations.  
Article 35- B. The SDE, on behalf of the Brazilian federal government, may enter into a 
leniency agreement with individuals or corporations who have committed infringement of the 
economic order, which will either extinct the punitive action of the public administration or 
reduce one to two thirds of the applicable penalty, under the terms of the present article, 
provided that they effectively collaborate with both the investigations and the administrative 
proceeding and that such collaboration results in:  
I - the identification of the co-authors of the infringement; and  
II - the gathering of information and documents that are proof of the alleged or investigated 
infringement.  
Paragraph 1. The provisions of the present article are not applicable to corporations or 
individuals who have been found to be the leaders of the conduct deemed illegal.  
Paragraph 2. The agreement mentioned in the opening paragraph of the present article can 
only be executed if the following requirements are fulfilled cumulatively:  
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I - the corporation or individual is the first to qualify with regards to the alleged or 
investigated infringement;  
II - the corporation or individual fully stops their involvement with the alleged or investigated 
infringement as of the date the agreement is proposed;  
III - the SDE does not hold sufficient evidence to ensure the condemnation of the corporation 
or individual at the time the agreement is proposed; and  
IV - the corporation or individual confesses to their participation in the infringement and fully 
collaborates with the investigations and the administrative proceeding by appearing at their 
own expense and whenever summoned until the conclusion of the proceeding.  
Paragraph 3. The leniency agreement entered into by the SDE on behalf of the Brazilian 
federal government shall stipulate the conditions deemed necessary to ensure the effective 
collaboration of the beneficiary and the fruitful result of the proceeding.  
Paragraph 4. The execution of the leniency agreement is not dependent on the approval by 
CADE. Nevertheless, at the time of the administrative proceeding trial, after the agreement is 
complied with, CADE is responsible for:  
I - declaring the extinction of the punitive action of the public administration in favour of the 
offender in the circumstance that the agreement proposal was submitted to the SDE when it 
was previously unaware of the alleged infringement; or  
II - in all other circumstances, reducing one to two thirds of the applicable penalties in 
accordance with the provisions of art. 27 herein. When deciding on the penalty, CADE must 
also consider the actual effectiveness of the collaboration and the good faith of the offender 
in the compliance with the leniency agreement.  
Paragraph 5. Under the circumstances of item II of the previous paragraph, the reduced 
penalty shall not be severer than the mildest of the penalties imposed to the other co-authors 
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of the infringement taking into account the proportions set for the application of penalties 
provided for in art. 23 herein.  
Paragraph 6. The effects of the leniency agreement shall be extended to the directing and 
managing staff of the eligible company involved in the infringement provided that they also 
sign the agreement along with the company and being observed the conditions mentioned in 
items II to IV of § 2 of the present article.  
Paragraph 7. The corporation or individual that fails to obtain eligibility to enter into the 
agreement described in this article during the course of investigations and the administrative 
proceeding may enter into another leniency agreement with SDE regarding another 
infringement that the SDE was previously unaware of before the original case is sent for trial.  
Paragraph 8. Under the circumstances of the previous paragraph, the offender shall benefit 
from a reduction of one third of the applicable penalty in the original proceeding without 
prejudice to securing the benefits provided for in item I of § 4 of the present article in relation 
to the new alleged infringement.  
Paragraph 9. The proposal mentioned in the present article shall be kept confidential except 
in the interest of the investigations and the administrative proceeding.  
Paragraph 10. The leniency agreement proposal rejected by the SDE Secretary, which shall 
be kept confidential, does not mean a confession to having committed the infringement or the 
acceptance of the unlawfulness of the conduct under analysis.  
Paragraph 11. The enforcement of the provisions in the present article shall comply with 
regulation to be issued by the Ministry of Justice.  
Article 35-C. In respect of crimes against the economy under Law No. 8137 of 27th of 
November, 1990, the execution of the leniency agreement, under the terms herein, calls for 
the suspension of the prescription period and prevents the case from being brought to court. 
Sole Paragraph. Upon the fulfilment of the leniency agreement by the offender, the 
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punishability of the crimes listed in the opening paragraph of the present article is 
automatically cancelled.  
Article 36. Federal authorities, as well as officers of independent agencies, federal 
government-owned companies and mixed-capital companies, shall render all assistance and 
collaboration required by CADE or SDE, including as regards preparation of technical 
reports on the matters under the authority thereof, under penalty of liability.  
Article 37. The defendant shall produce any evidence within forty-five days after submission 
of defence, as well as put forth new documents at any time before the discovery phase lapses.  
Sole Paragraph. The defendant may ask the SDE Secretary to set out a date, time and place 
for hearing of a maximum of three witnesses.  
Article 38. The Economic Policy Secretariat of the Ministry of Finance (SEAE) shall be 
informed by official letter of the institution of any administrative proceedings, and the 
Secretariat may elect to render an opinion on the matters within its sphere of authority, before 
the discovery phase lapses.  
Article 39. Upon conclusion of the discovery phase, the defendant will be summoned to put 
forth his/its final arguments within five days, after which the SDE Secretary will issue a 
substantiated report resolving on forwarding of the case records to CADE for review or 
shelving thereof, subject to an ex officio appeal to CADE in this latter case.  
Article 40. The SDE Secretary, the CADE members, and their civil servants and officials 
shall exert their best efforts to develop and conclude preliminary investigations and 
administrative proceedings in the interest of proper expedition as required for clarification of 
the facts, under penalty of liability.  
Article 41. The SDE Secretary decisions cannot be appealed to higher ranks.  
CHAPTER III  
CADE JUDGMENT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS  
425 
 
Article 42. Once the proceedings have been found admissible, the CADE President will 
randomly distribute such proceedings to the Reporting Official, who will be afforded a 
twenty day term to render an opinion thereon.  
Article 43. The reporting official may order supplementary investigations or request further 
information pursuant to article 35 hereof, as well as allow for the production of new evidence 
to the case whenever he/she considers the existing data insufficient for a final determination 
on the case.  
Article 44. Upon invitation of the CADE President in response to an indication of the 
reporting official, any person may provide CADE with clarifications on relevant matters.  
Article 45. Upon board judgments--the date of which will be made known to the parties at 
least five days in advance--the Attorney General and the defendant, or his/its attorney, will be 
respectively offered the floor for fifteen minutes each.  
Article 46. The CADE decision--which in any event shall be duly substantiated against 
violations of the economic order--shall contain:  
I - a detailed report on the violating acts, and an indication as to the antitrust action to be 
taken by the proper authorities;  
II - the terms for commencement and conclusion of the action referred to in the preceding 
item;  
III - the applicable fine; and  
IV - a daily fine to apply while the violation is in effect.  
Sole Paragraph. The CADE decision shall be published within five days in the Official 
Gazette of the Federal Executive.  
Article 47. CADE shall monitor compliance with its decisions.  
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Article 48. Total or partial noncompliance with the CADE decision shall be reported to the 
CADE President, who will ask the Attorney General to provide for execution thereof via 
court channels.  
Article 49. The CADE decisions shall be taken by majority vote, with the attendance of a 
minimum of five members.  
Article 50. The CADE decisions do not qualify for Executive Branch review; accordingly, 
any such decisions shall be promptly executed, the Attorney General Office being then 
advised in this respect for the purpose of taking all legal action within its sphere of authority.  
Article 51. The CADE regulations and in-house rules shall further regulate administrative 
proceedings.  
CHAPTER IV  
PREVENTIVE MEASURES AND CEASE-AND-DESIST ORDERS  
Article 52. The SDE Secretary or reporting official may--upon his/her own initiative or at the 
request of the CADE Attorney General--adopt preventive measures in any instance of 
administrative proceedings, whenever there are signs or sound reasons to believe that the 
defendant directly or indirectly caused or may cause irreparable or substantial damages to the 
market, or that he/it may render the final outcome of the proceedings ineffective. Paragraph 
1. The preventive measures issued by the SDE Secretary or reporting official shall order 
prompt cessation of damaging acts and the resumption of the preceding situation, if 
reasonably feasible, as well as impose a daily fine pursuant to article 25 hereof.  
Paragraph 2. The SDE Secretary or CADE reporting official decision on adoption of 
preventive measures may be voluntarily appealed to the CADE Board within five days, 
without suspensive effects.  
CHAPTER V  
CEASE-AND-DESIST COMMITMENTS  
427 
 
Article 53. In any sort of administrative proceedings, CADE may seize from the represented 
the commitment of cessation of the acts under investigation or of its harmful effects, always 
when, in the sense of convenience and opportunity, understands that it meets the interests 
protected by law.  
Paragraph 1. The commitment agreement shall provide the following clauses for:  
I - The specification of the obligations of the represented to stop the acts under investigation 
or its damaging effects, as well as obligations considered appropriate;  
II - The fixing of the fine value in case of total or partial breach of the committed obligations;  
III - The fixing of the value of the contribution to a Fund for the Defence of Diffuse Rights 
when included appropriate;  
Paragraph 2. Dealing with the investigation of infraction related to or stemming from conduct 
provided for in items I, II, III and VIII of art. 21 herein, among the obligations refer to in item 
I of paragraph 1 of the article figures, necessarily, the obligation to collect to the Fund for the 
Defence of Diffuse Rights a value that cannot be inferior to the minimum stated in the article 
23 of this law.  
Paragraph 3. The signing of the commitment agreement may be proposed until the beginning 
of the judgment session of the administrative proceeding related to the investigated act.  
Paragraph 4. The commitment agreement constitutes an extrajudicial execution instrument.  
Paragraph 5. The administrative proceedings will be suspended during the accomplishment of 
the commitment agreement and will be filed by the end of the fixed term if all the established 
conditions are attended.  
Paragraph 6. The administrative proceedings suspension referred to in the paragraph 5 herein 
will affect only to the represented which has signed the commitment, while to the other 
represented parties the proceeding will follow its regular path.  
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Paragraph 7. Declared the non-fulfilment of the commitment, CADE will apply the sanctions 
therein stated and will determine the continuity of the administrative proceedings and other 
appropriate administrative and judicial measures to its execution.  
Paragraph 8. CADE may change the commitment agreement conditions if proved an 
excessive burden to the represented, provided that the changes do not harm third parties or 
the society.  
Paragraph 9. CADE will define the complementary resolution laws about suitability, time and 
manner of the signing of the commitment agreement of cessation.  
Note: Article 53 was changed by law No 11.482/2007  
TITLE VII.  
MONITORING MECHANISMS  
CHAPTER I.  
MONITORING OF ACTS AND AGREEMENTS  
Article 54. Any acts that may limit or otherwise restrain open competition, or that  
result in the control of relevant markets for certain products or services, shall be submitted to 
CADE for review.  
Paragraph 1. CADE may authorize any acts referred to in the main section of this article, 
provided that they meet the following requirements:  
I - they shall be cumulatively or alternatively intended to: (a) increase productivity;  
(b) improve the quality of a product or service; or  
(c) cause an increased efficiency, as well as foster the technological or economic 
development;  
II - the resulting benefits shall be rateably allocated among their participants, on the one part, 
and consumers or end-users, on the other;  
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III - they shall not drive competition out of a substantial portion of the relevant market for a 
product or service; and  
IV - only the acts strictly required to attain an envisaged objective shall be performed for that 
purpose.  
Paragraph 2. Any action under this article may be considered lawful if at least three of the 
requirements listed in the above items are met, whenever any such action is taken in the  
public interest or otherwise required to the benefit of the Brazilian economy, provided no  
damages are caused end-consumers or -users.  
Paragraph 3. The acts mentioned in the opening paragraph include those aiming at any form 
of economic concentration, be it mergers, incorporations, the creation of a society to control 
other companies or any other type of corporate grouping that guarantees for the resulting 
company or group of companies a share of at least 20% of a relevant market, or that results in 
a gross revenue of R$ 400,000,000.00 (four hundred million reais) as shown in the most 
recent financial statement of any of the participating companies.  
Paragraph 4. The acts dealt with in the main section of this article shall be submitted to SDE - 
duly accompanied by three counterparts of the corresponding documentation - in advance or 
no later than fifteen business days after the occurrence thereof, and SDE shall promptly 
forward one such counterpart to CADE and another to SEAE.  
Paragraph 5. Noncompliance with the deadlines set forth in the preceding paragraph will be 
punishable with a fine in an amount between 60,000 (sixty thousand) UFIR and 6,000,000 
(six million) UFIR, imposed by CADE without prejudice to the opening of an administrative 
proceeding pursuant to article 32 hereof.  
Paragraph 6. Upon receipt of the SEAE technical report issued within thirty days, SDE shall 
pronounce thereon within this same period and then send the case and evidentiary documents 
on to the CADE Board, which shall resolve thereon within sixty days. Paragraph 7. The 
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effectiveness of any acts dealt with in this article will be conditioned to approval thereof, 
which approval shall be retroactive to the date of occurrence of such acts; if not looked into 
by CADE within the sixty-day period established in the preceding paragraph, the acts referred 
to above will be deemed automatically approved.  
Paragraph 8. The terms set forth in paragraphs 6 and 7 hereof will be stayed while the 
clarifications and documents considered essential for review of the case by CADE, SDE or 
SEAE are not submitted as requested.  
Paragraph 9. In the event the acts specified in this article are subject to suspensive conditions 
or have already caused fiscal or other effects to third parties, the CADE Board--if it elects to 
deny approval thereof--shall determine that all applicable action be taken to totally or 
partially revert - by way of dissolution, spin-off or sale of assets, partial cessation of 
activities, among others - any action or procedure damaging to the economic order, 
notwithstanding any civil liability for losses and damages caused third parties. Paragraph 10. 
Without prejudice to the obligations of the parties involved, any change in the stock control 
of publicly-held companies or registration of amalgamations shall be reported to SDE by the 
Securities Commission - CVM and by the Brazilian Commercial Registry Department of the 
Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism - DNRC/MICT, respectively, within five business 
days for the SDE review, if applicable.  
Article 55. The approval dealt with in the preceding article may be reviewed by CADE ex 
officio or at the SDE request, if this approval was based on false or misleading information 
rendered by the interested party, in the event of default on obligations assumed hereunder, or 
if the intended benefits have not been attained.  
Article 56. The commercial registries or corresponding state entities cannot file any acts 
related to organization, transformation, amalgamation, merger or grouping of companies, as 
well as changes in incorporation acts, unless all such acts contain:  
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I - a clear-cut and detailed statement as to the subject matter thereof;  
II - the interest of each partner, and the term for capitalization thereof;  
III - full name and identification of each partner;  
IV - the place where the headquarters is located and its respective address, including as 
regards any declared branches;  
V - full name and identification of the company's officers; VI - the term of duration of the 
company; and  
VII - the number, type and value of the outstanding stock.  
Article 57. Articles of dissolution shall state the reasons thereof, apart from a statement re the 
amount ascertained among the partners and an indication of the persons that are to assume the 
company's assets and liabilities.  
CHAPTER II  
PERFORMANCE COMMITMENT  
Article 58. The CADE Board will define performance commitments to be assumed by any 
interested parties that submitted acts for review pursuant to article 54 hereof, so as to ensure 
compliance with the conditions established in paragraph 1 thereof.  
Paragraph 1. Performance commitments will take into consideration the extent of 
international competition in a certain industry and their effect on employment levels, among 
other relevant circumstances.  
Paragraph 2. Performance commitments shall provide for volume or quality objectives to be 
attained within predetermined terms, compliance with which will be monitored by SDE.  
Paragraph 3. Failure without good cause to comply with performance commitments shall 
cause the CADE approval to be revoked pursuant to article 55 hereof, followed by the 
opening of an administrative proceeding for the adoption of the applicable measures.  
CHAPTER III CONSULTATION  
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Article 59. (REPEALED)  
TITLE VIII  
COURT EXECUTION OF CADE DECISIONS CHAPTER I  
PROCESSING  
Article 60. The CADE Board decisions imposing fines, as well as obligations to do or not to 
do, constitute an extrajudicial execution instrument.  
Article 61. Executions exclusively intended to collection of fines shall be carried out pursuant 
to Law # 6830 of September 22, 1980.  
Article 62. In the event of executions intended to collection of fines and compliance with 
obligations to do or not to do, the courts shall order specific performance of any such 
obligations, or otherwise provide for acts that ensure an outcome equivalent to compliance 
therewith in practical terms.  
Paragraph 1. An obligation to do or not to do can only lead into a suit for losses and damages 
its specific performance or obtainment of an equivalent outcome in practical terms is not 
possible.  
Paragraph 2. Losses and damages shall be paid without prejudice to any applicable fines.  
Article 63. Execution shall be carried out by all means, including by way of intervention in 
the company, if necessary.  
Article 64. The CADE decisions shall be executed at the federal courts of the federal district, 
or at the courts with jurisdiction over the executed party's headquarters or domicile, at the 
CADE discretion.  
Article 65. Motions or like action against an execution instrument shall not stay the execution 
itself, unless an amount corresponding to the fines imposed is deposited in court, and a bond 
is posted as determined by the courts to ensure compliance with a final decision on the case, 
including as regards daily fines.  
433 
 
Article 66. Depending on the severity of the violation of the economic order, and should there 
be sound reasons to believe in irreparable or substantial damages, the courts may order 
prompt adoption of all or a portion of the action required under the execution  instrument, 
notwithstanding the deposit of fines in court or the posting of bonds.  
Article 67. Daily fines on an ongoing violation shall be apply as from the deadline established 
by CADE for voluntary compliance with the CADE decision, up to the day of actual 
performance thereof.  
Article 68. The execution of CADE decisions shall be afforded priority over other kinds of 
action, except for habeas corpus and writ of mandamus.  
CHAPTER II  
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION  
Article 69. The courts shall order intervention in a company whenever required to ensure 
specific performance hereunder, and appoint a receiver.  
Sole Paragraph. The court decision on intervention shall be duly substantiated, as well as 
accurately establish the action to be taken by the appointed receiver.  
Article 70. If the executed party rebuts a court-appointed receiver within forty-eight hours on 
the arguments of ineptitude or lack of good standing, and if this claim is duly evidenced in 
three days, the courts shall render a decision thereon within this same period.  
Article 71. If the rebuttal is granted, the courts shall appoint another receiver within five days.  
Article 72. The intervention may be terminated early if the obligation that gave rise thereto 
has been proven complied with in full.  
Article 73. The court intervention shall be limited to those acts required for compliance with 
the court decision that gave rise thereto, and shall be effective for a maximum period of one 
hundred and eighty days; the receiver shall be held liable for his/her acts and omissions, 
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especially in the event of abuse of power and departure from the original purposes of his/her 
appointment.  
Paragraph 1. The receiver will be subject to articles 153 through 159 of Law # 6404 of 
December 15, 1976, to the extent applicable.  
Paragraph 2. The receiver will be entitled to a compensation stipulated by the courts, which 
may replace him/her at any time and whenever the receiver becomes insolvent, is charged 
with active or passive corruption or malfeasance in office, or violation of his/her duties.  
Article 74. The courts may withdraw the company's managers from their duties if they are 
proven preventing performance of acts incumbent on the receiver. Any such managers shall 
be replaced as provided for in the company's bylaws or articles of association.  
Paragraph 1. If any managers still prevent the receiver from taking proper action after 
adoption of the procedures set forth in the main section of this article, then the courts shall 
proceed as per paragraph 2 below.  
Paragraph 2. If a majority of the company's managers deny assistance to the court appointed 
receiver, the courts shall order that the receiver take over the company's management.  
Article 75. The receiver shall:  
I - perform or order performance of all acts required under the execution process;  
II -advise the courts of any irregularities committed by the company's management and of 
which the receiver may become aware; and  
III - submit to the courts a monthly report on his/her activities.  
Article 76. The expenses arising from the intervention hereunder shall be borne by the 
executed party.  
Article 77. Upon lapse of the intervention, the receiver shall provide the federal courts with a 
detailed report on his/her action, and either propose the dismissal or shelving of the case or 
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ask for an extension of the intervention period should the execution decision have not been 
fully performed in due course.  
Article 78. Whoever opposes or prevents any intervention or, after termination thereof, 
performs any acts that directly or indirectly annul its effects in whole or in part, or even fails 
to comply with legal orders from the court-appointed receiver, will be held criminally liable 
for resistance, disobedience or coercion under the execution process, pursuant to articles 329, 
330 and 344 of the Penal Code.  
TITLE IX  
FINAL AND TEMPORARY PROVISIONS  
Article 79. (VETOED)  
Sole Paragraph. (VETOED)  
Article 80. The CADE Attorney shall henceforth become an Attorney General official duly 
commissioned to the independent agency created hereunder, jointly with the CADE  
President and Board Member positions.  
Article 81. The Executive Branch shall send to the Congress within sixty days a bill of law on 
the permanent staff of the new independent agency, as well as on the duties and 
compensation applying to the CADE President, the Board Members, and the Attorney 
General.  
Paragraph 1. While CADE is not provided with staff of its own, civil servants may be 
temporarily assigned to this independent agency by commission or otherwise, without 
prejudice to the remuneration and other benefits originally afforded thereto, including for the 
purpose of representing this independent agency in court.  
Paragraph 2. The CADE President shall prepare and submit to the Board for approval a list of 
servants required for the independent agency, who may be placed at SDE disposal.  
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Article 81 -The Administrative Council for Economic Defence - CADE, according to the 
article 37, item IX, of the Brazilian Constitution and in attention to the contents of the Law 
8.745 of December 9th, 1993, may hire for a determinate period of time, 12 (twelve) months, 
technical personnel essential to the development of its institutional scope, not exceeding 30 
people.  
Sole Paragraph. The referred contracting caput may be postponed as long as its total duration 
does not surpass the time span of 24 (twenty four) months, with its validity limited in any 
situation to December 31st of 2005. It will take place through a simplified selective process, 
which must comprehend a written exam and an optional CV analysis without loss of others.  
Article 82. (VETOED)  
Article 83. The Code of Civil Procedure, as well as Laws # 7347 of July 24, 1985 and 8078 
of September 11, 1990, also apply to the administrative and court proceedings set forth 
herein.  
Article 84. The fines provided for herein shall be converted into Brazilian currency on the 
date of actual payment thereof, duly collected to the Fund dealt with in Law # 7347 of July 
24, 1985.  
Article 85. Article 4, VII of Law # 8137 of December 27, 1990 shall henceforth read as 
follows:  
"Article 4. ( ... )  
VII - increase without good cause the price of a certain product or service, in view of one's 
market control."  
Article 86. Article 312 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall henceforth read as follows:  
"Article 312. - Preventive imprisonment may be decreed so as to safeguard public or 
economic order in the interest of the criminal process, or to ensure enforcement of criminal 
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laws, whenever a crime was proven committed, or if there is sufficient evidence as to its 
perpetrator. "  
Article 87. - Article 39 of Law # 8078 of September 11, 1990 shall henceforth read as 
follows, with the additional items below:  
"Article 39. The supplier of a certain product or service cannot, among other abusive 
practices:  
( ... )  
IX - refuse to sell products or render services directly to whomever is willing to purchase 
them against prompt payment, except for intermediation cases duly regulated by special laws; 
and  
X - increase without good cause the price of a certain product or service."  
Article 88. - Article 1 of Law # 7347 of July 24, 1985 shall henceforth read as follows, with 
the additional item below:  
"Article 1. - Without prejudice to class actions, this Law applies to actions for moral and 
property damages arising from:  
( ... )  
V - violation of the economic order."  
Sole Paragraph. Article 5, II of Law # 7347 of July 24, 1985 shall henceforth read as follows:  
"Article 5. ( ... )  
II - include in its institutional purposes the protection to the environment, consumers, 
economic order, open competition, or the artistic, aesthetic, historical, tourism, and landscape 
heritage;  
( ... ) "  
Article 89. CADE shall be invited to take part as assistant in court actions involving 
application of this Law.  
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Article 90. The periods for consultations submitted under article 74 of Law # 4137 of 
September 10, 1962, as amended by article 13 of Law # 8158 of January 8, 1991, are hereby 
interrupted, with due regard for Title VII, Chapter I hereof.  
Article 91. This Law does not apply to dumping and subsidies cases dealt with in the Accords 
for Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Customs Tariffs and Trade, 
duly enacted by Decrees # 93941 and 93962 of January 16 and 22, 1987, respectively.  
Article 92. All provisions to the contrary are hereby revoked, as are Laws # 4137 of 
September 10, 1962; 8158 of January 8, 1991; and 8002 of March 14, 1990, except for article 
36 of Law # 8880 of May 27, 1994, which remains effective.  
Article 93. This Law takes effect on the date of its publication.  
ITAMAR FRANCO President of the Republic  
ALEXANDRE DE PAULA DUPEYRAT MARTINS Minister of Justice  
R. Dir. Econ., Brasilia, ago./dez. 1998 25  
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